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Editor’s Note
It is my honor to introduce Chapman Law Review’s first
issue of Volume 21. This issue consists of our “paper-only
symposium,” a collection of scholarly works discussing
“Constraining the Executive,” that features eight articles
discussing if, and how, constraining the executive is appropriate.
The issue opens with a thought-provoking introduction by
Professor Tom Campbell that provides insight into the creation of
this written symposium and the articles in the collection,
while also challenging the propositions advanced through
this scholarship. The articles thereafter highlight each
author’s unique and compelling insight into, and proposals
for, executive constraint. Mr. Paul Baumgardner begins the
conversation by focusing on one specific way to constrain the
executive—Thanksgiving Proclamations. Professor Randy Beck
explains qui tam actions and how they should be expanded to
allow Congress, when necessary, to legislate private standing in
order to constrain the executive. Professor Neal Devins argues
against congressional standing and argues that the judiciary’s
role in checking the executive branch should not be expanded
when Congress fails to check the president itself. Professors
Andrew Hessick and William Marshall focus on creating easier
standing requirements for states as plaintiffs to bring lawsuits
against the president in order to check executive authority.
Professor Gary Lawson suggests that the executive should
constrain itself by, among other means, vetoing laws that grant
the executive branch authority and appointing federal judges to
return the executive branch to the limits that Professor Lawson
believes the Framers intended. Professors Sanford Levinson and
Mark Graber argue that rules of judicial deference to the
executive depend on the qualities of the president currently in
office; a president who is anti-Publian (i.e., lacking the virtues of
Publius) should be given less deference by the judiciary, and
justiciability constraints against the president should not apply.
Professor Michael Ramsey focuses on Zivotofsky v. Kerry and its
implications for constraining the executive through litigation in
regards to foreign affairs decisions. Finally, Professor John Yoo
wraps up our symposium by addressing Franklin D. Roosevelt’s
presidency and using it as an example of the benefits that occur
when executive action is not constrained.

Chapman Law Review is grateful for the continued support
of the members of the administration and faculty that made this
written symposium and the publication of this issue possible,
including: Dean of Chapman University Dale E. Fowler School of
Law, Matthew Parlow; our faculty advisor, Professor Celestine
McConville; and our faculty advisory committee, Professors
Deepa Badrinarayana, Michael Bayzler, John Hall, Janine Kim,
and Associate Dean of Research and Faculty Development,
Donald Kochan. We would especially like to thank Professor Tom
Campbell for his guidance and assistance with this issue—from
his efforts in developing the topic and recruiting scholars, to his
personal contribution to the discourse on “Constraining the
Executive.” Finally, I would like to personally thank the Chapman
Law Review editors for their tireless efforts in completing
this volume.
Lauren Fitzpatrick
Editor-in-Chief

Introduction to Constraining the
Executive
Tom Campbell*
The essays in this symposium illuminate aspects of the task
of keeping the executive branch within its constitutionally
appointed boundaries. The symposium was conceived before the
2016 elections, so its plan was not directed toward the current
president. Nevertheless, it is inescapable that, writing after those
elections, the authors took recent developments into account.1
The lessons to be learned from these essays, however, have more
permanent application than simply for the immediate present. In
this introduction, I review the articles of the symposium hoping
to highlight the valuable contribution to separation of powers
jurisprudence that each offers for the long term.
This symposium focuses on means of constraining the
executive. There is, of course, a vibrant recent literature on what
constitutes the kind of executive overreach in need of being
constrained.2 This symposium takes as given that there have
been, and will be, instances of executive action or inaction
needing restraint (without becoming embroiled in the specifics
of any specific example), and turns its attention to what
institutional remedies may be available.
A.

Constraining the Executive Through the Courts
The courts are the logical place to seek relief when the
executive’s action needs to be constrained. However, standing
requirements might preclude identifying any plaintiff qualified to
bring a case under Article III’s case or controversy requirement.

* Professor of Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law; Professor of Economics, George L.
Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University. I am grateful for expert
research assistance by Ms. Sherry Levsen, J.D., M.L.S., M.A., of the Hugh and Hazel
Darling Law Library, Chapman University.
1 In one instance, that of Levinson and Graber’s article, their entire point of
departure deals with the specifics of President Trump, though they propose a set of
judicial responses that would apply to future presidents with characteristics similar
to his.
2 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Steven Menashi, Taking Steel Seizure Seriously:
The Iran Nuclear Agreement and the Separation of Powers, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1199
(2017); contra Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege,
131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).
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Four of the articles in this symposium recommend ways to
expand how cases challenging the president can be brought in
federal court.
1. Professor Randy Beck
Drawing from historical precedent, Professor Randy Beck
proposes a broader use of qui tam actions. Such actions are
already available in American courts under the False Claims
Act.3 Under that approach, when money is owed to the federal
government, and a private party draws that fact to the
executive’s attention but the executive fails to pursue the claim,
the private party can proceed, keeping a portion of any funds
recovered. It is like a whistleblower statute combined with a
finder’s fee.
The qui tam plaintiff has standing because she or he has a
percentage of potential money damages to be gained. A good
example here is the Antideficiency Act, where criminal penalties
can be imposed on an executive officer who spends government
money without authorization.4 If a private citizen uncovers an
unauthorized expenditure of money by an employee of the federal
executive branch, that private citizen can bring a qui tam action
to collect the unauthorized payment back to the federal treasury,
minus a share which the private plaintiff gets to keep.
Elsewhere, I have suggested qui tam as a way to get before a
federal judge the issue of the legality of a war carried on by the
executive without the approval of Congress,5 where money was
spent on expenses of such a war. Beck would allow Congress to
go even further. In connection with any specific duty or
prohibition imposed on the executive by statute, Congress could
add a penalty provision, owed to the U.S. Treasury, by an
executive officer who fails in her or his duty. Beck would thus
allow Congress to legislate private standing in almost any
context it might wish to constrain the executive through the
simple expedient of specifying a sum of money an executive agent
would owe the government, if found to be deficient in her or his
duties under that statute. The qui tam plaintiff would thus
distinguish herself or himself from the large mass of citizens by
her or his interest in a share of that sum.
I see no fault with the logic that this creates a case or
controversy regarding the qui tam claimant that sets her or him

31 U.S.C. §§ 3729–33 (2012).
See 31 U.S.C. § 1518 (removal from office); § 1519 (fine and imprisonment);
§ 1341 (predicate).
5 Tom Campbell, Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 585 (2017).
3
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apart from the average citizen. Unlike qui tam actions under the
False Claims Act, however, Beck’s expanded recourse to qui tam
does not start with a pre-existing sum of money which is, by
hypothesis, owed to the government. That “res” constitutes the
case or controversy for Article III purposes.6 The qui tam statute
merely expands the number of persons with a specific interest in
that “res.” Can Congress both create the “res” and the class of
persons with a specific interest in it? Beck maintains from
historical precedent that this can be done, and was done, often, in
British jurisprudence, going back to the fourteenth century. He
maintains that several American states have done the same,
including when they were colonies. Legislatures essentially
harnessed private energies to enforce duties on public officials by
imposing a fine on failure to fulfill such duties and letting the
private party share in the fine.
Beck realizes other jurisprudential doctrines, especially the
political question doctrine, might yet shield executive action or
inaction from judicial scrutiny. He also perceives a danger in
over-zealous use of the device he is advancing: executive agents
might be chilled in the conscientious performance of their duty by
the risk of personal liability. That risk, presumably, would be
taken into account as Congress decided the set of executive
actions or inactions in regard to which the expanded qui tam
claims could be brought. Beck suggests three, from recent public
events: waging war without Congressional authorization, failing
to preserve government emails as government records, and not
spending money the Congress has appropriated.
Is there a limit to what Beck proposes? At what point would
the Supreme Court say Congress could not create standing where
none existed before just by monetizing an executive duty? How to
articulate a constraining principle is the weakness in Beck’s
proposal—though one might view it as a strength, in that no
action of the executive would be able to evade judicial review (at
least on standing grounds) when the Congress put its mind to so
subjecting it.7
2. Professors Andrew Hessick and William Marshall
Professors Andrew Hessick and William Marshall also seek
to constrain the executive by greater access to the judicial
6 See United States v. Neifert-White Co., 390 U.S. 228, 232 (1968) (referring to the
focus of the False Claims Act on a financial loss to the government).
7 Of course, any Congressional bill creating the qui tam action might be vetoed, so
Beck’s remedy would require a two-thirds consensus of both houses of Congress. While
not a constraining substantive principle, that does constitute a practical constraint on
over-use of Beck’s imaginative idea.
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branch. In their article, they recommend easier standing
requirements for states as plaintiffs. They view litigation of the
type brought by twenty-six states against President Obama’s
“Deferred Action for Parents of Americans” (“DAPA”) as a
salubrious mechanism for checking executive authority (in that
case, executive inaction)—whether a court ends up siding with
the president or not.
States as plaintiffs hold advantages over Congress, in
Hessick and Marshall’s view, because Congress has declined
markedly in its vigorous vindication of legislative prerogatives,
becoming instead an instrument of partisanship.8 A Republican
Congress will challenge a Democratic president, but not a
Republican one, and vice versa. Of course, the same could be said
of state attorneys general and governors, so Hessick and
Marshall suggest a form of discretion in judicial rulings on
standing that would incorporate whether a bipartisan mix of
states’ governors or attorneys general were bringing the suit. If
such a group of states brings suit, then Hessick and Marshall
would ease the standing requirement of “injury in fact” to allow a
more speculative kind of injury to be pled, as in Massachusetts v.
Environmental Protection Agency,9 a case where, they maintain,
a private party’s fear of rising sea levels from global warming
would have been insufficient to establish standing.
Are Hessick and Marshall justified in claiming that states
have a unique kind of interest, deserving relaxed standing
requirements? They recognize the sovereign interest of states to
oppose being turned into instruments of the federal government.
That was the situation in one part of the challenge to the
Affordable Care Act/Obamacare (“ACA”) that prevailed before the
Supreme Court.10 There is also the non-sovereign interest that
the states have in suing on behalf of their citizens for their
citizens’ harm, in parens patriae actions.11 What they see in
addition to these established forms of standing is the states’
interest in constraining any federal action (not just presidential
action) because federal action will preempt state authority.12
8 For an in-depth development of the same theme, see Edward G. Carmines
& Matthew Fowler, The Temptation of Executive Authority: How Increased Polarization
and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the Expansion of Presidential
Power, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369 (2017).
9 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
10 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 588 (2012).
11 See 15 U.S.C. § 15c (West 2018).
12 In Jonathan Remy Nash, Sovereign Preemption State Standing, 112 NW. U. L.
REV. 201 (2017), Professor Nash explores the concept of a state having special standing
when the federal government has legislatively preempted a subject area, but then the
federal executive fails to vindicate that interest. Hessick and Marshall’s insight is a
similar one.
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They note states have a legitimacy that private parties do not
because of democratic accountability; and they further applaud
the development of expertise and judgment from the recurring
nature of this kind of litigation involving state actors, as opposed
to any private party in a given case.
Yet the same might be said of Congress. Any upholding of
presidential action in an area of shared authority cuts back what
Congress could do absent the president’s action. That affects
Congressional prerogatives as much as upholding a presidential
action in an area of potential state authority does the state’s
prerogatives. If getting many states on board confers legitimacy,
so also might legitimacy be found for a suit by a house of
Congress not brought just by a few members, but sanctioned by a
resolution from the house of Congress bringing the lawsuit, as
occurred in U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell (originally
filed as Boehner v. Burwell) (challenging the payments to insurance
companies under ACA as not having been appropriated).13
Also similar to Hessick and Marshall’s argument for the
states as parties, the House or Senate, too, will develop expertise
over the years, if permitted standing to challenge executive
authority. Hessick and Marshall’s preference for empowering
states, rather than Congress, to sue the executive, thus comes
down to a reluctance to weigh in on the side of Congress in
balance of powers issues, and a correlative willingness to weigh
in on the side of states in federalism issues, at least where the
group of states presenting the challenge is bipartisan.
For many years, the D.C. Circuit applied a doctrine of
equitable discretion to allow suits by members of Congress in
some circumstances.14 Raines v. Byrd appeared to end that route
for Congressional standing,15 but the Court recently opened a
new avenue for state legislators to sue agencies of state
government in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission, 16 distinguishing suits by state
legislatures from those by Congress.17 The Court identified the
same concern based on separation of powers that Hessick and
13 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 169
(D.D.C. 2016).
14 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Riegle
v. Federal Open Market Committee, 656 F.2d 873, 880–81 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert denied,
454 U.S. 1082 (1981); see also Sophia C. Goodman, Note, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss
Congressional-Plaintiff Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1075 (1990).
15 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818–29 (1997).
16 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).
17 Id. at 2665 n.12. Regarding the revived standing of states to sue the federal
executive for violations of federal legislative prerogatives, see Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Federalism All the Way Up: State Standing and “The New Process Federalism,” 105 CAL.
L. REV. 1739, 1745–50 (2017).
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Marshall did about Congressional recourse to the courts, but
noted the absence of such a concern when the state legislature
was suing a state agency.18 The defendant was a state agency,
not the federal executive, in Arizona Independent Redistricting
Commission. Hence, the Court’s explicit distinction between state
legislatures and Congress as plaintiffs might presage the Court’s
willingness to take exactly the course that Hessick and Marshall
advocate, and allow greater standing to states as plaintiffs
to invoke the third federal branch to constrain the second
federal branch.
3. Professor Michael Ramsey
Professor Michael Ramsey finds new hope for constraining
the executive through litigation where the subject is foreign
affairs because of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Zivotofsky
v. Kerry.19 Ramsey points out how the Zivotofsky decision
restricts the political question doctrine as announced in Baker v.
Carr,20 cutting back Baker’s six criteria to only two: (1) whether
the issue was textually committed to another branch of
government, and (2) whether manageable standards were
available for the court to make a judgment. Eliminating the more
open-ended of Baker’s criteria makes it more difficult for a court
to cite the political question doctrine. In Ramsey’s view, future
challenges to executive action in foreign affairs, including the
exercise of war powers, would be justiciable insofar as they call
on a court to interpret the meaning of a statute or a clause of the
Constitution.21 If a litigant asks a court to make a factual
judgment, however, especially one calling into question whether a
presidential decision was justified, the political question doctrine
would remain.
Id. at 2665 n.12.
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
21 Professor Julian Mortenson also sees increased likelihood for successful challenges
of presidential action in foreign affairs as a result of Zivotofsky, but for substantive
reasons in the opinion itself. See Julian Mortenson, Zivotofsky: The Difference Between
Inherent and Exclusive Presidential Power, 109 AJIL UNBOUND 45 (2017).
“It is not for the president alone to determine the whole content of the nation’s
foreign policy. That said, it is for the president alone to make the specific
decision of which foreign power he will recognize as legitimate.” Besides taking
every opportunity to emphasize the narrowness of its holding, the majority
seems repeatedly to go out of its way to celebrate the role of the legislature:
“[W]hether the realm is foreign or domestic,” the opinion urges over and over
again, “it is still the Legislative Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes
the law.” There is reason for more than a little suspicion that Marbury-style jiu
jitsu may be at work here: this decision reaches a pro-executive outcome, but
does so through the creation of a vehicle whose analytical structure and overall
atmosphere is strikingly pro-congressional.
Id. at 48–49 (footnotes omitted).
18
19
20
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Ramsey cannot point to any post-Zivotofsky case where a
court abandoned the political question doctrine, but he does
successfully identify how lower courts have, in writing their
opinions, trimmed their reliance on the doctrine because of the
Zivotofsky formulation. Ramsey also very helpfully traces the
history of the political question back to Marbury v. Madison,22
through later decisions of the Marshall Court, and the Civil War
Prize Cases,23 to demonstrate that Baker’s restrictive formulation
of the political question doctrine was more of an aberration than
a continuation of settled jurisprudence. (To this, I would add that
Justice Brennan’s announcement of six principles for the political
question doctrine in Baker was actually obiter dicta: the Court
held the doctrine did not apply to that case, so what was said
about when it might apply does not qualify as a holding.)
If Professor Ramsey is correct, perhaps the most important
consequence is that Zivotofsky will have opened up the courts to
deciding whether the War Powers Resolution24 is constitutional.25
That is a profoundly important question that has eluded judicial
resolution for forty-five years. Such a question would fit
Ramsey’s formulation: it would not require analysis of the facts
of any particular conflict. Rather, the two fundamental
challenges to its constitutionality would be answered as matters
of constitutional law: (1) can the president’s use of force be
restricted to sixty days absent an affirmative vote of Congress;
and (2) can Congress delegate to the president its right to choose
against whom to wage war for sixty days?
Academics, legislative leaders, and average citizens can only
hope that Professor Ramsey’s prediction does prove true, and
that members of the third branch take up the invitation to
constrain the executive in the foreign affairs area, in those
instances where a pure question of constitutional law or
statutory interpretation is required.
4. Professors Sanford Levinson and Mark Graber
Professors Levinson and Graber make a tremendously
original contribution to the academic literature on judicial review
of executive action with their submission to this symposium.26
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165–66 (1803).
The Brig Army Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
24 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48.
25 See Mortenson, supra note 21, at 45.
26 The only recent treatment I have seen that deals with some of these same issues is
Katherine Shaw, Beyond the Bully Pulpit: Presidential Speech in the Courts, 96 TEX. L.
REV. 71 (2017). Professor Shaw largely opposes judicial cognizance of presidential
speeches; while Professors Levinson and Graber base much of their argument for
heightened scrutiny of President Trump on his speeches and other public
22
23
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The entire U.S. constitutional scheme for executive authority
rests, in their view, on a conception of the president as minimally
qualified, not subject to conflicts of interest, and not emotionally
immature. When a president lacks these qualities, specific rules
of judicial deference to the executive, and justiciability
constraints on suits against him, should no longer apply.
Professors Levinson and Graber maintain President Trump
does lack these qualities. Accordingly, courts should approach
challenges to his actions with the following presumptions.
Wholesale delegations of power from Congress to the president in
legislation passed in an earlier era should be narrowly
interpreted now, and explicit grants of authority should
be required rather than allowed to be inferred. The kind of
motive-analysis with which the Supreme Court approached the
actions of southern legislatures in the civil rights era, but not in
other contexts, should be revived regarding President Trump.
Levinson and Graber invite federal courts to make use of
President Trump’s campaign (and some subsequent) statements
as to his own (possibly unconstitutional) motivations. They also
encourage federal courts to accept full constitutional challenges,
facial and as-applied, to actions by President Trump. They urge a
narrowing of the constitutional avoidance maxim, because the
premise that a co-equal branch did not intend to violate the
Constitution is not true in the case of President Trump.27
Their article focuses entirely on how courts should entertain
challenges to a president who is anti-Publian: that is, lacking the
virtues that Publius, the pseudonymous author of the Federalist
Papers, assumed a president would possess. Professors Levinson
and Graber’s guiding principle in recommending this approach is
that the Constitution has given way to exceptional powers
granted to the president in some contexts (war and other
national emergency), and to great skepticism of federalism in the
face of overt racial motivation for states’ actions. So, why in the
present context of a president less qualified than any in history,
and who has in his own statements evidenced prejudice often and
clearly, they ask, should we not also see a tailoring of judicial
doctrines developed in more normal circumstances?

pronouncements. However, Professor Shaw departs from her overall premise in her
section “Presidential Speech as Evidence of (Constitutionally Forbidden) Government
Purpose,” id. at 137–40, which is where Professors Levinson and Graber have put most of
their focus.
27 For a similar skepticism of the constitutional avoidance doctrine, see Aneil
Kovvali, Constitutional Avoidance and Presidential Power, 35 YALE J. REG. BULL.
10 (2017).
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It is true that the Supreme Court has evaluated motive in
striking down state governmental action neutral on its face, but
with a racially discriminatory effect.28 The normal deference
owed to a state legislature was suspended when the assumption
of their action in good faith was cast into serious doubt. Levinson
and Graber point to New York Times v. Sullivan29 as a case
abandoning centuries of libel and slander law to create a
protection for the press unique in world jurisprudence, all driven
by the specific circumstances of the civil rights era. So also,
Professors Levinson and Graber argue, we might normally expect
a court to ignore campaign rhetoric by a candidate in evaluating
that candidate’s actions once in office, and even accord some
deference to a plausibly constitutional motivation for official
action (as in the constitutional avoidance maxim for legislative
acts). They argue we should not do so, however, in the case of
President Donald Trump, whose campaign (and subsequent)
statements of an anti-immigrant nature, for example, corrupted
his various travel-bans, thus providing a legitimate basis for
overruling them, even though a court might have allowed an
identical executive order to go into effect from a president not so
tainted. This, of course, was the rationale of the Fourth Circuit in
overturning President Trump’s exclusion orders for immigrants
from select countries he claimed had imposed inadequate vetting,
but which the court held were selected because of their
Muslim populations.30
Professors Levinson and Graber’s suggestions deal with the
doctrines of justiciability developed under the rubric of judicial
prudence, not constitutional requirement. Adopting what the
Professors argue, therefore, would violate no constitutional
provision. As noted above, years ago, the D.C. Circuit developed a
doctrine of “equitable discretion” for deciding when to grant
standing to members of Congress to challenge presidential acts.31
The approach advanced by Professors Levinson and Graber
should be seen as no more controversial than that.
What is more difficult, however, is to determine “neutral
principles”32 for deciding when a president is non-Publian.
President Donald Trump qualifies for so many reasons, in the
Professors’ view, the conclusion is, in mathematical terms,
28 See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 340, 340 (1960) (enjoining action by the
Alabama legislature to redraw the boundaries of Tuskegee so as to eliminate almost all
black residents).
29 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
30 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2017).
31 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
32 Levinson and Graber’s point of departure in their article is Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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“overdetermined.” It is not entirely clear which characteristics
they would consider sufficient. Among the determinants they
cite are President Trump not having won a majority of the
popular vote, his being roundly criticized as incompetent by other
office-holders, silence of other office-holders who might have been
expected to defend him, his business conflicts of interest, his
crude speech especially on matters of race, his many factual
misstatements, his seeming inability to admit an error, the
manifest absence of any previous qualifying experience, and his
many changes of position, even within the same day.
Professors Levinson and Graber analogize treating a
non-Publian president differently from a “normal” president to
reforming a contract in the face of mutual mistake, improvising
dialogue in a theater piece when an actor forgets a line, or
running a different sports play when the originally planned move
becomes impossible. In each such case, however, the parties act
to re-establish what would have been done had they known a fact
at the start that only became apparent subsequently. That is not
the case with President Trump. Most, if not all, of the flaws
identified were well known from the campaign. This is more a
case of buyers’ remorse than mutual mistake. Indeed, President
Trump would maintain there was no mistake at all.
A suggestion I offer is that the decision to treat a president
as Publian or not should not be binary.33 Rather, I would suggest
that courts adopt a sliding scale, opting for higher scrutiny of
presidential action the more non-Publian the president may be.
This approach would allow for different decisions in different
contexts: in the instance of President Trump, his statements
about the federal judge being ineligible to decide the case
involving Trump University because of his parents’ Mexican
heritage might serve to justify a non-Publian conclusion in a
matter involving immigration, but not, necessarily, in a matter
of imposing offsetting tariffs for perceived trade violations by
other nations.
The Supreme Court will soon have the occasion to consider
the Levinson-Graber suggestion when it rules on President
Trump’s travel bans. Professors Levinson and Graber have
served up to the Court a rationale for taking into account the

33 Professors Levinson and Graber identify several other presidents whose
qualifications for president were minimal, but whom they would not consider
non-Publian. As a humbling note to this exercise, I might add to the presidents they
suggest, the case of our country’s greatest president, a one-term Congressman from
Illinois (though he had experience in the part-time state legislature), who never won a
majority of the popular vote, and whom the intelligent critics at the time considered
uneducated and uneducable.
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very specific facts of this president’s behavior, qualifications, and
public statements, should the Court be inclined to do so.
B.

Constraining the Executive by the Executive?

1. Professor Gary Lawson
In his article in this symposium, Professor Lawson suggests
that an effort to constrain the executive might be launched from
an entirely different source: the executive itself, and, especially,
President Trump himself. Structurally, of course, Professor
Lawson is right. A president devoted to limiting executive power
can go far to effectuating that result. Lawson identifies several
ways: vetoing laws that grant more power from Congress to the
executive branch, proposing the repeal of existing laws that grant
such delegations, failing to use the authority that has already
been delegated, and appointing federal judges who will revive the
nondelegation doctrine and otherwise return the executive
branch to the limits Lawson believes the Framers intended.
Lawson concedes the attraction of using executive power for
“good ends” might overcome these self-constraining instincts of a
president. President Obama’s approach to immigration reform is
a good example. President Obama wanted to grant protected
status to two large categories of individuals who had entered
America illegally, but withheld doing so for almost six years,
saying “for me to simply through executive order ignore those
congressional mandates would not conform with my appropriate
role as President.”34 Eventually, his desire for the policy
outcome overcame his reservations about whether he had
the constitutional authority to allow those groups of immigrants
to stay.
To have lasting effect, as the President Obama precedent
just cited shows, President Trump would have to do more than
simply implement his own preferred approach to administrative
law. He has ordered his executive branch agencies to repeal two
regulations for every one new regulation desired; but a new
president could reverse that instantaneously.
The ACA individual mandate has now been repealed,
thereby cutting back a huge grant of authority to the Secretary of
U.S. Health and Human Services to specify what elements had to
be in anyone’s health insurance. The next target of the Trump

34 United States v. Juarez-Escobar, 25 F. Supp. 3d 774, 783 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting
President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at the Univision Town Hall,
(Mar. 28, 2011, 10:37 AM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2011/
03/28/remarks-president-univision-town-hall [http://perma.cc/2APS-LQR5]).
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administration has already been identified: the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau, created by the Dodd-Frank
legislation, with sweeping authority to outlaw “unfair” financial
practices, and protected from the Congressional oversight
afforded by the appropriation process by reason of being funded
directly by the Federal Reserve.
For President Trump to fulfill his promise as Professor
Lawson sees it, Trump would have to urge the repeal of more
than just the ACA and Dodd-Frank. He would have to get
Congress to cut back the very broad delegations of power to the
executive enshrined in statutes such as the Federal Trade
Commission Act, with its prohibition of “unfair methods of
competition,”35 and the Securities Exchange Act, whose section
78j allows the Securities Exchange Commission to promulgate
any regulations “necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors.”36 Such a major step would
require Congressional majorities supporting President Trump
much larger than he now possesses and a systemic review of the
statutory underpinnings of the administrative state that has not
yet even been commenced.
The way President Trump might come close to achieving the
potential Lawson sees for him is more likely in his judicial
appointments. Professor Lawson notes that Justice Gorsuch
brings an interest in reviving the non-delegation doctrine to the
Supreme Court, far beyond any such disposition by Justice Scalia
whom he replaced. If future appointments to the Supreme Court
and the D.C. Circuit reflect a zealous focus on restoring the
non-delegation doctrine (as opposed to simply a commitment to
judicial conservatism), President Trump will have constrained
the executive more powerfully, and more permanently, than any
of the other mechanisms discussed in this symposium. In
Professor Lawson’s Monty Python lexicon, that would be
“something completely different.”
2. Mr. Paul Baumgardner
Mr. Paul Baumgardner enlivens our symposium with one
particular area to constrain the executive. Claiming to be neutral
as to the policy, he nevertheless sets forth the arguments against
the propriety of presidents issuing Thanksgiving Proclamations.
A Jeffersonian respect for the wall of separation between church
and state should inhibit presidents from this practice, he
maintains, even in the absence of any such proclamation’s calling

35
36

Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45.
15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b).
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on citizens to undertake particular religious acts or prayers, such
as thanking God.
Baumgardner does not provide any constraining principle, so
that his arguments would apply just as well to a presidential
speech as to a Thanksgiving Proclamation. If that suggestion
were followed, I personally would have deep regret. Perhaps the
finest Inaugural Address in history, Lincoln’s Second Inaugural,
places the Civil War squarely in the tradition of a vengeful God’s
punishment to North and South alike for the offenses of slavery,
which both parts of the nation tolerated, promoted, and from
which they both derived benefit. Here is the soaring rhetoric
that, under Baumgardner’s sources and reasoning, should never
have been spoken in March of 1865:
Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes
His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should
dare to ask a just God’s assistance in wringing their bread from the
sweat of other men’s faces, but let us judge not, that we be not judged.
The prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been
answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. “Woe unto the
world because of offenses; for it must needs be that offenses come, but
woe to that man by whom the offense cometh.” If we shall suppose
that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the
providence of God, must needs come, but which, having continued
through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He
gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to
those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any
departure from those divine attributes which the believers in a living
God always ascribe to Him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray,
that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet, if God
wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman’s two
hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until
every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another
drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still
it must be said “the judgments of the Lord are true and
righteous altogether.”37

Since Baumgardner’s analysis is directed at presidential
speech and not executive actions or regulations, I cannot see how
his analysis can be made to have force—except by convincing
individual presidents to self-censor. As a personal preference, I
would not deprive our nation of the treasure of Lincoln’s Second
Inaugural Address. As a constitutional matter, Baumgardner
does not grapple with the president’s own First Amendment right
to speak, or freely to exercise his religion. Nor, extrapolating his
arguments to apply to Congressional speech invoking God, does
37 President Abraham Lincoln, Second Inaugural Address, BARTLEBY (Mar. 4, 1865),
http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres32.html [http://perma.cc/2SR6-CL3H].
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his logic address the provision that any speech made in Congress
not be “questioned in any other place.” These are also parts of the
Constitution and need to be read in conjunction with, not to be
decimated by, the Establishment Clause.
As a thought piece, Baumgardner’s article provides a caution
to politicians who might exploit religion, but that assumes that
kind of politician is subject to shaming. I personally believe there
is a place for religion in public discourse, short of exploitation,
and it would be a great loss to see it end.
C.

Against Expanded Constraint of the Executive

1. Professor Neal Devins
Professor Neal Devins describes an almost apocalyptically
partisan world in Congress, from which situation he derives the
conclusion that courts should be even more reluctant to hear
lawsuits brought by legislators against executive overreach than
they have hitherto.38 Relying on impressive original research,
Devins details the demise of the institutionalists in Congress:
House members and Senators who would stand up for the
authority of Congress even against a president of their own
party. Now, Devins sees an urban battle zone pockmarked by
hollowed out buildings that once stood for institutional
principles, destroyed by their use as targets and weapons in an
unceasing partisan divide.
He is largely right. Bipartisanship seems reserved for former
Congress members,39 and several current Senators who have
formed the Common Sense Caucus,40 dedicated to overcoming the
partisanship that has stymied legislative progress on America’s
most pressing needs. However, the former group is significant for
many members who found bi-partisanship only after leaving
Congress; and the latter group, while productive in ending the
first government shutdown of 2018, has yet to fulfill its promise
as the critical mass able to move between the two parties to
create a transitory majority of sixty Senators able to overcome
filibuster by Democrats, and ideological purity from the
38 Professor Devins is not unique in his pessimistic description of the decline of
Congress’s ability and willingness to assert its institutional interests in a bipartisan way.
See, e.g., David Fontana & Aziz Z. Huq, Institutional loyalties in Constitutional Law, 85
U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 33–37 (2018).
39 Over 180 former Members of Congress have formed the “ReFormers Caucus.” See
ReFormers Caucus Members, ISSUE ONE, https://www.issueone.org/reformers/#reformerfull-list [http://perma.cc/BW74-23XH]. Just over one hundred are Democrats, and over
eighty are Republicans. See id.
40 See Alex Swoyer & David Sherfinski, Centrist senators form Common Sense
Caucus, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/23/
centrist-senators-form-common-sense-caucus/ [http://perma.cc/LNA2-MJHA].
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Republicans. For all the reasons Professor Devins laments, we
should wish these efforts well; but he’s right, their prospects for
success are bleak.
We are left with a dysfunctional Congress, incapable of
standing up for its institutional privileges against an expanding
executive. Professor Devins worries that allowing more legislators’
lawsuits will create a new forum for the partisan divide, and may,
therefore, paint the courts also with a more partisan cast. This
leaves Professor Devins with no specific remedy for the problem he
has chronicled: an institutional lassitude by Congress in the face
of executive branch encroachments.
Professor Devins and I respectfully disagree on the value of
expanded legislator standing.41 The value served by allowing
legislators to sue the executive is not in the unique insight of the
legislators’ legal arguments, but in the fact that in many cases
they may be the only parties with standing to challenge executive
actions. I trust courts to cut through the partisan nature of
arguments submitted in briefs by members of one party in the
House or Senate. What those members do, however, in getting a
case to court could be irreplaceable.
Consider, for instance, an executive’s failure to enforce laws:
whether President Obama on immigration, or President Trump
on the ACA tax. What private party would have standing to force
a president to act?42 Or consider the challenge to a president
spending money that was not the subject of an appropriation, as
the U.S. Constitution requires?43 If a group of members of
Congress, even though entirely partisan, nevertheless are held to
have standing (as, for instance, the House did in U.S. House of
Representatives v. Burwell44), and no one else conceivably could,
then I would weather the risk that a judge would be drawn into a
partisan dispute, in order to get the issue resolved. The political
question doctrine would still be available for the judge to avoid
ruling if there were too great a partisan divisive risk in doing so.
2. Professor John Yoo
Professor John Yoo presents a contrast to the majority of
participants in this symposium by a robust defense of executive
See generally Campbell, supra note 5.
I grant that it is still not clear that even members of Congress would have
standing in such situations, but their institutional interest in seeing laws passed by
Congress be enforced is of a different kind than that of the average citizen. That is the
gist of my article. See generally Campbell, supra note 5.
43 “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of
Appropriations made by Law.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
44 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 76
(D.D.C. 2015).
41
42
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action, occasionally even beyond legal limits. He provides an
exhaustive, insightful, and largely laudatory recounting of the
presidency of Franklin D. Roosevelt, as analyzed in domestic
policy, foreign policy, and civil liberties. Yoo sees the success of
FDR’s four terms in office as the direct result of FDR’s
willingness to stretch the powers of the presidency to the utmost.
In the area of domestic policy, Yoo candidly observes with
historical hindsight that the New Deal, and tight monetary
policy, prolonged rather than alleviated the Great Depression. He
criticizes the expansion of the administrative state, whereby
FDR’s legacy of federal agencies, excessive delegation of power
from Congress, and truncating state’s reserved powers continues
to have effects to this day—not all bad, but mostly so.
Yet in foreign affairs, and civil liberties, Yoo finds
redemption for FDR’s robust assertion of executive authority. Yoo
maintains that if the president abided by the spirit (and the
letter) of Congressional enactments consistent with the nation’s
preference for neutrality, America might never have helped
Britain at the time of Britain’s greatest need, and might have
entered the European theater of war too late, if at all.
The wartime civil liberties restrictions, including massive
wiretapping without warrants, are similarly justified, in
Professor Yoo’s view, by their results: An America largely
protected from enemy sabotage throughout World War II.
One might put Yoo’s position this way: Of what use is the
separation of powers, the rule of law, and the Bill of Rights in
America in a world where Nazism and fascism had triumphed in
Europe and intimidated the United States into the status of a
vassal state? This is a variant of Justice Jackson’s argument,
dissenting in Terminiello v. Chicago, that our U.S. Constitution
is not a “suicide pact.”45 The argument is that courts must not
ignore what is necessary to protect our country’s very existence
by an overly scrupulous regard for civil liberties or restrictions on
executive action more suited to normal times. Professor Yoo is in
this camp, in my view. He has good company; Justice Jackson
knew what he was talking about, having just returned from his
role as prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials. Terminiello dealt

45 “There is danger that, if the Court does not temper its doctrinaire logic with a
little practical wisdom, it will convert the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”
Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also
Linda Greenhouse, The Nation; ‘Suicide Pact,’ N.Y. T IMES (Sept. 22, 2002),
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/22/weekinreview/the-nation-suicide-pact.html
(discussing other appearances of this or similar phrases in Supreme Court opinions).
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with incitements to a mob, and Jackson detailed in his opinion
how manipulation of mobs had allowed Hitler to come to power.
Nevertheless, if we dull our sensitivity to violations of civil
liberties and to encroachments by the executive upon the people’s
representatives in the legislative branch, I believe we run
another risk of losing our identity as a constitutional democratic
republic of limited government powers and maximum individual
freedom. We have already seen these tendencies developing
rapidly in our “war on terror,” with unprecedented incursions
into individual liberties under the Patriot Act, and reliance on ex
parte judicial proceedings (like the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court) to issue search warrants and wiretaps that
sweep up information about innocent Americans along with
foreign suspects.
Undoubtedly, presidents like FDR (and Lincoln) exceeded
the boundaries of executive authority. Undoubtedly, they are also
two of the most beloved presidents in our country’s history. Both
saved our country.
Perhaps we have, tacitly, become the Roman Republic:
allocating exceptional powers to Consuls in time of great crisis.
The Roman Republic set a strict time limit for their Consuls,
with authority automatically reverting to the Senate when the
time ran out. That historical precedent, however, is not a
comforting one. The Roman Republic grew used to autocracy. The
security and welfare offered by those given dictatorial power
were favored by the people over their own freedom. The Consul
became the Emperor, and the days of Rome as a republic came to
an end.
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Constraining Moses: Rethinking
Thanksgiving Day Proclamations
Paul Baumgardner*
INTRODUCTION
Modern American presidents enjoy an extensive reserve of
formal and informal powers, which have developed in accordance
with the historical, institutional, and ideological changes across
the federal government. In recent months, many Americans have
felt the reach and impact of one particular power—the president’s
rhetorical power. Long before Donald Trump told the American
people that “there is blame on both sides” in Charlottesville,
Virginia, political scientists had begun researching the outsized
capital that presidential discourse can marshal.1 A president’s
words possess an unparalleled institutional power to arrange
and rearrange the populace—to motivate action, encourage
restraint, to assuage strife, and also to send peasants scrambling
for pitchforks.
Our political knowledge of a president’s rhetorical power
ought to inform and complicate how we analyze the
constitutionality of certain presidential practices. In this article, I
focus on one such presidential practice: Thanksgiving Day
Proclamations. The presidential tradition of offering Thanksgiving
Proclamations began with our first president, George Washington,
and it has remained a common—but not constant—oratorical
practice of American presidents up to the present. However,
Thanksgiving Proclamations have sustained a fair degree of legal
and political scrutiny, even during the founding generation.
In this article, I examine the core criticisms of Thanksgiving
Proclamations that have connected certain Founders, such as
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, with contemporary
Supreme Court Justices. Jeffersonian and Madisonian concerns
about religious entanglement and endorsement align with recent

* Paul Baumgardner is a PhD candidate in the Department of Politics and the
Humanities Council at Princeton University. During the 2017–2018 academic year, he is
a visiting fellow in the Institute for Law and Philosophy at Rutgers Law School.
1 Michael D. Shear & Maggie Haberman, Trump Defends Initial Remarks on
Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html? mcubz=1&_r=0.
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Supreme Court cases and constitutional standards concerning
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. As currently
understood by some members of the Court, the First Amendment’s
prohibition on government actions respecting an establishment of
religion brings the content of Thanksgiving Proclamations under
sharp scrutiny.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet deemed
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations to be unconstitutional,
it has criticized and, in some cases, struck down similar calls to
prayer. In this article, I unpack the political, legal, and historical
arguments against presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations and
outline some of the advantages of “constraining Moses.”
The reasons for selecting this particular presidential
rhetorical practice are manifold, but one of the most intriguing
certainly is the political preparatory work/worries that already
have been accomplished—prematurely—in anticipation of this
very article.2 To be clear: I do not advocate for the
end of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. However, it is
important to uncover the best variations of these arguments,
including the sort of resources that they should draw on.3 In
the final analysis, these arguments may not supply the best
moral or constitutional course for future Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.4 Rather, this thesis-less article is designed to
highlight the pieces that seem best ordered for justifying this
constitutional direction, even if such a direction proves unlikely or
unwarranted in the current political climate.
So let us jump in. First, an introduction to a spectrum of
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. In Section II, a brief

2 We built this moated fortress and have had it manned for years, because we knew
your horde would eventually come! See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 100–03, 113
(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 492 U.S.
573, 670–71 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 633–35, 645 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Wes Barrett, God
Returns to Presidential Thanksgiving Proclamation, FOX NEWS (Nov. 25, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/11/25/god-returns-to-presidential-thanksgivingproclamation.html [http://perma.cc/GER5-5HXC]; Chuck Norris, Obama vs. George
Washington on Thanksgiving, WORDNETDAILY (Nov. 23, 2014, 4:13 PM), http://www.wnd.
com/2014/11/obama-vs-george-washington-on-thanksgiving/#6Ofv9G2XPslDYBAK.99
[http://perma.cc/8HAB-DVAE]; Joel Siegel, Obama Leaves God out of Thanksgiving
Speech, Riles Critics, A.B.C. NEWS (Nov. 25, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/obamaomits-god-thanksgiving-address-riles-critics/story?id=15028644 [http://perma.cc/5W5D-RBZN];
Carson Holloway, Thanksgiving and the Constitution, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE (Nov. 26, 2013),
http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2013/11/11618/ [http://perma.cc/9KPV-QKJM]; DONALD L.
DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT 2–3, 18–20 (2010).
3 But why is this “uncovering” so important if you’re not advocating for the abolition
of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations? What do you have against Thanksgiving!?
4 Moral or constitutional? Oh dear! What would Dworkin have said to this distinction?
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political science interlude on presidential rhetoric. In Section III,
linkages to Establishment Clause cases and considerations, old
and new. In Section IV, cameo appearances by some
unimpeachable Founding presidents/precedents. In Section V,
select reservations, resignations, and Bible readings.
I. SO WHAT ARE WE DEALING WITH HERE? SOME EXAMPLES OF
PRESIDENTIAL THANKSGIVING PROCLAMATIONS
Many American presidents have issued Thanksgiving
Proclamations. A central constitutional worry with this practice
is that it exploits the station of the presidency for the purposes of
evangelism. As directives from the country’s highest executive
office, which generally are designed to (1) situate the country’s
eyes on a certain god, a specific religious tradition, and/or a
particular set of beliefs, and (2) encourage participation in
discrete spiritual actions, these proclamations could approach the
line of religious establishment.
So what are we dealing with here? These executive actions
have taken on a variety of forms over the years. Quite a few
proclamations have served as calls to worship God—wielding
religious symbols and Judeo-Christian rhetoric to reaffirm a
preference for a particular belief system and a governmental
push to embrace that belief system now—while others have
sounded more like general statements of appreciation for
the successes and strengths of our nation. Compare, for
example, President Barack Obama’s 2011 Thanksgiving Day
Proclamation to President George W. Bush’s 2008 Thanksgiving
Day Proclamation.
The first sentence of President Obama’s Proclamation 8755
reads: “One of our Nation’s oldest and most cherished traditions,
Thanksgiving Day brings us closer to our loved ones and invites
us to reflect on the blessings that enrich our lives.”5 This opening
line was indicative of the general tone and thesis of Obama’s
Thanksgiving Proclamation. The President focused on the origins
and history of the holiday. He also emphasized the cooperation
between Native Americans and Pilgrims, the valuable
contributions of Native Americans, and the importance of
diversity, family, and friendship in the good times and bad.6
President Obama also mentioned that Americans “give
thanks to each other and to God for the kindness and comforts

5 President Barack Obama, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 8755 (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=97063 [http://perma.cc/R5T3-9QKD].
6 Id.
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that grace our lives.”7 With the exception of one reference to
George Washington’s praise of God in the first presidential
Thanksgiving Proclamation, this was the only time the word
“God” appeared in President Obama’s Proclamation.8 Instead of
invoking a certain god or a specific religious tradition, President
Obama exhorted:
[T]he people of the United States to come together—whether in our
homes, places of worship, community centers, or any place of
fellowship for friends and neighbors—to give thanks for all we have
received in the past year, to express appreciation to those whose lives
enrich our own, and to share our bounty with others.9

Three years before President Obama’s Proclamation,
President George W. Bush gave his final Thanksgiving
Proclamation.10 In his opening paragraph, President Bush
declared: “We recognize that all of these blessings, and life itself,
come not from the hand of man but from Almighty God.”11 Unlike
President Obama’s Proclamation, President Bush’s address
centered on religion, thankfulness to God, and pronouncements
of faith that the Christian God (that many of our Founding
Fathers turned to) would continue to help the United States.12 He
also counseled Americans to “let us all give thanks to God who
blessed our Nation’s first days and who blesses us today. May He
continue to guide and watch over our families and our
country always.”13
President Bush’s 2008 Thanksgiving Proclamation is not an
outlier in terms of religious rhetoric and instruction. Just look at
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Proclamation more than five
decades earlier.14 In Proclamation 3036, President Eisenhower
supplied a very short, priestly admonishment for citizens to
genuflect.15 Wasting no time or ink, the Proclamation’s
introduction dove right into a direct call to prayer:
As a Nation much blessed, we feel impelled at harvest time to follow
the tradition handed down by our Pilgrim fathers of pausing from our
labors for one day to render thanks to Almighty God for His bounties.
Now that the year is drawing to a close, once again it is fitting that we

Id.
Id.
9 Id.
10 President George W. Bush, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 8322 (Nov. 21, 2008),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=84954 [http://perma.cc/PAR7-BB2B].
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 President Dwight D. Eisenhower, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 3036 (Nov. 7,
1953), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=72469 [http://perma.cc/W7BN-25G8].
15 Id.
7
8
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incline our thoughts to His mercies and offer to Him our special
prayers of gratitude.16

Eisenhower’s proclamation from 1953 designated the
American population to be “a religious people,” faithful to the
presumably Christian God but still in need of some good,
old-fashioned kneeling.17 On Thanksgiving, he told the country to
“bow before God in contrition for our sins, in suppliance for
wisdom in our striving for a better world, and in gratitude for the
manifold blessings He has bestowed upon us and upon our
fellow men.”18
II. PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC
Although there has been remarkably little scholarly analysis
of Thanksgiving Proclamations, recent American political
scientific research does illuminate some of the cardinal political
worries surrounding this governmental practice.19 For example,
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations have a breadth,
directness, and authoritativeness that other controversial forms
of government benediction do not possess. In fact, the president
has unrivaled rhetorical powers in American politics.

Id.
Id.
18 Id.
19 See James W. Ceaser et al., The Rise of the Rhetorical Presidency, 11
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 158, 159–61 (1981); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS
PRESIDENTS MAKE: LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH 445– 46 (1993);
KARLYN KOHRS CAMPBELL & KATHLEEN HALL JAMIESON, PRESIDENTS CREATING THE
PRESIDENCY: DEEDS DONE IN WORDS 6–9 (2008); Jeffrey E. Cohen, Presidential Rhetoric
and the Public Agenda, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 87, 87–89 (1995); Todd Garvey, The Obama
Administration’s Evolving Approach to the Signing Statement, 41 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
393, 394–95, 406 (2011); Vanessa B. Beasley, Speaking at Selma: Presidential
Commemoration and Bill Clinton’s Problem of Invention, 44 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 267,
268–69, 286–87 (2014); Jeffrey Friedman, A “Weapon in the Hands of the People”: The
Rhetorical Presidency in Historical and Conceptual Context, 19 CRITICAL REV. 197, 199–
200 (2007); ANDREW B. WHITFORD & JEFF YATES, PRESIDENTIAL RHETORIC AND THE
PUBLIC AGENDA: CONSTRUCTING THE WAR ON DRUGS 2–6 (2009); JEFFREY K. TULIS, THE
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 3–4 (1987); Jeffrey K. Tulis, Revisiting the Rhetorical
Presidency, in BEYOND THE RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 3–4, 13–14 (1996); Christopher S.
Kelley et al., Assessing the Rhetorical Side of Presidential Signing Statements, 43
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 274, 274–76 (2013); Michael J. Berry, Controversially Executing
the Law: George W. Bush and the Constitutional Signing Statement, 36 CONGRESS & THE
PRESIDENCY 244, 244–45, 266–68 (2009); Christopher S. Kelley & Bryan W. Marshall, The
Last Word: Presidential Power and the Role of Signing Statements, 38 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 248, 248–67 (2008); Martin J. Medhurst, A Tale of Two Constructs: The
Rhetorical Presidency versus Presidential Rhetoric, in BEYOND THE RHETORICAL
PRESIDENCY xi–xxv (1996); WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE
POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 176–77(2003); BRANDICE CANES-WRONE, WHO
LEADS WHOM? PRESIDENTS, POLICY, AND THE PUBLIC 3–5 (2006); SAMUEL KERNELL,
GOING PUBLIC: NEW STRATEGIES OF PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP 1–2 (3d ed. 2007).
16
17
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According to political scientist Keith Whittington,
presidential rhetoric has a disparate and more pronounced role
in modern times than in the early years of American political
history.20 Since the twentieth century, Americans have witnessed
a different brand of president—an institutional actor more
willing to engage with the public, by giving more speeches,
making more proclamations, and attempting to connect directly
with citizens.21 This rhetorical shift in the modern presidency is
aimed at exerting political power over the citizenry—influencing
public sentiment by rallying support or disdain, pushing certain
policy agendas, and inculcating particular civic values and
practices. Whittington writes, “[p]residential rhetoric not only
persuades but also constructs a political world within which
various political actors operate.”22
Presidency scholars take note of the disproportionate
amount of public attention that is paid to presidential discourse
and how this coverage creates a greater number of political
opportunities for the chief executive.23 Presidential rhetoric can
significantly impact public opinion and influence policy.24 When a
president speaks to the public, his words have the power to
increase the salience of certain issues and civic practices.25
Modern presidents rely on rhetorical performances such as
directives, public speeches, and proclamations to set agendas and
communicate to the American people how they prioritize
different people, cultures, and values.
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: CASES,
PRECEDENTS, AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
The historical scrutiny that has been leveled against
a constellation of related governmental institutions, persons,
and practices seriously informs the legal and normative
considerations about presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations.
These adjacent religious figures and observances include prayers
issued at the start of municipal meetings and state appointments
and uses of chaplains and benedictions at public school
graduations and athletic events. Now, although there are
important distinctions between Thanksgiving Proclamations and

20 KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, The Rhetorical Presidency, Presidential Authority, and
President Clinton, 26 PERSP. POL. SCI. 199, 199–201 (1997).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 205.
23 See generally Cohen, supra note 19; CANES-WRONE, supra note 19; KERNELL,
supra note 19.
24 See Cohen, supra note 19, at 87–88, 101, 103.
25 See CANES-WRONE, supra note 19, at 19–23; see also KERNELL, supra note 19, at 1–9.
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this constellation (with many of these distinctions casting
additional doubt on the constitutionality of presidential
proclamations), it would be wise to first highlight the significant
number of similarities and legal precedents involved.
The most relevant constitutional provision to these matters
is the Establishment Clause, which reads: “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion.”26 Located within
the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, this clause
initially prohibited only the federal government from respecting
an establishment of religion.
In Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court
incorporated the Establishment Clause, thus extending the
prohibition to states.27 The divided Court provided important
clarification to this short constitutional clause.28 Everson, one of
the foundational twentieth century Establishment Clause cases,
highlighted the guiding principles within the Clause, principles
which—to this day—serve as a controversial set of standards for
Establishment Clause analysis. In direct and forceful language,
Justice Hugo Black articulated the strict separation enshrined by
the Clause:
The “establishment of religion” clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect “a wall of separation between Church and State.”29

Although the Justices were divided about how to apply the
Establishment Clause to the case before them, the Court was
unified about the strict separation principles undergirding the
Clause: the Government must be neutral between religions and

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
See id. (finding “[t]hat [the First] Amendment requires the state to be neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the
state to be their adversary”).
29 Id. at 15–16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
26
27
28
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also between religion and non-religion; state and national
governmental actions cannot show religious favoritism, either by
favoring religion generally or favoring a specific religion; the
government also would violate the Establishment Clause by
demonstrating religious disfavor through a national or state law
that actively harms a religion or its institutions, practices,
and adherents.30
But, in practice, how strict must the separation be between
church and state? How do we know when the government has not
been neutral towards religion? Must a citizen prove that the
government coerced her into participating in an alien religious
practice in order for the courts to be sure that a breach of the
Establishment Clause has occurred? In a series of cases following
Everson, many of which explicitly dealt with the topic of
governmentally-sanctioned prayer, the Court provided greater
definition to the strict separation principles within the
Establishment Clause.
A.

Prayer and Public Schools
In Engel v. Vitale, the Supreme Court ruled that a
governmentally approved prayer said daily in New York public
schools represented an impermissible establishment of religion.31
In a 6-to-1 ruling, the Court outlined the manifold problems with
this sort of religious entanglement and promotion. Using
sweeping language, the Justices in the majority argued that it is
problematic for the government to encourage prayer—and not
just because of the age of the admonished audience, but because
of the state-sanctioned nature of the religious act.32 Justice Black
turned to James Madison’s writings for historical support. He
asserted: “The Establishment Clause thus stands as an
expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our
Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to
permit its ‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate.”33
The majority and concurring opinions in Engel also were
clear that a governmental policy may violate the Establishment
Clause even when no one is legally compelled to participate in a
religious practice. Distinguishing the Establishment Clause from
the Free Exercise Clause that follows in the First Amendment,
the majority claimed the Establishment Clause “does not depend
See generally Everson, 330 U.S. 1.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424–25 (1962).
See id. at 424–25, 432–33.
33 Id. at 431–32 (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against
Religious Assessments (June 20, 1785), in 2 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1783–1787,
at 187 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901)).
30
31
32
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upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is
violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official
religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
nonobserving individuals or not.”34 A year later, in School District
of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, the high court
again struck down governmentally-approved prayers and Bible
readings, reiterating that “a violation of the Free Exercise Clause
is predicated on coercion, while the Establishment Clause
violation need not be so attended.”35
Two additional Supreme Court cases offer insight into the
constitutionality of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. In
Lee v. Weisman, the Court determined whether the Establishment
Clause forbids clergy from offering non-denominational prayers at
middle school and high school graduation ceremonies.36 Writing
for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy dedicated a good deal
of ink showcasing the “subtle coercive pressure,” “indirect
coercion,” and “peer pressure” involved in these benedictions.37
Those individuals who would not willingly participate in such
prayers are placed in an uncomfortable situation in which
religious activity is either required or is costly to avoid (because of
the incredible social pressure that comes along with abstaining
from participation). It was clear to the majority that although a
governmental practice does not have to be coercive to contravene
Americans’ religious liberty, coerced participation in prayer
certainly is unconstitutional: “[T]he Constitution guarantees that
government may not coerce anyone to support or participate
in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way
which ‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends
to do so.’”38
As in Engel (and numerous other Establishment cases) the
writings, speeches, and actions of Thomas Jefferson and James
Madison were used authoritatively by both the majority and

34 Id. at 430; see also id. at 438 (Douglas, J., concurring) (“[T]here is no element of
compulsion or coercion in New York's regulation requiring that public schools be opened
each day with the following prayer . . . a child is free to stand or not stand, to recite or not
recite, without fear of reprisal or even comment by the teacher or any other
school official.”).
35 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); see
also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 59–61 (1985) (holding an Alabama law that required
public schools to set aside a short period of class time for silence, meditation, or prayer
violated the First Amendment).
36 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 586–87 (1992).
37 Id. at 588, 592–93.
38 Id. at 587 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)).
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dissenting Justices in Lee.39 In fact, Justice David Souter’s
concurrence, which was joined by Justices Stevens and O’Connor,
relied on Thomas Jefferson’s well-documented objection to
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations to support the view
that the Establishment Clause entails no state endorsement
of religion.40
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Court
analyzed the constitutionality of a prayer offered by a high school
student and broadcast before high school football games in Santa
Fe, Texas.41 Following Lee, the Court stressed the heightened
coercion and social pressure involved in this practice of praying
“on school property, at school-sponsored events, over the school’s
public address system, by a speaker representing the student
body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a
school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public
prayer.”42 Writing for the six-member majority, Justice John Paul
Stevens found the school district improperly “invite[d] and
encourage[d] religious messages.”43 The Establishment Clause
cannot brook this sort of “perceived and actual endorsement
of religion.”44
As in earlier Establishment cases, the presidential practice
of making Thanksgiving Proclamations hovered in the
background of Santa Fe. Whereas the majority of the Court
claimed that “the religious liberty protected by the Constitution
is abridged when the State affirmatively sponsors the particular
religious practice of prayer,”45 the dissenting Justices—led by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist—rejoined:
Neither the holding nor the tone of the opinion is faithful to the
meaning of the Establishment Clause, when it is recalled that George
Washington himself, at the request of the very Congress which passed
the Bill of Rights, proclaimed a day of “public thanksgiving and
prayer, to be observed by acknowledging with grateful hearts the
many and signal favors of Almighty God.” 46

39 See id. at 634 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that Jefferson, in his second
inaugural address, specifically “acknowledged his need for divine guidance and invited his
audience to join his prayer”); see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431–32 (1962).
40 Id. at 623 (Souter, J., concurring).
41 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315–17 (2000).
42 Id. at 290.
43 Id. at 306.
44 Id. at 305.
45 Id. at 313.
46 Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting George Washington, Presidential
Proclamation (Oct. 3, 1789), in 1 A COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1897, at 64 (J. Richardson ed., 1897)).

2018]

Rethinking Thanksgiving Day Proclamations

29

Prayer cases such as these should bear heavily on our
evaluation of the constitutionality of Thanksgiving Proclamations.
For if a high school student cannot give a “nonsectarian,
nonproselytizing” prayer before an audience of a few hundred
people, 47 it is difficult to imagine how the President of the United
States can give a (sometimes highly sectarian) prayer and
encourage hundreds of millions of Americans to continue with
more (sometimes highly sectarian) praying. If “the members of
the listening audience must perceive the pregame message as a
public expression of the views of the majority of the student body
delivered with the approval of the school administration,” is it
not reasonable to assume that the American people also perceive
the president’s Thanksgiving Proclamation as an expression of the
public’s view, endorsed by the United States federal government?48
B.

Legislative Prayer
Two Supreme Court cases addressed aspects of legislative
prayer that are informative of constitutional questions and the
specific modes of analysis that may be involved in reconsidering
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations.
The first of these cases concerns state appointments and
uses of chaplains. In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court considered
whether the Nebraska state government violated the
Establishment Clause by authorizing a chaplain to conduct
prayers before legislative sessions.49 Of added legal concern was
the fact that “a clergyman of only one denomination has been
selected by the Nebraska Legislature for 16 years, that the
chaplain is paid at public expense, and that the prayers are in
the Judeo-Christian tradition[.]”50
The Court ruled 6-to-3 that the chaplaincy position and
legislative prayers did not constitute an establishment of
religion. Chief Justice Warren Earl Burger penned the majority
opinion, which gave special weight to this practice of “unique
history” and tradition, and argued that the chaplain’s duties
served as “a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held.”51
In a blistering dissent, Justice William Brennan rejoined
that these government-sanctioned prayers are at odds with the
Constitution and inconsistent with the Court’s previous

47
48
49
50
51

Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 294.
Id. at 308.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 784 (1983).
Id. at 783–84.
Id. at 791–92.
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decisions.52 The simple fact that Nebraska’s legislature—as well
as the U.S. House of Representatives, the U.S. Senate, and many
state legislatures—has a rich history of praying before sessions
does not erase the Establishment transgression. In pointed
response to the majority opinion, Justice Brennan noted: “Prayer
is serious business—serious theological business—and it is not a
mere ‘acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of
this country’ for the State to immerse itself in that business.”53
The fact that a large number of Americans share a particular
faith or participate in a similar religious practice only increases
the need for a robust Establishment Clause and a “wall between
church and state” that is “kept high and impregnable.”54
Government-sanctioned prayer, including prayer from a
legislative chaplain, undercuts the fundamental purposes of the
Establishment Clause and instead “forces all residents of the
State to support a religious exercise that may be contrary to their
own beliefs. It requires the State to commit itself on fundamental
theological issues.”55
More than thirty years after Marsh was decided, the Court
returned to the matter in Town of Greece v. Galloway. In Greece,
the Court evaluated the constitutionality of prayers offered at the
start of municipal meetings.56 In the town of Greece, New York,
the municipal council regularly invited local clergymen to deliver
an invocation before meetings began and government business
was conducted. Many of the prayers were Christian in nature
and were given by Christian clergymen, for “nearly all of the
congregations in town were Christian.”57
In one of the most anticipated Establishment Clause rulings
handed down by the U.S. Supreme Court this decade, the Greece
Court, divided 5-to-4, found the town council prayers to be a
constitutional exercise.58 Writing for the majority, Justice
Anthony Kennedy worked hard to elaborate the critically
non-religious aspects of the pre-meeting invocations. According to
the majority, the prayers were redeemable because they

See id. at 795–96 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 819.
54 Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
55 Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 808 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
56 See Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1815 (2014).
57 Id. at 1816. During the more than 120 monthly meetings at which prayers were
delivered during the record period (from 1999 to 2010), only four prayers were delivered
by non-Christians. These four prayers occurred in 2008, shortly after the plaintiffs began
complaining about the town’s Christian prayer practice and nearly a decade after that
practice had commenced. Id. at 1839 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
58 Id. at 1813.
52
53
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furnished a number of secular benefits.59 For instance, the
clergyman’s invocation “lends gravity to public business, reminds
lawmakers to transcend petty differences in pursuit of a higher
purpose, and expresses a common aspiration to a just and
peaceful society.”60 Justice Kennedy stressed the purely
ceremonial and somehow innocuous nature of this form of
government prayer, arguing it is a benign part of our heritage
and “intended to place town board members in a solemn and
deliberative frame of mind.”61
Offsetting his language about the ceremonial and
significantly secular nature of the town council prayers, Justice
Kennedy explored the setting and audience for the prayers to
ascertain the extent to which people were being coerced into
religious participation.62 Fortunately for Kennedy & Co., the
critically non-religious religious oration was determined to be
non-coercive and principally directed at lawmakers. Justice
Kennedy was clear to point out that “[t]he analysis would be
different if town board members directed the public to participate
in the prayers . . . . Although board members themselves stood,
bowed their heads, or made the sign of the cross during the
prayer, they at no point solicited similar gestures by the
public.”63 The majority’s logic clearly hinged on the limited
number of citizens that attended town council meetings, citizens
were not the intended audience for the prayers, and attendants’
ability to opt out of listening and participating.
The brightest parts of Justice Elena Kagan’s dissenting
opinion, which was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Stephen Breyer, and Sonia Sotomayor, sharply disagreed over
this very evaluation of the setting and audience for town council
prayers. According to the four dissenters, many members of the
audience during these council meetings were members of the
general public.64 Moreover, “the prayers there [were] directed
squarely at the citizens.”65
An especially damning characteristic of the prayers was
their association with a single religion—Christianity. Justice

Id. at 1818.
Id.
61 Id. at 1816.
62 See id. at 1825 (“It is an elemental First Amendment principle that government
may not coerce its citizens ‘to support or participate in any religion or its exercise.’ . . . The
inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both the setting in which the prayer
arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”) (quoting Cty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civ.
Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 659 (1989)).
63 Town of Greece, N.Y., 134 S. Ct. at 1826.
64 Id. at 1842 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 1848.
59
60

32

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

Kagan was especially troubled by the establishment risks that
attend to this level of sectarianism. In her dissent, Kagan
walked through several examples of governmental actors—a
judge, an election official, an official at a naturalization
ceremony—engaging in public religious invocations to show how
“prayer repeatedly invoking a single religion’s beliefs in these
settings—crossed a constitutional line.”66 This clashes with the
principle of full and equal citizenship guaranteed by the
Establishment Clause. A government-sponsored prayer aligned
with a single faith can offer the impression that they are less
than full citizens and their equal rights and equal ownership
over democratic government is predicated on an established
religious orthodoxy.67 In the closing paragraph of her opinion,
Justice Kagan reinforced this point, writing: “When the citizens
of this country approach their government, they do so only as
Americans, not as members of one faith or another . . . they
should not confront government-sponsored worship that divides
them along religious lines.”68
C.

Grounds for Reconsidering Thanksgiving Proclamations
Not coincidentally, almost every court case discussed so far
included some judicial reference to, or sustained commentary
on, American presidents’ practice of issuing Thanksgiving
Proclamations. Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never
evaluated this particular practice, it certainly has given citizens
the resources to do so. The arguments best equipped to cast doubt
on the constitutionality of Thanksgiving Proclamations certainly
include materials from the aforementioned constellation of
governmental institutions, persons, and practices. Many of the
precedents and modes of judicial reasoning generated by the
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, spanning
at least from Everson to Greece, complicate our historical
embrace of presidential prayers and executive calls to thank and
praise God.
For decades now, courts have turned to Everson v. Board of
Education when explicating the strict separation principles
undergirding the Establishment Clause. Based on these

Id. at 1843.
Id. at 1841 (“I think the Town of Greece’s prayer practices violate that norm of
religious equality—the breathtakingly generous constitutional idea that our public
institutions belong no less to the Buddhist or Hindu than to the Methodist or
Episcopalian. . . . In my view, that practice does not square with the First Amendment’s
promise that every citizen, irrespective of her religion, owns an equal share in
her government.”).
68 Id. at 1854.
66
67
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principles, it seems that presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations
must be neutral between religions and also between religion and
non-religion for them to pass constitutional muster. These official
governmental actions cannot show religious favoritism, either by
favoring religion generally or favoring a specific religion. After
examining the various Thanksgiving Proclamations of the past, it
should be clear that many of these executive statements have
favored religion generally and also favored a specific religion.
Those who may claim that Thanksgiving Day Proclamations
are vindicated by the fact that such Proclamations do not force
citizens into religious observance should return to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decisions in Engel and Abington. In these cases,
the Court communicated the State’s constitutional duty to avoid
this exact sort of religious entanglement and promotion.69
State-sanctioned calls for prayer are constitutionally suspect,
even when no one is legally compelled to participate in the
religious practice. This is because a government practice does not
have to be coercive to violate the Establishment Clause.
Following the holdings in Lee and Santa Fe, we might
wonder about the “subtle coercive pressure,” “indirect coercion,”
and “peer pressure” involved in these benedictions, which flow
from an individual who is regularly interpreted as the leader of
the free world and the most powerful person on Earth.70 A strong
claim could be made that the president’s words disseminate as a
“perceived and actual endorsement of religion.”71
Although the outcomes of Marsh and Greece appear to justify
Thanksgiving Proclamations, this is not necessarily the case. The
United States does not have a unique and unbroken history of
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Not every president
has delivered this sort of religious message, and several who
have issued Proclamations were troubled by their actions and/or
used brief, muted, and/or secular declarations.
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice Kagan’s
dissenting opinion in Greece both illustrated the added
constitutional obstacles facing presidential Thanksgiving
addresses. Thanksgiving Proclamations are not purely
ceremonial and innocuous words, issued by a local minister to a
small crowd. Many of these Proclamations include religious
exhortations, deeply theistic messages, and explicitly
Judeo-Christian language and references. If four Justices of the

69
70
71

See supra Section III(A).
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 588, 592–93 (1992).
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 305 (2000).
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Court were made queasy by the town council of Greece’s strong
association with a single clerical background, they must surely
shudder by the language of Thanksgiving Proclamations and
their common religious affiliation.
Even the majority opinion in Greece was adamant that “[t]he
analysis would be different if town board members directed the
public to participate in the prayers.”72 The setting and audience
for presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations is the public at
large—political recipients of executive orders and messages.
These Proclamations represent official governmental statements
and are widely reported in the media. Moreover, many of these
Proclamations clearly direct the public to participate in prayers.
IV. “THOU SHALT NOT MAKE RELIGIOUS PROCLAMATIONS” – JAMES
MADISON AND THOMAS JEFFERSON
In addition to the conventional political scientific wisdom on
presidential rhetoric and the relevant First Amendment
jurisprudence on government-sanctioned prayer, several frank
opinions from the founding generation may prove valuable to the
evaluation of presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Some
may consider this line of inquiry to be a fool’s errand, especially
because the first two presidents—George Washington and John
Adams—both felt comfortable in offering Thanksgiving
Proclamations.73 Several influential leaders (and presidents) in
the early years of our nation, however, expressed serious
concerns over these exact practices.
An unmistakable characteristic of the Establishment Clause
case law is the repeated struggles between competing historianJustices over how best to appropriate (and pay homage to) James
Madison and Thomas Jefferson. Madison and Jefferson wrote

Id. at 1826.
After he left office, however, John Adams seemed less comfortable with these
decisions. See From John Adams to Benjamin Rush, 12 June 1812, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-02-02-5807 [http://perma.cc/DWH2-B2FE]
(last modified June 29, 2017).
The National Fast, recommended by me turned me out of Office. It was
connected with, the general Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, which I had
no concern in. . . . A general Suspicion prevailed that the Presbyterian Church
was ambitious and aimed at an Establishment as a National Church. I was
represented as a Presbyterian and at the head of this political and
ecclesiastical Project. The Secret Whisper ran through them all the Sects ‘Let
Us have Jefferson, Madison, Burr, any body, whether they be Philosophers,
Deist or even Atheists, rather than a Presbyterian President.’ This Principle is
at the Bottom of the Unpopularity of national Fasts and Thanksgivings,
Nothing is more dreaded than the National Government meddling
with Religion.
Id.
72
73
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and spoke extensively on the topic of religious liberty, and both
men were active in securing a strong separation of church and
state while they served in governmental positions.
On the religion clauses of the First Amendment, these
Founders’ words have been “accepted almost as an authoritative
declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment.”74 For
example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Everson brim
with dozens of references to these two men.75 The Court turned to
Madison and Jefferson throughout, as Establishment Clause
exponents, experts, and historical beacons.76 So if the actions and
views of Madison and Jefferson are believed to offer “irrefutable
confirmation of the Amendment’s sweeping content,”77 what can
the lives of these two statesmen tell us about presidential
Thanksgiving Proclamations?
For at least the past 140 years, Supreme Court Justices have
trusted Thomas Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists as a
reliable companion text to the Free Exercise Clause and
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.78 Believing this
letter helps to explicate the purposes and principles lying within
our constitutionally guaranteed religious liberty protections,
constitutional commentators have fought over the true meaning
and history of Jefferson’s missive.79 Interestingly enough, a
primary purpose behind President Jefferson’s letter pertains to
Thanksgiving Day Proclamations.

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 34 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
See generally id.
77 Id. at 34.
78 See Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and
his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that
the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building
a wall of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of
the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see
with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore
to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to
his social duties.
Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson).
79 See generally DONALD L. DRAKEMAN, CHURCH, STATE, AND ORIGINAL INTENT
(2010); DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (2002); PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE (First Harvard Univ. Press ed. 2002); VINCENT PHILLIP MUNOZ, GOD AND THE
FOUNDERS: MADISON, WASHINGTON, AND JEFFERSON (2009); JOHN WITTE JR., RELIGION
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT (2d ed. 2000).
74
75
76
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During his eight years as President, Jefferson never
made such a Proclamation. Understanding the controversy
surrounding this political decision, Jefferson relied on his Letter
to the Danbury Baptists “to explain his reasons for refusing to
issue presidential proclamations of days for public fasting and
thanksgiving.”80 On the same day that Jefferson sent the letter,
he explained to then-attorney general Levi Lincoln these very
intentions: “[T]he Baptist address now inclosed [sic] admits of a
condemnation of the alliance between church and state, under
the authority of the Constitution. [I]t furnishes an occasion too,
which I have long wished to find, of saying why I do not proclaim
fastings & thanksgivings.”81
Although Jefferson had issued a Thanksgiving Proclamation
more than twenty years earlier, as governor of Virginia, he did
not believe the president was constitutionally authorized to
engage in this sort of religious practice.82 During his final term in
office, Jefferson reiterated his constitutional view on the matter:
I consider the government of the U.S. as interdicted by the
constitution from intermedling with religious institutions, their
doctrines, discipline, or exercises. [T]his results not only from the
provision that no law shall be made respecting the establishment, or
free exercise, of religion, but from that also which reserves to the
states the powers not delegated to the U.S. certainly no power to
prescribe any religious exercise, or to assume authority in religious
discipline, has been delegated to the general government . . . but it is
only proposed that I should recommend, not prescribe a day of fasting
& prayer. [T]hat is that I should indirectly assume to the U.S. an
authority over religious exercises which the constitution has directly
precluded them from. [I]t must be meant too that this
recommendation is to carry some authority, and to be sanctioned by
some penalty on those who disregard it: not indeed of fine &
imprisonment but of some degree of proscription perhaps in public
opinion. [A]nd does the change in the nature of the penalty make the
recommendation the less a law of conduct for those to whom it
is directed?83

80 DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 2, 27–30 (2002).
81 Thomas Jefferson, To Levi Lincoln, 1 Jan. 1802, in 36 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON: DECEMBER 1, 1801 TO MARCH 3, 1802, at 256–57 (Barbara B. Obery ed., 2009),
available at https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/levi-lincoln-0
[http://perma.cc/CK8A-7BLQ].
82 President Thomas Jefferson, Proclamation Appointing a Day of Thanksgiving and
Prayer (Nov. 11, 1779), http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/01-03-02-0187
[http://perma.cc/2CWW-5WCN].
83 From Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Miller, 23 January 1808, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jefferson/99-01-02-7257 [http://perma.cc/VVU8-WSJH]
(last modified June 29, 2017).
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Jefferson steadfastly believed it was not the responsibility of the
president to direct a religious activity. Even if no legal
compulsion accompanies the president’s rhetoric, these official
Thanksgiving Proclamations have the power to produce
social pressure, inequality, and religious division among the
American people.
James Madison, who played an instrumental role in the
construction and congressional passage of the religion clauses of
the First Amendment, shared Jefferson’s constitutional worries
and spent decades expressing his disapprobation with
Thanksgiving Proclamations and similar practices. In his
Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments,
Madison expounded his belief in a meaningful separation of
church and state.84 Madison’s petition argued a government
could only secure religious equality for its citizens if it abstained
from establishing a single faith or using public resources to
support religion.85 Religious life would thrive best, Madison
reasoned, when it was divorced from government aid and our
political institutions would operate most effectively when they
did not depend on religious alliances.86
Madison’s commitment to a mutually beneficial divorce
between church and state elucidates his discomfort with
presidential Thanksgiving Day Proclamations. Unlike Jefferson,
Madison did make such Proclamations while President. He was,
however, cognizant of the public concern over the constitutionality
and propriety of “religious Proclamations” coming from the
presidency, and he wrote quite a bit about these religious
exercises (even to President James Monroe).87
In his Detached Memoranda, Madison deemed the
appointment and use of legislative chaplains to be

84 Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments, [ca. 20 June] 1785,
F OUNDERS O NLINE , http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163
[http://perma.cc/2ZEU-W4Q9] (last modified June 29, 2017).
85 See id.
86 See id. (“If ‘all men are by nature equally free and independent,’ all men are to be
considered as entering into Society on equal conditions; as relinquishing no more, and
therefore retaining no less, one than another, of their natural rights. Above all are they to
be considered as retaining an ‘equal title to the free exercise of Religion according to the
dictates of Conscience.’ Whilst we assert for ourselves a freedom to embrace, to profess
and to observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny an
equal freedom to those whose minds have not yet yielded to the evidence which has
convinced us.”).
87 See From James Madison to James Monroe, 11 December 1818, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0339 [http://perma.cc/4QTD-XTCF]
(last modified June 29, 2017).
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unconstitutional. 88 Immediately following this evaluation, he
articulated why “[r]eligious proclamations by the Executive
recommending thanksgivings & fasts are shoots from the same
root with the legislative acts reviewed.”89 Madison went into
detail on this point, recounting his legal, political, and historical
“objections” to these Proclamations. These objections include the
national government’s lack of legal authority to instruct religious
activities such as prayer, the Proclamation’s offering the
impression of an established national religion, and the possibility
that politicians and political parties would use these prayers to
serve political ends.90
In an 1822 letter to Edward Livingston, Madison again
identified Thanksgiving Proclamations as a practice that
compromised “a perfect separation between ecclesiastical & Civil
matters” in the United States.91 Madison complained: “There has
been another deviation from the strict principle, in the Executive
Proclamations of fasts and festivals; so far at least as they have
spoken the language of injunction, or have lost sight of the
equality of all Religious Sects in the eye of the Constitution.”92
Madison remained hopeful, though, about the future of religious
liberty, telling Livingston: “I have no doubt that every new
example will succeed, as every past one has done, in shewing
that Religion & Govt. will both exist in greater purity, the less
they are mixed together.”93
Madison’s optimism was not entirely misplaced. The
presidents immediately succeeding Madison stopped the practice.
It was not until the 1860s, more than forty years after the last
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamation was made, that Moses
spoke again.
V. ON NON-CONCLUSIONS AND THERMIDOR
The political power of presidential rhetoric, the development
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and the opinions of a few,
long-dead Founding Fathers—where does all this leave us? Some
may think it leads to a robust constitutional claim against
presidential Thanksgiving Proclamations. Others may pray that
88 Detatched Memoranda, CA. 31 January 1820, FOUNDERS ONLINE, http://founders.
archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-01-02-0549 [http://perma.cc/64V2-WW3R] (last modified
June 29, 2017).
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 From James Madison to Edward Livingston, 10 July 1822, FOUNDERS ONLINE,
http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/04-02-02-0471 [http://perma.cc/WU5T-CSLA]
(last modified June 29, 2017).
92 Id.
93 Id.
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it leads nowhere—drowned out by at least an equal number of
political, scientific, legal, and historical materials and
counterclaims. Let’s leave that necessary dialectic for a different
day and another law review article. Until then, remaining
puzzles (or excursus):
Some Thanksgiving Proclamations have been neither as
separationist as President Obama’s nor as catechismal as
President Bush’s or President Eisenhower’s. The subject of
President Jimmy Carter’s 1979 Thanksgiving Day Proclamation
was hope and determination.94 President Carter highlighted the
countless obstacles through which the American people have
persevered: Pilgrims struggling on a new continent, a later
generation maintaining faith during the Revolutionary War, and
subsequent Americans remaining confident in the nation’s future
even as the Civil War raged.95 This Thanksgiving Proclamation
was dedicated to a people who always made it through, who were
virtuous, successful, and capable of finding their way out
of trials.
Near the end of his Proclamation, President Carter did “ask
all Americans to give thanks on that day for the blessings
Almighty God has bestowed upon us, and seek to be good
stewards of what we have received.”96 But the President’s
broader message to the United States seems to have been one of
collective praise and unity, encouraging citizens to “be thankful
in proportion to that which we have received, trusting not in our
wealth and comforts, but in the strength of our purpose.”97
...
“I have seen these people,” the Lord said to Moses, “and they are a
stiff-necked people. Now leave me alone so that my anger may burn
against them and that I may destroy them. Then I will make you into
a great nation.”
But Moses sought the favor of the Lord his God. “Lord,” he said, “why
should your anger burn against your people, whom you brought out of
Egypt with great power and a mighty hand? Why should the
Egyptians say, ‘It was with evil intent that he brought them out, to
kill them in the mountains and to wipe them off the face of the earth’?
Turn from your fierce anger; relent and do not bring disaster on your
people. Remember your servants Abraham, Isaac and Israel, to whom
you swore by your own self: ‘I will make your descendants as
numerous as the stars in the sky and I will give your descendants all

94 President Jimmy Carter, Thanksgiving Day Proclamation 4693 (Sept. 28, 1979),
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=31444 [http://perma.cc/BMJ2-YCTY].
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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this land I promised them, and it will be their inheritance
forever.’” Then the Lord relented and did not bring on his people the
disaster he had threatened.
Moses turned and went down the mountain with the two tablets of the
covenant law in his hands. They were inscribed on both sides, front
and back. The tablets were the work of God; the writing was the
writing of God, engraved on the tablets.
When Joshua heard the noise of the people shouting, he said to Moses,
“There is the sound of war in the camp.”
Moses replied: “It is not the sound of victory, it is not the sound of
defeat; it is the sound of singing that I hear.”
When Moses approached the camp and saw the calf and the dancing,
his anger burned and he threw the tablets out of his hands, breaking
them to pieces at the foot of the mountain. And he took the calf the
people had made and burned it in the fire; then he ground it to
powder, scattered it on the water and made the Israelites drink it.98

98

Exodus 32: 9-20.

Promoting Executive Accountability Through
Qui Tam Legislation
Randy Beck*
The United States government has experienced a profound
rebalancing of power over the past century as authority has
shifted from the legislative branch to the executive branch.1 In
domestic affairs, much federal law now comes from agencies
operating under broad statutory mandates, and the tasks of
weighing conflicting interests, devising specific regulatory
standards, and setting enforcement priorities often fall to the
executive.2 In the international sphere, there has been a rapid
expansion in the number of agreements negotiated unilaterally
by the executive branch, without submission to the Senate for
ratification as treaties.3 With respect to military affairs,
presidents have become increasingly comfortable with unilateral
decisions to initiate combat and have sometimes side-stepped
even the post-hoc congressional review process contemplated by
the War Powers Resolution.4

* Justice Thomas O. Marshall Chair of Constitutional Law, University of Georgia
School of Law. The research for this essay was conducted while the author was a Garwood
Visiting Fellow in the James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at
Princeton University. I would like to express my appreciation to Tom Campbell for his
comments on a draft of this essay.
1 Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of
Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 444–45 (2012) (“The power of the modern presidency has
been enhanced by the gradual accumulation over time of an extensive array of legislative
delegations of power. The complexities of the modern economy and administrative state,
along with the heightened role of the United States in foreign affairs, have necessitated
broad delegations of authority to the executive branch.”).
2 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L.
REV. 953, 961–62 (2016) (delegations of authority by Congress have increased the power
of the executive branch, particularly in light of legislative gridlock); PHILIP HAMBURGER,
IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 111–28 (2014) (detailing numerous mechanisms
through which executive branch agencies exercise legislative functions).
3 See Treaties, UNITED STATES SENATE https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/
history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#3 (last visited May 10, 2017) [http://perma.cc/876PNYLL]; Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties’ End: The Past, Present, and Future of International
Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1258–60 (2008) (375 treaties
entered into by the U.S. from 1980–2000, compared to 2744 congressionally authorized
executive agreements).
4 Douglas Kriner, Accountability Without Deliberation? Separation of Powers in
Times of War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1284 (2015) (“Since Truman, all presidents have
asserted the office’s unilateral authority to order American military forces abroad, absent
explicit congressional authorization, to pursue a wide range of policy goals.”); see also Eric
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The increasing power of the executive branch underscores
the importance of effective mechanisms to enforce legal
constraints on executive conduct. The Constitution imposes on
the president the duty to “take [c]are that the laws be faithfully
executed,”5 and affords him the ability to respond to misconduct
by his subordinates.6 But relying on the executive branch to
police its own members will often prove inadequate due to
unavoidable conflicts of interest and the difficulty of managing a
vast bureaucracy. Congress can conduct occasional oversight
hearings to investigate the legality of executive actions, but
cannot directly respond to executive misconduct except through
cumbersome processes like lawmaking or impeachment.7 That
leaves the option of judicial enforcement of the law in suits by
persons outside the executive branch. However, this mechanism
can be stymied through application of Article III standing
principles and other justiciability rules like the political question
doctrine.8 In short, there may be many instances in which
potentially illegal executive conduct goes unaddressed due to
limitations of the standard options for ensuring executive branch
legal compliance.
In a forthcoming article, I review the history of a now
largely-abandoned method for enforcing the law against
government officials.9 From the fourteenth-century through the
establishment of the United States government, it was very
common for Anglo-American legislatures to regulate government
officials through qui tam legislation. A qui tam statute allowed
any member of the community to collect a fine for violation of a
legal duty, and keep part of the proceeds, even if the litigant did

A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485, 497–98
(2016) (noting partisan invocation of constitutional and War Powers Act restrictions in
response to unilateral executive military interventions in Grenada, Panama, Serbia and
Libya); Bradley & Morrison, supra note 1, at 440–47 (explaining reasons it can be easier
for the executive branch to act than the legislative branch).
5 U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1.
6 See Jurisdiction of Integrity Comm. When Inspector Gen. Leaves Office After
Referral of Allegations, 2006 WL 5779980, at 3–4 (O.L.C. Sept. 5, 2006).
7 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951–59 (1983)
(Congress must comply with bicameralism and presentment requirements when acting to
change legal rights, duties or relations of persons outside the legislative branch); U.S.
CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3 (impeachment procedures), § 7 (procedures for passage of legislation).
8 See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 575–78 (1992) (applying standing
doctrine to reject case against executive branch official); Stephen I. Vladeck, War and
Justiciability, 49 SUFFOLK L. REV. 47, 47–48 (2016) (courts avoided ruling on the merits of
Vietnam War cases in various ways including standing and political question grounds).
9 Randy Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials: Constitutional
Implications of a Neglected History, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
[hereinafter Beck, Qui Tam Litigation Against Government Officials].
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not have a particularized injury as required by modern rules
of standing.10
This essay will consider the possibility of selectively reviving
the tradition of qui tam legislation to enforce particular legal
duties of executive branch officials. By overcoming Article III
standing concerns, qui tam legislation has the capacity to fill
gaps left by more common methods of enforcing the law. At the
same time, introducing a profit motive into law enforcement
carries risks that legislators should take into account. Part I will
briefly describe the history of qui tam regulation of government
officials in England, the early American states and the first two
Congresses, and discuss the Supreme Court’s conclusion that qui
tam litigation satisfies Article III standing requirements.11
Part II will consider hypothetical qui tam legislation to enforce
executive branch legal duties in three areas: (1) expending funds
without a supporting congressional appropriation, or refusing to
spend funds as directed by statute; (2) pursuing military action
in violation of the War Powers Resolution; and (3) using
private email systems for public business.12 Part III briefly
considers downsides of reviving qui tam legislation to regulate
executive officials.13
I. QUI TAM REGULATION OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
The fourteenth-century English Parliament faced significant
challenges in providing for enforcement of laws governing a large
country with a dispersed population.14 Some legislation was less
problematic because it was designed to benefit private citizens
individually. Violation of this kind of statute could be addressed
through litigation pursued by the victim of illegal conduct.15 The
more difficult problem arose when a law protected interests of
the entire community or of the central government, rather than
individual citizens. Today, government officials typically enforce
such laws. In the fourteenth-century, however, there were far
fewer government officials, and those at the local level might not

10 Id. at 3; see also Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771–78
(2000) (finding qui tam plaintiff satisfied Article III standing requirements, even though
suing based on injury to the United States).
11 See infra notes 14–34 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 35–73 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 74–81 and accompanying text.
14 See Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui Tam
Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 567 (2000) [hereinafter Beck, English Eradication].
15 See, e.g., Statute of Labourers, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 1 (1349) (cause of action for party
“damnified” by food merchant charging excessive prices, but also allowing qui tam
enforcement as a backup).
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vigorously enforce laws designed to advance goals of the
central government.16
Parliament developed the qui tam statute to prevent underenforcement of penal statutes, which could deprive laws of their
deterrent effect.17 The typical qui tam statute imposed a legal
obligation, specified a forfeiture for violation, and provided that
any person could sue to collect the penalty, with the informer
entitled to keep a percentage (usually half) if successful.18 The
statutory authorization for anyone to sue, and the bounty offered
to the successful informer, effectively deputized any member of
the community to enforce the law, vastly expanding available law
enforcement resources.19
Most English qui tam statutes regulated private conduct,
often commercial in nature.20 Early on, however, Parliament also
deployed qui tam statutes to enforce specified duties of
government officials. Initially, such qui tam provisions were used
as a supplement to regulation of private commercial conduct,
promoting integrity and diligence among regulatory officials. For
instance, fourteenth-century statutes permitted qui tam actions
against officials who traded in regulated commodities or who
were less than diligent in enforcing regulatory requirements.21
Over time, though, Parliament expanded the practice to take in
an increasing array of officials performing a growing list of
functions, e.g., purveyors acquiring goods for the royal household,
ecclesiastical judges exceeding the limits on their jurisdiction,
officials responsible for enforcing religious uniformity laws,
revenue officers handling tax receipts, and individuals serving in
Parliament despite a statutory disqualification.22
Regulation of government officials through qui tam
legislation was widely practiced in the American colonies and
early states. Qui tam monitoring was used to promote statutory
compliance by an enormous variety of state officials, particularly
those performing decentralized functions such as road
construction and maintenance, judicial administration, and

Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 567.
Id. at 568 (qui tam statute increased chances statutory forfeiture would be
enforced). The qui tam label derives from a longer Latin phrase that can be translated
“who pursues this action on our Lord the King’s behalf as well as his own.” Vt. Agency of
Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 768 n.1 (2000).
18 Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 552–53 (describing characteristics of
qui tam statutes).
19 Id. at 569.
20 Id. at 570–71.
21 See Beck, supra note 9, at 22–24.
22 See id. at 25–29.
16
17
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regulation of commercial activities.23 It was common for early
states to rely on qui tam oversight to ensure lawful conduct by
officials performing functions critical to public confidence in
government, such as conducting elections and collecting taxes.24
The United States Constitution was ratified against the
backdrop of over four and a half centuries in which AngloAmerican legislatures had often regulated government officials
through qui tam legislation.25 It should come as no surprise,
then, that the earliest Congresses extensively employed qui tam
statutes to regulate both private parties and executive branch
officials. Statutes enacted in the first two Congresses included
qui tam provisions applicable to federal revenue officers, census
workers, Treasury officials, postal workers, and those regulating
trade with Native American tribes.26 Qui tam regulation of
executive branch officials disappeared over time as the growing
number of government employees reduced the need for qui
tam oversight and the demand for professionalization of public
service prompted movement away from profit-motivated law
enforcement mechanisms.27 There can be no doubt though that
supervising the legality of executive branch conduct through qui
tam litigation was understood as a permissible legislative option
when the Constitution took effect.
The case for selective qui tam monitoring of the executive
branch rests on the Supreme Court’s understanding of
standing principles flowing from the Article III “case or
controversy” requirement. The Court has articulated a familiar
injury-causation-redressability test for evaluating a litigant’s
standing to sue: “The plaintiff must have suffered or be
imminently threatened with a concrete and particularized ‘injury
in fact’ that is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial
decision.”28 For a quarter century, the Supreme Court has
said that the requirement of a “particularized” injury—i.e., one
that affects the plaintiff in a manner distinct from the public
at large—represents part of the “irreducible constitutional
minimum” of standing.29 This particularized injury requirement
is often applied to deny standing in cases against the executive
Id. at 29–42.
Id. at 45–49.
25 Id. at 63.
26 See id. at 50–62.
27 See generally NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (2013) (detailing the shift away from
profit-incentivized enforcement of the laws).
28 Lexmark Int’l Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014).
29 Id. (quoting Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
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branch, with courts dismissing claims that present only
“generalized grievances” about the legality of government conduct.30
Notwithstanding the rule that standing requires a
particularized injury, the Court has found that qui tam litigation
satisfies Article III requirements. In Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, the Court considered a
False Claims Act case in which a qui tam “relator” (i.e., informer)
alleged that a federal grant recipient submitted false claims to
the Environmental Protection Agency in an effort to obtain
excess grant funds.31 The Court recognized that the relator had
no personal injury in fact; the only particularized injury was
suffered by the government.32 The Court nevertheless found
Article III standing on the theory that the statute’s qui tam
provision acted as a partial assignment to the relator of the
government’s claim.33 The Court’s finding of standing for
informers was supported by the “long tradition of qui tam actions
in England and the American Colonies,” a history “well nigh
conclusive with respect to the question before us here:
whether qui tam actions were ‘cases and controversies of the sort
traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial
process.’”34 Since qui tam litigation allows the informer to
challenge the legality of conduct that inflicts no particularized
harm on the litigant, it creates the possibility of enhancing the
legal accountability of executive officials in situations where
private suits might easily be dismissed as generalized grievances.
II. POSSIBLE MODERN APPLICATIONS OF QUI TAM LEGISLATION TO
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH
Qui tam legislation offers a potentially appealing mechanism
for promoting legal compliance by executive branch officers
because it allows judicial consideration of legal challenges that
might otherwise fail for lack of standing. Let’s consider
three types of legal duties that might be enforceable through qui
tam monitoring.
A.

Reinforcing the Congressional Power of the Purse
The Constitution vests in Congress broad control over the
use of public money. Congress has the affirmative power “to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defense and general
See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. at 571–78.
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 770 (2000).
See id. at 772–73.
33 Id. at 774.
34 Id. at 766–77 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83,
102 (1998)).
30
31
32
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Welfare of the United States.”35 This power is reinforced by a
negative prohibition: “No money shall be drawn from the
Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by law.”36
Administrations of both major political parties have sometimes
sought to circumvent the congressional power of the purse. The
Nixon Administration famously asserted an authority to
“impound” public funds, refusing to spend money on grounds
unrelated to the congressional spending program in question.37
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, was found to
have violated the Constitution by sending money to insurance
companies under the Affordable Care Act without a supporting
congressional appropriation.38
Standing doctrine tends to foreclose many lawsuits
challenging the use of public money.39 In Frothingham v. Mellon,
the Supreme Court determined that taxpayer status did not give
an individual standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
federal expenditure.40 An individual’s interest in money in the
U.S. Treasury “is shared with millions of others, is comparatively
minute and indeterminable, and the effect upon future taxation,
of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the
preventive powers of a court of equity.”41 This bar to taxpayer
standing has long been understood as one application of the
generalized grievance principle.42 Other case law has strictly
limited lawsuits by individual members of Congress seeking to
protect legislative powers.43 The recent case challenging
Affordable Care Act payments to insurers satisfied standing
concerns only because an entire house of Congress decided to file
suit, something that would be impossible in many cases.44
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
See Train v. City of N.Y., 420 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1975) (finding the statute did not
permit Environmental Protection Agency to allocate less funds for municipal sewage and
treatment facilities than Congress authorized for appropriation); Adam Rozenzweig,
The Article III Fiscal Power, 29 C ONST. C OMM. 127, 138–39 (2014) (discussing
impoundment controversy).
38 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 185 F. Supp. 3d 165, 174–75
(D.D.C. 2016).
39 See, e.g., Brown v. Ruckelshaus, 364 F. Supp. 258, 265 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (plaintiff
lacked standing to challenge Environmental Protection Agency’s withholding of funds).
40 Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923).
41 Id. at 487.
42 See Turner v. City & Cty. of S.F., 617 Fed. Appx. 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2015)
(claim asserted as taxpayer could not be pursued in federal court because only raised
generalized grievance).
43 See, e.g., Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 830 (1997) (holding individual members of
Congress lacked standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act).
44 U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 80–81
(D.D.C. 2015).
35
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There is precedent for using qui tam legislation to monitor
government officials in connection with fiscal matters, as in the
English and American statutes that regulated tax collection
efforts.45 Caswell v. Allen46 was an early American case against
one of the county supervisors of Cayuga County, New York. The
New York legislature had instructed the county to raise up to
$800 in tax revenues to build a fireproof clerk’s office near an
anticipated new courthouse.47 The defendant joined the majority
that voted down a proposal to comply with the legislative
directive. A qui tam informer then sued the defendant under a
statute imposing a $250 forfeiture on any county supervisor who
neglected or refused to follow a law directing the county to levy
funds for public buildings.48 The issue on appeal was whether the
legislation concerning funds for a clerk’s office was mandatory or
discretionary. The appellate court concluded that the legislation
imposed a mandatory duty to raise revenue for a clerk’s office
and therefore granted a new trial against the defendant.49
A modern qui tam statute could be used to reinforce
Congress’ power of the purse. The statute could impose a
forfeiture on any executive official who refused to spend funds
where a statute made the expenditure mandatory, or who
authorized an expenditure that was not supported by a
congressional appropriation. The qui tam provision would
overcome Article III objections and eliminate the barrier to
adjudication created by the rule against taxpayer standing.
B.

Preserving the Congressional Role in Military Affairs
The constitutional allocation to Congress of the power to
“declare war” has proved ineffective in ensuring congressional
control over the use of military force. Our political and legal
institutions early on accepted the lawfulness of military
engagements that involved no such declaration.50 In the
aftermath of the Vietnam War, Congress sought to reinvigorate
the legislative role in military decision-making by adopting the
War Powers Resolution (“WPR”). The provisions are complex, but
the key points can be outlined succinctly. The president must

See supra notes 22, 24 and 26 and accompanying text.
7 Johns. 63 (N.Y. 1810).
Id. at 63.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 68–69.
50 Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2059–60 (2005) (“One reason is historical practice.
Starting with early conflicts against Indian tribes and the Quasi-War with France at the
end of the 1700s, the United States has been involved in hundreds of military
conflicts that have not involved declarations of war.”).
45
46
47
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consult with Congress whenever possible before introducing
military forces into actual or imminent “hostilities,”51 and must
report such deployments to Congress.52 As a general rule, the
resolution instructs the president to terminate the deployment of
troops unless Congress within sixty days declares war or adopts
“specific authorization” for the use of force.53 Authorization may
not be inferred from a provision of an appropriation statute
unless it “specifically authorizes the introduction of United
States Armed Forces into hostilities” and states that it is
intended to satisfy the WPR authorization requirement.54
Many observers argue that certain recent military operations
have violated the letter or spirit of the WPR. President Clinton
continued U.S. participation in the NATO bombing of Kosovo
beyond the sixty day limit of the WPR based on the theory that
Congress authorized the action through an appropriation
provision, even though the statute rejects authorization by that
means.55 President Obama claimed that extended participation
in the NATO operation in Libya was not subject to the WPR
because our drone and bombing attacks did not amount
to “hostilities.”56
Qui tam legislation was used historically to regulate militia
service, enforcing duties such as showing up for training
exercises with the necessary equipment.57 Could qui tam
legislation potentially help Congress in the higher profile context
of enforcing the WPR? Imagine a law imposing qui tam
forfeitures on executive branch officials for acts such as
(1) introducing troops into hostilities (perhaps accompanied by
further definition of the term) without consulting with Congress
in a situation where such consultation was possible, (2) failing to
report to Congress within a specified time period after troops
have been introduced into hostilities, or (3) continuing

50 U.S.C. § 1542.
Id. § 1543(a).
Id. § 1544(b).
54 Id. § 1547(a)(1).
55 See Jason Reed Struble & Richard A.C. Alton, The Legacy of Operation Allied
Force: A Reflection on Its Legality Under United States and International Law, 20 MICH.
ST. INT’L L. REV. 293, 310–13 (2012). But see Abraham D. Sofaer, The War Powers
Resolution and Kosovo, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 71, 76–77 (2000) (arguing WPR provision
preventing appropriations from serving as approval of a military operation is
legally ineffective).
56 Jack Goldsmith & Matthew Waxman, Obama, Not Bush, Is the Master
of Unilateral War, N EW R EPUBLIC (Oct. 14, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/
article/119827/obamas-war-powers-legacy-he-must-seek-congressional-authorization
[http://perma.cc/R34Z-8NPC] (stating that Obama administration construction of War
Powers Resolution in connection with Libya operations was unconvincing).
57 See Beck, supra note 9, at 43.
51
52
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participation in hostilities for more than 60 days without
congressional authorization in the required form.
A qui tam provision could remove the Article III standing
barrier that courts have invoked to avoid adjudication of claims
under the WPR.58 Cases seeking to enforce the resolution could
nevertheless face other barriers to justiciability, especially the
political question doctrine.59 The application of the political
question doctrine depends on a variety of factors,60 but the force
of some factors could be minimized by careful drafting. For
instance, if Congress specified objective conditions that would
trigger legal duties under the WPR and made clear that the
duties are mandatory rather than discretionary, a court would be
less likely to find a lack of “judicially discoverable and
manageable standards” for resolving the case or the need for “an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion.”61 Dismissal on political question grounds would be
more likely if the legal question arguably turned on the exercise
of military or foreign affairs expertise. For instance, a court
might find a political question if the executive branch was
offering an intelligence-based analysis of the historical
relationship between Al Qaeda and the Islamic State to argue
that operations against the Islamic State come within the scope
of the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against Al
Qaeda.62 On the other hand, if the sole issue was whether
Congress had authorized a military action and (as in Kosovo)
the only arguable authorization was an appropriations bill,
the questions presented to the court would seem more legal
in nature.
While a qui tam provision might help get a WPR case into
court, it is an open question whether one should view that as a
desirable outcome. Some people would consider it unwise to place

58 See Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 20–26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding members
of Congress lacked standing to challenge Kosovo bombing as a violation of the War
Powers Resolution).
59 See Vladeck, supra note 8, at 47–48 (noting that in cases challenging the Vietnam
War, courts avoided decisions on the merits in “every way imaginable,” including political
question doctrine).
60 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
61 Id.
62 See MATTHEW C. WEED, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R43760, A NEW
AUTHORIZATION FOR USE OF MILITARY FORCE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: ISSUES AND
CURRENT PROPOSALS (2017) (“During his Administration, President Obama stated that
the Islamic State can be targeted under the 2001 AUMF because its predecessor
organization, Al Qaeda in Iraq, communicated and coordinated with Al Qaeda; the Islamic
State currently has ties with Al Qaeda fighters and operatives; the Islamic State employs
tactics similar to Al Qaeda; and the Islamic State, with its intentions of creating a new
Islamic caliphate, is the ‘true inheritor of Osama bin Laden’s legacy.’”).
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the president under legally enforceable constraints—even the
loose constraints of the WPR—in dealing with rapidly changing
international threats. Moreover, those desiring a greater
congressional voice in decisions about the use of military force
might find that overcoming barriers to adjudication proved a
Pyrrhic victory. A court could resolve a case on the merits by
reading the WPR in a manner deferential to the executive.63
C.

Preserving Official Email Records
So far, we have discussed use of qui tam legislation to allow
adjudication of high-level legal conflicts central to the allocation
of power between Congress and the president. Disputes over the
congressional appropriations power or the president’s unilateral
initiation of military action are important, but not frequent.
Historically, qui tam legislation was more often used to monitor
activities of lower level officials performing the mundane daily
tasks of government. For instance, qui tam statutes were often
used in past centuries to promote thorough and accurate record
keeping by public officials. English law used qui tam remedies to
regulate record keeping regarding sales of horses at fairs and
markets.64 Early state laws deployed qui tam monitoring to
ensure that records of a justice of the peace were preserved upon
death or resignation.65 The first Congress adopted qui tam
legislation to govern creation and retention of census records.66
To round out our discussion of the potential use of qui tam
legislation to promote executive branch accountability, it is worth
considering a modern record-keeping question that has been
much in the news. The 2016 presidential election was roiled by
disclosures that the Democratic nominee had set up a private
email system through which she sent and received official
electronic correspondence in her role as Secretary of State.67
Official inquiries confirmed that an earlier Republican Secretary
of State had also conducted some government business through a
private email account.68 Doing public business on a private email
63 Given longstanding questions about the constitutional status of the War Powers
Resolution, the risk of an executive-leaning interpretation might be heightened by the
canon of constitutional avoidance. See Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 380–81 (2005) (“If
one of [two plausible statutory constructions] would raise a multitude of constitutional
problems, the other should prevail—whether or not those constitutional problems pertain
to the particular litigant before the Court.”).
64 Beck, supra note 9, at 25.
65 Id. at 37–38.
66 Id. at 56–57.
67 OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, ESP-16-03, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY:
EVALUATION OF EMAIL RECORDS MANAGEMENT AND CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS 23–25
(2016) (discussing private email use by Secretary Clinton).
68 Id. at 21–22 (discussing private email use by Secretary Powell).
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system can undermine laws designed to ensure preservation of
records, promote transparency, and reduce cybersecurity risks.69
Notwithstanding campaign criticism of the Democratic nominee’s
email practices, at least six close advisors to President Trump
have reportedly used private email accounts since the election to
discuss White House matters.70
A private litigant might have difficulty challenging an
official’s practice of using a private email account for public
business. Assuming a relevant cause of action could be identified,
the plaintiff could be deemed to allege a generalized grievance
widely shared by the public at large.71 One public interest
organization did manage to secure disclosure of many of the
Secretary of State’s emails using the Freedom of Information Act
(“FOIA”), presumably establishing a particularized injury based
on the rights created by a FOIA request.72 However, since FOIA
applies to an agency, it may not guarantee accountability of
individual federal employees, and a significant number of agency
records are exempt from release under the statute.73
So how might qui tam legislation address modern concerns
about email preservation by government employees? Imagine a
statute imposing a $1000 forfeiture for each email sent in the
course of a government employee’s official duties using a private
email account. Statutory definitions could be used to create
greater certainty about when an email was subject to the statute.
A safe harbor provision could protect a government employee
from suit if an email sent from a private account was promptly
archived among the government’s official email records. The
legislation could be enforced by any qui tam informer with

69 See id. at 2–19 (record keeping, preservation and transparency requirements), 26–
34 (cybersecurity policies). Lisa Jackson, director of the Environmental Protection Agency
in President Obama’s first term, raised comparable transparency and record-keeping
concerns (though not necessarily cybersecurity risks) when she sent emails on a second
government email account registered under the alias “Richard Windsor.” Julian Hattam,
Former EPA Chief Under Fire for New Batch of ‘Richard Windsor’ Emails, THE HILL
(May 1, 2013), http://thehill.com/regulation/energy-environment/297255-former-epa-chiefunder-fire-for-new-batch-of-richard-windsor-emails [http://perma.cc/7E5L-5FXN]; see also
Jaime Dupree, Documents Show Ex-Attorney General Lynch Used “Elizabeth Carlisle” as
Email Alias, ATLANTA JOURNAL CONST. (Aug. 7, 2017), http://jamiedupree.blog.ajc.com/
2017/08/07/documents-show-ex-attorney-general-lynch-used-elizabeth-carlisle-as-emailalias/ [http://perma.cc/864J-T3RP].
70 Matt Apuzzo & Maggie Haberman, At Least 6 White House Advisers Used Private
Email Accounts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/25/us/
politics/private-email-trump-kushner-bannon.html.
71 See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77 (1974) (lawsuit
challenging failure to release list of CIA expenditures presented a generalized grievance).
72 See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Kerry, 844 F.3d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (case seeking
to recover emails from former Secretary of State’s private email accounts not moot).
73 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1976) (FOIA exemptions).
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evidence of an email violating the prohibition, with a successful
informer entitled to keep half (or perhaps all) of the recovery as
a bounty.
At this point, some readers may be thinking this sounds like
an excellent way to ensure that executive branch employees
comply with legal obligations flowing from their role as public
servants. Other readers, however, may be getting nervous as
they contemplate how the statute might work in practice. Would
federal employees be distracted from their jobs by burdensome
litigation? Would profit-motivated lawyers or informers develop a
business of targeting careless federal employees? Would the
statute be put to political use by interest groups or partisan
warriors? Such concerns underscore some of the possible
downsides of qui tam regulation and help explain why such
statutes fell into disfavor in England and the United States. The
next section discusses some of the problems with qui tam
legislation and whether those problems might be ameliorated
through legislative drafting.
III. POSSIBLE DRAWBACKS TO QUI TAM REGULATION OF
EXECUTIVE OFFICIALS
England eliminated its remaining qui tam statutes in 1951.74
I have argued elsewhere that recurring problems experienced in
the history of qui tam enforcement flowed from a conflict of
interest built into the design of the legislation. A qui tam statute
deputizes private citizens to represent the interests of the public
in enforcing the law, but simultaneously offers the informer a
private financial interest in the outcome. When these public and
private interests pull in different directions, informers may
pursue private gain at the expense of the public good.75
English informers sometimes negotiated secret settlements
with those allegedly in violation of qui tam legislation, keeping
payments that should have been shared with the government.76
They sometimes pursued fraudulent or malicious claims.77 They
brought suit in inconvenient locations, making it burdensome for
defendants to litigate.78 They sought to enforce statutes in ways
that undermined the public good.79 Legislative responses to such
abuses were only partially successful.80 Professional informers,

74
75
76
77
78
79
80

Beck, English Eradication, supra note 14, at 548–49.
Id. at 549.
Id. at 580–81.
Id. at 581–83.
Id. at 583.
Id. at 583–85.
Id. at 574–75, 590.
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who made a livelihood through qui tam litigation, came to
be despised by the public and were sometimes beaten by
angry mobs.81
It is easy to imagine a modern informer’s conflict of interest
producing analogous problems to those experienced in English
history. If a statute permitted qui tam litigation against
executive branch employees for failing to perform some legal
duty, lawyers might be tempted to build a practice around suing
agents of the federal government. The public interest could be
undermined by distracting employees from their duties, or by
applying the statute to the limits of its language. If there was a
qui tam statute penalizing government use of private email, for
instance, and a federal employee used a private email system to
deal with an unanticipated emergency, a public prosecutor would
have discretion to decline to bring a case, reasoning that the
public interest did not warrant prosecution. The bounty provision
of a qui tam statute, however, tends to make profit maximization
the goal of law enforcement. Qui tam legislation can effectively
eliminate the disinterested exercise of prosecutorial discretion for
the benefit of the public.
Such problems could potentially be ameliorated in the
drafting process. Perhaps Congress could make qui tam bounties
very low, so that such litigation would only be pursued by public
interest firms motivated by considerations other than profit.
Perhaps the legislation could place a cap on the amount a person
could earn under a qui tam statute, preventing individuals from
becoming professional informers. There could be a mechanism for
the Department of Justice to dismiss qui tam cases it considered
abusive or contrary to the public interest. At the very least,
however, the problems that led England to eliminate qui tam
legislation midway through the last century suggest that
Congress should exercise great caution, carefully weighing costs
and benefits, before deploying this particular tool for promoting
executive branch accountability.

81

Id. at 576–78.

Congress, the Courts, and Party
Polarization: Why Congress Rarely Checks
the President and Why the Courts Should Not
Take Congress’s Place
Neal Devins
This essay will make two points about Congress-President
relations—one is clearly right and the other is debatable. One
point (clearly right) is that Congress is generally uninterested in
the Constitution, especially with regard to asserting its
institutional prerogatives and checking presidential unilateralism.
This was largely the case before polarization set in (around 1995)
and polarization has significantly exacerbated this phenomenon. In
particular, lawmakers from the president’s political party no
longer assert institutional prerogatives to resist presidential
encroachments; consequently, Congress cannot act in a
bipartisan way to block presidential initiatives. The second point
(debatable) is that courts should not relax standing to sue
limitations so that disappointed lawmakers can take their
grievances to the judiciary when Congress is unable to stand up
for itself. Polarization may make it harder for Congress to check
the president, but polarization also cuts against lawmakers (or
even institutional counsel) speaking Congress’s voice in court.1
More than that, polarization has fueled the growing perception
that the court itself is polarized and politicized—so much so that
the courts have good reason to steer from this political thicket.
In making these points, I will focus my attention on how
Congress turns to the courts to assert its institutional
prerogatives. Section I will talk generally about structural and
practical limits to Congress advancing a pro-Congress theory of
either statutory or constitutional interpretation before the courts.
 Sandra Day O’Connor Professor of Law and Professor of Government, William and
Mary School of Law. Thanks to Tom Campbell for asking me to be a part of this
symposium and for his insights.
1 When a House or Senate committee seeks to enforce a subpoena in court, the
committee is speaking its own voice and not Congress’s voice. See Tara Leigh Grove &
Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
571, 622 (2014). For this reason, the broader point I make against lawmaker efforts to
speak Congress’s voice in court does not apply to committee enforcement of subpoenas.
See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
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The centralization of litigation authority in the Department of
Justice is a manifestation of these limits. Section I will also
explain how it is that Congress sought to combat these limits in
separation of powers disputes with the executive—giving itself
some institutional voice in court by creating the Office of House
Counsel and the Senate Office of Legal Counsel. Section II will
examine how both lawmakers and institutional counsel have
become less and less interested in separation of powers disputes
as Congress has become more polarized. In particular,
lawmakers have shifted away from institutional pursuits and
toward the pursuit of social issues that divide the parties. In
making this point, I will also highlight how party polarization
has transformed Congress—from mildly disinclined to think
about its institutional prerogatives under the Constitution, to
outright uninterested in protecting its role in our system of
divided government. Correspondingly, lawmakers of the
president’s party no longer use their oversight authority to check
the president; lawmakers of the opposition party see oversight
principally as a vehicle to embarrass their political opponents.
Section III will consider the ramifications of increasing party
polarization on the standing of lawmakers and institutional
counsel in disputes with the executive. These disputes are
increasingly visible; opposition party lawmakers have strong
incentive to discredit the president and frustrate his agenda.
Litigation is a visible, low cost way to pursue their interests. For
this very reason, however, litigation exacerbates polarization and
threatens the judiciary. The judicial role in checking the
executive should not expand to take into account Congress’s
failure to assert its institutional prerogatives through traditional
Article I devices, most notably, oversight and legislation.2
I. WHY CONGRESS (PRETTY MUCH) LEAVES IT TO THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO DEFEND CONGRESS’S INTERESTS
IN COURT3
The competing incentives of the president and Congress
explain both Congress’s disinterest in asserting its institutional
2 My argument will be limited to the question of whether polarization—as a policy
matter—cuts in favor of more expansive standing for lawmakers and institutional
counsel. I will not engage in constitutional analysis to ascertain the appropriate scope of
lawmaker or institutional standing. For recent treatments of this constitutional question,
see Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1311 (2014);
Jonathan Remy Nash, A Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 114 MICH. L. REV.
339 (2015); and Michael Sant’Ambrogio, Legislative Exhaustion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1253 (2017).
3 This Section builds on and occasionally borrows from earlier writings of mine,
most notably, Neal Devins, Why Congress Does Not Challenge Judicial Supremacy, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1495 (2017).
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prerogatives and the related dynamics of Congress’s interface
with both the executive and the courts. To start, presidents are
well positioned to simultaneously advance policy goals and
expand the power of the presidency. In particular, presidents
always claim they are constitutionally authorized to pursue
favored policy positions and, as such, presidents are consistent
and persistent advocates of executive power. Political scientists
Terry Moe and William Howell put it this way: “[W]hen
presidents feel it is in their political interests, they can
put whatever decisions they like to strategic use, both in
gaining policy advantage and in pushing out the boundaries of
their power.”4
For its part, Congress possesses ample weapons to defend its
institutional interests, but has little incentive to make use
of these tools. While each of Congress’s 535 members have
some stake in Congress as an institution, lawmakers regularly
trade-off their interest in Congress as a strong, vibrant
institution. They put aside institutional interests in favor of their
interests in reelection, in serving on a desired committee, in
assuming a position of leadership in their party, or in advancing
their and their constituents’ policy goals. Lawmakers, in other
words, are “trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: all might benefit if
they could cooperate in defending or advancing Congress’s power,
but each has a strong incentive to free ride in favor of the
local constituency.”5
This collective action problem stymies Congress in two
distinctive ways. First (and most obviously), lawmakers have
little interest in defending congressional prerogatives. On war
powers, for example, lawmakers rarely assert Congress’s
constitutional powers. In particular, today’s military is all
volunteer and generally supportive of presidential power;
lawmakers feel little constituent or public pressure to reign in
presidential warmaking.6 Consequently, notwithstanding the
clear constitutional mandate that Congress “declare war,”7
lawmakers often find it more convenient to acquiesce to
presidential unilateralism than to face criticism that they
obstructed a necessary military operation.8
4 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action,
15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 138 (1999).
5 Id. at 144.
6 Neal Devins, Bring Back the Draft?, 19 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1107, 1110 (2003).
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
8 See LOUIS FISHER, CONGRESSIONAL ABDICATION ON WAR AND SPENDING 166–68
(2000). For this very reason, institutionally-minded members of Congress have turned to
the courts to preserve their constitutional powers. For one prominent example, see
Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 19, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2000), which holds that members of
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Second, the policy interests of lawmakers are not necessarily
in sync with the institutional interests of Congress. Lawmakers
opposed to legislation on policy grounds often embrace a narrow
view of congressional power. Indeed, constitutional objections to
legislation are typically raised by lawmakers and those who
oppose legislation on policy grounds.9 Examples abound,
including the Affordable Care Act, the Defense of Marriage Act,
and the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act. Lawmakers opposed
to these statutes filed briefs arguing that Congress was without
constitutional authority to enact these measures. 10
With little interest in abstract discussions of legislative
power, there clearly is no appetite for pursuing institutional
goals such as enhancing pro-Congress interpretations of the
Constitution or federal statutes. Likewise, lawmakers have little
interest in contemplating potential judicial review of their
handiwork—policy goals are pursued when a bill is enacted and a
court decision striking down legislation is seen as an opportunity
to reassert policy priorities through the enactment of new
legislation.11 When amending legislation in the wake of a judicial
decision, lawmakers do not engage with the courts; they rather
“make[] clear concessions to the Court’s decision” by embracing
the same policy through alternative means.12 As Second Circuit
Judge Robert Katzmann put it, “Congress is largely oblivious of
the well-being of the judiciary as an institution.”13 Consider, for
example, issues of statutory interpretation that cut to the core of
congressional priorities and prerogatives. The simple fact is that
“[n]o one ever lost an election by saying ‘I’m for purposivism’”;14
Congress could not sue President Bill Clinton for alleged violations of the War Powers
Resolution in his handling of the war in Yugoslavia. For additional discussion, see infra
Section III, which argues that institutionally-focused lawsuits are a rarity and that most
lawmakers seek partisan advantage through litigation.
9 See J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE
IMPACT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 143–44 (2004).
10 See generally Neal Devins, Measuring Party Polarization in Congress: Lessons
from Congressional Participation as Amicus Curiae, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 933 (2015).
For reasons I will detail in Section II, polarization exacerbates this phenomenon, as
today’s lawmakers are more apt to file briefs and make other formal declaration that
Congress has exceeded its powers.
11 See PICKERILL, supra note 9, at 23.
12 Id. at 49.
13 ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY
7 (1988).
14 Victoria F. Nourse, Overrides: The Super-Study, 92 TEX. L. REV. 205, 214 (2014).
In 2016, congressional Republicans pursued legislation that would eviscerate judicial
deference to agency interpretations. See Vikram David Amar, Chevron Deference and the
Proposed “Separation of Powers Restoration Act of 2016”: A Sign of the Times,
JUSTIA: VERDICT (July 26, 2016), https://verdict.justia.com/2016/07/26/chevron-deferenceproposed-separation-powers-restoration-act-2016-sign-times [http://perma.cc/DVG4-WFF9].
When introduced, this bill—which was never taken up in the Senate—sought to call
attention to the “lawless” Obama administration; lawmakers were not concerned with
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and with no constituency payoff, there is no lawmaker interest
in thinking about statutory interpretation techniques used by
the courts.
A.

Congress and the Department of Justice
Another manifestation of lawmaker uninterest in
institutional power, including judicial review of Congress’s
handiwork, is the centralization of litigation authority in the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”). First, although the defense of
federal statutes is an executive function,15 Congress limits its
influence over legal arguments made in court by centralizing
litigation authority this way. Second (and somewhat relatedly),
the entity within Congress that oversees the Justice Department
(the House and Senate Judiciary Committees) have incentive to
embrace judicial supremacy—potentially at the expense of proCongress theories of interpretation. Neither of these claims is
obvious, so let me provide more details.
First, by centralizing litigation authority in the DOJ, subject
matter committees in Congress focus their energies on
policymaking; for most lawmakers, what matters is direct
influence through the writing of laws, the holding of hearings,
and related investigations.16 Unlike legislation and oversight,
legal arguments made in court are abstract and indirect.
Historically, however, Congress understood that decentralized
lawyering enhanced lawmaker power vis-à-vis the executive.
Before 1870, there was no DOJ; before 1933, powerful agency
solicitors controlled statutory and administrative legal
arguments.17 These solicitors had strong ties with congressional
oversight committees and, at this time, oversight committees
held greater sway with executive branch legal arguments.18
Recognizing the costs of decentralization to executive power,
Franklin Delano Roosevelt reorganized executive branch
litigation, transferring litigation authority from agency solicitors
congressional power, and indeed the bill sought to sift power to the courts, not Congress.
In July 2017, the bill was reintroduced by Senate Republicans. See Press Release,
Orrin Hatch, Senate Leaders Introduce Bill to Restore Regulatory Accountability
(July 19, 2017), https://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/7/senate-leadersintroduce-bill-to-restore-regulatory-accountability [http://perma.cc/R32G-23RD].
15 For reasons why I think this is so, see Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 625. For a
competing perspective, see Jack M. Beermann, Congress’s (Less) Limited Power to
Represent Itself in Court: A Comment on Grove and Devins, 99 CORN. L. REV. ONLINE 166,
168 (2014).
16 See Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White
House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1998).
17 See NANCY V. BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789–1990, at 62–63 (1992).
18 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 207.
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to the DOJ.19 In so doing, presidents—through their Attorneys
General—have greater control of the administrative state. In
particular, unlike agency solicitors (who are more beholden to
oversight committee chairs than to the White House), the
Attorney General is typically a close political ally of the
president, often involved in the president’s personal and political
life.20 Correspondingly, since the mission of DOJ attorneys is to
defend the interests of the United States (rather than a single
agency whose interests may be in conflict with other agencies),
there is less chance that either narrow constituent interests or
congressional committees will capture the DOJ. Indeed,
defenders of centralized litigation authority highlight the
perceived need for the government to make consistent legal
arguments across a range of cases.21 More to the point, “DOJ
attorneys may well see the president as their client.”22 Indeed, as
Sai Prakash and I have examined in our study of DOJ refusals to
defend federal statutes, the DOJ fends off agency rivals and
thereby enhances its status within the executive by advancing a
pro-president legal policy agenda.23
Congress’s willingness to go along with DOJ control of
litigation is a byproduct of the intensity of preferences within
Congress and the executive branch. For reasons already noted,
presidents push for centralization of litigation authority in the
DOJ. The DOJ too is a fierce advocate for centralization; the
power and prestige of the DOJ is tied to litigation authority,
and the DOJ’s preference to control litigation far exceeds
departmental and agency interests in decentralized
arrangements. After all, agency heads have substantial power to
advance policy preferences through their power to regulate and
19 See Neal Devins, Government Lawyers and the New Deal, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 237,
256–58 (1996).
20 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219.
21 For a summary of DOJ arguments in support of centralized litigation authority,
see The Attorney General’s Role as Chief Litigator for the United States, 6 Op. Att’y Gen.
47 (1982). For a fuller presentation and critique of those arguments, see Neal Devins &
Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558 (2003).
22 Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219; see also Geoffrey P. Miller, Government
Lawyers’ Ethics in a System of Checks and Balances, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1293, 1298 (1987).
The DOJ, however, is not simply a lackey of the president; witness, in particular, the
battle between President Trump and his DOJ.
23 See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 507, 537–59 (2012); see also Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,
Presidential Power, Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097,
1105–06 (2013). In making this point, a distinction must be drawn between DOJ efforts to
advance the president’s legal policy agenda and possible DOJ investigations into criminal
conduct by high-ranking executive officials. The power of the DOJ is hinged both to its
advocacy of the executive’s legal policy agenda and its reputation for neutrality in the
pursuit of criminal investigations.
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their work with congressional committees in shaping federal
law.24 More significantly, the DOJ’s overseers in Congress are
strong supporters of centralization. The power of the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees is significantly moored to the
power of the DOJ and, as such, the Judiciary Committees look for
ways to strengthen DOJ control of litigation. For example, when
other congressional committees contemplate shifting litigation
authority away from DOJ and to a regulatory agency, the
Judiciary Committees fight back. Michael Herz and I recount
several such episodes in our study of DOJ centralization of
litigation authority, including fights between the House
Judiciary and Energy and Commerce Committees regarding the
enforcement of environmental laws.25
The interests of the DOJ and Judiciary Committees also
coalesce on judicial supremacy. Both are strong advocates of
judicial power as the power of the DOJ and Judiciary
Committees is moored to the courts. When the federal courts play
a significant policy-making role, the power of the DOJ to speak
the government’s voice is at its apex, as is the power of the
Judiciary Committees to oversee the DOJ. For this very reason,
the DOJ embraces a duty to defend federal statutes that sees the
Supreme Court as speaking the last word on the Constitution’s
meaning; as a result, the Senate Judiciary Committee typically
demands that Solicitor General and Attorney General nominees
formally commit to the defense of federal statutes.26
Furthermore, Judiciary Committee members demonstrate
respect for basic legal principles, “adher[ing] to formal rules
against interfering in any way with ongoing litigation, and
maintain[ing] a general policy that no bill should take effect
retroactively.”27 In other words, unlike power committees who
pay no attention to potential judicial roadblocks to favored
policy initiatives, the Judiciary Committees are court-centric
and conform to—rather than challenge—judicial limits on
congressional power.28

24 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 219 (explaining why agencies do not see
litigation authority as core to their powers); see also Devins, supra note 3, at 1528–30
(highlighting agency role in drafting legislation).
25 See Devins & Herz, supra note 16, at 221–22.
26 For a discussion of DOJ views, see The Attorney General’s Duty to Defend and
Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legislation, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 275 (1980). For a
general discussion of the incentives of the DOJ, Congress, and the White House, see
Devins & Prakash, supra note 23, at 538–59.
27 Mark C. Miller, Congress and the Constitution: A Tale of Two Committees, 3
SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 317, 338 (1993).
28 See id. at 317–62 (contrasting House Judiciary Committee to Energy and
Commerce Committee).
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B.

Congress in Court
The fact that Congress largely leaves it to the DOJ to speak
the government’s voice in court does not mean that lawmakers
never turn to the courts for recourse. In Section II, I will discuss
lawmaker amicus filings as well as the practices of institutional
counsel for the House and Senate—analysis that will highlight
how party polarization has contributed to declining lawmaker
interest in Congress’s institutional authority vis-à-vis the
president. In Section III, I will discuss court-imposed limits on
the standing of disappointed lawmakers to defend Congress’s
institutional prerogatives. For the balance of this section,
I will examine the political conditions that led to the
establishment of institutional counsel—conditions that speak to
the circumstances when Congress will overcome the disincentives
that typically result in lawmaker disinterest in Congress’s
institutional authority.
The Office of Senate Legal Counsel was created by statute in
1978 as part of Watergate-era reforms to bolster congressional
interests in separation of powers disputes; the Office of House
Counsel was created by an administrative directive of the House
Speaker Tip O’Neill in 1976.29 Differences between the two offices
reflect differences in the chambers. The House is controlled by
the majority party and the House counsel essentially works for
the majority party.30 Senate norms traditionally favor
bipartisanship and the Senate counsel acts at the behest of a
supermajority of members from both parties.31 Indeed, Senate
norms of bipartisanship explain the unwillingness of the House
to sign onto a joint congressional counsel that would serve both

29 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 608–14. In addition to creating an Office of
Senate Legal Counsel, Congress also mandates that the DOJ notify that office when it
would not defend federal statutes (principally so that institutional counsel could defend
congressional interests in separation of powers disputes). See 2 U.S.C. § 288e(a) (2006)
(allowing the Senate counsel—when authorized—to appear in legal actions regarding “the
powers and responsibilities of Congress under the Constitution”). The House
Bipartisanship Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) directs the House counsel. See Grove &
Devins, supra note 1, at 618. The BLAG is controlled by the majority party and has
always backed majority party preferences.
30 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618–19. In litigation defending the Defense
of Marriage Act, the House counsel responded to Democratic complaints that it did not
speak the voice of the entire House by acknowledging that it represents the views of the
majority party. Id. In lower court filings, the counsel stated that although it “seeks
consensus whenever possible, it functions on a majoritarian basis, like the institution it
represents.” E.g., Brief for Defendant–Appellant the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of
the United States House of Representatives, Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d
Cir. 2012) (No. 12-2335), 2012 WL 3647722, at *3 n.1.
31 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 612–21 (noting that Senate counsel action
must be approved by two-thirds of a group made up of four members of the majority party
and three members of the minority party).
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chambers and serve as a bulwark against presidential power.32
Notwithstanding arguments that “[n]either House acting alone
can assert the prerogative of representing the Congress,”33 House
leadership feared that a nonpartisan joint office might not give
voice to majority preferences in the House.
The willingness of lawmakers to back the creation of an
Office of Senate Legal Counsel to advance the Senate’s
institutional interests in the courts is a byproduct of unique
political circumstances—so much so that the creation of this
office is the exception, which proves the rule of lawmaker
disinterest in protecting their institutional prerogatives. During
the Watergate era (1972–1978), Democrats occupied every
ideological niche and there were several liberal Republicans.34
For this reason, George Wallace justified his third-party bid for
the presidency by claiming that “there was not a ‘dime’s worth of
difference’ between the two parties.”35 Senate committees, for
example, often made use of unified staff—rather than divide staff
by majority or minority party.36 With no meaningful ideological
gap between the parties, bipartisanship was possible and
Congress sometimes saw itself as an institution with a distinctive
set of interests that set it apart from the White House.
Nonetheless, lawmakers still needed to see personal political
advantage in asserting Congress’s institutional interests and, as
such, the previously discussed collective action problem typically
stood as a roadblock to Congress’s asserting institutional
interests, especially on matters as abstract as litigation
authority. Watergate, however, made fears of presidential
overreach politically salient and lawmakers rallied behind
several significant legislative proposals designed to limit
the president and protect Congress.37 Congress enacted the

32 See id. at 612–13; see also Rebecca Mae Salokar, Legal Counsel for Congress:
Protecting Institutional Interests, 20 CONGRESS & PRESIDENCY 131 (1993).
33 Public Officials Integrity Act of 1977, Blind Trusts and Other Conflict of Interest
Matters: Hearing on S. 555 Before the Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 95TH CONG. 61
(1977) (statement of Sen. James Abourezk, D–S.D.).
34 See SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION IN CONGRESS 27–35 (2008); see
also S TEVEN S. S MITH & G ERALD G AMM, The Dynamics of Party Government in
Congress, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 147–49 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce L. Oppenheimer
eds., 9th ed. 2009).
35 Richard Pearson, Ex-Gov. George C. Wallace Dies at 79 in Alabama, WASH. POST
(Sept. 15, 1998), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1998/09/15/ex-gov-georgec-wallace-dies-at-79-in-alabama/f77a36e4-0689-4086-9b96-b0d9a293cd57/?utm_term=.f39
de6268e8c [http://perma.cc/4CEW-DRM5].
36 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1543 (2005).
37 See Neal Devins, Presidential Unilateralism and Political Polarization: Why
Today’s Congress Lacks the Will and the Way to Stop Presidential Initiatives, 45
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 395, 401–06 (2009).
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War Powers Resolution (overriding a presidential veto),38 the
1974 Impoundment Control Act,39 and the 1978 Ethics in
Government Act.40 All these statutes were politically popular; all
these statutes responded to presidential overreach of core
legislative powers.
In Section II, I will explain why today’s Congress lacks the
will and the way to assert institutional prerogative against the
executive. Before doing so, let me close this section out
by highlighting ways that institutional counsel—before
polarization set in—defended congressional prerogatives in court.
In the 1970s and 1980s, lawmakers were more willing to embrace
a unified view of Congress’s institutional prerogatives. In
particular, rather than see themselves as Democrats or
Republicans, lawmakers were sanguine with institutional
counsel defending the constitutionality of federal statutes or
seeking to enforce committee subpoenas against executive
officials. Consider, for example, Congress’s participation in two
Reagan-era separation of powers disputes, Immigration
and Naturalization Services v. Chadha (legislative veto) and
Bowsher v. Synar (deficit reduction).41 In both cases, counsel for
the House and Senate participated in oral arguments and filed
briefs supporting Congress.42 In both cases, party identity did
not matter—majority Democrats in Chadha initially litigated
the dispute against the Carter administration; majority
Senate Republicans litigated the Synar dispute against the
Reagan administration.43
The ability and willingness of institutional counsel to
advance Congress’s institutional interests in a bipartisan way, as
we will see, stands in stark contrast to practices in today’s
polarized Congress. At the same time, the participation of
institutional counsel in earlier separation of powers disputes
should not be seen as a departure from this section’s central
claims about lawmaker uninterest in institutional authority
and lawmaker acquiescence to judicial supremacy. To start,
institutional counsel embraced separation of powers litigation
and believed in judicial supremacy. At the time of Chadha
and Bowsher, the status of the lawyers in these offices
War Powers Resolution, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–48 (1973).
Impoundment Control Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 682–88 (1974).
40 Ethics in Government Act, P.L. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
41 Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
42 See Devins, supra note 10, at 950.
43 In Chadha, no member of Congress filed an amicus brief. In Bowsher, there were
two amicus briefs filed—one in support of the statute and one in opposition of the statute.
These briefs were bipartisan. See id. at 1017–19.
38
39
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hinged on their participation in marque separation of powers
disputes—high profile cases where they were arguing against top
DOJ lawyers, cases which often made their way to the Supreme
Court.44 In the case of the Senate counsel, the very purpose of her
office was to provide a bipartisan institutional voice to Senate
interests in separation of powers disputes against the
president.45 Likewise, the power of these lawyers derives from
the power of the courts; institutional counsel pursue high
visibility cases in court and embrace the Court’s power to say
what the law is. For their part, lawmakers in the pre-polarization
era were generally uninterested in the work of institutional
counsel and acquiesced to a system that largely ran itself. In
other words, after lawmakers put in place institutional counsel in
the Watergate era, lawmakers did not see these offices as
partisan tools and passively went along with the efforts of these
offices to advance Congress’s institutional interests in court.46
II. HOW PARTY POLARIZATION HAS CONTRIBUTED TO GROWING
LAWMAKER DISINTEREST IN CONGRESSIONAL PREROGATIVES
Section I highlighted the collective action problem that limits
lawmaker interest in institutional power disputes, including
lawmaker support of DOJ control of government litigation.
Section I also explained the creation of institutional counsel for
Congress in the Watergate era, highlighting how the political
salience of presidential power disputes overcame collective action
limitations. In this section, I will focus on today’s polarized
Congress. I will highlight how polarization exacerbates the
collective action problem. I will also look to changing practices in
both institutional counsel litigation and lawmaker amicus filings
to document the diminishing salience of institutional power
disputes to members of Congress.
A.

Polarization and the Collective Action Problem
Polarization diminishes the ability of lawmakers to work
together to defend Congress’s institutional prerogatives. Unlike
the Watergate era, today’s lawmakers increasingly identify with
party-defined messages and seek to gain power by advancing
44 I speak from personal experience. In 1985, I had preliminary conversations with
then-Senate counsel Mike Davidson about working in his office.
45 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 611–13.
46 I certainly do not mean to suggest that all lawmakers were disengaged in
separation of powers disputes. During the pre-polarization period, there were certainly
institutionally-minded members in the House or Senate who cared deeply about
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. At the same time, these members were a fairly
small minority and most members were subject to the collective action problem discussed
earlier in this section.
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within their respective party.47 Correspondingly, Republicans
and Democrats are increasingly at odds with each other and
increasingly unlikely to find common ground. Measures of
ideology reveal that all or nearly all Republicans are more
conservative than the most conservative Democrats.48 Likewise,
with the demise of Northern Rockefeller Republicans and
Southern Democrats, there is no meaningful ideological range
within either party.49
The rise in party-line voting exemplifies this phenomenon.
Unlike the Nixon impeachment (where—even before the release
of Watergate tapes—seven of seventeen Republicans joined
House Democrats in voting for articles of impeachment),50 the
“virtual party line votes in the House and the Senate” during the
Clinton impeachment “reinforce[d] public perception of the
intense partisanship underlying the proceedings.”51 The filibuster
is another example. In November 2013, the then-Democratic
Senate made it more likely that presidential lower court
nominations would be approved by repealing the filibuster
for those nominees; in April 2017, the Republican Senate
likewise made it more likely that presidential Supreme Court
nominations would be approved by repealing the Supreme Court
filibuster rule.52 These examples, while striking, typify current
practice: House Republicans vote with their party around
47 See Neal Devins, Party Polarization and Congressional Committee Consideration
of Constitutional Questions, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 737, 756–59 (2011); see also C. LAWRENCE
EVANS, Committees, Leaders, and Message Politics, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED 238
(Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 7th ed. 2001).
48 See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTE VIEW (Jan. 18, 2013),
web.archive.org/web/20131116022958/http://polarizedamerica.com/political_polarization.asp.
49 See Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and
Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000, 47 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 305, 314–15 (2003).
50 See Richard K. Neumann, Jr., The Revival of Impeachment as a Partisan Political
Weapon, 34 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 161, 255 (2007). Republicans and Democrats also came
together in subpoenaing information from the executive and going to court to seek
enforcement of that subpoena. See Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725, 726–27 (D.C. Cir. 1974). For additional discussion, see
Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 600–01.
51 MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 193 (2d ed. 2000).
52 See Jeremy W. Peters, In Landmark Vote, Senate Limits Use of the Filibuster, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 21, 2013), https://nyti.ms/17Qt6DG; see also Amy Davidson Sorkin, Gorsuch
Wins, The Filibuster Loses, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/
news/amy-davidson/gorsuch-wins-the-filibuster-loses [http://perma.cc/3PHE-CAEJ]. In
September 2017, Senate Republicans threatened to do away with the so-called blue slip, a
practice which allows Senators from the state of residence of a federal judicial nominee to
delay or potentially block a vote on the nominee. See Karoun Demirjian, McConnell Wants
to End Practice of Allowing Senators to Block Appeals Court Judges, WASH. POST
(Sept. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/senate-gop-leader-wants-toend-practice-of-allowing-senators-to-block-circuit-court-judges/2017/09/13/d10aa028-98d911e7-87fc-c3f7ee4035c9_story.html?utm_term=.81217b34d9a0 [http://perma.cc/UQZ9-AR5U].
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ninety-two percent of the time and Senate Democrats vote with
their party around ninety-four percent of the time.53
When it comes to oversight and hearings, party identity is
also key. Majority and minority staff no longer work together;
each side, instead, calls witnesses who support preexisting party
views.54 Oversight too is contingent on party identity. When the
majority party is the same as the president, oversight is lax;
when the government is divided, oversight is a top priority.55
Correspondingly, the House majority is willing to seek judicial
enforcement of subpoenas against high-ranking executive
officials during periods of divided government. When Democrats
controlled the House in 2007, the Bush administration’s firing of
U.S. attorneys prompted extensive oversight and litigation.56 In
the Fast and Furious gun running case of 2012–2013,
Republicans targeted Obama Attorney General Eric Holder.57 In
both these disputes, the minority filed competing briefs urging
judicial restraint.58
Party polarization, finally and most significantly, contributes
both to the rise of presidential unilateralism and to Congress’s
acquiescence to judicial supremacy. Members of the president’s
party are unlikely to check presidential priorities and,
consequently, the opposition party is unlikely to forge a
bipartisan coalition to check presidential power.59 Moreover, the
53 Elahe Izadi, Congress Sets Record for Voting Along Party Lines, NAT’L. J. (Feb. 3,
2014), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/62617 [http://perma.cc/9GLY-ND99].
54 See Neal Devins, The Academic Expert Before Congress: Observations and Lessons
from Bill Van Alstyne’s Testimony, 54 DUKE L.J. 1525, 1544 (2005).
55 See Devins, supra note 37, at 409.
56 See Philip Shenon, As New ‘Cop on the Beat,’ Congressman Starts Patrol, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 6, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/06/us/politics/06waxman.html.
57 See John Bresnahan & Seung Min Kim, Holder Held in Contempt of Congress,
POLITICO (June 28, 2012, 5:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2012/06/holder-held-incontempt-of-congress-077988 [http://perma.cc/8STK-YLEE]. Another manifestation of
polarization’s impact on Executive Branch-Congress dynamics is the March 2018 decision
of the Trump administration to turn over Obama-era documents on the Fast and Furious
investigation to Republican-led Congress. See Sarah N. Lynch, Trump administration to
provide records on Obama-era gun-smuggling probe, REUTERS (Mar. 7, 2018, 9:21 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-justice-guns/trump-administration-to-providerecords-on-obama-era-gun-smuggling-probe-idUSKCN1GJ2KH [http://perma.cc/DL54-VBTK].
58 See Jordy Yager, Dems File Brief Urging Court to Dismiss Issa’s Contempt Suit
Against Holder, THE HILL (Dec. 19, 2012, 9:34 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house
/273827-dems-file-brief-urging-court-to-dismiss-issas-contempt-suit-against-holder.com
[http://perma.cc/MN5W-KP94]. The partisan divide in these cases stands in sharp
contrast to the bipartisan efforts of the Watergate-era Congress to go to court to enforce a
subpoena against President Nixon. For additional discussion, see supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
59 I do not mean to suggest that the president’s party will never stand up to the
president. In 2017, Republicans in Congress joined Democrats to back sanctions
legislation against Russia for its meddling in the 2016 elections—legislation which was
seen as a rebuke to President Trump. See Elana Schor, Congress Sends Russia
Sanctions to Trump Desk, Daring a Veto, POLITICO (July 27, 2017, 1:55 PM),
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prospects of both parties coming together to advance Congress’s
institutional interests through the enactment of legislation is less
likely in divided government (and we have had divided
government thirty-six of the past fifty years). The result:
presidents act unilaterally and Congress stands aside. Sometimes
presidents advance new policies through executive orders (Clinton
on health care; Bush on faith based initiatives; Obama on
immigration);60 sometimes presidents take greater control of the
administrative state through Office of Management and Budget
regulatory review and related coordinating techniques.61
Polarization facilitates judicial supremacy for much the same
reason. Lawmakers are increasingly at odds about preferred
policies; on matters before the courts, lawmakers—as I will soon
discuss—increasingly file conflicting Democrat and Republican
amicus briefs. Consequently, courts are emboldened, as it is close
to unimaginable that lawmakers will stand together to advance
pro-Congress positions in ways that courts would take into
account.62 Polarization furthers judicial supremacy in other ways.
For example, polarization has resulted in a shift of power away
from congressional committees and to party leaders—so much
so that committee hearings related to constitutional and
statutory interpretation are now dominated by the court-centric
Judiciary Committees.63
Polarization and Amicus Briefs64
Lawmakers regularly file amicus briefs in federal court
litigation, especially before the Supreme Court. From 1974–1985,
B.

http://www.politico.com/story/2017/07/27/russia-sanctions-bill-senate-to-pass-241034
[http://perma.cc/TM7H-4FQH]. At the same time, my bottom line claim is valid, that is,
today’s lawmakers rarely have incentive to check a president of their own party. Indeed,
Congressional Republicans backed President Trump’s efforts to discredit his own
Department of Justice and FBI by releasing memos and conducting oversight favorable to
the president. See also infra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing Republican
support for President Trump during the first months of his presidency). For a provocative
argument that Congress retains its core powers to check the president and that the
failure to act speaks more about the situational use of power (rather than the diminution
of power tied to polarization), see JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION:
LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017).
60 See Moe and Howell, supra note 4, at 165–66 (noting that only 3 of 1000 executive
orders from 1973–1998 were overridden by legislation). For a more complete (and current)
inventory, see WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF
DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 112–20 (2003).
61 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 H ARV . L. R EV . 2245,
2247–49 (2001).
62 See Devins, supra note 3, at 1518–19; see also LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 14–17 (1998) (arguing that the Supreme Court calibrates its
decisions to take into account the possibility of congressional disapproval).
63 See Devins, supra note 36, at 762–63.
64 This subsection is drawn from Devins, supra note 10.
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930 lawmakers signed onto fifty-two briefs in forty-five cases;
from 2002–2013, those numbers skyrocketed—3807 lawmakers
signed onto one hundred fifty briefs in eighty-six cases.65 This
spike in filings, however, does not speak to greater lawmaker
interest in Congress’s institutional authority, nor greater
congressional influence before the Court. In fact, differences
between the less polarized 1974–1985 period and the highly
polarized 2002–2013 period speak both to the rise of partisanship
in lawmaker briefs and a shift away from less divisive separation
of powers cases to salient divisive issues like abortion, health
care, and gay rights. During the 1974–1985 period, fifteen briefs
(twenty-nine percent) were filed on social issues and twenty
(thirty-eight percent) were filed on institutional issues.66 During
the 2002–2013 period, fifty-two (thirty-five percent) were filed on
social issues and forty-three (twenty-nine percent) were filed on
institutional issues.67 Individual lawmakers were twice as likely
to sign onto social issue briefs (1822 lawmakers; forty-eight
percent) than institutional briefs (926 signatories; twenty-four
percent).68 In the earlier period, lawmakers signed onto
comparable numbers of social and institutional issue briefs (388
lawmakers, forty-two percent for social issue briefs; 372
lawmakers, forty percent for institutional).69
More striking, today’s lawmakers focus almost exclusively on
the underlying policy dispute. Briefs are filed in cases that do not
implicate congressional power (affirmative action and legislative
prayer are two recent examples).70 The question of whether
congressional power is expanded or limited is of secondary
importance. Democrats backed the Affordable Care Act and
campaign finance laws and opposed the Defense of Marriage Act;
Republicans were on the opposite side of both issues.71
A closer look at abortion and separation of powers filings
backs up these claims. For abortion, lawmakers did not file any
amicus briefs in cases implicating state regulatory authority
until 1986; in 1980, a bipartisan coalition of 238 lawmakers (104
Democrats, 135 Republicans) filed a brief arguing that lawmaker
control over the appropriations process extended to the decision
not to fund abortions.72 Starting in 1986, however, lawmakers
Id. at 942–43.
Id. at 945–46.
67 Id. at 946.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 995–96, 999–1000.
71 Id. at 992–94, 998–99.
72 See Brief of Rep. Jim Wright et al. as Amici Curiae, Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980) (No. 79-1268), 1980 WL 339672, at *1–5.
65
66
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began to file in state as well as federal cases; partisan divisions
also emerged. Initially, competing briefs were filed by coalitions
dominated by Republicans or Democrats (pro-choice briefs were
ninety percent Democrats and pro-life briefs were ninety percent
Republicans).73 By 2014, most briefs were exclusively Democrat
or Republican filings. In the 2014 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby case
(involving the contraceptive mandate of the Affordable Care Act),
four of five briefs were one party briefs.74
Abortion briefs are striking for another reason—hundreds of
lawmakers sign onto these briefs (an average of 171 signatories
per case).75 In other words, lawmakers see abortion briefs as an
opportunity to register a policy preference on an issue that
divides the party. Lawmakers no longer care whether the
underlying issue implicates state or federal power. More striking,
even in cases implicating federal power, lawmakers now care
only about pro-choice or pro-life preferences and not about the
scope of federal power. Today, it is inconceivable that a broad
bipartisan coalition would back legislative power—as they did in
the 1980 abortion funding case.76 Instead, Democrats will resist
federal power to restrict abortion rights and back federal power
to guarantee abortion access; Republican views of federal power
are likewise contingent on whether pro-choice or pro-life policy
outcomes are at play. In the 2007 Gonzales v. Carhart case,
for example, Republicans uniformly backed and Democrats
uniformly resisted congressional power to impose a federal
partial birth abortion ban.77
Amicus filings in separation of powers cases highlight both
the growth of partisanship and the declining importance of
separation of powers issues to lawmakers. As noted, today’s
lawmakers are less likely to participate in disputes implicating
institutional power and less likely to sign onto briefs in cases
where briefs are filed. While House and Senate counsel
participation may deflate the number of signatories (a topic I will
address in the next subsection), it is quite clear that there is less
Devins, supra note 10, at 947.
Id. at 948.
75 Id. One hundred and seventy-one is the average number of briefs studied in my
earlier research on congressional amici.
76 In 2014, House Republican leadership filed a lawsuit against Obama
administration implementation of the Affordable Care Act—claiming that the
administration usurped Congress’s appropriations power. For their part, Democratic
leadership filed competing briefs—advancing a narrower view of the appropriations
power. See Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress in Support of Defendants’ Motion
for Summary Judgment, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53
(D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC), 2015 WL 10376844.
77 Devins, supra note 10, at 1014–15. All 152 Republican signatories supported the
law. Ninety-nine out of one hundred and one Democrat signatories opposed.
73
74
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interest in staking out a position in a separation of powers
dispute than a case implicating abortion or some other social
issue. For example, throughout the enemy combatant dispute, a
total of sixteen lawmakers signed amicus briefs and no amicus
briefs were filed by the House or Senate counsel.78 Additionally,
when an amicus brief is filed, there are relatively few brief
signers—roughly nineteen per brief as compared to 171 in
abortion cases.79
Separation of powers filings are revealing for other reasons.80
First, there is a growing trend towards partisan filings; recent
examples include George W. Bush litigation over enemy
combatants, Barack Obama litigation over recess appointments
and immigration, Donald Trump litigation over immigration.81
Second, although some bipartisan briefs were filed, lawmakers
were not motivated by a desire to preserve or expand
congressional power. In litigation over the item veto in the 1990s,
lawmakers defended delegating legislative power to the president
in order to facilitate their reputations as deficit hawks.82 In
related 2012 and 2014 litigation over the authority of Congress to
allow individuals born in Jerusalem to list Israel as their place of
birth, brief signers were interested in reaffirming their support
for Israel.83
Lawmaker amicus briefs reflect growing polarization in
Congress, including growing lawmaker disinterest in issues
implicating Congress’s institutional power. Moreover, with
increasing attention paid to short-term goals tied to advancing
party policy priorities, lawmakers are increasingly apt to
file briefs highlighting limits in legislative power. Relatedly,
today’s amicus briefs largely cancel each other out—coalitions
of Democrats and Republicans make competing arguments
about constitutionality so that there are roughly as many
briefs arguing that Congress is without authority as arguing
that Congress has constitutional authority. And if that isn’t
enough—these briefs are further limited by the fact that
Republicans and Democrats are inconsistent in their positions
Id. at 949.
Id. at 948. Nineteen is the average number of studied briefs in my
earlier research.
80 The balance of this paragraph is largely lifted from id. at 949–50.
81 Id. at 949; see also Seung Min Kim, Dem Lawmakers Back Brief Supporting
Obama’s Immigration Action, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://www.politico.com/story/
2016/03/obama-immigration-action-democrats-amicus-brief-220419 [http://perma.cc/BH6G4L5N]; Tal Kopan, Congressional Democrats Join Court Challenge to Trump’s Travel Ban,
CABLE NEWS NETWORK (Feb. 15, 2017, 3:28 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/15/politics/
democrats-amicus-brief-trump-travel-ban/index.html [http://perma.cc/9YT3-CFG4].
82 Devins, supra note 10, at 949–50.
83 Id. at 950.
78
79
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over time. The flashpoint in these briefs is the underlying
policy issue and not the more abstract question regarding the
scope of congressional power. For reasons I will now detail,
changes in the role of institutional counsel in Congress also
demonstrate growing partisanship and polarization in separation
of powers disputes.
C.

Polarization and the Changing Role of Institutional Counsel
Party polarization has reshaped the role of institutional
counsel. Gone are the days where institutional counsel served as
a bulwark against a too powerful executive—defending the House
and Senate in separation of powers lawsuits, typically speaking
the voice for both Democrats and Republicans.84 Indeed, in the
period before polarization, lawmakers typically did not file
amicus briefs and typically backed Congress as an institution
when they did file amicus briefs.85 At that time, the House and
Senate counsel often worked in tandem, participating in the
same cases and advancing the shared institutional interests
of the House and Senate in a strong Congress.86 Today,
House-Senate differences are on prominent display as
polarization has transformed the role of institutional counsel in
ways that reflect profound differences between the House and
Senate.
The Senate counsel was designed to reflect Senate norms of
bipartisanship and consensus. From 1978 (when the Office of
Senate Legal Counsel was first created) until 1995, the Senate
counsel regularly participated in litigation involving the
separation of powers. However, polarization has made bipartisan
consensus next to impossible; as a result, the Senate counsel is
largely moribund in the very separation of powers disputes that
were core to the creation of the office. With one notable exception
(that I will soon discuss), the Senate counsel has not locked horns
with the executive and defended congressional prerogatives
before the Supreme Court in any separation of powers dispute
since 1995.87 For example, in a 2014 dispute over the president’s
See Devins, supra note 10, at 950.
See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 617; Devins, supra note 10, at 950.
See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 614–22 (discussing efforts of House and
Senate counsel to coordinate filings in separation of powers litigation).
87 See id. at 617; see also Neal Devins, Counsel Rests, SLATE (Jan. 13, 2014, 5:55 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/01/the_senate_s_lawy
er_doesn_t_participate_in_important_litigation_against.html [http://perma.cc/3T3R-EU3N].
In a 2015 dispute regarding a federal statute intended to facilitate the collection of money
judgments brought by victims of terrorists acts, the Senate Counsel and Department of
Justice both filed amicus briefs backing up congressional authority. See Brief for the U.S.
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310
(2016) (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 9412676; Brief of Amici Curiae Former Senior Officials of
84
85
86
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purported end-running of the Senate’s confirmation power
through the use of recess appointments, the Senate counsel stood
on the sidelines while counsel for Senate Republicans filed briefs
and made oral arguments before both the D.C. Circuit and
Supreme Court.88
The one case where the Senate counsel did participate,
Zivtofsky v. Kerry, is the exception that proves the rule. The issue
in Zivtofsky was whether Congress could override State
Department policy to disallow individuals born in Jerusalem to
claim on their passports that they were born in Israel (so that
their passports would designate their birthplace as Jerusalem
and not Israel).89 Senate Democrats and Republicans did not
come together to defend Senate prerogatives; they came together
to support Israel. Lawmakers who signed amicus briefs in the
case included some of the most liberal Democrats and some of the
most conservative Republicans.90 These lawmakers regularly
signed onto single party briefs in other cases, but were united in
their support of Israel. Indeed, while 333 signatories of a proCongress amicus brief signed a letter to President Obama
affirming the “commitment to the unbreakable bond that exists
between our country and the state of Israel,”91 no member of the
Zivotofsky coalition spoke about the case’s separation of powers
implications on either the House or Senate floor.92
On the House side, polarization has played out in
fundamentally different ways, reflecting the fact that the House
counsel speaks the voice of the House majority. During periods of
unified government, the House typically leaves the president
alone—seeing the president as the leader of their party and
the Office of Legal Counsel in Support of Respondents, Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S.
Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770), 2015 WL 9412677.
88 See Devins, supra note 87. For their part, Senate Democrats too stood on the
sidelines, not wanting to embrace a circumscribed confirmation power and not wanting to
join Senate Republicans in their efforts to limit Obama administration efforts to fill
judicial and administrative vacancies. Id. In Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Noel Canning,
134 S. Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014), the Supreme Court unanimously rejected Obama
administration arguments and backed a larger Senate role.
89 Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2081–83 (2015). The Supreme Court ruled
that the president has complete power of recognition and that Congress cannot override
that power by statute. Id. at 2096.
90 Devins, supra note 10, at 954.
91 Letter by Representatives Steny Hoyer and Eric Cantor to Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton Reaffirming the U.S.-Israel Alliance, AIPC (Mar. 26, 2010),
https://www.aipac.org/-/media/publications/policy-and-politics/source-materials/congress
ional-action/2010/3_26_10__letter_to_secretary_of_state_re_us_commitment_to_israeli_
security_and_middle_east_peace.ashx. That letter was sent by 333 House members; a
nearly identical letter was sent by seventy-six Senators. See Ben Smith, 76 Senators Sign
on to Israel Letter, POLITICO (Apr. 13, 2010, 4:21 PM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/bensmith/2010/04/76-senators-sign-on-to-israel-letter-026380 [http://perma.cc/N5GN-Y4CG].
92 Devins, supra note 10, at 954.
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someone to shield from opposition party criticism.93 Oversight is
lax and the president and House speaker sound similar messages
on the issues that divide the parties. Needless to say, the House
counsel is not engaged in litigation disputes with the White
House during periods of unified government.94
During periods of divided government, however, the House is
increasingly willing to challenge presidential actions in court,
including lawsuits against presidential initiatives and subpoena
enforcement actions. As discussed earlier, the Democratic House
sought to enforce subpoenas against the George W. Bush
administration and the Republican House likewise sought to
enforce subpoenas against the Obama administration.95 More
telling, the Republican House challenged Obama administration
implementation of the Affordable Care Act, claiming that the
administration “spent billions of unappropriated dollars to
support the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” and that
“under the guise of implementing regulations, effectively
amended the Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate by
delaying its effect and narrowing its scope.”96 The House too has
pursued the defense of federal statutes that the executive refuses
to defend. Recent examples include Miranda override legislation

93 The Trump administration may ultimately become the exception that proves the
rule. At least until January 2018, however, Republicans in Congress—notwithstanding
some public criticism of the president—have largely backed President Trump and
certainly Republican lawmakers have not gone to court to challenge the president. See
Aaron Bycoffe, Tracking Congress in the Age of Trump, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 14, 2016
3:24 PM), https://projects.fivethirtyeight.com/congress-trump-score/ [http://perma.cc/
CG7L-YBV3]. Indeed, House Republicans backed President Trump’s efforts to discredit
his own bureaucracy by releasing a memo critical of the FBI. See supra note 59. At the
same time, there is reason to think that Republicans in Congress may see personal
advantage in criticizing the president and, as such, Congress may eventually step up its
oversight of the Trump administration. In late September 2017, for example, Republican
House overseers joined Democrats in seeking information regarding Trump
administration officials’ use of personal emails to conduct government business. See Mike
DeBonis, Gowdy Joins Democrats in Probing Trump Administration’s Use of Personal
Email, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/
wp/2017/09/25/gowdy-joins-democrats-in-probing-trump-administration-use-of-personalemail/?utm_term=.174e3bea8e4a [http://perma.cc/EKE6-7ZAC].
94 The only exception is a low salience separation of powers dispute regarding the
Federal Advisory Committee Act in 1993. See Memorandum from Jennifer Casazza, DOJ
Decline Defense Congressional Participation 6 (on file with author) (discussing the House
Counsel’s participation in Association of American Physicians and Surgeons v. Clinton,
997 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
95 See Shenon, supra note 56; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57.
96 U.S. House of Representatives. v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 57 (D.D.C. 2015).
The House also appeared as amicus in backing a state challenge to Obama administration
immigration initiatives. For additional discussion, see Brief for 172 Members of the U.S.
House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, infra note 106.
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(Dickerson v. United States) and the Defense of Marriage Act
(United States v. Windsor).97
Dickerson and Windsor reveal the profound impact of
polarization on the work of the House counsel. In periods of
divided government, the House counsel will advance majority
party preferences. In part, this means that the House counsel
will engage in disputes that have nothing to do with the
separation of powers—as the focus is advancing the policy
agenda of the House (and, for reasons discussed, separation of
powers gives way to social issues when Congress is polarized).98
In part, this means that the minority party in Congress will
publicly take issue with the House counsel. In both Dickerson
and Windsor, the House minority filed a competing brief to make
clear that the House counsel was both wrong on the merits and
spoke only for the majority party.99 Institutional power disputes
follow a similar script. The minority party will make competing
filings and the House counsel will focus her energies on highly
politicized matters, especially investigations intended to
embarrass high-ranking Executive Branch officials. Recent
examples include Democratic investigations of the U.S.
Attorneys’ firings under George W. Bush and Republican
investigations of Attorney General Eric Holder’s handling of the
Fast and Furious gun smuggling scheme.100
In today’s polarized Congress, the House and Senate counsel
no longer represent Congress’s institutional interests in disputes
with the president. The Senate counsel is largely enfeebled by
bipartisanship requirements. The House counsel represents the
majority party and is only interested in checking the president
during periods of divided government. Moreover, the House
counsel largely limits her intervention to highly politicized
disputes that divide Republicans and Democrats—so much
so that the minority party increasingly rebuts House counsel
filings with opposition briefs. Finally, as was true with
lawmaker amicus filings, institutional disputes are less critical
to institutional counsel and the social issues that divide the
97 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618; see also Dickerson v. United States, 530
U.S. 428 (2000); United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
98 See Shenon, supra note 56; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57.
99 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the House Democratic Leadership in Support of
Petitioner, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) (No. 99-5525), 2000 WL
126192; Jennifer Bendery, Defense of Marriage Act: House Republicans Tie Federal Gay
Marriage Ban to House Rules, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 23, 2014), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/01/02/defense-of-marriage-act_n_2399383.html [http://perma.cc/3XJR-ZC64].
100 See Shenon, supra note 56; Brian Montopoli, So Is This U.S. Attorney
Purge Unprecedented Or Not?, CBS N EWS (Mar. 14, 2007, 5:17 PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/so-is-this-us-attorney-purge-unprecedented-or-not/
[http://perma.cc/73UP-WEHQ]; Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 57.
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parties are increasingly likely to spill over to the work of
institutional counsel.
III. CONCLUSION: WHY EXPANDING LAWMAKER STANDING IS NOT
THE SOLUTION TO CONGRESSIONAL DYSFUNCTION
In turning back a lawsuit by members of Congress who
challenged the Reagan administration for subverting Congress’s
war making powers by backing the Contras, then-judge Ruth
Bader Ginsburg claimed that “Congress has formidable weapons
at its disposal—the power of the purse and investigative
resources far beyond those available in the Third Branch. . . . ‘If
the Congress chooses not to confront the President, it is not our
task to do so.’”101 This claim made sense in 1985 and even in 1993
when Judge Ginsburg was confirmed to the Supreme Court by a
resounding bipartisan vote of 96–3;102 at that time, the seeds of
polarization were planted but had not yet taken hold of Congress.
Today, the natural disinclinations of lawmakers to invest in
Congress as an institution have metastasized. The era of
presidential unilateralism has now taken hold as Congress lacks
the will and way to check the president and advance its
institutional interests.103
The question remains: Should the courts fill that void by
providing avenues for disappointed lawmakers to challenge the
president? After all, our system of checks and balances
anticipates some check on presidential unilateralism and judicial
intervention seems far more likely than Congress coming
together in a bipartisan way to place limits on presidential
entreaties. For institutionally minded lawmakers, court filings
may be the only real vehicle available to check the president’s
expansionist tendencies.
For the balance of this essay, I will explain why
polarization does not cut in favor of an expanded judicial
role—notwithstanding the fact that polarization cuts against

101 Sanchez-Espinoza v. Reagan, 770 F.2d 202, 211 (D.C. Cir 1985) (Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
102 Linda Greenhouse, Senate, 96-3, Easily Confirms Judge Ginsburg as a Justice,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/08/04/us/senate-96-3-easilyaffirms-judge-ginsburg-as-a-justice.html.
103 As noted earlier, the Trump administration may become the exception that proves
this rule. See Moe & Howell, supra note 4, at 138. Republicans (as of January 2018) are
generally backing the president and, consequently, reinforcing the central claims of this
essay. That may change and that change may add nuance to the claims made in this
paper. Nonetheless, I truly doubt that the actions of Congress during the Trump era will
undermine my central claims regarding congressional incentives. Furthermore, a tick up
in congressional oversight would cut in favor of my bottom line conclusions regarding
legislator standing to challenge the executive in court.
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Congress asserting its institutional prerogatives through the
legislative process. My argument is two-fold. First, lawmakers
will increasingly turn to the courts for partisan ends and,
relatedly, it is increasingly likely that there will be competing
factions of Democratic and Republican filings. In other words,
lawmakers will see courts as one more vehicle to articulate party
preferences and call attention to differences between the two
parties. These lawmakers speak for their political party; they do
not speak Congress’s institutional voice.
Consider four recent cases where the House of Representatives
squared off against the Obama administration—Committee
on Oversight and Government Reform v. Holder (where the
House sued Attorney General Holder for failing to turn over
requested documents in its Fast and Furious investigation);
United States House of Representatives v. Burwell (where the
House sued the Obama administration for implementing the
Affordable Care Act in ways that allegedly undermined House
prerogatives); United States v. Windsor (where the House
defended before the Supreme Court the DOMA after the Obama
administration refused to defend); and United States v. Texas
(where the House appeared before the Supreme Court as amicus
to challenge Obama’s immigration directive).104 In all four cases,
Republican lawmakers sought to embarrass the Obama
administration and/or advance favored policy priorities in the
courts;105 in all four cases, Democratic lawmakers filed competing
briefs defending the Obama administration.106 Needless to say, if
Democrats controlled the House there would be a raft of lawsuits
challenging the Trump administration.107 Indeed, Democratic

104 See Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform v. Holder, 979 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.
2013); U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2016); United
States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
105 See Bresnahan & Kim, supra note 56 (discussing Holder); see also Burwell, 130 F.
Supp. 3d 53; Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 618–19 (discussing DOMA); Brief for
Amicus Curiae the United States House of Representatives in Support of Respondents,
United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-674), 2016 WL 1377718.
106 See Yager, supra note 58; Brief of Amicus Curiae Members of Congress in Support
of Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell,
130 F. Supp. 3d 53 (D.D.C. 2015) (No. 1:14-cv-01967-RMC), 2015 WL 10376844; Brief of
172 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 40 U.S. Senators as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondent Edith Schlain Windsor, Urging Affirmance on the
Merits, United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 840029;
Brief of 186 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives and 39 Members of the U.S.
Senate as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, United States v. Texas, 809 F.3d 134
(5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-647), 2016 WL 891342.
107 For this very reason, there are real costs to a regime in which institutional counsel
for the House have standing to speak the House’s voice without allowing minority party
lawmakers access to the courts to raise institutional power claims. Specifically, during
periods of unified government, Congress would be mute. See Bycoffe, supra note 93.
During periods of divided government, Congress would be active—but only presidential

78

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

state Attorneys Generals have launched more than a dozen
lawsuits against the Trump administration and Democrats in
Congress have also launched lawsuits.108 For example, almost
200 Congressional Democrats have filed a lawsuit claiming that
President Trump violated the Foreign Emoluments Clause by
accepting benefits from foreign states without first seeking to
obtain the consent of Congress.109
There is little question that opposition party lawmakers are
now locked and loaded; they will go to court whenever possible to
strengthen their base, advance their agenda, and—whenever
possible—embarrass the president. None of this is to say that the
House and Senate never have standing to defend institutional
prerogatives. Indeed, I have previously written (with Tara Grove)
that House and Senate counsel can seek judicial enforcement of
subpoenas.110 In particular, the House and Senate need not act as
a bicameral body when it comes to implementing the “rules
of . . . proceedings” of their respective chambers;111 it therefore

opponents would speak Congress’s voice. To the extent that the Supreme Court signaled
potential approval of such a regime in Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting
Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2657 (2015), the Court should rethink its approach to lawmaker
and institutional standing. For further discussion of the Arizona case, see Sant’Ambrogio,
supra note 2, at 1540.
108 See Michael Levenson, Maura Healey’s Top Target These Days is Donald Trump,
BOS. GLOBE (June 24, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/06/23/healey/
8C3t7IXZZWENRHKllVqbIK/story.html [http://perma.cc/R9ET-ZK63]. For a particularly
revealing look at the efforts of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman’s efforts to
wage legal warfare with President Trump, see Danny Hakim & William K. Rashbaum,
New York’s Attorney General in Battle with Trump, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/26/nyregion/eric-schneiderman-attorney-general-newyork.html?_r=0.
109 See Blumenthal v. Trump, Complaint, No. 17-cv-01154, 2017 WL 2561946 (D.D.C.
June 14, 2017). A related lawsuit filed by the Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in
Washington was dismissed for want of standing. See David A. Fahrenthold & Jonathan
O’Connell, Judge dismisses lawsuit alleging Trump violated Constitution, WASH. POST,
(Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/judge-dismisses-lawsuitalleging-trump-violated-constitution/2017/12/21/31011510-e697-11e7-ab50-621fe058
8340_story.html?utm_term=.0c2df9144622 [http://perma.cc/V78R-PK6C].
110 See Grove & Devins, supra note 1, at 597–603, 622. The House also may have
standing in ongoing (as of fall 2017) litigation regarding the appropriations power and
Obama-era enforcement of the Affordable Care Act. Specifically, since the Constitution
mandates that appropriations legislation originates in the House, the House arguably
suffers a distinct injury when presidential action allegedly undermines House
appropriations authority. In Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d at 58, federal district judge
Rosemary Collyer found standing for this reason. On December 15, 2017, Collyer’s
standing holding was effectively ratified by a settlement between the Trump
administration, House Republicans, and Democractic Attorneys General. See Anna Edney
& Andrew M. Harris, Obamacare Subsidy Lawsuit Settled by White House, Democrats,
BLOOMBERG POLITICS (Dec. 15, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-12-15/obamacare-subsidy-lawsuit-settled-by-white-house-democrats
[http://perma.cc/6WEC-X5FK].
111 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The fact that either chamber might have authority to
seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas does not mean that judicial resolution is superior
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stands to reason that each chamber can pursue investigations as
well as issue and enforce subpoenas as a unilateral body. At the
same time, these lawsuits come at a cost in this age of polarized
politics. Lawmakers are not motivated to use litigation to
advance Congress’s institutional interests; the focus of litigation
is partisan gain and Democrats and Republicans will simply use
the courts as another field of battle to engage in partisan battles
with each other. Again, that is not to say that lawmakers or
institutional counsel are without standing; my concern is
whether polarization—as a policy matter—weighs in favor or
against congressional standing.
My second argument against congressional lawsuits is that
they embroil the courts in highly partisan political fights and
that the courts pay a price for being embroiled in such overtly
political litigation. Starting in 2010, the Supreme Court became a
partisan Court—all of the Republican-nominated Justices are
now to the right of all of the Democratic-nominated Justices.112
Polarization has fueled this partisan divide and Senate
Democrats and Republicans have both exacerbated this divide by
engaging in party-line voting on judicial nominees and, relatedly,
by ending the filibuster.113 When Barack Obama was president
and Democrats controlled the Senate, Democrats broke a
Republican logjam on lower court nominees by ending the
filibuster for such nominees.114 When Republicans gained control,
they blocked Obama’s Supreme Court nominee Merrick Garland
by claiming that the 2016 election should decide who appoints
the next Supreme Court Justice.115 And after Democrats
filibustered Trump nominee Neil Gorsuch, the majority
Republican Senate ended the filibuster of Supreme Court
nominees and confirmed Gorsuch on a near party line vote.116
to informal political bargaining. See Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information
Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal—Do Nothing, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 109, 110, 130–32 (1996).
112 See Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301 (2017).
113 Id. at 323–25.
114 Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear’ Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters
on Nominees, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/
senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-of-precedent/
2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0fd2ca728e67c_story.html?utm_term=5cf247d3b95a
[http://perma.cc/GJ4F-AZDA].
115 Mitch McConnell & Chuck Grassley, McConnell and Grassley: Democrats
Shouldn’t Rob Voters of Chance to Replace Scalia, W ASH. P OST (Feb. 18, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mcconnell-and-grassley-democrats-shouldnt-robvoters-of-chance-to-replace-scalia/2016/02/18/e5ae9bdc-d68a-11e5-be55-2cc3c1e4b76b_story.
html?utm_term=.b97a5e7c3539 [http://perma.cc/F6KX-9PXB].
116 Russell Berman, Republicans Abandon the Filibuster to Save Neil Gorsuch,
THE A TLANTIC (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/
republicans-nuke-the-filibuster-to-save-neil-gorsuch/522156/ [http://perma.cc/A4LD-9G66].
Senate Republicans also did away with the blue slip (allowing home state Senators to
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Against this backdrop, it is little wonder that the
courts—especially the Supreme Court—are increasingly seen
as another political, partisan institution.117 The Court, as the
Justices have recognized, must “speak and act in ways that allow
people to accept its decisions.”118 Indeed, to preserve their
reputation as a collegial court, most Supreme Court Justices
have spoken against the politicization of the Judiciary.119
Correspondingly, after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, the
Justices committed themselves to deciding cases unanimously
and to avoid partisan 4–4 deadlocks.120
Judicial resolution of congressional lawsuits cuts against
these efforts of the Court to preserve its reputation as a court of
law. For reasons discussed, congressional lawsuits are
increasingly likely to be seen as partisan. And while some of these
lawsuits will be filed by institutionalists interested in defending
Congress’s constitutional prerogatives, it is nonetheless the case
that judicial rulings on President Trump and the Emoluments
Clause, or President Obama’s implementation of the Affordable
Care Act, will both be seen as partisan and will dwarf nonpartisan
efforts to, say, preserve Congress’s war-making authority. Again,
it may be that lawmakers or institutional counsel already possess
block judicial nominees) when then-Senator Al Franken sought to hold up the nomination
of Seventh Circuit judge David Stras. See Kevin Freking, Senate confirms David Stras for
Court of Appeals despite Al Franken withholding support, TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS
(Jan. 30, 2018, 3:57 PM), https://www.twincities.com/2018/01/30/senate-confirms-david-strasfor-court-of-appeals-despite-al-franken-withholding-support/ [http://perma.cc/S4JZ-SGYA].
117 Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court is a Political Court. Republicans’ Actions
are Proof, WASH. POST (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/thesupreme-court-is-a-political-court-republicans-actions-are-proof/2016/03/09/4c851860-e14211e5-8d98-4b3d9215ade1_story.html?utm_term=.c21993986959 [http://perma.cc/8B6n-Z3G2].
118 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992)
(plurality opinion). In quoting this language, I do not mean to suggest that the Court does
or should follow public opinion.
119 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, The Political Wars Damage Public Perception of the
Supreme Court, Chief Justice Roberts Says, W ASH . P OST (Feb. 4, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/the-political-wars-damage-publicperception-of-supreme-court-chief-justice-roberts-says/2016/02/04/80e718b6-cb0c-11e5a7b2-5a2f824b02c9_story.html?utm_term=.1723d547a198 [http://perma.cc/725G-A48V];
Ryan Lovelace, Sonia Sotomayor Saddened by Perception of Judges as Political, WASH.
EXAMINER (Mar. 10, 2017, 10:42 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/Sonia-sotomayorsaddened-by-perception-of-judges-as-political/article/2617019 [http://perma.cc/ZUY4-W8FE];
Catherine Lutz, Justice Elena Kagan Talks Power on the Supreme Court, ASPEN INST.
(July 18, 2017), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-posts/ supreme-court-associate-justiceelena-kagan-power-court/ [http://perma.cc/93MK-DPM4]; Lincoln Caplan, A Workable
Democracy, HARV. MAG. (Mar.–Apr. 2017), http://harvardmagazine.com/2017/03/a-workabledemocracy [http://perma.cc/7LTC-2TBX].
120 See Adam Liptak, Rulings and Remarks Tell Divided Story of an 8-Member
Supreme Court, N.Y. T IMES (May 30, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/31/
us/politics/rulings-and-remarks-tell-divided-story-of-an-8-member-supreme-court.html;
Adam Liptak, A Cautious Supreme Court Sets a Modern Record for Consensus, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/27/us/politics/supreme-courtterm-consensus.html.
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constitutional standing to bring such suits. Nonetheless, party
polarization cuts against the bringing of those lawsuits and is
reason for the courts to move cautiously before expanding
congressional standing.121
In arguing against congressional standing, I understand full
well that I am embracing presidential unilateralism. As Justice
Jackson wrote in the Steel Seizure case, “[t]he tools belong to the
man who can use them.”122 Congress is not likely to use its tools; it
is naturally disinclined to stand up for institutional prerogatives
and party polarization further cuts against Congress asserting its
prerogatives. Nonetheless, the courts should not seek to prop
Congress up by intervening in cases where standing is not clearly
established. Today’s Congress is a cacophony of competing sound
bites by Democrats and Republicans. Amicus curiae filings by
lawmakers and institutional counsel provide an appropriate
vehicle for the expression of the myriad interests of lawmakers
and political parties. Congressional lawsuits are not such a
vehicle; those lawsuits further expose partisan rifts in Congress
and are potentially harmful to the courts’ institutional standing.

121 The courts are generally reluctant to intervene and look for ways to avoid tackling
the merits in these disputes. Indeed, federal courts often seek end-runs where they do
not have to rule on standing. This is true of information access disputes. See
Complaint, supra note 109. It is also true of ongoing litigation regarding the
appropriations power—where the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals is holding the case in
abeyance (starting December 5, 2016) rather than ruling on the lower court’s standing
determination. In this litigation, the House and Trump administration both support the
D.C. Circuit’s action. See Timothy Jost, Parties Ask Court to Keep Cost Sharing Reduction
Payment Litigation on Hold (Updated), HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Feb. 21, 2017),
http://healthaffairs.org/ blog/2017/02/21/parties-ask-court-to-keep-cost-sharing-reductionpayment-litigation-on-hold/ [http://perma.cc/2QUV-XPXE].
122 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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State Standing to Constrain the President
F. Andrew Hessick* and William P. Marshall**
Ambition, as it turns out, has not been able to counteract
ambition.1 Or at least this has been true when the ambition that
was supposed to be countered was that of the President of the
United States and the institution doing the countering was the
United States Congress. Presidential ambitions now consistently
overwhelm those of the Congress with the result that the power
of the presidency has now become far greater than the framers
may have imagined—both in absolute and in relative terms.2 As
far back as 1952, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
Justice Jackson observed that the president “exerts a leverage
upon those who are supposed to check and balance his
power which often cancels their effectiveness.”3 Subsequent
developments have only served to increase the president’s
leverage since that time.
Perhaps because it has recognized this reality, the Supreme
Court in recent years has become notably less sympathetic to the
notion that it should defer to the vagaries of the political
wrangling between Congress and the Executive.4 Consequently,
the Court has become more active in reviewing separation of
powers disputes.5 This does not mean the Court always rules

Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina. We’d like to thank
Tom Campbell for his helpful suggestions. Thanks also to Josh Roquemore for his
research assistance.
1 Cf. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
2 See Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 Y ALE L.J. 1725,
1816–18 (1996).
3 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653–54 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
4 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196–97 (2012) (rejecting
the argument that recognition of foreign sovereigns is a political question not subject to
judicial review) [hereinafter Zivotofsky I]; see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 103 (2000)
(per curiam) (resolving dispute about presidential electors instead of leaving the matter to
Congress as prescribed by Article II).
5 See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015) (holding
that the legislature cannot infringe on the president’s sole power to recognize other
sovereigns and nations) [hereinafter Zivotofsky II]; see also NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S.
Ct. 2550, 2556–57 (2014) (ruling that the president exceeded his authority by appointing
a member to the National Labor Relations Board under the Recess Appointments Clause).
*
**
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against the Executive.6 In fact, many of the Court’s recent cases
have upheld the exercise of federal executive power against
separation of powers challenges.7 It does mean, however, that the
Court has rejected the premise that political processes alone can
protect against separation of powers encroachments. The Court,
in short, has sent the message that it is ready to actively police
structural constitutional issues.8
Against this background, it may not be surprising that there
is a new sheriff in town aiming to challenge the exercise of
federal executive power in the federal courts. Or, rather, there
are new sheriffs. In recent years, state attorneys general have
become increasingly more aggressive in seeking to patrol federal
executive action. During the Obama Administration, for example,
some state attorneys general instituted a series of cases, brought
on behalf of their home states, challenging federal action in the
areas of immigration9 and environmental protection.10 Since
President Trump took office, other state attorneys general have
filed actions against specific directives of his administration,
most notably in the immigration area.11 All signs suggest that
6 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488, 2495–96 (2015) (ruling in favor of the
Internal Revenue Service’s (“IRS”) interpretation of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”),
which would allow a tax credit for those enrolled in either a Federal Exchange or State
Exchange, despite the ACA’s seemingly clear language limiting the tax credit for those
enrolled in State Exchanges).
7 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (holding that the president has the sole power
to recognize other sovereigns); see also Dep't of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct.
1225, 1233 (2015) (remanding a nondelegation challenge to Amtrak rulemaking).
8 See Zivotofsky II, 135 S. Ct. at 2096; Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. at 2577; see also
Aziz Z. Huq, Standing for the Structural Constitution, 99 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1523 (2013)
(criticizing the Court’s willingness to resolve structural constitutional disputes); Rachel E.
Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the
Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 336 (2002) (arguing the Court is
more willing to rule on structural matters).
9 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (twentythree Republican state attorneys general, three Republican governors whose attorneys
general were Democrat, and one Republican governor filed suit against the United States
to challenge the Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent
Residents (“DAPA”) initiative). But see Brief of the Amicus States of Wash., Cal., Conn.,
Del., Haw., Ill., Iowa, Md., Mass., N.M., N.Y., Or., R.I., and Vt., and D.C., in Support of
Motion to Stay District Court Preliminary Injunction at 1–2, Texas v. United States, 809
F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-40238), 2015 WL 1285125, at *2–3 (fourteen Democratic
attorneys general for fourteen states and the District of Columbia filed briefs in support of
the United States’ amnesty policy).
10 See Brief for Petitioners at 1–2, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Nov. 26, 2014)
(No. 14-1146) , 2014 WL 6687575, at *6 (twelve Republican attorneys general filed briefs
against the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in response to increased regulation
of coal power plants). But see Final Brief for State Intervenors in Support of Respondent
at 10, West Virginia v. EPA (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 2015) (No. 14-1146), 2015 WL 926748, at
*6–7 (eleven Democratic attorneys general and the District of Columbia filed in support of
the EPA’s increased regulation measures).
11 All briefs filed by state attorneys general—both in opposition and in support of the
travel ban executive order—were done so strictly along party lines. See, e.g., Motion for
Leave to File and Brief for N.Y. et al. as Amici Curiae in Opposition to Petitioners’ Stay
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this trend of state attorneys general challenging exercises of
presidential power will continue.12
These state attorneys’ general suits face a critical threshold
barrier: standing to challenge federal executive power. Do the
states have such standing and, if so, under what circumstances
may they do so? This issue was central in Texas v. United States,
a case in which the Fifth Circuit found that Texas had
standing.13 The question was ultimately left unresolved by the
United States Supreme Court when the Fifth Circuit decision
was affirmed by an equally divided Court.14
This essay examines the issue of state standing to constrain
presidential power. Part I reviews why presidential power has so
drastically expanded since the Founding. It further discusses
why Congress has not been up to the task of checking the
president and why expanded state standing might be a useful
vehicle to constrain executive power. Part II canvasses the
existing case law regarding state standing to challenge federal
executive action and specifically includes recent cases brought
against the Obama and Trump Administrations. Part III
demonstrates how courts have found states to have standing to
challenge federal executive action, but also discusses how the
scope of that right is not yet clear. Part III(A) discusses why
states might be appropriate parties to bring actions challenging
federal executive power, including their role in diffusing power
Application at 3, Trump v. Hawai’i, 138 S. Ct. 42 (2017) (No. 16-1540), 2017 WL 3049332,
at *5 (New York, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and
D.C. filed as amicus curiae in support of Hawaii’s action); see also Profiles in Courage,
DEMOCRATIC ATTORNEYS GENERAL ASSOCIATION, http://democraticags.org/profiles-2/
[http://perma.cc/MUC2-65YC] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing every state attorney
general in the aforementioned brief who opposed both the current administration’s travel
ban and climate change deregulation are Democrat); Motion for Leave to File and Brief
for Tex. et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners and their Stay Application at 1,
Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project (2017) (No. 16-1436), 2017 WL 2533119, at *4
(Texas, Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Kansas, Louisiana, Montana, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia,
and the Governor of the State of Mississippi filed as amicus curiae in defense of the
administration’s executive order); see also Meet the Attorneys General, REPUBLICAN
A TTORNEYS G ENERAL A SSOCIATION, http://www.republicanags.com/meet_the_ags
[http://perma.cc/69TD-XXFN] (last visited Aug. 1, 2017) (showing every state attorney
general in the aforementioned brief who supported the travel ban executive order
are Republican).
12 See Juliet Eilperin, NYU Law Launches New Center to Help State AGs Fight
Environmental Rollbacks, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/politics/nyu-law-launches-new-center-to-help-state-ags-fight-environmental-rollbacks/
2017/08/16/e4df8494-82ac-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.a7c7b3e8b7b9
&yoyolxmi [http://perma.cc/UY2P-MQAT] (reporting that Bloomberg Philanthropies
funded a center to help state attorneys general bring environmental actions against the
United States).
13 Texas, 809 F.3d at 155–56.
14 Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016).
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within the federal system. Part III(B) offers some reservations,
such as the fact that the states’ motivations in maintaining these
suits may be based more on partisan interests than on structural
concerns with constraining the federal executive. Part IV
proposes that states should enjoy a modicum of liberalized
standing by allowing a more generous construction of injury-infact as applied to them than would be applied to other entities. It
suggests, however, that even this modest grant of standing
should be subject to further prudential review in light of the
potential problems that state standing engenders. Part V offers a
brief conclusion.
I. THE EXPANDING POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY
As numerous participants in the Symposium have noted,
presidential power has expanded exponentially since the
Founding.15 There are many reasons for this expansion.16 Some
are simply the unavoidable effects of forces inherent in modern
government dynamics. For example, as Justice Jackson observed
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the fact that the
office of the president has a unique hold on public and media
attention means that in “drama, magnitude and finality” its
decisions far overshadow those of any other.17 In addition, the
need for modern government to respond quickly to national crises
necessarily invests power in the presidency because only that
institution has the ability to act expeditiously.18 The growth of
the administrative state19 and the power of the armed forces has
inevitably empowered the president, who stands at the head of

15 See Randy Beck, Promoting Executive Accountability Through Qui Tam
Legislation, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 41–42 (2018) (discussing a shift and rebalancing of power
from the legislative to the executive branch); Gary Lawson, Representative/Senator
Trump?, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 115–19 (2018) (demonstrating how executive branch’s power
has expanded through subdelegation of legislative authority); Sanford Levinson &
Mark A. Graber, The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents: Constitutional
Interpretation in a Broken Constitutional Order, 21 CHAP. L. REV. 168 (2018) (noting
the large power of the “[c]ontemporary” president); see also Tom Campbell, Executive
Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 555–56 (2017) (noting expansions of
executive power).
16 See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably
Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505, 507–19 (2008); see also Flaherty, supra
note 2, at 1816–19; Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential
Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (“Now, it is the President [instead of
Congress] whose power has expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.”).
17 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
18 See Flaherty, supra note 2, at 1806.
19 See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers
and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 587 (1984) (describing the degree to
which administrative agencies are centrally managed by the president).
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both the Executive Branch and the military.20 The president has
unique access to and control over information in a world where
information is power.21
Other factors have contributed to this expansion. Presidents,
for example, are able to build upon the collective actions of their
predecessors in justifying their own actions—creating a one-way
ratchet that consistently expands presidential power from
administration to administration.22 The legal limits on
presidential power are defined in the first instance by the
president’s own appointees in the Justice Department23 who,
even if committed to providing objective legal advice, are often
predisposed to finding ways in which the president can further
his agenda.24 Finally, presidents are interested in building
legacies and they well understand that history judges leaders by
their actions and not by their forbearance. They are therefore
constantly exploring new avenues and methods to get things
done.25 After all, the last president celebrated for not exercising
power may very well be George Washington and his decision not
to run for a third term.26
Another key reason why presidential power has so
drastically expanded rests not with the presidency but with

20 See also Norman C. Bay, Executive Power and the War on Terror, 83 DENV. U. L.
REV. 335, 338 (2005) (discussing presidential control of the military).
21 See Patricia M. Wald & Jonathan R. Siegel, The D.C. Circuit and the Struggle for
Control of Presidential Information, 90 GEO. L.J. 737, 737 (2002).
22 See Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive During the
First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1458–60 (1997); see also John Yoo,
Jefferson and Executive Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 421, 429–30 (2008).
23 See LUTHER A. HUSTON, ARTHUR S. MILLER, SAMUEL KRISLOV & ROBERT D. DIXON,
JR., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968).
24 See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS 103, 107 (2001) for a discussion about how the ability (and
motivation) of the attorney general to challenge a president is likely to be particularly
diminished in times of crisis. The most famous documented example of this involves
Attorney General Francis Biddle and the evacuation of Japanese Americans during World
War II. Although Biddle had considerable doubts as to the constitutionality of the
evacuation order, he ended up dropping his opposition in the face of military objections
and a president who had, nonetheless, decided to go through with the action. See id.
25 President Bush, for example, was particularly aggressive in claiming that he had
inherent powers that justified his taking unilateral actions on key matters. See Bush Says
He Signed NSA Wiretap Order, CNN (Dec. 17, 2005, 8:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2005/POLITICS/12/17/bush.nsa [http://perma.cc/9Y44-LF7H]. President Obama, in turn,
relied on his expansive reading of statutes to support his unilateral decisions. See Charlie
Savage, Shift on Executive Power Lets Obama Bypass Rivals, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/us/politics/shift-on-executive-powers-let-obamabypass-congress.html?mcubz=3.
26 See Rufus King, Personal Memorandum (May 3, 1797), in 3 THE LIFE AND
CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING: COMPROMISING HIS LETTERS, PRIVATE AND OFFICIAL,
HIS PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, AND HIS SPEECHES 545, 545 (Charles R. King ed., 1896).

88

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

Congress.27 An effective system of separation of powers requires
Congress to protect its institutional prerogatives to check the
Executive. Yet the relationship between Congress and the
president has become instead, in the words of Darryl Levinson
and Richard Pildes, separation of parties.28 Members of Congress
see their primary role as advancing the interests of their party
and not protecting Congress’s institutional prerogatives.29
This dynamic has reduced the power of Congress and
increased the power of the president. When the same party holds
Congress and the presidency, congressional majorities often
stand behind their president even when doing so might diminish
their own institution’s authority, a practice that directly serves to
expand presidential power. Less obviously, even when there has
been a divided government, the dynamic of hyper-partisanship
has indirectly led to increased presidential power. In times of
divided government, of course, Congress is motivated to attempt
to check the president because it is in its partisan interests to
do.30 Yet presidents have become adept at characterizing this
resistance as Congress not doing its job to justify exercising
executive power unilaterally. They have thus been able to turn
congressional efforts to block their agenda into a mechanism for
enhancing their own powers.31 Congress, meanwhile, has had no
effective response.
In contrast to Congress, one institution that has been able to
block the president thus far is the Supreme Court. In cases such
as Youngstown,32 United States v. Nixon,33 and the war-on-terror
decisions,34 the Court has imposed important limits on the
Executive. Equally important, even in cases in which the

27 See Michael J. Teter, Gridlock, Legislative Supremacy, and the Problem of
Arbitrary Inaction, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2217, 2222 (2013).
28 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2329–30 (2006).
29 See Jeff Flake, My Party is in Denial About Donald Trump, POLITICO MAG. (July
31, 2017), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/31/my-party-is-in-denial-aboutdonald-trump-215442 [http://perma.cc/UX7H-RPBY] (condemning both parties for blindly
engaging in partisan behavior).
30 See Franita Tolson, The Union as a Safeguard Against Faction: Congressional
Gridlock as State Empowerment, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2267, 2267–68 (2013)
(describing an instance where Republican senators blocked a veteran jobs bill to prevent
President Obama from signing beneficial legislation before the 2012 election).
31 See William P. Marshall, Warning: Self-Help and the Presidency, 124 Yale Online
L.J. F. 95 (2014); William P. Marshall, Actually We Should Wait: Evaluating the Obama
Administration’s Commitment to Unilateral Executive-Branch Action, 2014 UTAH L. REV
773, 786 (2014).
32 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952).
33 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974).
34 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536–37 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 646 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 794 (2008).
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president has prevailed, the Court has indicated it is fully willing
to subject exercises of presidential power to judicial review.
Courts can hear cases only when parties have requisite
standing. This means that presidential actions may be able to
escape judicial review because of standing limitations. For
example, if the lower courts had not granted standing to Texas to
challenge President Obama’s Dreamers initiative, which declared
a policy of not enforcing immigration laws against a large class of
immigrants, then it is likely no party would have been able to
maintain that suit.35 To establish standing to challenge a policy,
an individual must show he suffered an injury in fact because of
that policy.36 The Dreamers policy of not enforcing the law does
not obviously injure anyone; instead, it confers a benefit on the
immigrants covered by it. Giving the states standing to sue,
therefore, may be the only way through which a president’s
actions can be subject to judicial scrutiny. The next sections
accordingly examine the current law governing state standing
and discuss whether the scope of state standing should be
adjusted so as to provide an additional check on the expansion of
presidential power.
II. STATE STANDING TO SUE THE EXECUTIVE UNDER CURRENT
LAW
A.

The Law of State Standing
State suits against the president and other federal executive
officials seeking to force compliance with the Constitution and
federal law invariably raise questions of Article III standing.37
Standing is one of the various doctrines that implement the
“cases” and “controversies” provision in Article III.38
Ordinarily, to have standing, a person must demonstrate
that he has suffered, or is imminently about to suffer, an
“injury in fact.”39 That injury must be to a “legally protected
35 Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s
Nonenforcement Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX.
L. REV. 781, 786 (2013).
36 See WRIGHT, ET AL., infra note 49 and accompanying text.
37 Although the most heavily litigated, standing is not the only obstacle states face in
suits against federal actors. For example, states must also demonstrate their claim is ripe
and not moot. Although the United States and its officials also enjoy sovereign immunity
in suits by states, Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of Univ. & Sch. Lands, 461 U.S. 273,
280 (1983), section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act waives that immunity for
suits seeking non-monetary damages against an “officer or employee” of the United
States. 5 U.S.C. § 702. Accordingly, so long as a suit does not seek damages, sovereign
immunity should not be an obstacle to state suits against federal officials.
38 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
39 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009).
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interest”—for example, the interest against unwanted physical
harm—and it must be “concrete and particularized.”40 The injury
must also be “fairly traceable” to the actions of the defendant,
and it must be susceptible to “redress[] by a favorable decision.”41
Individuals who fail to satisfy these requirements cannot
maintain suit in federal court.42
But for states, things are different. States can establish
standing by demonstrating an injury to the same sort of interests
held by private individuals such as the interest in holding
property. But because they are sovereigns, states also have
sovereign and quasi-sovereign interests, and the violation of
those interests can also support standing.43 Thus, states have
broader potential standing than private individuals.44
A state’s sovereign interests include its interests in enforcing
its criminal and civil laws. States can sue to enforce these
sovereign interests even when they do not suffer an injury in
fact.45 A state has standing, for example, to prosecute Dan for
assaulting Vicky in violation of state law, even though the
assault does not hurt the state.46 For similar reasons, states have
sovereign standing to defend their laws against challenges that
the laws are unconstitutional or preempted,47 and they have
standing to challenge federal laws pressuring the states to
change their laws.48
A state’s quasi-sovereign interests are less well defined.49
They include the state’s interest “in the well-being of its
populace,”50 such as by protecting its residents from pollution,51
reducing unemployment in the state,52 preserving wildlife in the
state,53 and ensuring that the state is “not . . . discriminatorily
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992).
42 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102–03 (1998).
43 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982).
44 Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing Doctrine?, 102
MICH. L. REV. 689, 695 (2004).
45 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 136 (1986) (finding state standing based on the
“interest in the continued enforceability of its own statutes”).
46 See Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 392
(1995) (finding there is no standing problem when a state “prosecutes criminal and civil
actions under its own laws in its own courts”).
47 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137.
48 See West Virginia v. EPA, 362 F.3d 861, 868 (finding state standing to challenge
federal regulation requiring states to adopt new standards or to accept federal standards).
49 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 13A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3531.11 (2d ed. 1984) (describing quasi-sovereign interests as “admittedly vague”).
50 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 602 (1982).
51 Id. at 604–05.
52 Id. at 608 (finding parens patriae standing to reduce unemployment).
53 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923) (noting “the quasi sovereign
right of the State to regulate the taking of wild game within its borders”).
40
41
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denied its rightful status within the federal system.”54 States
have parens patriae standing—so-called because a state
asserting these interests is seeking to protect its residents and
resources—to vindicate these quasi-sovereign interests.
B.

State Suits against the Federal Executive
States’ standing in suits against the federal government,
however, is more complex. Although states have standing to
vindicate sovereign interests and parens patriae standing to
vindicate quasi-sovereign interests in other contexts, neither
form of standing provides a sound basis under current doctrine to
sue federal officials to force compliance with a federal statute or
the Constitution. States do not have a sovereign interest in
federal compliance with a federal statute or the Constitution.55
Federal law and the Constitution are not state law. Although
states must enforce federal and constitutional law, it is because
those laws trump state laws. The violation of federal law
accordingly does not inflict injury on a state’s sovereignty. It is
only if that violation also happens to violate, or interfere with,
state law that a state suffers a sovereign injury supporting
sovereign standing.56
States also likely do not have parens patriae standing to sue
the president to force him to comply with federal law or
the Constitution. This is not because states do not have a
quasi-sovereign interest in ensuring that their residents are
governed by a law abiding federal government. They do. The
failure of the federal government to obey federal law can
threaten a state’s property, resources, stability, and population.
Rather, the problem is that, according to the Supreme Court,
states cannot assert those interests of its citizens against the
United States.57
The reason is that the point of a parens patriae suit is to
allow a sovereign to protect its citizens, and the citizens of a state
are also citizens of the United States.58 According to the Court,
the United States has the primary responsibility of managing the
federal government and ensuring its compliance with federal

Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 607.
Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REV.
851, 886–87 (2016).
56 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 323–25 (1966) (upholding state’s
standing to enforce state law against Attorney General).
57 Michigan v. EPA, 581 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[A] State may not use
[parens patriae] to sue the United States.”).
58 Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–86 (1923).
54
55
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law.59 Therefore, states cannot sue the federal government as
parens patriae to protect state citizens from unconstitutional acts
of the federal government.60 For example, in Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the Court held that Massachusetts lacked parens patriae
standing to challenge, under the Tenth Amendment, a federal
law giving money to states that took certain measures to protect
mothers and infants.61
Under this logic, states likely do not have parens patriae
standing to sue the president or other federal officers to force
compliance with the Constitution or federal law. Such a suit
seeks to protect state citizens from federal actions that violate
federal law or the Constitution. To be sure, the suit targets
executive actions instead of legislative ones, as in Mellon, but it
is unclear why that distinction should matter. What matters is
whether the suit challenges the acts of the federal government.
One might argue the difference is that the suit is against an
officer and not the United States. That difference, however,
should not matter as to a state’s parens patriae standing. The
United States acts through its officers to protect its citizens as
parens patriae. That is especially true for the president. Article II
explicitly tasks him with seeing that federal law is enforced.62
Given the difficulties with states establishing sovereign or
quasi-sovereign standing against the president, it is no surprise
that courts that have recently found that state standing to
challenge presidential actions have avoided the sovereignty and
quasi-sovereignty question, and have instead based standing on
factual injuries alleged by the states.63 Consider Texas v. United
States.64 There, the Department of Homeland Security adopted a
policy of not enforcing immigration laws against a large swath of

59 Id. (“[I]n respect of their relations with the [f]ederal [g]overnment[, it is] . . . the
United States, and not the state, which represents them as parens patriae, when such
representation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the latter, they must
look for such protective measures as flow from that status.”).
60 Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 324 (“Nor does a State have standing as the parent of its
citizens to invoke these constitutional provisions against the Federal Government.”);
accord Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 18 (1927); see also WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 49, at
§ 3531.11.1 (“[I]t is settled that a state cannot appear as parens patriae to assert
the rights of its citizens to be protected against unconstitutional acts of the
federal government.”).
61 Mellon, 262 U.S. at 486.
62 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
63 See, e.g., Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015) (basing
standing on increased costs from issuing licenses), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S.
Ct. 2271 (2016); Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1158–61 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying
Lujan factors in analyzing state standing based on alleged harm to proprietary interests).
64 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at 155–56 (basing standing on increased costs
from issuing licenses).
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individuals illegally in the United States,65 deeming these
individuals to be “lawfully present in the United States.”66 Texas
and twenty-six other states challenged the policy, claiming that
the Department’s policy violated the Administrative Procedure
Act. Texas argued it had parens patriae standing and that it had
suffered an injury in fact.
In finding Texas had standing, both the district court and
the Fifth Circuit avoided the question whether Texas had parens
patriae standing. Instead, they concluded that Texas had
suffered an adequate injury in fact. The courts pointed out that,
because Texas law authorizes lawfully present individuals to
obtain a Texas drivers license, Homeland Security’s policy
expanded the number of individuals eligible for Texas licenses,
and Texas would incur costs in issuing these licenses. According
to the courts, these costs supported Texas’s standing, even
though Texas could have eliminated those costs by amending
Texas law to bar those immigrants from obtaining licenses.67
The Ninth Circuit took a similar approach in Washington v.
Trump.68 There, Washington and Minnesota filed suit
challenging President Trump’s Executive Order suspending
entry of immigrants from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan,
Syria, and Yemen. The states argued the policy violated the
Establishment Clause, Due Process under the Fifth Amendment,
the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Foreign Affairs Reform
and Restructuring Act, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,
the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Tenth Amendment.69
Washington and Minnesota asserted standing based on both a
violation of their quasi-sovereign interests and an injury in fact
to their proprietary interests.
Like the Fifth Circuit in Texas v. United States, the Ninth
Circuit avoided the question whether the states had standing
based on their quasi-sovereign interests.70 Instead, the Circuit

65 Id. at 147 (“In November 2014, by what is termed the ‘DAPA Memo,’ DHS
expanded DACA by making millions more persons eligible for the program and extending
‘[t]he period for which DACA and the accompanying employment authorization is
granted . . . to three-year increments, rather than the current two-year increments.”)
(citing Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Leon
Rodriguez, Dir. USCIS, et al. 3–4 (Nov. 20, 2014), http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/
files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf [http://perma.cc/U2NJ-2J26]).
66 Id. at 148 (emphasis omitted).
67 See id. at 155–56 (holding the “financial loss[es]” that Texas would bear, due to
having to grant drivers licenses, constituted a concrete and immediate injury for
standing purposes).
68 See Trump, 847 F.3d at 1157–61.
69 Id. at 1157.
70 See id. at 1161 n.5; see also id. at 1157 (concluding the States had Article III
standing based on both proprietary and quasi-sovereign interests).
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concluded the states had suffered an injury in fact. The court
stated the executive order caused a concrete and particularized
injury to the states’ public universities by preventing nationals of
the designated countries from entering the country to join the
universities as faculty and students.71
III. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF STATES IN SUING THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE
A.

The Role of the States
States have a special role in ensuring the federal executive’s
compliance with the Constitution because of their interest in
preserving federalism. Federalism defines the boundary between
the states and the federal government.72 The federal government
is one of limited powers.73 For example, the Constitution
empowers Congress to legislate in only a few designated areas.74
States do not face comparable limitations. States have general
government powers. They may broadly regulate in any area,
including areas in which the federal government may also
regulate,75 and they may broadly enforce those laws.
States have an interest in protecting their domain from
federal intrusion. That interest is most obvious when the federal
executive takes actions that directly interfere with matters
committed to the states.76 An example is the promulgation of
a rule by an executive agency that regulates completely
local matters.77
But the states’ federalism interest in ensuring that the
Executive complies with the constitution is not limited to the
executive actions that directly invade the province of the states.
States have a federalism interest in preventing all unlawful
executive actions, even if those actions do not directly touch on
an area reserved to the states.78 That is so for two reasons.
First, states have a political interest in ensuring that the
president not exercise powers allocated to Congress because of
Id. at 1161.
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999).
73 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000).
74 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
75 But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (the prohibition on states “coin[ing] [m]oney” is an
example of how the Constitution imposes several discrete limits on state power).
76 See Grove, supra note 55, at 887.
77 See id.
78 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of
Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 359, 462 (2012) (observing that “cooperative federalism
schemes provide a check on federal executive power” and that “[t]he very growth of
the federal administrative state has swept states up as necessary administrators of
federal law”).
71
72
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their better representation in Congress.79 Although the president
is elected through a nationwide election, he does not represent a
particular state; he represents the nation collectively. By
contrast, each state has representatives in Congress who
can defend their state’s interests. Pushing actions from the
Executive to Congress thus gives states a larger say in federal
policy decisions.80
Second, states have a direct regulatory interest in preventing
unlawful executive action because a declaration that a federal
executive action is unlawful prevents that action from
preempting state law or from otherwise affecting how states
conduct themselves. Consider an executive order that regulates
interstate commerce. That order does not impermissibly touch an
area left to the states because the Constitution authorizes the
federal government to regulate interstate commerce.81 Instead,
the constitutional objection is that the order violates separation
of powers because the Constitution commits to Congress, not the
president, the power to regulate that commerce. But states have
a federalism interest in challenging that executive order, because
that executive order would preempt inconsistent state laws on
commerce. Voiding the executive order removes the possibility for
preemption and accordingly leaves the states in a better position
to issue regulations on commerce.
The same argument applies to executive actions that fail to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act and other
requirements imposed by statute. Those actions can preempt
state law. Even when they do not preempt, those agency actions
can influence the way states act—by, for example, administering
spending programs that condition the disbursement of funds on
the state’s meeting requirements imposed by the agency.82
Because they interfere with state autonomy, states have a

79 See Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public Law Litigation in an Age
of Polarization, at 19 (manuscript on file with authors) (“[I]t’s terribly important for
federalism that Congress make the laws, not executive actors.”).
80 See Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV.
543, 547 (1954). To be sure, especially in recent times, Congress has not been particularly
effective at policymaking because of gridlock. But that gridlock may be a function, at least
in part, of the divergent views of states.
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
82 See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, When is Two a Crowd? The Impact of Federal Action
on State Environmental Regulation, 31 H ARV. E NVTL. L. R EV. 67, 82 (2007)
(acknowledging, in the context of environment agency action, that “federal agency actions
can . . . have preclusive effect” and that “[t]he most straightforward way to encourage
state activity is to offer financial support for state programs that meet federal
requirements or to otherwise confer benefits on compliant state governments”).
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federalism interest in challenging executive actions that violate
the APA or other statutory procedures.83
This state interest in limiting the federal government to
protect the states’ prerogatives is a critical part of the
constitutional design. The principal reason for dividing power
between state and federal government is to check abuses of
federal power and to prevent the establishment of a federal
tyranny.84 The idea is not simply that sharing power with the
states results in the federal government not having the complete
authority necessary to establish a tyranny. It is also that state
officials seeking to protect their own power “stand ready to check
the usurpations”85 of the federal government. As Madison put it
in Federalist No. 51, the competition for power between the state
and federal government ensures that the “different governments
will control each other[.]”86 The Constitution’s design thus
contemplates that the states stand as guardians against federal
overreach.87 All of these interests support enabling states to
bring suits challenging unlawful executive actions.
In addition to having these federalism interests, states are
particularly well suited to bring challenge to executive actions
because of their democratic accountability. One reason for the
standing doctrine is to prevent would-be litigants from
undermining the political process by limiting their access to the
courts. The premise of our Constitution is that the elected
branches make policy, and elections are the appropriate
mechanism to seek to change government policies. Permitting
individuals to resort to the court to challenge government policies
short-circuits this political process. Standing seeks to avoid
this problem by permitting individuals to go to court only if
they have suffered direct injuries from the government’s
83 This logic extends to federal executive actions that violate individual
constitutional rights. A successful challenge to a federal action on the ground that it
violates a constitutional right promotes federalism by barring federal action that
preempts state law. To be sure, preventing the federal government from taking actions
that violate rights would not let states take the same actions, because with only a few
exceptions constitutional rights equally bar the federal government and the states. Still,
removing the federal program would leave space for a state to regulate in that area.
84 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“Perhaps the principal benefit of the
federalist system is a check on abuses of government power.”).
85 THE FEDERALIST NO. 28, at 181 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
86 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 323 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
87 A broad argument for state standing could be based on the premise that the
Constitution should be viewed as a compact among the states. See John C. Calhoun,
Rough Draft of What Is Called the South Carolina Exposition, in UNION AND LIBERTY:
THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 350 (Ross M. Lence ed., 1992)
(advocating the state-compact theory of the Constitution). If so, states could arguably
have standing to challenge all ultra vires federal actions as a breach of contract. Because
the premise of this argument is so contestable and its potential implications so
far-reaching, however, we do not advance that argument here.

2018]

State Standing to Constrain the President

97

actions. Individuals cannot, in other words, base standing on
generalized grievances.
Broad state standing does not threaten the political
processes to the same degree because states themselves are
political entities. They are unlikely to bring suits that are
inconsistent with the majority views of their constituency.
Consistent with this view, states do not face the same standing
restriction for generalized grievances. For example, unlike
individuals, states can bring suit to enforce state criminal laws,
even when the violation of the criminal law does not directly
harm the state.88
There are also pragmatic reasons why states should enjoy
broader standing than individuals. Unlike many individuals who
might bring suit against the federal executive, states are prone to
take a more deliberative and cautious approach to assessing
when to bring suit. They are more likely to evaluate the merits
more carefully to avoid spending their taxpayers’ money on a suit
that they cannot win. Moreover, unlike many individuals, states
have the resources to launch and maintain a significant judicial
challenge to executive actions.89 As with any major litigation,
pursuing a challenge to an executive action can be an expensive
affair because of the scope of discovery, the breadth of the issues,
and the intense motions practice. In addition, more than other
types of suits, challenges to an executive action turn on
sophisticated legal arguments that can be made most effectively
by attorneys that specialize in the relevant field of law. Most
private individuals lack the resources to maintain this type of
litigation and to retain specialist attorneys who are more likely
to prevail on a such a challenge.
To be sure, states are not the only ones with the interests
and resources to challenge the federal executive. Congress also
plays a significant role in constraining the federal executive. Just
as with federalism, the reason that the Constitution divides
power between Congress and the president is to prevent either
branch from accumulating or abusing its power.90 Conferring
broader legislative standing on Congress to challenge federal
executive actions would increase Congress’s ability to play
that role.91
See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 46, at 392.
See Raymond H. Brecia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of
State Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
90 See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (“[T]he separation and independence of the
coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of
excessive power in any one branch[.]”).
91 See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 15, at 603, 605 (arguing Congress should have
broader standing to challenge executive decisions not to enforce the law).
88
89
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Whether Congress should have greater standing to challenge
the president is beyond the scope of this Article; but there are
sound reasons to be cautious before proceeding too far down this
route. The most significant is that broader congressional
standing could threaten the balance of powers.92 Although
Congress has largely abdicated its function of checking the
president, Congress has the potential to be extremely powerful,
not only because it holds the legislative and other powers, but
also because it has more direct popular support than the other
branches of government.93 For this reason, the Constitution
imposes various limits on Congress’s power. One limitation is
that the Constitution specifically enumerates Congress’s power.
Another limitation is that the Constitution prescribes procedures
that Congress must follow to exercise those powers. For example,
for Congress to create a law, the bill must pass both houses of
Congress and be presented to the president for his approval
before becoming a law.94 Similarly, Article I prescribes a specific
procedure that Congress must follow to remove a federal officer
through impeachment.95
Among the various powers given to Congress are a handful of
tools with which Congress can respond to illegal executive action.
The Constitution authorizes Congress to enact new legislation,
bring impeachment proceedings, withhold appropriations, or
refuse to confirm nominations. Conferring standing on Congress
to challenge executive actions would add a new weapon to
Congress’s arsenal for challenging executive action. If Congress
one day decided to begin using all of its tools for checking
92 The text of the Constitution does not explicitly answer whether Congress can
bring lawsuits. On one hand, the Constitution specifically enumerates Congress’s powers,
such as the power to enact legislation, impeach federal officials, and approve treaties and
nominations for various federal offices. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 8, 10. One might argue
that the enumeration of these powers implies that Congress cannot exercise powers not
specifically enumerated, and bringing suit is not one of the powers enumerated in the
Constitution. On the other hand, one might argue that the Necessary and Proper Clause
authorizes Congress to enact legislation conferring standing on itself to challenge
unlawful federal action. But cf. Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited)
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571, 574 (2014) (“Congress may
not delegate to itself the power to execute the laws.”) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919,
956 (1983)); see also id. at 577 (finding that “[t]he defense of federal statutes by
[Congress]” offends the principle that “the Constitution carefully separates the enactment
of federal law from its implementation, sharply constraining Congress’s role in and
control over the latter”).
93 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 309–10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and
drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. . . . [The legislature’s] constitutional powers
being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of precise limits, it can, with the
greater facility, mask, under complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments
which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.”).
94 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
95 Id. § 3, cl. 6–7.
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executive power, the additional tool of broad standing could
disrupt the balance of power.96
B.

Concerns with State Standing
Although there are obvious benefits in granting states
standing to bring suits to challenge separation of powers, there
are some serious concerns. To begin with, even if states are well
situated as an abstract matter to challenge exercises of federal
executive power, states, in the abstract, do not file lawsuits. A
state officer or entity (usually the state attorney general) must
bring such claims in the name of the states. And therein lies the
rub. Any ideal of the states acting as platonic guardians standing
against federal executive excesses needs to be tempered by
political reality.
There are often raw political reasons why state attorneys
general pursue actions against the federal government beyond
their having serious concerns about the scope of federal executive
power.97 Challenging a president of the other party leads to its
own series of rewards.98 State attorneys general can earn favor
with their constituencies, position themselves for running for
higher office, and enhance their leadership standing within their
political party.99 They can raise money for their offices and their
states in the form of damages and attorneys’ fees, and they can
raise money for their own political campaigns in the form of
campaign contributions from supporters pleased by their
actions.100 They can stop, delay, harass, or hinder the
implementation of federal policies that they ideologically oppose.
It is therefore not surprising that one must look hard and
long to find a lawsuit brought by the states challenging the
federal government that is motivated by deep-founded concerns
for separation of powers rather than by partisan preference. It
is, after all, no accident that Republican attorneys general
led the actions against the Obama Administration and that
96 Moreover, while the checks provided by the Constitution can be politically costly
for Congress to use, the filing of a lawsuit is relatively low cost. Expanding congressional
standing could very well result in members of Congress using only lawsuits, and not the
constitutionally prescribed procedures, to challenge executive actions.
97 To be sure, not all suits by state attorneys general have partisan motivations. See
Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 25–26 (arguing that business interests and other
considerations drive some state attorney general litigation decisions).
98 See generally Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement,
127 HARV. L. REV. 853 (2014) (arguing there are both personal and departmental
incentives for state attorneys general to score significant legal victories, including
political and reputational benefits, pleasing state constituencies for reelection purposes,
and obtaining financial awards that can often be retained by enforcement agencies).
99 Id.
100 Id.
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Democratic attorneys general prosecuted lawsuits against
President Trump.101
It was not always this way. For many years, state attorneys
general worked across party lines to protect state interests;102
including, on occasion, taking actions contrary to their own
partisan interests.103 No longer. Bipartisanship has become the
rare exception104 and institutional concerns have become
subservient to partisan agendas.105 The same polarization forces
that once undermined Congress’s ability to check the president
now affect state attorneys general.106
This is not to say a suit filed for partisan reasons is somehow
illegitimate or cannot have a substantial effect in checking
against separation of powers abuses.107 It does suggest, however,
the states may not have such a uniquely pristine role in
patrolling federal executive action that they can be distinguished
from other interested parties for the purpose of standing. It also
suggests that even if states are granted standing, the credibility
and gravitas of their claims may be diminished,108 thus
undercutting one of the central reasons for granting states
expansive standing in the first place.109
Expanded state standing may also bring to the forefront
another difficult issue—determining who, for the purposes of
such litigation, is the appropriate officer or entity to represent
the state. Is it the state attorney general, the governor, the
101 See supra notes 9–10 and accompanying text (showing that Republican attorneys
general and Republican states take action against Democratic presidents, while
Democratic attorneys general and Democratic states take action against Republican
presidents); see also Margaret H. Lemos & Kevin M. Quinn, Litigating State Interests:
Attorneys General As Amici, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1251–52 (2015) (showing an overall
increase in partisan amicus briefs filed by state attorneys general beginning in
the 2000s).
102 Anthony Johnstone, Hearing the States, 45 PEPP. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 20).
103 Lemos & Quinn, supra note 101, at 1256.
104 See PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL: STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL AND
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA (2015); see Johnstone, supra note
102, at 23 (suggesting the turning point of this may have been when then-Alabama
Attorney General (now Judge William Pryor) created the Republican Attorneys General
Association).
105 See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1090–92
(2014) (noting that state objections to federal power are primarily based on partisan
politics and not the protection of state prerogatives).
106 Id.
107 See Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 30 (arguing that state litigation with
partisan motivation still plays the useful role of checking federal power); Grove, supra
note 55, at 897 (rejecting the notion that states should have expansive standing to sue the
federal government but also noting that partisan motivations can lead “state officials to
do a better job of representing the State in court”).
108 Johnstone, supra note 102, at 22.
109 See supra notes 36–71 and accompanying text.
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leaders of the legislature, or even citizens who sponsor state
initiatives? Should state attorneys general have the authority to
bring such lawsuits on behalf of the state when the legislature or
the governor opposes such actions? Should the attorneys general
be required to bring such a claim if the governor or legislature
presses her to do so, even if she opposes such action? And how, if
at all, should a federal court hearing such a claim resolve this
internal issue? Put simply, there is a Pandora’s Box of state law
issues underlying these lawsuits,110 and federal courts will have
to insert themselves in the thicket of intra-state divisions of
power to be able to hear these cases. It is a project, we suspect,
federal courts might want to avoid.111
Finally, expanded state standing to challenge federal
executive action also means an expanded role for the courts. As
discussed above, there are strong positive reasons why courts
should be more involved in imposing constraints upon executive
branch action, but also reasons to be cautious. After all, the
theories that posit that disputes over federalism and separation
of powers should be resolved by the political processes rather
than the courts112 presented more than just an abstract
110 See, e.g., William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency?: Governors, State
Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2455–67
(2006) (discussing cases addressing which state officer represents the state); Joseph
Kanefield & Blake W. Rebling, Who Speaks for Arizona: The Respective Roles of the
Governor and Attorney General When the State is Named in a Lawsuit, 53 ARIZ. L. REV.
689 (2011) (discussing the various issues surrounding which state official should
represent a state and concluding that, for the purpose of unity and clarity, the state
attorney general should be subservient to the governor in any case involving the state);
but see State ex rel. Discover Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nibert, 744 S.E.2d 625, 642–45 (W. Va.
2013) (ruling that state attorney generals have common law powers that are not specified
by statute, despite the fact other courts and legal scholars disagree on this point); see also
Press Release, Georgia: Governor Lifts Block Against Syrian Refugees (Jan. 4, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/us/georgia-governor-lifs-block-against-syrianrefugees.html (describing when Georgia’s Governor Nathan Deal rescinded an executive
order to block the placement of Syrian refugees within his state, after his attorney general
officially announced that Governor Deal did not have the authority to issue such an order
in the first place); Press Release, Office of Attorney General Mark Brnovich, Terry
Goddard Declines to Join Lawsuits Against Federal Health Care Law (Mar. 24, 2010),
https://groupwise.azag.gov/press-release/terry-goddard-declines-join-lawsuits-againstfederal-health-care-law [http://perma.cc/39PX-8U4J] (describing Democrat Attorney
General Goddard’s refusal to join the Republican-led health care suit for its lack of merit);
State ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Serv., No. 3:10–cv–91–
RV/EMT, 2010 WL 2000518 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 8, 2010) (in which Republican Governor Jan
Brewer represented Arizona in a suit when Arizona’s attorney general publicly refused
to join).
111 Cf. Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 30 (1959) (holding the
federal court should abstain in answering the question of whether a city had the power to
initiate eminent domain proceedings under state law).
112 See, e.g., JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS
263 (1980) (arguing the judiciary should not rule on constitutional questions regarding
the allocation of powers between Congress and the president); Herbert Wechlsler, The
Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965) (arguing the Supreme Court
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affirmation of the role of politics as a constitutional constraint on
the exercise of federal power. They also offered the tangible
advantage of extricating the judiciary from particularly difficult
and often highly politicized determinations. Setting a standard
for when separation of powers is violated consistently presents
the judiciary with concerns of judicial management, as well as
with questions of judicial enforceability and the challenge of
maintaining political capital when issuing politically charged
decisions. Accordingly, fashioning doctrines that could keep the
courts out of federalism and inter-branch disputes was attractive
on a number of counts. As Alexander Bickel taught long ago,
there are significant benefits that may be gained from a
modest judiciary.113
The value of avoiding the courts as the arbiters of politicallyladen issues surrounding the scope of presidential power may
have even greater resonance in the current climate in which the
dynamics of polarization and judicial selection have infected the
courts as well as the other branches.114 First, if the courts’
decisions regarding the exercise of presidential power are
motivated by partisan concerns, they will hardly do much to
constrain the Executive, particularly when the president is of the
same party. Second, to the extent that court decisions seem to
reflect partisan preferences, they will undercut the courts’
legitimacy.115 Third, even if the judicial system as a whole is able
to insulate itself against partisan decision-making, particular
judges may not be so self-constrained. Already, the experience
with states bringing actions challenging federal action has
reflected a substantial amount of judge shopping, and there is no
reason to assume that savvy attorneys general will cease using
this tactic in later cases. But the potential costs to the national
interest of a partisan decision by an errant judge could be
considerable. A single judge, after all, can do significant mischief
in interrupting presidential actions—even if that action later
turns out to be perfectly legal.

must exercise restraint and neutrality, and that there must be limits on its ability to bind
other branches and the states in its constitutional interpretation).
113 See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (advocating that the Supreme Court use discretion
to avoid deciding controversial issues); see also Flaherty, supra note 2, at 1828
(advocating that courts revisit and incorporate Bickel’s notions of “passive virtues”).
114 See Johnstone, supra note 102, at 3–4.
115 Id. at 5.
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IV. RELAXING INJURY IN FACT FOR STATES TO CHALLENGE
EXECUTIVE ACTIONS
What should be clear by this point is that states are
particularly well positioned to constrain expanding executive
power. States have a unique federalism interest in ensuring that
federal executive officers comply with the Constitution and
federal laws, and they have the resources and sophistication to
bring successful suits of this sort. At the same time, however,
there are concerns with granting states plenary standing to bring
any suit against the Executive. One way to balance these benefits
and concerns about empowering states to challenge executive
actions is to relax the injury in fact test for states, but impose
prudential constraints on standing. Easing the injury in fact test
would expand the power of the state to bring suit. But it would
still require states to demonstrate some type of actual injury that
would ensure that states do not meddle in affairs that truly do
not affect them. Moreover, continuing to enforce prudential
limitations, such as third-party standing, would prevent states
from bringing suits that others are better positioned to litigate.
Finally, in order to further guard against hyper-partisanship, we
also propose requiring states to show some level of bipartisan
support to maintain their actions against the Executive.
The injury in fact test requires that a plaintiff show he has
suffered, or is imminently about to suffer, an “injury in fact.”116
That injury must be to a “legally protected interest,” and it must
be “concrete and particularized.”117 Moreover, the injury must be
traceable to the defendant and of the sort that courts could likely
redress through a ruling in favor of the plaintiff.118 Ordinarily, a
plaintiff satisfies this test by showing a loss of money or physical
harm.119 However, this is not always the case. Although courts
purport to apply the same injury in fact test in all cases, in
practice, different tests apply to different types of cases.120
For example, courts have often relaxed the injury
requirement for Equal Protection Clause violations.121 Thus, in
Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 492–93 (2009).
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016).
118 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61(1992).
119 But see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (defining injury in fact to
include injuries to “[a]esthetic and environmental well-being” and “economic well-being”).
120 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1061,
1065 (2015).
121 Id. at 1075 (“[T]he Supreme Court does not always demand a redressable ‘Wallet
Injury’ to ground standing . . . under the Equal Protection Clause.”); see also Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 618–19 (1988) (the Court notoriously relaxed standing for alleged
Establishment Clause violations); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing for Privilege: The Failure
of Injury Analysis, 82 B.U. L. REV. 301, 328 (2002) (“[T]he Court often waves litigants
complaining of government support for religious endeavor right past the injury hurdle.”).
116
117
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Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Court held that a
nonminority contractor had standing to challenge a government
program that gave preference to minority businesses.122 In doing
so, the Court dispensed with the “concrete” requirement for
injury and the requirement of redressability because the plaintiff
could not prove that it would have received any contracts if race
were not considered.123 Instead, the Court explained the denial of
the opportunity “to compete on an equal footing” constituted a
sufficient injury for standing.124
At the other end of the spectrum, courts have been less
willing to find standing in cases in which the plaintiff challenges
government actions related to national security.125 In Clapper v.
Amnesty International USA, for example, the Court explicitly
indicated the imminence requirement is particularly rigorous in
suits challenging actions implicating national security.126
Similarly, and more salient to this essay, federalism
concerns appear to have led to restrictions on standing. Consider
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons.127 There, an individual who had
previously been choked by police sued the police, alleging he
might again be subject to a police chokehold.128 The Court denied
standing on the ground the injury was too speculative. Given
the Court’s willingness to find standing based on other
low-probability injuries, one explanation for the denial of
standing in Lyons is the Court sought to avoid interfering with
the inner workings of state’s government.129
These decisions show that the rigor of the injury in fact test
varies depending on certain considerations, such as separation of

But see id. at 311 (discussing how the Court has not always been so generous with Equal
Protection standing and listing cases as examples).
122 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 210–12 (1995).
123 See id. at 211.
124 Id. (“The injury in cases of this kind is that a ‘discriminatory classification
prevent[s] the plaintiff from competing on an equal footing.’”) (quoting Ne. Fla. Chapter,
Associated Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667 (1993)). For
other examples of the same analysis, see Ne. Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of
Am. v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 667–68 (1993), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978).
125 F. Andrew Hessick, The Separation-of-Powers Theory of Standing, 95 N.C. L. REV.
673, 725 (2017) (arguing the standing test is stricter for national security cases than
Equal Protection Clause cases).
126 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013); see Fallon, supra note
120, at 1079 (expanding on this point).
127 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
128 Id. at 97–98.
129 F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 76 (2012) (“The
denial of standing in Lyons and the grant of standing in Laidlaw may reflect the Court's
unwillingness to interfere in the workings of state government.”).
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powers, federalism, and the type of right asserted.130 When a suit
raises a challenge in an area that federal courts generally seek to
avoid, such as national security or the military, the standing
inquiry is more stringent.131 By contrast, when a suit seeks to
vindicate rights that federal courts have regarded as particularly
important, the standing test is relaxed.132
In this light, the injury in fact test should be relaxed when a
state sues to force executive officers to comply with the law.133 As
discussed above, states have a unique interest in preventing
unlawful federal action. Permitting states to protect that interest
is a fundamental component of the division of power in the
Constitution. More pragmatically, state officials are prudent
enough to bring only those suits that matter, that they may win,
and that they have the resources to argue effectively. They
accordingly should face a lower standing threshold when
challenging unlawful executive action or inaction.
There are a variety of ways to operationalize a relaxed
standing requirement. One way is to expand the types of injuries
that suffice for state standing in such suits. For example, one
could expand state standing to injuries for which the states are
partly responsible. Courts have said individuals should not be
permitted to base standing on injuries that are based on
reactions to federal actions. Thus, in Clapper, the Court held that
the costs that private individuals incurred to avoid federal
surveillance was insufficient to confer standing on those
individuals to challenge the surveillance program.134 But one
could discard this restriction when states sue the Executive.
The Fifth Circuit arguably adopted this approach in Texas v.
United States.135 There, the Republican Attorney General of
Texas challenged President Obama’s policies deeming various
types of illegal immigrants to be lawfully present in the United
130 Id. at 77 (noting that separation of powers, federalism, and docket size affect
standing decisions).
131 See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 68, 73 (1984) (“In
fact the law of standing has become so disjointed that the danger now exists that the
Court will come to accept it as a manipulable doctrine whose primary value lies in its
ability to serve nonjurisdictional ends.”).
132 See F. Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury in Fact, and Private Rights, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 275, 304 (2008) (“The Court has been hesitant to deny standing in cases involving
the violation of a right that the Court deems particularly important even when the
plaintiff has not suffered a perceptible injury.”).
133 See Indiana v. EPA, 796 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2015) (suggesting that even
though a state cannot sue the United States parens patriae, it should get “‘special
solicitude’ to sue the United States . . . if a quasi-sovereign interest of the state is
at stake”).
134 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 417 (2013).
135 See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015), aff'd by an
equally divided Court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
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States. To establish standing, Texas argued that under Texas
law, these immigrants could obtain driver’s licenses, and Texas
would incur costs in issuing these licenses. The Fifth Circuit held
these costs supported Texas’s standing, even though Texas could
have eliminated those costs by amending Texas law to bar those
immigrants from obtaining licenses.136
This is not to say states should always be able to create an
injury in fact. For example, Texas should not have had standing
if it enacted its law authorizing immigrants to obtain driver’s
licenses after President Obama adopted his policies. In that
situation, federal law would not have forced Texas to incur the
costs of providing licenses to immigrants because, at that time of
the adoption of the federal policy, Texas would not have been
required to provide licenses to immigrants. Rather, Texas would
have incurred the cost of providing licenses to immigrants
through its own action of enacting the Texas law against the
backdrop of the federal policy.
Nor is it fair to say that any federal action that conflicts with
state law creates an injury in fact sufficient for the state’s
standing.137 The state must point to some sort of factual effect on
the state to establish an injury in fact.
Another way to soften the injury in fact test for state claims
against the executive is to relax the requirement that the injury
not be speculative,138 requiring states to show only that there is a
realistic possibility that they might suffer the threatened harm
instead of a high probability. This approach finds support in the
decision of the Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA.139 There,
Massachusetts sued the EPA for failing to regulate carbon
dioxide. Massachusetts claimed it had standing because federal
law conferred a cause of action on the states to challenge the
EPA’s decision, and because the Environmental Protection
Agency’s failure to regulate carbon dioxide would result in global
warming, which in turn would raise sea levels and erode

See id. at 155–57.
See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 268 (4th Cir. 2011)
(concluding the preemption of Virginia law prohibiting individual mandates by the
individual mandate provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act did not
cause Virginia an injury in fact). It may be possible that federal preemption of state law
creates standing based on the impairment of the state’s sovereign interest, as opposed to
being based on the state suffering an injury in fact. But we leave that issue for
another day.
138 Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992); see also Diamond v.
Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 66 (1986) (rejecting standing based on “unadorned speculation”);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975) (denying standing because the plaintiffs had not
demonstrated a “substantial probability” of harm).
139 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
136
137
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Massachusetts’s
land.140
The
Court
concluded
these
considerations sufficed for standing, explaining when they have
“quasi-sovereign interests” at stake, states are entitled to “special
solicitude” in the standing analysis.141 The Court did not explain
what it meant by “special solicitude.” One might think from the
reference to “quasi-sovereign interests” that the special solicitude
referred to parens patriae standing. But that is not so. The Court
did not base standing on Massachusetts’s role as parens patriae.
Instead, the Court pointed to the factual injury of the erosion to
Massachusetts’s land.142
Rather than referring to parens patriae standing, it appears
that the special solicitude the Court afforded Massachusetts was
to relax the restriction on speculative injuries. The erosion to
Massachusetts’s land would not occur for decades.143 That distant
and speculative injury would likely not suffice for standing.144
The Court’s conclusion that the possible erosion did suffice
suggests that it applied the imminence requirement less
rigorously. Massachusetts v. EPA thus supports the idea that,
when a state alleges a quasi-sovereign interest, the standing
inquiry should be relaxed, even when the state seeks to
base standing on an injury in fact instead of parens
patriae standing.145
At the same time, we also suggest that even this relatively
modest proposal of relaxing the injury in fact requirement
for states should be further qualified. As pointed out
previously, expanded state standing creates its own set of
concerns—specifically that many of these actions will be
driven more by a motivation for political disruption than by a
true concern with executive branch overreach.146 Some, of course,
might suggest this is fine—that the use of highly partisan
attorneys general as a check against highly partisan presidents
is fully consonant with Madison’s notion of ambition
counteracting ambition.147 Perhaps. Yet the use of excessive

Id. at 518–22.
Id. at 520.
Id. at 521–24.
143 Id. at 541–42 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting the possible loss of land as one
harm supporting standing in the next few decades).
144 As the Court explained in Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992),
the further off in time that an injury may occur tends to make the injury more
speculative. See id. (stating the “purpose” of “imminence” is “to ensure that the alleged
injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is ‘certainly
impending’”) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
145 For other instances in which federal courts have relaxed standing requirements
for states, see Lemos & Young, supra note 79, at 11–12.
146 See supra notes 36–71 and accompanying text.
147 See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
140
141
142
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partisanship as a method to reduce the effects of excessive
partisanship does not seem to be the type of remedy that would
help combat the polarization that lies at the heart of much of the
dysfunction that has helped lead to the expansion of presidential
power in the first place. More directly, the potential risk to the
national interest engendered by overly partisan attorneys
general bringing harassment or dilatory actions against the
executive in front of overly partisan courts is not one that can be
easily glossed over.
For this reason, we propose the courts demand some indicia
of bipartisanship as a prudential matter before relaxing the
injury in fact requirement for states.148 To be clear, we are not
suggesting that courts should deny standing if the state meets
traditional injury in fact requirements.149 But in cases in which
the injury in fact requirement needs to be relaxed to find
standing, there should be a showing that the action has some
measure of bipartisan support to justify the “special solicitude”
the Supreme Court had indicated may be warranted when a
sovereign state is bringing the claim.150 Thus, under our
approach, both the state plaintiffs in Massachusetts v. EPA151
and in United States v. Texas152 would have had to demonstrate
bipartisan support, since in both cases the injury in fact
requirement was relaxed.153 In Washington v. Trump,154 on the
other hand, no showing would have been needed because the
state readily satisfied injury in fact requirements.155
Anthony Johnstone and Michael Solimine, writing
separately, have advocated for a similar approach in the context
of amicus briefs, contending that the Supreme Court should only
give deference to briefs from the states that reflect some level of
bipartisan support.156 In fact, the National Association of
Attorneys General (“NAAG”) already requires bipartisan action
by attorneys general in order to invoke the authority of the
states. Its constitution requires that in order for a sign-on letter

148 This does not necessarily mean more than one state will always be necessary to
maintain an action. But if one state goes at it alone, it should be required to assert that
the action has some bipartisan support.
149 E.g., Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d. 1151, 1159 (9th Cir. 2017).
150 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007); Indiana v. EPA, 796 F.3d 803,
810 (7th Cir. 2015).
151 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518.
152 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 155–56 (5th Cir. 2015).
153 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518; Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d at
155–56.
154 Trump, 847 F.3d at 1158–61.
155 Id.
156 Johnstone, supra note 102, note at 29–30; Michael Solimine, Retooling the Amicus
Machine, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 151, 166 n.86 (2016).
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to become NAAG policy (appearing on NAAG letterhead as a
result), the letter must have at least the support of thirty-six
attorneys general (a two-thirds majority of NAAG’s overall state
and territorial membership).157
These approaches make sense. As Johnstone indicates, the
requirement of bipartisanship works to assure that the case is “a
reliable signal of general state interests.”158 Further, because
such a requirement would force attorneys general to work across
party lines, it may, in that respect, have the additional benefit of
helping work against the tide of partisan polarization.159
We also propose the courts should not allow states to
maintain third-party standing cases absent a showing of cross
party support. The Court has already held that whether a party
can sue on behalf of the rights of third parties is a matter for
prudential consideration.160 Taking steps to assure that a lawsuit
against the president brought by a state is more than only
a partisan attack would seem to be a prudent exercise of
judicial power.161
Finally, state standing should be allowed only upon a proper
showing that the state officer or entity bringing the suit is the
single correct party to maintain the action in the federal court.
As noted previously, various state officials—the governor,
attorney general, legislators, and even individuals who sponsor
state initiatives—often dispute who has the authority to litigate
on behalf of the state.162 Those disputes are exacerbated when
the officers disagree on the merits of the action. Both the state
attorney general who thinks the president has violated the
Constitution and the state governor who thinks that the
president’s action is lawful may each claim that he alone has the
power to bring suit on behalf of the state. To avoid the
embarrassment of resolving a suit against the president
improperly brought by the wrong state official, federal courts
should closely examine whether the official bringing the case has
the authority to do so under state law. If state law does not
authorize the officer who brought the suit to do so, or even if the
law is unclear, courts exercise their discretion to deny standing.
Dismissing on that ground would prevent unnecessary conflict

157 CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS
GENERAL art. VIII, § 2.
158 Johnstone, supra note 102, at 29.
159 See id.; Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development
of Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REV. 355, 393 (2012).
160 See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504 (1975).
161 Cf. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004).
162 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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with the president and avoid deciding many unnecessary
constitutional questions.
V. CONCLUSION
The vast expansion of presidential power in the twentieth
and twenty-first centuries, as well as the possibility of a runaway
presidency, calls for new ways for thinking about how to
constrain the Executive. Granting the states standing to
challenge federal executive action is one avenue deserving
exploration. Expansive state standing, however, raises its
own set of concerns—including further exacerbating the
over-politicization issues that are currently plaguing both the
state offices of the attorneys general and the federal courts.
There is thus a legitimate question as to whether liberalized
state standing may raise more problems than it solves.
In this essay, we offer a modest solution. We propose the
states should not have standing to raise purely abstract issues
but that a more generous notion of injury in fact should be
applied to them than to other entities. Such an approach allows
states to maintain actions against the Executive that might
otherwise not be justiciable. We further suggest, however, even
this limited grant of standing should be subject to prudential
review because of the potential problems that expanded state
standing generates.
We end with a final word of caution from the opinion by
Justice Jackson in Youngstown that is cited at the beginning of
this essay. Although the Court in Youngstown found the
president’s action in that case to be unconstitutional, Justice
Jackson’s opinion in that case was not optimistic that the
decision would effectively constrain the Executive. As he wrote:
But I have no illusion that any decision by this Court can keep power
in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its
problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps
primarily, challenges Congress. If not good law, there was worldly
wisdom in the maxim attributed to Napoleon that “The tools belong to
the man who can use them.” We may say that power to legislate for
emergencies belongs in the hands of Congress, but only Congress itself
can prevent power from slipping through its fingers.163

Expanded state standing to challenge federal executive
action, in short, may be warranted; but it, by itself, will not be
sufficient to seriously constrain presidential power. The broader
solutions lie elsewhere.
163

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952).

Representative/Senator Trump?
Gary Lawson*
The 2016 presidential election sent many people, including
many otherwise seemingly sensible people, completely over the
edge. College and university campuses en masse set up
counseling services for disappointed students, and I suspect that
many faculty and administrators probably “used” those services
at least vicariously. Former friends were ostracized—or, even
worse, “unfriended” on Facebook—for the heinous sin of voting
for Donald Trump. Ordinarily sober scholars describe President
Trump’s election as a symptom of “constitutional rot.”1 At my
own institution, at a post-election panel on which I participated
as the faculty’s token knuckle-dragger, student questions
focused largely on how President Trump could be removed from
office—several months before he actually assumed that office. A
list of anecdotes of this kind could go on for quite a while.
In all fairness to my grieving colleagues and students, I feel
their pain. A lot of us sucked it up, without any school-provided
puppies, for the eight years of the Obama Administration, but it
was a thoroughly miserable time for anyone concerned about
individual freedom. And although I did not vote for George W.
Bush in 2000—I voted for Libertarian Harry Browne—I vividly
remember that, at one brief moment during election night, I
actually felt physically ill when it looked like the execrable Al
Gore might ride his fevered fantasies about feverish planets into
the White House. Presidential elections seem to matter a great
deal to a lot of people.
From a constitutionalist standpoint,2 this is something of a
puzzle. The United States Constitution simply does not appear to
* Philip S. Beck Professor, Boston University School of Law. This article was
prepared for a symposium sponsored by the Chapman Law Review on “Constraining the
Executive,” and I thank the editors for inviting me to participate. I am grateful to R.J.
Pestritto and Joe Postell for helpful suggestions, though they bear no responsibility for
anything that I say here.
1 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Rot and Constitutional Crisis, 77 MARYLAND L.
REV. (forthcoming 2018).
2 By “constitutionalist” I mean nothing more linguistically complex than “by
reference to and in accordance with the meaning of the United States Constitution.” That
meaning was fixed—at least for the original Constitution and quite possibly for
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make the president all that important of a figure. To be sure, in
times of war, the president is commander-in-chief of the armed
forces,3 but the Constitution gives Congress the powers to
“declare War,” to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,” to
“make Rules regarding Captures,” to “raise and support Armies,”
to “provide and maintain a Navy,” to “make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval forces,” and
to provide for “calling forth” and “organizing, arming, and
disciplining, the Militia.”4 Congress actually has most of the
constitutional war powers–so much so that the Commander-inChief Clause was necessary to foreclose an inference that
Congress also has the un-enumerated, but implied, power to
control troop movements.5 Furthermore, while the president’s
“executive Power”6 gives him7 control over the law enforcement
machinery, that power is subject to duties to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed”8 and to carry out executive
responsibilities in accordance with fiduciary principles.9 More
fundamentally, executive power is, in all but a very small set of
contexts, a purely implementational power that comes into play
only to execute law that is provided from sources external to the
executive.10 The president can also grant pardons,11 convene and
adjourn Congress,12 and, with the advice and consent of the

amendments as well—in 1788, in the sense that the criteria for determining the referents
of the concepts in the Constitution are determined by the cognitive framework of a
reasonable reader in 1788. See Gary Lawson, Reflections of an Empirical Reader (or:
Could Fleming Be Right This Time?), 96 B.U. L. REV. 1457, 1460–67 (2016); Gary Lawson
& Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 47, 48 (2006).
3 I believe that this authority comes from the Vesting Clause of Article I rather than
from the more specific Commander-in-Chief Clause, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, which
states that “[t]he President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the
United States.” This simply confirms the president’s “executive Power” to command the
military, but that point is incidental to the present argument.
4 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 11–16.
5 Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The Jeffersonian Treaty Clause, 2006 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1, 29–30 (2006).
6 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
7 The Constitution consistently refers to the president by a generic male pronoun. I
therefore follow that practice, without endorsing it.
8 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
9 For a book-length defense of the proposition that all constitutional powers,
including the executive power, are fiduciary powers, see GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN,
“A GREAT POWER OF ATTORNEY”: UNDERSTANDING THE FIDUCIARY CONSTITUTION (2017).
For an article-length defense of a duty of care on the part of federal officials, and therefore
of a presidential duty of care in the execution of the laws, see Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, By Any Other Name: Rational Basis Inquiry and the Federal Government’s
Fiduciary Duty of Care, 69 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018).
10 See Gary Lawson, Take the Fifth . . . Please! The Original Insignificance of the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process of Law Clause, 2017 BYU L. REV. 611, 631 (2018).
11 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
12 Id. § 3.
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Senate, make appointments and treaties,13 but it is hard to see
how powers of this kind could generate Caesarian nightmares.
The sum total of constitutional presidential powers is far
from trivial; the American president is—and always was—a
formidable constitutional figure.14 But it is not necessarily a lifealtering huge sum either. Even if one believes, as I emphatically
do, that the Article II Vesting Clause grants the president all
power that falls within the conceptual category of “executive
Power,”15 the conceptual lines of the power limit its scope.
Possessing the “executive Power” does not allow the president to
take over steel mills unilaterally in order to help a war effort,16
and it does not allow the president to order federal courts to
dismiss pending cases in order to promote foreign policy goals.17
If one looks at the presidency through a constitutional lens, it is
hard to see why people would get as emotionally charged as they
do about who occupies that office. As a matter of original
meaning, it just would not make that much of a difference in
most people’s lives. It probably matters more who is mayor of
one’s city—and perhaps even who is on the local zoning board.
As a matter of political and social reality rather than original
meaning, of course, strong reactions to presidential elections are
more understandable. The modern presidency bears little
relationship to the office created by the Constitution of 1788.18
Presidents today matter far more than they should if one’s
touchstone is the Constitution. For one thing, presidents have,
with the blessing of Congress, assumed powers of at best dubious
constitutional lineage on everything from uses of military force19
Id. § 2, cl. 2.
See generally SAIKRISHNA BANGALORE PRAKASH, IMPERIAL FROM THE BEGINNING:
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ORIGINAL EXECUTIVE (2015).
15 See Lawson & Seidman, supra note 5, at 22–43. For the most powerful rebuttal to
that position, see Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Constitution’s
“Executive Vesting Clause”—Evidence from Eighteenth-Century Drafting Practice, 31
WHITTIER L. REV. 1 (2009).
16 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (correctly
so holding).
17 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 675–76 (1981) (not doing quite as well
as Youngstown, and indeed pretty much making a botch of everything).
18 It is conventional to use 1789 as the starting date for the United States
Constitution. That is the correct date for when a fully functioning government under the
Constitution, including a sworn-in Congress and president, first appeared. The
Constitution, however, became law for the ratifying states on June 21, 1788 (or at most
shortly thereafter), and at least some important portions of the Constitution were
effective as of the summer of 1788. See generally Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, When Did
the Constitution Become Law?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2001).
19 See Gary Lawson, Inigo Montoya Goes to War, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1355, 1364–67
(2015) (describing constitutional controversies over the scope of presidential power to
initiate hostilities).
13
14
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to the unilateral establishment of military governments in
peacetime within the United States.20 For another thing, federal
courts have routinely assumed powers far beyond those
plausibly attributable to the “judicial Power”21 conferred by the
Constitution. Consequently, the power to appoint federal judges
has acquired significance beyond anything contemplated in the
eighteenth century. But most importantly, in modern times, the
election of the American president effectively elects the federal
legislature as well. That is because the executive has become, for
all practical purposes, the legislative department (at least when
the judicial department chooses not to assume that authority).
Modern executive action, through regulations, adjudications, and
enforcement decisions, creates law that often has far more effect
on people’s lives than the entire mass of congressional legislation
does. Congress has fostered that development by delegating—or,
more precisely, subdelegating22—much of its legislative authority
to the executive department via open-ended statutes that
essentially instruct executive actors to go forth and do good. A
great many federal statutes make lawmakers, not laws. As a
consequence, presidential elections determine far more than the
Constitution of 1788 ever had in mind. It is no wonder that
people get so invested in them.
That level of investment is potentially a bad thing in several
respects. It is constitutionally bad because it reflects a perversion
of the constitutional design. It is socially bad if one believes that
politics should not matter so much that people turn on each other
for supporting different candidates and policies. And it might be
intellectually bad because people who care too much about
something do not always think clearly and logically about it.
Part One of this essay very briefly catalogues the extent to
which the American presidency has effectively become the
American Congress through subdelegation of legislative
authority. Part Two just as briefly explains why that is a
constitutional perversion. Part Three suggests, contrary to the
fears of many who are in the throes of Trump Derangement
Syndrome, how the Trump presidency may present the best
opportunity in generations to reverse the trend of subdelegation
and begin the long process of reining in executive power.

20 That happened? Yep, that happened. See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, The
Hobbesian Constitution: Governing without Authority, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 581, 617–24 (2001).
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
22 See PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 377 (2014)
(explaining that the constitutional “delegation” problem is really a subdelegation problem
because Congress was delegated the legislative power in the first instance).
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Ironically, the change agent, if any change actually happens, is
likely to be President Trump.
In no event do I expect the presidency of 2020 to look
anything like the presidency of 1788. But for the first time
in a long time, there is a chance that one might see some
movement on that front toward, rather than away from, the
United States Constitution.
I. “MEET THE NEW BOSS”
The American presidency has grown in power since 1788 for
many reasons, and it would require someone better versed than I
in both history and political science to describe and analyze them
all.23 But one of those reasons obviously dwarfs in magnitude all
of the others: Congress has essentially designated the president
as its substitute legislature. The expansion of presidential power
through subdelegation of legislative authority is so enormous
that any attempt to restrain executive power that does not
address the subdelegation problem head-on is like putting bandaids on Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid after their final
encounter with the Bolivian police. The federal executive now
functions as the federal legislature for many, and perhaps even
most, practical purposes. Federal law, in the modern world, is
largely an executive construct. The observation is common
enough to be almost mundane. As Professor Mila Sohoni aptly
summarized the conventional wisdom:
Due to gridlock and partisanship, Congress is less able to act as an
effective lawmaker and hence as an institution that actually authorizes
and controls agency action. With respect to some statutes . . . ,
Congress has conferred primary custodianship over the shape and
structure of regulatory schemes on agencies by giving agencies the
power to waive and alter key statutory requirements. In other
areas . . . , the accretion of complex statutory schemes and the opacity
of legislative intent have together produced a system of “de
facto delegation” that effectively transfers lawmaking power to the
executive branch.24

23 For an outstanding effort at such an account by someone better versed than I in
both history and political science, see generally JOSEPH POSTELL, BUREAUCRACY IN
AMERICA: THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE’S CHALLENGE TO CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT
(2017). Professor Postell’s book is an indispensable supplement and, in some cases,
antidote to Professor Jerry Mashaw’s seminal book on early administrative law. See
generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE LOST
ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012).
24 Mila Sohoni, On Dollars and Deference: Agencies, Spending, and Economic Rights,
66 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1701 (2017) (footnotes omitted).
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Professor Adrian Vermeule put it even more succinctly: “[T]he
executive and administrative sector of the state . . . often
overshadows the classical institutions of the Constitution of
1789 altogether.” 25
There is no uniquely correct way to measure the relative
influence of legislative and executive—and, for that matter,
judicial—action in the creation of federal law. But even crude
metrics tell an important story. At the end of 2012, the number of
pages in the Code of Federal Regulations (“CFR”) exceeded the
number of pages in the United States Code by a factor of nearly
four.26 Notwithstanding the numerous problems, vectoring in
somewhat different directions, with this comparison—the
Statutes at Large rather than the United States Code is the
better measure of congressional lawmaking; many regulations
simply parrot statutory language and thus add nothing to the
legal baseline;27 gross volume numbers do not convey information
about relative importance; and an enormous amount of federal
law is made through executive adjudication rather than
executive rulemaking, and thus does not show up in measures of
the CFR—there is something striking about the raw figures
comparing statutes and regulations. At the very least, it
constitutes a piece of concrete evidence, if any is actually needed,
that executive lawmaking is central to modern governance.
Casual anecdotalism28 sheds further light on the relative
importance of executive and legislative action in the creation of
federal law. Two of the most important statutes enacted during
the Obama Administration—The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act29 and the Dodd-Frank Act30—consume
thousands of pages of text between them, but they are both
toothless in important respects until implemented through
significant regulatory action. As with most modern regulatory

25 ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 3 (2016).
26 See Tom Cummins, Code Words, 5 J. LEGAL METRICS 89, 98 (2015).
27 Such “parroting” regulations could add to the legal baseline if they were given
deference by courts. But regulations that simply repeat what is said in statutes do not
receive deference. See Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257–58 (2006). To be sure,
regulations do not seem to need to differ much from statutory language in order to avoid
the “anti-parroting” rule of Gonzalez. See Plateau Mining Corp. v. Fed. Mine Safety &
Health Review Comm’n, 519 F.3d 1176, 1192–93 (10th Cir. 2008).
28 Yes, it is a word. I looked it up.
29 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010), amended by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified primarily in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
30 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
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statutes, they frequently authorize executive agencies to make
law rather than prescribe rules of conduct for executive agencies
to implement.
Consider, as just one example, some interlocking provisions
from the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).31 One of the central
concepts underlying the ACA is the “qualified health plan,” which
is the only kind of plan that can be sold on the ACA exchanges. It
is therefore vital under the statute to know what makes a health
care plan “qualified.” The basic statutory definition of a “qualified
health plan” is one that “has in effect a certification . . . that such
plan meets the criteria for certification described in section
18031(c) of this title.”32 The criteria for certification prescribed
by section 18031(c) are: “The Secretary [of Health and Human
Services] shall, by regulation, establish criteria for the
certification of health plans as qualified health plans.”33 In other
words, the statute does not establish the criteria but instructs an
executive official to provide them. To be sure, the statute then
sets out nine considerations that must be part of that executive
prescription, but those considerations are basically drivel,34 much
as were the statutory “constraints” in the National Industrial
Recovery Act35 or the directions to the United States Sentencing
Commission in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.36 The ACA
also makes clear that a qualified health plan must “provide[] the
essential health benefits package described in section 18022(a).”37
It is anticlimactic to point out that section 18022(a) reads in
relevant part: “[T]he term ‘essential health benefits package’
means, with respect to any health plan, coverage that . . . provides
for the essential health benefits defined by the Secretary [of
Health and Human Services] under subsection (b).”38
These provisions are noteworthy in modern times for being
more specific than one has come to expect from major
31 For an interesting discussion of subdelegation of legislative authority under the
Dodd-Frank Act and other securities laws, see Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and
Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L. J. 435, 437 (2017). See also Tom Campbell,
Executive Action and Nonaction, 95 N.C. L. REV. 553, 566 (2017) (noting that the DoddFrank Act contains “398 specific calls in the statute for regulatory agencies, including the
newly created Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, to issue rules, interpreting
vague concepts such as ‘unfairness’ by financial institutions, and ‘systemic risk’”)
(footnote omitted).
32 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(A) (2012).
33 Id. § 18031(c)(1).
34 See id. § 18031(c)(1)(A)–(I).
35 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 534–35 (1935).
36 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 374–77 (1989).
37 42 U.S.C. § 18021(a)(1)(B). The plan must also be provided by a properly licensed
insurer. See id. § 18021(a)(1)(C).
38 Id. § 18022(a)(1).
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congressional legislation. The Emergency Economic Stabilization
Act of 2008,39 one of the most famous (or infamous) legislative
legacies to emerge from the second Bush Administration, handed
the Secretary of the Treasury three quarters of a trillion dollars
with which to “purchase . . . troubled assets from any financial
institution, on such terms and conditions as are determined by
the Secretary.”40 “Troubled assets,” in case anyone wonders, are
mortgages and “any other financial instrument that the
Secretary . . . determines the purchase of which is necessary to
promote financial market stability . . . .”41 Throw on such old
standards that populate the United States Code as the
Communications Act of 193442 and the Clean Air Act,43 and one
can see that much modern legislation does not make law, but
instead merely designates executive agents as lawmakers.44 The
president, as the ultimate repository of all executive power,
thereby becomes the de facto Congress. The president and other
executive agents make the law. President Trump is thus also,
over a staggeringly large range of cases, Representative Trump
and Senator Trump to boot—with no requirements of quorums,
cloture, or majority votes to stand in the way of his lawmaking.
To be sure, in the real world it is “other executive agents” far
more than it is the president who makes the law. The federal
executive apparatus is so enormous that even the most

39 Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008) (codified in scattered sections of 12 &
26 U.S.C.).
40 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2012).
41 Id. § 5202 (2012). The subdelegation problem was just one of many constitutional
infirmities with the Troubled Assets Relief Program (“TARP”). See Gary Lawson, Burying
the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 57–58 (2010).
42 47 U.S.C. § 307 (2012) (providing that the Federal Communications Commission
shall grant broadcast licenses to applicants “if public convenience, interest, or necessity
will be served thereby”).
43 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012) (providing that the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency shall set primary air quality standards, “the attainment and
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, based on such criteria and
allowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health”).
44 For a less consequential, but no less legally significant, example, consider the law
underlying the events in Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). Captain Yates
threw overboard some undersized grouper that he had caught in the Gulf of Mexico, and
he was prosecuted for concealing a “tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or
influence” a federal investigation. 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). The Yates Supreme Court
decision focused on whether fish were “tangible object[s]” within the meaning of this
statute, Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1077, but consider for a moment why Captain Yates felt the
need to throw his fish overboard. What federal statute prescribed the maximum length of
red grouper for American fishing vessels? There was no such statute; the only relevant
statute made it illegal “to violate . . . any regulation or permit” issued by the National
Marine Fisheries Services. 16 U.S.C. § 1857(1)(A) (2012). For a more detailed account of
the federal “law”—all stemming from executive regulations—regarding the permissible
size of Gulf of Mexico red grouper, see LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 108–09.
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committed president can control only a tiny fraction of what
actually goes on within it. Congressional subdelegation thus
creates an alternative multi-member Congress within the
executive whose institutional functioning is too complex to be
captured by any simple analogy. Nonetheless, as a formal matter,
all executive power is lodged in the president, even if he cannot
always effectively exercise it in the face of a “deep state” that has
its own agenda(s).
Of course, there are serious limits even to this expanded
executive power, as recent (as of July 2017) events concerning
efforts to repeal or amend the ACA demonstrate. The president
cannot simply wave a law into or out of existence. The legislature
is not irrelevant. But the constitutional role of the legislature is
not to be “not irrelevant.” It is to make the law, which is then
executed by the president and other executive agents. Much of
the time, that is simply not how it works.
II. “WHY SHOULD I CARE, WHY SHOULD I CARE?”
Is it really a constitutional problem if the president makes
the law? To ask the question is to answer it, at least as a matter
of original meaning. Indeed, there are few propositions of
constitutional meaning as thoroughly overdetermined as the
unconstitutionality of subdelegations of legislative authority. I
have spent much of the past quarter century defending that
claim, and I will not repeat those extensive arguments here
beyond the brief references in this section.
One can discern a constitutional principle against
subdelegation of legislative authority through any number of
convergent lines of reasoning. The basic principle of enumerated
powers reserves all “legislative powers herein granted” to
Congress and thus denies them to executive (or judicial) agents,45
whose enumerated powers do not include the power to legislate.
A law subdelegating legislative power to the president or an
executive official would not be “necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution” federal powers.46 To let the president make,
rather than execute, law would violate the principle of legality
that has been part of the Anglo-American legal tradition since
the Magna Carta and that underlies the constitutional idea of
due process of law.47 And, most powerfully and fundamentally,
See GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 180–81 (7th ed. 2016).
See Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235, 242–67 (2005); Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 345–52 (2002).
47 See Lawson, supra note 10, at 618–26.
45
46
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subdelegation violates the fiduciary principles that underlie the
Constitution. The United States Constitution is most aptly
characterized as a kind of fiduciary instrument,48 and the
background principles of interpretation for the document are
therefore at least partially defined by the background rules for
interpretation of eighteenth-century fiduciary instruments.49 One
of the best-established eighteenth-century fiduciary duties is the
requirement that agents exercising delegated discretionary
authority personally exercise rather than subdelegate that
authority.50 Accordingly, if a fiduciary instrument is to allow the
agent to subdelegate discretionary authority,51 the instrument
needs specifically to provide for such authority, at least where
authority to subdelegate is not incidental to the granted power.
The United States Constitution contains no specific authorization
for the subdelegation of legislative—or, for that matter, of
executive or judicial—power. As Guy Seidman and I have said:
There is no affirmative grant of power in the Constitution to
subdelegate legislative authority. The necessary and proper clause,
the only plausible source of such authority, only authorizes incidental
powers, and the power to sub-delegate can be incidental only with
respect to ministerial tasks, or where delegation is necessary in a
strict sense, or where there was in the eighteenth century an
established custom or usage of subdelegation. In other words,
understanding the agency-law foundations of the Constitution
confirms what textual, intratextual, and structural analysis all reveal:
Congress may not delegate its legislative power to other actors, be
they executive agents, judicial agents, state governments, foreign
sovereigns, or private parties. The rule against subdelegation of
legislative authority is among the clearest constitutional rules one
can imagine.52

Outside of governance of occupied territory during wartime53 and
the constitutionally specified power to make treaties,54 the
president is not supposed to make laws. That is the job of the
constitutionally vested legislative authority. The president is
supposed to execute (and faithfully execute) the laws provided
by others.

See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 49–75.
See id. at 8–11, 76–78.
50 See id. at 113–17.
51 Agents are generally free, absent specification in the governing instrument, to
subdelegate the performance of ministerial tasks.
52 LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 117.
53 See GARY LAWSON & GUY I. SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 47–51 (2004).
54 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
48
49
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The real question is not whether Congress can subdelegate
discretionary authority—the short answer is “no.” The real
question is what constitutes an act of subdelegation. Surely
Congress cannot subdelegate its formal Article I, Section 7 power
to vote on bills, but suppose Congress exercises that formal
power by enacting Article I, Section 7 laws that tell executive
agents to go find problems and then fix them. Does the
constitutional anti-subdelegation principle control the content of
the laws that Congress can enact? Does it forbid granting
executive (and judicial) agents a certain kind, quantity, and
quality of discretion, even if those grants fulfill the formal
procedural requirements for constitutional lawmaking?
Some say no. For example, in the early 2000s, Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeuele argued that Congress can only be said to
subdelegate its power when it transfers its formal authority
under Article I, Section 7; it can never be said to subdelegate
when it vests substantive authority in executive agents, no
matter how open-ended the grant of authority may be.55 I have
an article-length response to that argument elsewhere,56 and that
response is both supported and supplanted by subsequent work
on the fiduciary underpinnings of the Constitution.57 Congress is
not granted a general legislative power. It is charged with
specific tasks and given tools with which to perform those tasks.
Those charges call for the exercise of discretionary authority, and
in the absence of specific authorization to subdelegate those
authorities, Congress must exercise those powers itself. Under
basic fiduciary principles, Congress cannot pass off the exercise
of those discretionary acts to others, even by enactments that
follow the form of Article I, Section 7:
Consider just the structure of Article I, Section 8. Its first seventeen
clauses contain provisions that give Congress power to perform such
actions as to “lay and collect,” “borrow,” “regulate,” “establish,”
“coin . . . , regulate . . . , and fix,” “provide,” “establish,” “promote . . . by
securing,” “constitute,” “define and punish,” “declare . . . , grant . . . ,
and make Rules concerning,” “raise and support,” “provide and
maintain,” “make Rules for the Government and Regulation of,”

55 See generally Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721 (2002); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Nondelegation: A Post-Mortem, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1331 (2003).
56 See Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 46.
57 See LAWSON & SEIDMAN, supra note 9, at 107–26. I would be remiss if I did not
thank Robert Natelson for making me aware of the importance of understanding the
fiduciary character of the Constitution. My long-time collaborator Guy Seidman saw that
point before I did, and he pushed me a bit in that direction, but Mr. Natelson’s work is
what really brought home to both me and Professor Seidman the need to bring fiduciary
concepts to bear on constitutional interpretation across the board.
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“provide for calling forth,” “provide for organizing, arming, and
disciplining,” and “exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over” . . . . Exactly who, in this governmental scheme, is
supposed to be doing the lion’s share of the laying and collecting,
borrowing, regulating, establishing, coining, regulating, fixing,
providing, establishing, promoting by securing, constituting, defining
and punishing, declaring, granting, making Rules concerning, raising
and supporting, providing and maintaining, making Rules for the
Government and Regulation of, providing for calling forth, providing
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, and exercising exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over?58

Just as not everything done by presidents through procedurally
proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid exercise of
“executive Power,” and not everything done by courts through
procedurally proper means is necessarily a constitutionally valid
exercise of “judicial Power,” not everything done by Congress
through procedurally proper means is necessarily a
constitutionally valid exercise of the various “legislative Powers
herein granted” with which Congress is vested. The principle
against subdelegation is substantive, not formal.
To be sure, the conceptual lines between the constitutionally
vested legislative and executive powers are not always crisp. It
does not necessarily violate the Constitution for Congress to pass
a law that requires some measure of interpretation. Figuring out
where the executive power ends and the legislative power begins
“is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry,”59 and James Madison
drily observed that “[q]uestions daily occur in the course of
practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in these subjects,
and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political science.”60
That adept-puzzling obscurity, however, did not stop Madison from
categorically declaring that various powers of government are “in
their nature . . . legislative, executive, or judiciary.” Nor did it stop
John Adams from stating that the “three branches of power have an
unalterable foundation in nature; that they exist in every
society natural and artificial . . . ; that the legislative and executive
authorities are naturally distinct; and that liberty and the laws
depend entirely on a separation of them in the frame of
government . . . .” Nor did it prevent many state constitutions of the
founding era from including separation-of-powers clauses that
expressly distinguished, again without express definitions, the
legislative from the executive from the judicial powers. Nor did it
prevent the United States Constitution from basing its entire scheme

58
59
60

Lawson, Discretion as Delegation, supra note 46, at 263.
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 46 (1825).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37 (James Madison).
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of governance on the distinctions among those powers. However
difficult it may be at the margins to distinguish those categories of
power from each other, the founding generation assumed that there
was a fact of the matter about those distinctions and that one could
discern that fact in at least a large range of cases. The communicative
meaning of the Constitution of 1788 cannot be ascertained without
reference to some such distinction, even if legal scholars or political
scientists (adept or otherwise) find the distinction unhelpful
or confusing.61

As Chief Justice John Marshall memorably put it:
The line has not been exactly drawn which separate those important
subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself,
from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made,
and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions
to fill up the details.62

But wherever and however that line is properly drawn, huge
swaths of modern law go beyond any plausible boundaries. Going
forth and doing good pursuant to a statute that instructs the
executive to go forth and do good is not an exercise of “executive
Power” under any sensible eighteenth-century understanding of
that concept, and that simple observation is enough to sweep in
many of the statutes at the core of modern law. Nor is enactment
of such a law a valid exercise of legislative power. Congress,
under the Constitution, must enact laws, not empty collections
of words.
This is as good a place as any to respond to a recent critique
of this argument from Adrian Vermeule. Professor Vermeule
maintains that “the institutional innovations that appall Lawson
[such as subdelegation of legislative authority] were themselves
generated by the very system of lawmaking-by-separation-of-powers
that he wants to defend. Lawson never comes to grip with the
problem of abnegation, the brute fact that everything Lawson
deems inconsistent with the Constitution of 1789 emerged
through and by means of the operation of that very Constitution,
not despite it.”63 More broadly:
We have an administrative state that has been created and limited by
the sustained and bipartisan action of Congress and the President
over time; that is supervised and checked by the President as it
operates; and that has been blessed by an enduring bipartisan
consensus on the Supreme Court. The classical Constitution of
separated powers, cooperating in joint lawmaking across all three

61
62
63

Lawson, supra note 10, at 623–34(footnotes omitted).
Wayman, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43.
VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 42.
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branches, itself gave rise to the administrative state. When critics of
the administrative state call for a return to the classical Constitution,
they do not seem to realize they are asking for the butterfly to return
to its own chrysalis. If political legitimacy is not to be found in this
long-sustained and judicially-approved joint action of Congress and
the President, the premier democratically elected and democratically
legitimate bodies in our constitutional system . . . and the real complaint
of the critics is not that the administrative state is illegitimate, but that
our whole constitutional order is intrinsically misguided.64

This argument rests on a distressingly common error: it conflates
arguments about textual meaning with arguments about political
and moral legitimacy. I have in the past made, and am here
making, no claims whatsoever about the political legitimacy vel
non of the administrative state, the Constitution in general, or
any form of governmental organization. As I have said elsewhere:
I have nothing interesting to say about such matters, and so I choose
to say nothing about them. Legitimacy is a political and moral
concept, and I am not a political or moral theorist . . . . To be sure,
political legitimacy is an important thing about which to think. It just
is not the province of legal theory, and I would prefer not to venture
outside that relatively narrow zone of comfort in professional
academic work.65

My only claim, here and elsewhere, is that subdelegation of
legislative authority is contrary to the meaning of the
Constitution. I declare nothing about what any real-world person
ought to do with that information or how any past, present, or
future political actors should respond to it.66 And I emphatically
make no claim that constitutional infidelity is a distinctively
modern phenomenon. The very first statute enacted by the
very first Congress was wildly, flagrantly, and knowingly
unconstitutional.67 So are a great many statutes that have been
enacted by past and present congresses, signed and enforced by
past and present presidents, and upheld and applied by past and
present judges. That is not “hubris.”68 That is empirical fact, as
all claims of constitutional meaning are claims of empirical fact.
It may or may not be an intellectually interesting empirical fact,
depending upon one’s intellectual interests, but it is an empirical
fact. In other words, in my professional guise, I do not see myself
Id. at 46 (citation omitted).
Gary Lawson, No History, No Certainty, No Legitimacy . . . No Problem: Originalism
and the Limits of Legal Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1551, 1567 (2012) (footnotes omitted).
66 For more on the oft-elided distinction between claims of constitutional meaning
and claims of political obligation, see Gary Lawson, Originalism without Obligation, 93
B.U. L. REV. 1309 (2013).
67 See Gary Lawson, The Constitution’s Congress, 89 B.U. L. REV. 399, 403–06 (2009).
68 VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 45.
64
65
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as a “critic[] of the administrative state.”69 I see myself as a
disinterested expositor of the Constitution.70 As a straightforward
interpretative matter, the Constitution forbids the subdelegation
of legislative authority, no matter how socially inevitable,
normatively desirable, or politically legitimate it may be. One can
certainly elect to choose social inevitability, normative desirability,
or political legitimacy over the Constitution, but that has no
bearing on what the Constitution actually says.
III. “YOU NEED A NEW SONG”
Assuming that one regards unconstitutional subdelegation
as a problem,71 it is beyond pointless to look to Congress for
solutions to that problem. Congress created the problem by
giving away its authority in the first place. Psychologists,
historians, and political scientists are better situated than I to
say why this has happened, but some fairly obvious considerations
come to mind. “By delegating the ultimate decision to an agency,
Congress can take credit for doing something while dodging the
blame from disappointed constituents.”72 Realistically, though, can
this kind of transparent ploy actually work to improve legislators’
electoral prospects? Evidently so: “[P]olitical scientists have
documented the value of ‘credit-claiming’ and ‘position-taking’ in
legislators’ efforts to maximize the probability of re-election.”73
Moreover, subdelegation has efficiency benefits for legislators:
“Legislators delegate authority in order to reduce various costs of
legislating, which allows them to legislate more private goods.
Stated differently, delegation reduces the legislator’s marginal
cost of private-goods production[.]”74 It also offers efficiency of
access for interest groups: By “unbundling” specific items (such
as energy regulation) from everything else on the legislative

Id. at 23.
Of course, anyone who knows me knows that, in my personal rather than
professional guise, I am emphatically a critic of the administrative state. They also know,
however, that in that guise I am emphatically a critic of non-administrative states as well.
I dispute the moral legitimacy of all governments—big, small, state, federal,
administrative, non-administrative, constitutional, and non-constitutional. That personal
position has, I believe, no bearing whatsoever on my empirical scholarly claims regarding
constitutional meaning, which stand or fall on the quality of the observations and
arguments offered for them.
71 Because I do not maintain that anyone must so assume, everything beyond this
point is in the form of a hypothetical imperative.
72 Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 369–70 (2010).
73 David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative
State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 135 (2000).
74 Peter H. Aranson, Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Legislative
Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 56 (1982).
69
70
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agenda (such as monetary policy, drug policy, and foreign trade)
it allows parties with concentrated interests to focus their
attention on institutions (agencies) wholly dedicated to their
precise area of concern. It is not surprising that Congress and
those who seek to influence Congress would find subdelegation
very attractive.75
To be sure, there are occasional token thrusts in Congress to
gain some measure of legislative control over executive
lawmaking. The Congressional Review Act, which is part of the
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996,76
provides a mechanism for fast-track legislative cancellation of
major agency rules,77 and the statute has been employed more
than a dozen times in 2017 after being used only once in its first
two decades.78 A version of the so-called REINS (“Regulations
from the Executive [I]n Need of Scrutiny”) Act, which would
require Congress legislatively to approve major rules before they
take effect, has made it farther through Congress in 2017 than it
has ever gone before,79 though its prospects for ultimate passage
are dubious. Through all of this, however, the simple expedient of
passing real statutes instead of vague mush and/or amending the
old enactments that are really subdelegations masquerading as
statutes is nowhere on the congressional agenda. Hence the first
sentence of this section.80
Nor can one plausibly rely on the courts to police legislative
subdelegations. The Supreme Court’s complete retreat from the
field of subdelegation is too well known to require elaborate
summary.81 Liberal and conservative jurisprudes disagree on
75 For more background on the positive political science literature regarding
rationales for congressional delegation, see Rodrigues, supra note 31, at 447–49.
76 Contract with America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat.
857–74 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5 and 15 of the United States Code).
77 For a brief description of the statute, see LAWSON, supra note 45, at 173–74.
78 See Stephen Dinan, GOP Rolled Back 14 of 15 Obama Rules Using Congressional
Review Act, WASH.TIMES (July 22, 2017), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/
15/gop-rolled-back-14-of-15-obama-rules-using-congress/ [http://perma.cc/Z8G4-HX5A].
79 See Eric Boehm, Rand Paul’s REINS Act Finally Makes It to Senate Floor,
REASON.COM (July 17, 2017, 5:32 PM), http://reason.com/blog/2017/05/17/rand-paulsreins-act-finally-makes-it-to [http://perma.cc/BK83-85E8].
80 Cf. VERMEULE, supra note 25, at 9 (“Congress episodically rouses itself to enact
framework statutes intended to constrain executive power in a global way . . . . But these
statutes are mostly dead letters, for the spasm of congressional resolve that leads to their
enactment is not sustained over time.”).
81 See Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, supra note 46, at 328–29 (“After
1935, the Court has steadfastly maintained that Congress need only provide an
‘intelligible principle’ to guide decisionmaking [sic], and it has steadfastly found
intelligible principles where less discerning readers find gibberish.”); Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“[T]he conventional
[delegation] doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad ones (and counting).”). To be
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many things, but they have found common cause—or, more
precisely, an overlapping consensus—in capitulation to
congressional desire to subdelegate its authority. Some Justices
fly the flag of surrender because, on policy grounds, they want to
grease the wheels of the administrative state. As a nearunanimous Supreme Court said with admirable candor (if
perhaps less admirable lack of regard for law): “[I]n our
increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job[?!]
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general
directives.”82 Others flee the battlefield because of an extraconstitutional concern about judicial discretion: “[W]hile the
doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an
element readily enforceable by the courts.”83 Although Justice
Thomas has expressed some interest in enforcing a constitutional
ban on subdelegations,84 and Justice Gorsuch may be more
receptive to such arguments than was Justice Scalia,85 no one
seriously expects the federal courts to rise up and smite major
portions of the administrative state in the name of the
Constitution of 1788.
That leaves, as the last line of constitutional defense, the
president.86 There is any number of tools available to presidents
sure, Professor Sunstein and I may both be overstating our cases. It is surely a mistake to
gauge the effectiveness of a principle against subdelegation by how many laws get
overturned by courts rather than by how closely legislatures hew to that principle without
need for judicial invalidation. See Joseph Postell & Paul D. Moreno, Not Dead Yet – or
Never Born? The Reality of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 CONST. STUDIES (forthcoming
2017). And while the subdelegation doctrine has been dead in the Supreme Court for a
long time, it has occasional sparks of life in the lower courts (and, quite possibly, has a
new ally on the Supreme Court). See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1154
(10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
82 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). And what, precisely, is
Congress’s constitutional “job”? To regulate in a way and to a degree that is pleasing to
the political sensibilities of a majority of the Supreme Court? One might think, looking at
the Constitution, that Congress’s job is to legislate in accordance with the substantive and
procedural norms prescribed by the Constitution. But, then again, one might think,
looking at the Constitution, many things which are at odds with statements in Supreme
Court opinions. The explanation, of course, is that statements in Supreme Court opinions
almost never try to ascertain the meaning of the Constitution, so it is not at all surprising
that they almost uniformly fail to do so.
83 Id. at 415 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an explanation of why this concern about
judicial discretion is extra-constitutional, see Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, The
Rule of Law as a Law of Law, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 483 (2014).
84 See Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.R.s, 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240–52 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
85 See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153–54.
86 Technically, the last line of constitutional defense is an armed citizenry, but
it would surely take more than some unconstitutional subdelegations to warrant
outright revolution.
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to resist unconstitutional subdelegations if they are inclined to
use those tools. Most obviously, presidents can veto proposed
legislation that fails to make law. Congress can override those
vetoes with a two-thirds majority in each House, but a
presidential veto can be a serious roadblock to subdelegation.
Moreover, the president could issue a veto message
communicating the constitutional grounds for the action and
thereby raise public awareness of Congress’s constitutional failure.
The president could also recommend legislation amending or
repealing past laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate authority.
Appointing judges who take the Constitution seriously could also
indirectly help in this regard. Finally, and most dramatically
(and therefore least plausibly), the president could refuse to
enforce laws that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative
power. Presidents have a power and duty of executive review
that is equal to, and derives from the same source as, the
collateral power of judicial review.87 If courts are allowed, and
indeed required, to refuse to give legal effect to unconstitutional
laws, the same is true of presidents (and everyone else in the
constitutional order). At this point, however, the shade of Andrew
Johnson will surely begin whispering about the possible
consequences of presidential nonenforcement of statutes on
constitutional grounds. A genuine constitutionalist will respond
that the president nonetheless has an unconditional obligation to
the Constitution, consequences be damned.88 Even if one does not
take this extreme tack, however, there is no obvious reason why
presidents cannot, and constitutionally should not, make use of
the other tools at their disposal to resist subdelegation. All that
is needed is the will to use those tools.
At first glance, it may seem even more absurd to rely on the
president to police subdelegations of legislative authority than to
rely on Congress or the courts. Don’t such subdelegations by
definition increase the power of the executive, both absolutely
and relative to its chief institutional competitors? If Congress is
willing to cede some, or even most, of its authority to the
president, who would expect the president to decline the offer?

87 For a lengthy explication of this position, see generally Gary Lawson &
Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L.
REV. 1267 (1996).
88 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8 (prescribing the presidential oath of office as: “I
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the
United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States”).
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As with the Spanish Inquisition, no one expects it. But, as
with the Spanish Inquisition, it just might appear anyway. To be
sure, history is on the side of the skeptics. The Reagan
Administration made a great fuss over constitutional fidelity,
especially in the realm of separation of powers. In the 1980s,
Attorney General Edwin Meese III gave voice to some
monumental, and monumentally important, constitutional
principles dealing with the separation of powers, such as
departmentalism and the unitary executive.89 The Justice
Department was filled with constitutional originalists who
understood quite well that the Constitution does not authorize
subdelegation of legislative authority. With all of that
intellectual and political firepower assembled, what was the
number of bills vetoed by President Reagan on the ground that
they unconstitutionally subdelegated legislative power to the
president? That would be zero. The number of bills introduced or
supported by the Reagan Administration to repeal or replace old
statutes that unconstitutionally subdelegate legislative power to
the president? That would also be zero. The number of such bills
vetoed or championed, respectively, by either of the Bush
Administrations? Yep, zero again. (I assume that no one finds it
necessary for me to repeat these numbers for modern Democrat
administrations.) All conventional grounds for judgment suggest
that the executive department is a central part of the problem of
subdelegation of legislative authority and likely the last place
that one should look for a solution.
Enter Donald Trump. Exit conventional grounds for
judgment. Whatever one thinks of Donald Trump (and I confess
that I have a higher regard for him than do most of the people
with whom I usually associate), one must acknowledge that the
usual rules of politics do not apply to him. Indeed, his election
was, at least for many who voted for him, precisely a pair of
double-barreled middle fingers thrust into the face of political
convention (with a loud razzberry added for good measure). The
fact that invoking a constitutional principle against
subdelegation of legislative authority would elicit shrieks of
horror from the political and cultural establishment would not
necessarily deter President Trump from doing it. Indeed, it just
might be an added incentive.
The question is whether there is anything substantive that
would or could motivate President Trump to take a stand against

89 See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary
Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601, 701 (2005).
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legislative subdelegation, perhaps by vetoing proposed legislation
on constitutional subdelegation grounds and issuing a stinging
veto message. Several considerations suggest—and I emphasize
that I deliberately use the word “suggest” in its literal and
modest sense—that there might be.
First, President Trump’s key appointments to legal offices
speak to a commitment to constitutional first principles that
exceeds that of any president in my lifetime. His first
appointment to the Supreme Court was Neil Gorsuch, who, as a
court of appeals judge, specifically raised the idea of reviving the
subdelegation doctrine.90 President Trump’s nominations to the
lower federal courts thus far also have originalists cheering and
maybe even salivating. And both of his appointees to top
executive department legal positions—Attorney General Jeff
Sessions and White House Counsel Don McGahn—are long-time
advocates (if not necessarily consistent practitioners) of
originalism. The pairing is significant. My recollection from
three-plus decades ago is that the Reagan Justice Department
was more than occasionally at odds with the White House
Counsel’s Office, which had considerably less enthusiasm than
did Attorney General Meese and his staff for picking fights about
broad structural principles. That kind of internal conflict reduces
the likelihood of bold action. If the Department of Justice and
White House Counsel’s Office are both strongly committed to
originalism, they can speak with a united front on subdelegation.
No originalist can defend, with a straight face, the gross
subdelegations of legislative power that pervade modern
government as consistent with the Constitution.91
Second, all of the foregoing considerations suggest that
President Trump is inclined to defer, on legal and constitutional
matters, to those who he regards as reliable experts on those
subjects. No one seriously believes that Donald Trump entered
the political arena in 2015 with a well-formed theory of
constitutional interpretation in mind. Obviously, he has decided
that originalists are the go-to folks in this area. If, hypothetically,
President Trump’s Attorney General and White House Counsel
both recommend a veto on constitutional grounds, it is not
See Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 115354.
At the risk of repetition: They can certainly defend those subdelegations as
consistent with all manner of things besides the Constitution, and those other things
might well be more important to any given person than is the meaning of the
Constitution. I am not saying unconditionally that originalists must urge the president to
oppose subdelegations. I am only saying that they have good reason to do so if they regard
the meaning of the Constitution as normatively relevant, and that they must do so if they
regard the meaning of the Constitution as normatively decisive.
90
91
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absurd to imagine that President Trump would take that
recommendation very seriously.
Third, former White House strategist Steve Bannon declared
in February 2017 that the Trump Administration was committed
to “deconstruction of the administrative state.”92 The exact
meaning of the phrase is not important here. The significance for
present purposes is that the standard response to any attempt to
revive a constitutional principle against subdelegation is to
complain that it would be an assault on the administrative
state.93 That certainly seemed to be an important driver of the
decision in Mistretta,94 and I have heard something like it from
my colleagues for decades. If Mr. Bannon truly speaks for the
Administration on this point, it suggests that the standard
establishment response will not resonate all that well with the
current president. To be sure, there are nontrivial arguments to
be made that the unbundling afforded by subdelegation increases
democratic responsiveness in some respects,95 but these do not
seem like arguments that will carry much weight with a
constitutionalist who wants to deconstruct the administrative state.
Fourth, every force in the legal universe is currently aligned
to jump at the chance to constrain executive power. The political,
legal, and cultural establishments all despise the current
occupant of the White House. If there is ever going to be a time
for limits on executive power, this is it. And if those limits come
from the White House itself, would the establishment really find
it within themselves to resist?
Perhaps there never will be a time for such limits. Certainly,
those who think of President Trump as a swaggering,
overbearing, tin-plated dictator with delusions of godhood (or
perhaps even as a Denebian slime devil)96 will regard as
laughable the idea that he would turn down power. I am more
inclined than many to think that Donald Trump cannot be
written off as a power-mad autocrat, but maybe the many are

92 See Tim Hains, Stephen Bannon: Core of Trump’s Platform Is “Deconstruction of
the Administrative State,” REAL CLEAR POLITICS (July 17, 2017), https://www.realclear
politics.com/video/2017/02/23/stephen_bannon_pillar_of_trumps_platform_is_deconstructi
on_of_the_administrative_state.html [http://perma.cc/F7RS-MWES].
93 See, e.g., Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323,
327–28 (1987). I use this citation only because I happen to have it on hand when writing
this footnote. I am sure that any reader will have favorite examples of their own.
94 See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
95 See generally David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the
Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97 (2000); Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why
Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
96 With apologies to David Gerrold.
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right. Maybe Adrian Vermeuele is right about the inevitability of
the administrative state; it certainly would not surprise me if he
was right about that. Perhaps, as with every other modern
president before him, Donald Trump will choose expanded
executive power over the Constitution, and perhaps the
establishment’s love for the administrative state is stronger than
its hatred for President Trump. But maybe, just maybe, an odd
combination of originalism, swamp draining, and the looming
specter of Trump-as-Congress will lead to something that no one
expects—maybe even something constitutionally more significant
than a comfy chair.

The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian
Presidents: Constitutional Interpretation in a
Broken Constitutional Order*
Sanford Levinson** and Mark A. Graber***
INTRODUCTION
Herbert Wechsler’s On Neutral Principles in Constitutional
Law is one of the most widely cited1 and reviled essays in the legal
literature. After declaring that judicial decisions “must be genuinely
principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved in
reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved,”2 Wechsler insisted that the most
canonical of all twentieth century cases, Brown v. Board of
Education, did not meet this standard.3 Wechsler first maintained
that justices applying neutral principles would treat segregated
schools as raising “freedom of association” issues.4 He then
professed to be unable to discern a proper neutral principle that
would constitutionally justify a judicial decision forcing whites who
did not wish to associate with African-Americans to attend the
same public schools as students of color.5 Wechsler was correctly
chastised for what many, most notably Charles Black,
demonstrated was a stunning obtuseness to the realities of
American history and the role that sheer racism played (and,

* We are grateful to the editors of the Chapman Law Review and to Dean Tom
Campbell for encouraging us to collect our thoughts on this matter. We have also
benefitted from the responses of Aziz Huq, Keith Whittington, and Kenneth Kersch, not to
mention many conversations with colleagues and co-participants at conferences in
Madison, Wisconsin, and New Orleans.
** W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law,
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin.
*** Regents Professor, University of Maryland Carey School of Law.
1 Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All
Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012).
2 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
3 Id. at 22; see also Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
4 Wechsler, supra note 2, at 34.
5 Id.
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for that matter, continues to play) in allocating the burdens and
benefits of life in the United States.6 To accept Wechsler’s notion
that constitutional law should in essence ignore self-conscious
and public Southern-white efforts to establish racial apartheid,
whatever might be thought to be constitutional commands to the
contrary, is akin to writing a guide to normal everyday life for
Londoners in 1941 that ignored the Battle of Britain.
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown has been confined to the
dustbin of history, but his claim that constitutional decision
makers should abstract constitutional law problems from their
underlying constitutional politics is alive and well in the legal
literature on executive power in the age of Donald Trump.
Experts and pundits commonly claim that President Trump is
constitutionally entitled to exercise the same constitutional
authority as has been historically exercised by other presidents.
Journalists and constitutional analysts insist that courts should
engage in “business as usual” when evaluating President Donald
Trump’s exercise of executive power. The Washington Post gave
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals a scolding when the judges
quoted Trump’s bigoted remarks on the campaign trail as
reasons for finding unconstitutional a federal order severely
limiting immigration from seven Muslim-majority countries.7
The Post’s editorial quite correctly declared that in the past,
“Presidents have enjoyed, and deserve, broad leeway when it
comes to setting immigration limits.”8 Lest one dismiss the Post
writers as lacking in the requisite legal training, leading
constitutional experts on prominent blogs, at least some of whom
acknowledge that President Trump is woefully unqualified for
office, nonetheless agree with the Post that courts should declare
unconstitutional executive orders issued by the Trump
Administration only if that tribunal would strike down an
identical order issued by a more competent president for the
same reasons. Josh Blackman claims that “[t]he judiciary should

6 Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J.
421, 427–29, 427 n.19 (1960).
7 Editorial Board, Mr. Trump’s travel ban is offensive and imprudent. But is it really
unconstitutional?, W ASH. P OST (May 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
opinions/mr-trumps-travel-ban-is-offensive-and-imprudent-but-is-it-really-unconstitutional/
2017/05/28/901947d0-41aa-11e7-8c25-44d09ff5a4a8_story.html?utm_term=.2952d4c6ebd8
[http://perma.cc/2RGA-U6EY].
8 Id. (emphasis added).
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not abandon its traditional role simply because the president has
abandoned his.”9
When judges treat this president as anything other than normal, it
sends a signal to the public that the chief executive is not as
legitimate as his predecessors. . . . Trump was elected through the
same constitutional process by which judges received their lifetime
commissions. He should be treated as such.10

Defense department experts have informed Congress that
President Trump has the same power to begin a nuclear war as
any other president. “If we were to change the decision-making
process because of a distrust of this president,” former
undersecretary for policy at the Defense Department Brian
McKeon asserted, “that would be an unfortunate decision for the
next president.”11
This claim that all presidents enjoy the same Article II
prerogatives was an implicit staple of the literature on executive
power published prior to the 2016 election. Consider a brilliant
article, The President’s Enforcement Power, published in 2013 by
University of Michigan professor of law Kate Andrias.12 Her
subject, the discretion a president has to determine the actual
enforcement of the law, could hardly be a more important topic in
light of President Obama’s bitterly contested order that many
undocumented aliens be freed from the potential burden of
deportation if they present no genuine threat to the United
States,13 or Attorney General Eric Holder’s decision not to enforce
clearly valid federal drug laws14 against various Coloradans who

9 Josh Blackman, Why Courts Shouldn’t Try to Read Trump’s Mind, POLITCO (Mar.
16, 2017) (emphasis added), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/why-courtsshouldnt-try-to-read-trumps-mind-214921 [http://perma.cc/F8GB-PYB4].
10 Id.
11 Karoun Demirjian, Trump’s nuclear authority divides senators alarmed by his
‘volatile’ behavior, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/power
post/senators-deadlock-in-debate-over-whether-to-restrain-trumps-nuclear-launch-authority/
2017/11/14/491a994a-c95b-11e7-8321-481fd63f174d_story.html?utm_term=.15b6498a5436
[http://perma.cc/Z6E5-NW3C].
12 See generally Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1031 (2013).
13 See Janet Napolitano, Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to
Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children, U.S. DEPT. OF HOMELAND
SECURITY (June 15, 2012), https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorialdiscretion-individuals-who-came-to-us-as-children.pdf. But see Texas v. United States,
809 F.3d 134, 135, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (enjoining enforcement of the order).
14 See Ryan J. Reilly & Ryan Grim, Eric Holder Says DOJ Will Let Washington,
Colorado Marijuana Laws Go Into Effect, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 29, 2013, 1:30 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/29/eric-holder-marijuana-washington-colorado-
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were taking advantage of the legalization of marijuana
possession and sale in that state. Professor Andrias’ article is
extremely illuminating in many ways. What is especially striking
from the perspective of 2017 is the essay’s unrelenting
abstraction in the tradition of “Neutral Principles.” There are
allusions to Washington and Obama, among many other
presidents, but the article is very much, as promised by the title,
about the constitutional authority of a reified president to
determine how laws are, or are not, enforced.15 Professor
Andrias, like other distinguished scholars of executive power,16
offers interesting proposals to govern the conduct of all possible
occupants of the White House implementing laws passed by all
possible Congresses.17
More fairly, we should write all “conceivable” occupants of
the Oval Office as of 2013. No one writing about presidential
power before the 2016 election could genuinely conceive of the
possibility that Barack Obama would be succeeded by Donald
Trump or a person equally as unfit for office. Staying within one,
or even two, standard deviations of the norm is usually sufficient.
When thinking of presidents, scholars should account for
Franklin Pierce as well as Franklin Roosevelt, but good reason
exists for thinking that the differences among the first forty-five
presidents did not warrant significant variation in their formal
legal powers. We do not usually require that scholars consider a
wildly improbable figure, three standard deviations away, as
would have been the case had Andrias or any other student of

doj_n_3837034.html [http://perma.cc/LR6N-GFTX]. Attorney General Sessions has
recently announced his decision to reverse the Holder policy. See, e.g., Jon Hill, Sessions
Reverses Obama-Era Marijuana Enforcement Policy, LAW360 (Jan. 4, 2018, 6:20 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/998871/sessions-reverses-obama-era-marijuanaenforcement-policy.
15 See generally Andrias, supra note 12.
16 For a sampling, see David J. Barron and Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in
Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding,
121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 699 n.20 (2008), citing the most influential pieces of scholarship
on executive power over the last half century, none of which suggest that the legal power
of presidents varies by office-holder. Substantial literature exists in political science
pointing out that presidential capacity to exercise these fixed legal powers varies by
officeholder and time. See STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993); RICHARD E. NEUSTADT,
PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP FROM
ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN (The Free Press ed., 1990); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (4th ed. 1972).
17 Id. at 1078.
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executive power considered the possibility that a bigoted,
uninformed, serial liar would assume the powers of the oval
office. John Hart Ely highlighted this facet of ordinary scholarship
when his conclusion to his monumental Democracy and Distrust
explained why his theory of representation reinforcement—and
the concomitant rejection of the Supreme Court’s aggressively
enforcing non-textual “fundamental rights”—did not prevent a
hypothetical Congress from prohibiting the removal of gall
bladders except when necessary to save the person’s life.18 Ely
asserted that such a bill “couldn’t pass” in our actual political
system and “refuse[d] to play the game”19 of constructing a
constitutional theory concerned with what in context are the
equivalent of science-fiction hypotheticals dealing with invasions
by space aliens.
The flying saucers have landed. Donald J. Trump is now
President of the United States. We are often informed that
elections have consequences. What this means, of course, is that
at least on occasion, the specific identity of those who win
elections and are empowered to make decisions can have
significant consequences, for good and for ill. As of January 2018
when we completed our revisions of this essay, one can discern
an ever-growing consensus among at least a solid majority of the
American public and probably at least ninety percent of the
politically informed public that Trump is manifestly unfit to be
president. That he is president is the consequence of a severe
malfunction in the constitutional system for electing presidents,
whether one assigns the failure to the constitutional text, the
constitutional culture, or, as is almost certainly the case, both.20
The question we must now ask is whether this constitutional
failure is a subject only for political science or whether
constitutional decision-makers, when interpreting Article II,

18 J OHN H ART E LY , D EMOCRACY AND D ISTRUST : A T HEORY OF J UDICIAL R EVIEW
182–83 (1980).
19 Id. at 183.
20 Donald Trump’s election was also the consequence of a presidential primary
system not imagined by those who designed the Constitution. He was immeasurably
aided by having more than a dozen rivals at the beginning of the process and half a dozen
until the last few primaries. This enabled him to prevail, especially in first-past-the-post
states, with considerably less than a majority of the vote. Trump’s failure to obtain a
plurality of the final national vote made him the first president in history to have lost
both the majority of his party’s primary vote and the popular vote in the ensuing national
election.
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ought to take into account that Americans have elected a chief
executive manifestly unfit to exercise the longstanding powers of
the presidency. When Justice Joseph Story in Martin v. Mott
spoke of “the high qualities which the Executive must be
presumed to possess, of public virtue, and honest devotion to the
public interests,”21 was he speaking of a conclusive or a
rebuttable presumption?
As readers may already have guessed, we challenge this
almost unexamined assumption that the constitutional powers of
the president can be blithely abstracted from the occupant of the
White House. We insist that constitutional decision makers must
take into account (assuming they realize) whether they are
making decisions for a constitutional order functioning within
normal parameters or, on the contrary, a constitutional order
reeling from the collapse of crucial assumptions underlying the
constitutional text and ordinary constitutional practice. We
maintain that the Article II powers of a president manifestly
unfit for office are different from the Article II powers of a
president who has the character and capabilities appropriate for
exercising those powers. Common sense, The Federalist Papers,
other interpretive activities, and Brown v. Board of Education
provide strong reasons for not vesting the anti-Publian president
with Publian powers.
Our argument proceeds as follows. We begin by briefly
elaborating the consensus that Donald Trump lacks the
constitutional, even if not the “legal,” qualifications to be
President of the United States. The next section discusses how
Publius in The Federalist Papers closely yoked presidential
powers to the character of the office-holder. We then note how
such other interpretive exercises as plays, athletics, and contract
law routinely make adjustments when events undermine the
assumptions underlying the authoritative text, whether that text
be instantiated in a script, play, or bargain. American
constitutional practice, we continue, has been historically far
more responsive to Publian failures than contemporary claims
about executive power under President Trump acknowledge.
Such decisions as Brown v. Board of Education22 and New York

21
22

Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. 19, 32 (1827).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Times Co. v. Sullivan23 are far better explained as judicial
responses to constitutional frauds perpetrated by the Jim Crow
South than the more abstracted reasons given by the justices in
their opinions. Brown, in fact, provides a model for thinking
about limiting the power of an anti-Publian president. Such
judicial strategies include focusing on actual motives for
executive action, taking rationality standards seriously, and
limiting, wherever possible, official powers when the officeholder
or officeholders demonstrate that they are incapable of using or
unwilling to use those powers responsibly or consistently with
established constitutional norms.
Given our ostensible 5000-word limit, very generously
interpreted to mean 5000 words per author, our essay is
necessarily provocative. We hope to initiate an important—and
overdue—conversation rather than provide anything in the way
of definitive answers (even assuming such things exist with
regard to complex legal and political dilemmas). Both of us
believe the American constitutional order is broken, even as we
dispute the nature of the malady and the remedy.24 We also
agree that the remedy for a broken constitutional order is not
constitutional interpretation as usual. Doing so, we think, is
analogous to telling a quarterback to throw a long pass because
that was the called-for play, even though the receiver has fallen
down. At the very least, we hope to convince readers that
the Constitution of the United States might not be
officeholder-indifferent, and that constitutional politics as usual
is not the remedy for the Trump presidency or, for that matter,
the severe crisis of American constitutional democracy. The
pages below provide one, but hardly the exclusive, path for
constitutional decision makers and American citizens to begin
thinking about presidential power in light of the actual
officeholder and, more generally, to think about constitutional
practice in a time of severe constitutional failure.

376 U.S. 254 (1964).
See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS
OF GOVERNANCE (2012) (arguing the American constitutional order is broken); Mark A.
Graber, Belling the Partisan Cats: Preliminary Thoughts on Identifying and Mending a
Dysfunction Constitutional Order, 94 B.U. L. REV. 611, 617–18 (2014).
23
24
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I. DONALD TRUMP AS THE ANTI-PUBLIAN PRESIDENT
President Donald Trump lacks every constitutional
qualification for office save that he was elected consistently with
the rules set out in Article II of the Constitution of the United
States, including, obviously, the Electoral College. Trump is
known to be proudly ignorant, uninterested in constitutional
limits on his power, a probable sex offender, a likely associate of
Russian mobsters eager to launder their money by lending to
someone who cannot procure loans from almost any leading
American bank given his demonstrated record in refusing to
honor his debts,25 a bully, and a bigot who professes to see no real
difference between George Washington and Robert E. Lee.
James Clapper, the former Director of National Intelligence,
told CNN following an August 2017 Trump campaign rally in
Phoenix, Arizona that he “really question[s] [Trump’s] ability to
be—his fitness to be—in this office.”26 After labeling Trump’s
remarks and demeanor “downright scary and disturbing,”27
Clapper, who served in the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama
Administrations, denounced Trump’s “behavior and divisiveness
and complete intellectual, moral and ethical void,”28 describing
his presidency as “this nightmare[.]”29 Clapper was particularly
disturbed about presidential access to, and power to put into
operation, America’s nuclear codes. “In a fit of pique he decides to
do something about Kim Jong Un, there’s actually very little to
stop him,” Clapper said. “The whole system is built to ensure
rapid response if necessary. So there’s very little in the way
of controls over exercising a nuclear option, which is pretty
damn scary.”30
That most Democrats or political liberals might readily agree
with Clapper is hardly surprising. What is remarkable, though,
is the extent to which Donald Trump’s gross unfitness for office

25 We cannot, of course, supply sufficient proof of this assertion because of his
resolute refusal to release any of his tax returns that might well indicate significant
interaction with Russian moguls.
26 Leinz Vales, James Clapper calls Trump speech ‘downright scary and disturbing’,
CNN (Aug. 24, 2017, 5:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/23/politics/james-clappertrump-phoenix-rally-don-lemon-cnntv/index.html [http://perma.cc/9KL7-WPD8].
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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has become the conventional wisdom among conservative
commentators. Washington Post columnist Michael Gerson, who
loyally served George W. Bush as a speechwriter and a conduit to
the Christian community, describes Trump as “willfully blind to
history” with “a shriveled emptiness where [his] soul once
resided.”31 Gerson is not alone among conservatives in his
contempt for Trump. George Will, who re-registered as an
independent after Trump’s nomination, observed that Trump has
“an untrained mind bereft of information and married to
stratospheric self-confidence.”32 Jack Goldsmith, a lawyer who
headed the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush II administration,
describes Trump as a “President of the United States who does
not at all grasp the Office he occupies, and who thus entirely
lacks the proper situation sense, or contextual knowledge, in
which a President should exercise judgment or act.”33 Benjamin
Wittes, the editor of Lawfare who is associated with both the
Brookings Institution and the Hoover Institution, declared that
Trump “does not enter office with a presumption that as
President he will pursue a vision of what national security
means . . . or that he will do so in a rational fashion[.]”34 “What
does it even mean,” he asked, “for a person who contradicts
himself constantly, who says all kinds of crazy things, who has
unknown but extensive financial dealings that could be affected
by his actions, and who makes up facts as needed in the moment
to swear an oath to faithfully execute the office?”35 Peter Wehner,
who served Republican Presidents Reagan, George H. W. Bush,
and George W. Bush, recently referred, approvingly, to “a
Republican member of Congress [he] spoke with [who] called the

31 Michael Gerson, There is a shriveled emptiness where Trump’s soul once resided,
WASH. POST (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/there-is-a-shriveledemptiness-where-trumps-soul-once-resided/2017/08/17/bb9edd22-8370-11e7-b359-15a3617
c767b_story.html?utm_term=.aaa9527e2dd8 [http://perma.cc/BN78-B936].
32 George F. Will, Trump has a dangerous disability, WASH. POST (May 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-has-a-dangerous-disability/2017/
05/03/56ca6118-2f6b-11e7-9534-00e4656c22aa_story.html?utm_term=.43785bf8d842
[http://perma.cc/ZQE4-LQW6].
33 Jack Goldsmith, Two Reflections on the Comey Statement, LAWFARE
(June 7, 2017, 8:56 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/two-reflections-comey-statement
[http://perma.cc/Z2WA-NEJQ].
34 Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the
President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whathappens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [http://perma.cc/YZ8T-F9FH].
35 Id.
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president a ‘child king,’ and a ‘self-pitying fool.’”36 Continued
hopes that Trump as president will prove significantly different
from what he had revealed about himself during the campaign
are naïve. Doyle McManus of the Los Angeles Times notes that
“[l]ast November, 63 million voters gave Trump a chance to grow
into the office he won . . . Instead, he seems intent on proving
that he’s either unable or unwilling to grow.”37 Daniel Drezner
answers the question, “Can Donald Trump Grow up in office?” by
responding, “toddlers are gonna toddler.”38
The above sources are all prior to September 2017, when this
essay was initially drafted and submitted to the editors of the
Chapman Law Review. The ensuing months have provided an
abundance of additional sources. Consider an October 26, 2017
column by Mr. Gerson praising Republican senators John
McCain and Bob Corker for their criticisms of Donald Trump.
McCain and Corker pointed to the undoubted truth that
“Americans have elected a president who is dangerously
unstable, divisive, childish, nasty, deceptive, self-deluded,
morally unfit, deeply unconservative and thus badly wrong on
some of the largest issues of our time.”39 Arizona Senator Jeff
Flake, who recently denounced Trump—and, by implication, the
contemporary Republican Party—while announcing his own
decision to retire from the Senate rather than face almost certain
defeat in the Republican primary, describes the
[M]oral vandalism that has been set loose in our culture, as well as
the seeming disregard for the institutions of American democracy. The
damage to our democracy seems to come daily now, most recently with
the president’s venting late last week that if he had his way, he
would hijack the American justice system to conduct political
prosecutions—a practice that happens only in the very worst places on

36 Peter Wehner, Behold Our ‘Child King,’ N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/26/opinion/sunday/trump-our-child-king.html?ref=
opinion&_r=0.
37 Doyle McManus, Another day, another vulgar Trump tweet. The president clearly
isn’t learning on the job., L.A. TIMES (June 29, 2017, 9:45 AM), http://www.latimes.
com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-trump-tweet-mike-20170629-story.html
[http://perma.cc/CV7H-TSZV].
38 Daniel W. Drezner, Can Donald Trump grow up in office?, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/03/can-donald-trump-growup-in-office/?utm_term=.bb6933cad2bb [http://perma.cc/3C4S-RFZ2].
39 Michael Gerson, God bless all the anti-Trump Republicans, WASH. POST (Oct. 26,
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/god-bless-all-the-anti-trump-republicans/
2017/10/26/14f45b9a-ba80-11e7-be94-fabb0f1e9ffb_story.html?utm_term=. c452e623f3db
[http://perma.cc/GGR9-RHC7].
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earth. And as this behavior continues, it is not just our politics being
disfigured, but the American sense of well-being and time-honored
notions of the common good.40

Michael Wolff’s Fire and Fury: Inside the Trump White House
dominated the news in early January 2018. Wolff quoted
numerous White House insiders who referred to the President as
an “idiot” or the equivalent of a “child” with an insatiable need for
loyalty and approval. These observations, the above paragraphs
demonstrate, are neither new nor surprising. What may be most
striking is Wolff’s conclusion to an article he published in The
Hollywood Reporter, which maintained Trump may be exhibiting
signs of dementia. “Hoping for the best,” Wolff wrote:
[W]ith their personal futures as well as the country’s future depending
on it, my indelible impression of talking to [Trump’s associations in
the White House] and observing them through much of the first year
of his presidency . . . came to believe he was incapable of functioning
in his job.
At Mar-a-Lago, just before the new year, a heavily made-up Trump
failed to recognize a succession of old friends.41

That Donald Trump is no George Washington is of less
constitutional concern to contemporary Americans than to the
framers. Publius imagined presidents in the image of
Washington, who rise above the partisan strife of their day. Such
characters were recognized as being “pre-eminent for ability and
virtue”42 across the political spectrum. The two-party system that
developed almost immediately after the Constitution was ratified
(and which developed in part because of the structure of
presidential elections)43 obviated the possibility of a universally
esteemed president. Partisan presidents in a Publian system can
at best lay claim to having the qualifications their party believes
necessary to be a successful president. Parties have nevertheless
remained within what might be called a “zone of acceptability”

40 Jeff Flake, In a Democracy, There Can Be No Bystanders, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/opinion/jeff-flake-speech-letters-democracy.html.
41 Michael Wolff, “You Can’t Make this S--- Up”: My Year Inside Trump’s Insane
White House, THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Jan. 4, 2018, 4:00 AM), https://www.hollywood
reporter.com/news/michael-wolff-my-insane-year-inside-trumps-white-house-1071504
[http://perma.cc/YJ6M-ME7T]; MICHAEL WOLFF, FIRE AND FURY: INSIDE THE TRUMP
WHITE HOUSE (2018).
42 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 461 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
43 See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEFFERSON,
MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005).
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with regard to the candidates they present for the White House,
with presidential nominees perhaps deficient in one qualification
possessing other prerequisites for the oval office.
Even within this context, Donald Trump appears to be no
Rutherford B. Hayes, James Earl Carter, or even Warren G.
Harding who, unlike the vindictive Woodrow Wilson, pardoned
Eugene Debs and even invited him to visit Harding at the White
House (which Debs did).44 These less distinguished presidents
were thought competent to hold office by a substantial segment of
their party, including, crucially, experienced political leaders and
office-holders, even as members of the rival party and rival
factions of their party frequently jeered at their qualifications.
Moreover, commentators often exaggerate formal qualifications.
The most formally qualified presidents in our history, in terms of
the multiplicity of offices they occupied before moving to the
White House, were John Quincy Adams, James Buchanan, and
George H. W. Bush. Abraham Lincoln was among the least
qualified. Barack Obama scarcely teemed with obvious
qualifications for the office he sought. (His predecessor, George
W. Bush, had at least been governor for six years of a major
state.) What makes Donald Trump historically unique is his lack
of any serious qualification for public office and the ever-growing
consensus among informed members of his party that he is, in
addition, a menace to American constitutional institutions.
Republican members of Congress, unaware that their microphones
are on, have been caught describing Trump as “crazy” and have
not retracted such comments.45 Tennessee Republican Senator
Bob Corker stated on the record that “[t]he president has not yet
been able to demonstrate the stability, nor some of the
competence, that he needs to demonstrate in order to be
successful.”46 Texas Senator Ted Cruz, when speaking of Trump
prior to his nomination, stated: “This man is a pathological liar”

44 Peter Richardson, ‘Democracy’s Prisoner: Eugene V. Debs, the Great War, and the
Right to Dissent’ by Ernest Freeberg, L.A. TIMES (June 15, 2008), http://www.latimes.
com/style/la-bk-richardson15-2008jun15-story.html [http://perma.cc/44EB-UTNP].
45 Philip Bump, Senators on hot mic: Trump is ‘crazy,’ ‘I’m worried,’ WASH. POST
(July 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2017/07/25/senators-on-hotmic-trump-is-crazy-im-worried/?utm_term=.3c36f79061e6 [http://perma.cc/X6MJ-6XKD].
46 Richard Cowan, Republican senator says Trump yet to demonstrate needed
stability, REUTERS (Aug. 17, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-corker/
republican-senator-says-trump-yet-to-demonstrate-needed-stability-idUSKCN1AX2DW
[http://perma.cc/KB95-FWSW].
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who “doesn’t know the difference between truth and lies.”47 Many
congressional Republicans, of course, have remained relatively
silent, but as Sherlock Holmes noted long ago, dogs that do not
bark in the night can provide central clues. In this case, what is
striking is the nearly complete absence of Republican officeholders who are willing to counter Senator Corker, Senator Cruz,
Senator Flake, leading conservative columnists, and Admiral
Clapper by praising Trump’s capacity for sober judgment and
ability to be an adroit Commander-in-Chief.48
II. PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER AND PRESIDENTIAL POWERS
So what, one might ask. Shouldn’t constitutional decision
makers—most importantly inhabitants of judicial office, but also
academics who play a vital role in socializing young would-be
lawyers—be committed to upholding universal and neutral
constitutional norms? Shouldn’t they suppress their “private”
(and therefore legally irrelevant) reluctance to do so and instead
permit President Trump to exercise the same presidential powers
as any other occupant of the Oval Office?49 Article II is facially
indifferent to the character of the office-holder. The Qualifications
Clause requires only that the President meet the age requirement,
be a “natural-born” citizen, and reside within the United States for
at least fourteen years before taking office.50 Lawyers, doctors,

47 David Wright et al., Cruz unloads with epic takedown of ‘pathological liar,’
‘narcissist’ Donald Trump, CNN (May 3, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/05/03/politics/
donald-trump-rafael-cruz-indiana/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q22F-YSGD].
48 Perhaps the most notable exception is Alabama Senator Lucius Strange, at a time
when he was desperately (and, it turned out, unsuccessfully) trying to hold on to the seat
to which he was appointed to succeed now-Attorney General Jeff Sessions. “President
Trump is the greatest thing that has happened to this country,” Strange has said. “I
consider it a biblical miracle that he’s there.” Not to be out-Trumped, but as it were, his
principal (and ultimately successful) opponent in the Republican primary, former state
Chief Justice Roy Moore proclaimed, “God puts people in positions he wants. I believe he
sent Donald Trump in there to do what Donald Trump can do.” Ben Jacobs, ‘A biblical
miracle’: Alabama GOP Senate primary set to test Trump’s reach, THE GUARDIAN
(Aug. 15, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/aug/15/alabamagop-senate-primary-donald-trump-mitch-mcconnell [http://perma.cc/L49R-EB6V].
49 See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
50 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5. Had Ted Cruz been elected, we might have
considered the “true” meaning of “natural born citizen.” Should a Puerto Rican citizen
who moved to the mainland when he was thirty decide to run for the presidency ten years
later, we could mull over whether Puerto Rico, though not a state, is now “within the
United States.” See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 251 (1901). Chief Justice Fuller, in
his Downes dissent, asks if “a native-born citizen of Massachusetts [would] be ineligible if
he had taken up his residence and resided in one of the territories for so many years that
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other professionals, and many applicants for ordinary, minimum
wage positions must meet rigorous educational standards and
less rigorous character tests, but not the President of the United
States. The text states that “[t]he President shall be Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,”51 not that
“the President shall be Commander in Chief, provided that he is
a mature adult.” The impersonal language of the text seemingly
compels a court considering the constitutionality of presidential
decrees that determine who is fit to enter the United States to
follow the same interpretive practices judges would follow if the
ban on entry was issued by Barack Obama, George W. Bush,
Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, or, were they eligible to
hold the office, St. Francis of Assisi or Adolf Hitler. That the
president in question is unfit to hold the office is not relevant
because “equal protection of presidents” requires that all be
treated as identical to one another.
We think this consensus is tragically mistaken, not only as a
matter of intellectual analysis, but, quite possibly, with regard to
the actual future of what Burke might have referred to as the
living and the yet unborn. We agree with the major premise.
Constitutional decision makers, when assessing President
Trump’s actions, should be guided by constitutional norms. We
disagree, however, with the near universal view that those norms
are indifferent to the particular office-holder. The Constitution
presupposes at least some version of what we call “Publian
presidents,” presidents with the character and capacity necessary
to exercise the vast powers conferred by Article II.
The term “Publian presidents” is drawn from The Federalist
Papers. Although we are not “originalists” as that term is used in
intra-mural debates among constitutional interpreters, we do
believe that understanding the knowable presuppositions
underlying the constitutional text is important. Americans do not
have a rigid duty to adhere to past norms or empirical
assumptions as to how institutions would work to achieve those
norms, but constitutional fidelity entails an intellectual duty to
examine how those responsible for the Constitution of the United

he had not resided altogether fourteen years in the states?” Id. at 357. Fortunately, these
speculations are beyond the scope of this article.
51 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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States thought constitutional institutions would work to achieve
constitutional norms, as well as to understand the back-up
systems they did (or did not) put in place, should particular
constitutional institutions fail. A wooden esteem for the
Founders’ parchment ignores their repeated emphasis on the
importance of learning from the “lessons of experience.” John
Marshall proclaimed in McCulloch v. Maryland that a
“constitution[] intended to endure for ages to come” must “be
adapted to the various crises of human affairs.”52 We break faith
with the framers and the American constitutional tradition when
we treat the Constitution as a mere set of rules that must be
followed even when following the letter of the rules subverts
more fundamental constitutional purposes.
The presidency of Donald Trump is one such “crisis of human
affairs” calling for constitutional adaptation. The framers, we
shall see, anticipated the possibility of such a constitutional
failure and provided constitutional decision makers with special
tools for constraining the anti-Publian president. They regarded
as only a rebuttable presumption that the President of the
United States would be a mature adult. Unlike Justice Antonin
Scalia, who regarded as a conclusive presumption that any child
born within a marriage was fathered by the husband, whatever
the demonstrable impossibility of that assertion,53 the framers
were empiricists committed to an evidence-based constitutional
politics and constitutional law.54
The selection process set out in the Constitution with regard
to presidents exhibits both the framing commitment to
republican leadership and their insistence that Americans be
empirically minded when determining how to obtain republic
leaders. As is well known, Americans were not (and are not
today) given the opportunity directly to elect their presidents.
That task is assigned to presidential electors. Not surprisingly,
immediately after assuring his readers that the president would
not enjoy the powers of a monarch in Federalist No. 67,55 Publius
immediately turns in Federalist No. 68 to elaborate how the

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis removed).
See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 (1989).
See JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF
THE CONSTITUTION xv (1996).
55 THE FEDERALIST NO. 67, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
52
53
54
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constitutional scheme for a presidential election is designed to
guarantee, as far as is humanly possible, the selection of persons
with exceptional capacities and virtuous character.56
This process of election affords a moral certainty, that the office of
president, will seldom fall to the lot of any man, who is not in an
eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications. Talents for
low intrigue and the little arts of popularity may alone suffice to
elevate a man to the first honors in a single state; but it will require
other talents and a different kind of merit to establish him in the
esteem and confidence of the whole union, or of so considerable a
portion of it as would be necessary to make him a successful candidate
for the distinguished office of president of the United States. It will
not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability
of seeing the station filled by characters pre-eminent for ability
and virtue.57

Publius hedged when asserting that the electoral college will
assure that only “seldom” will the president be less than a
sterling individual. That suggests the importance of other,
“auxiliary precautions” to which we will turn presently. But one
cannot read this paragraph without believing that the electors
will be faithful trustees for the public in preventing the rise of a
scoundrel to our highest office. That this no longer describes the
actual role of electors, who are now viewed simply as “delegates”
of the voters who formally placed them in power, increases the
importance of other institutional mechanisms that secure the
election of a president with the character and capacity to operate
the constitutional order. If such mechanisms no longer exist,
then this raises fundamental questions about the relevance of
“originalism” in a constitutional universe bereft of the
institutions the framers thought vital to maintaining the
constitutional order they fashioned.
Publius discusses the character of the president before
discussing presidential powers. One can reasonably infer that the
scope of presidential powers is a function of the character of the
office-holder. Consider in this context the pardon power,
discussed in Federalist No. 74.58 A president must know when
mercy is required to rectify the inevitable errors in a system of
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 460–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
57 Id.
58 THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500–03 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
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procedural justice; but he must also know when service to the
republic requires pardoning even those who might validly be
accused of insurrection, like the participants in the Whiskey
Rebellion who were wisely pardoned by George Washington.
Publius tightly connects presidential power and presidential
character when stating, “a single man of prudence and good
sense, is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance the
motives, which may plead for and against the remission of the
punishment, than any numerous body whatever.”59 Prior to
Donald Trump and his pardon of “Sheriff Joe” Arpaio, one could
only speculate about what a president lacking in “prudence and
good sense” might make of the plenary power to pardon.
The theme of virtuous leadership runs through The
Federalist Papers, including the most canonical of all, Federalist
No. 10.60 Although some political scientists interpret Federalist
No. 10 as the first statement of what would come to be known as
interest-group pluralism,61 any close reading reveals the
likelihood of an “expanded republic” producing the election of
more virtuous leaders disposed to seek the public good or
“common interest,” rather than simply reflect the preferences of
their constituents.62 Other papers elaborate on the importance of
the character of the officials who will be exercising constitutional
powers. Federalist No. 57 declares that every political
Constitution should strike above all “to obtain for rulers, men
who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue
the common good of the society; and in the next place, to take the
most effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous, whilst they
continue to hold their public trust.”63
Federalist No. 31 makes intimate the connection between the
character of an official and official powers. The text states that
“all observations founded upon the danger of usurpation, ought to
be referred to the composition and structure of the government,

Id. at 501–02.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
61 See, e.g., Martin Diamond, Democracy and the Federalist: A Reconsideration of the
Framer’s Intent, 53 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52, 56 (1959).
62 THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 59, 63 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(noting that elections in the extended republic “will be more likely to centre on men who
possess the most attractive merit”).
63 THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 384 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
59
60
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not to the nature or extent of its powers.”64 Good government,
Publius repeatedly insists, needs broad powers.65 For this reason,
Americans then and now should not be obsessed with the powers
of the national government or with the powers of any individual
within the government. Rather, Publius would concentrate our
constitutional focus on whether the schemes for staffing
a government privilege the selection of persons able to
wisely exercise government powers. Presidential power is
constitutionally justified when the process for staffing the
presidency has generated “characters pre-eminent for ability and
virtue.”66 Contrary to one popular view of the Constitution as a
“machine that will run by itself,”67 independent of the actual
office-holders, Publius was more than aware that character was
important even if he certainly did pay attention to the
importance of well-designed institutional structures. Indeed, The
Federalist Papers integrates character and institutions. The
machine would “run by itself” only if the institutional structures
privileged the establishment of a republican leadership class and
provided incentives for maintaining their republican character
when in office.
These observations cast new light on Publius’s claim in
Federalist No. 51 that the separation of powers is an “auxiliary
precaution.”68 A back-up generator is an auxiliary precaution, not
the main power supply. A crucial feature of an auxiliary
precaution is that the system functions differently in times of
emergency. The back-up generator comes on only when the main
power fails. “Checks and balances” function similarly; other
institutions must step up more vigorously when constitutional
institutions, designed to ensure virtuous leadership, malfunction
and produce persons who lack the capacities that justify the
powers of their office and consequent respect from other officials.
This should not be viewed as “civil disobedience” or any other
extra-constitutional assertions of power, but instead, as the

THE FEDERALIST NO. 31, at 197 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
This is the central theme of Federalist No. 23. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 23
(Alexander Hamilton).
66 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
67 See, e.g., MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. ed., 1986).
68 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
64
65
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generation of a “legal-constitutional opposition”69 contemplated
by the drafters themselves and instantiated in the institutions
they created.
If presidential powers are justified by the anticipated
character of the president, and if the separation of powers exists
in part to prevent leadership by unfit officials, then contrary to
much received wisdom, the persons responsible for the
Constitution did not intend for constitutional decision makers
charged with maintaining it to be indifferent to the character of
the president when assessing at any given time how much
executive power a particular president should wield. Publius
would not have constitutional interpreters be presidentindifferent. The Federalist Papers point to an important auxiliary
precaution in the original Constitution when emphasizing the
capacity for federal legislative and judicial officials to afford less
deference to an anti-Publian president.
III. GOING OFF-SCRIPT AND BROKEN PLAYS
Our claim that interpretation responds to breakdowns in
underlying assumptions is more ordinary than extraordinary.
Contract law and contract practice make adjustments when
background conditions that structured the bargain change in
ways not anticipated by the parties. Actors go off-script when
props malfunction or other actors forget previous lines. Athletes
improvise when the play called in the huddle breaks down
because of unforeseen developments. Conventional constitutional
wisdom that paradoxically is labeled “textualism” from the
perspective of these activities is both extraordinary and perverse
in insisting that constitutional decision makers not take into
account failings that any person with common sense would
recognize compel changing planned behaviors that have become
either impossible to perform or counterproductive.
The long tradition in American constitutionalism that
regards the Constitution of the United States70 as a collective
contract provides powerful support for interpreting constitutional

69 We owe this phrase to Ken Kersch, who provided very helpful comments to an
earlier draft.
70 See Anita L. Allen, Social Contract Theory in American Case Law, 51 FLA. L. REV.
1, 2–4 (1999).

152

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

provisions in light of their background assumptions. Contract
law does not interpret every provision of a contract as having a
“no matter what” clause. Charles Fried, when analyzing the
famous case of Krell v. Henry,71 points out that the contract for
rooms to watch the coronation procession of Edward VII
contained neither the clause “unless there is no procession to
view” nor the clause “whether or not the coronation is
subsequently canceled.”72 Because the decision to enforce the
literal terms of the bargain was just as much an interpretation as
a decision to interpret the contract as not covering a cancellation,
Fried maintains that contract authorities had to consider which
interpretation best expressed the promises the parties made to
each other in light of a circumstance neither anticipated. Krell,
he concluded, correctly recognized that the contract between the
parties made sense only on the assumption that the coronation
would take place as planned, and that no damages should be paid
when events falsified that mutual assumption.73
Contract law in practice is even less committed to the
wooden textualism that would insert “no matter what” clauses
into all provisions in Article II. Stewart Macaulay’s study of
contractual relationships among businesspersons observes:
Disputes are frequently settled without reference to the contract or
potential or actual legal sanctions. There is a hesitancy to speak of
legal rights or to threaten to sue in these negotiations. Even where
the parties have a detailed and carefully planned agreement which
indicates what is to happen if, say, the seller fails to deliver on time,
often they will never refer to the agreement but will negotiate a
solution when the problem arises apparently as if there had never
been any original contract. One purchasing agent expressed a common
business attitude when he said, “if something comes up, you get the
other man on the telephone and deal with the problem. You don’t read
legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to do
business again.”74

A constitution “intended to endure for ages to come,” a good
businessperson would recognize, should be interpreted in

Krell v. Henry [1903] 2 KB 740 (Eng.).
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION
64 (1981).
73 See id. at 60–61, 67.
74 Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. SOC. REV. 55, 61 (1963).
71
72
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ways that are responsive to failures in the functioning of
basic institutions.
Actors engage in similar improvisations as businesspersons
when faced with what contract law might call “frustration” of
script.75 The swan in Lohengrin fails to show up. The pulley
taking Don Juan to the underworld fails. A phone rings off cue. A
nervous performer completely misses crucial lines.76 When these
events occur, experienced, and most inexperienced, actors
respond. Sometimes a bon mot seems appropriate. “Does anyone
know when the next swan is leaving?” “It seems Hell has no
vacancies.” An apocryphal story relates that one actor picked up
the phone and promptly handed the receiver to the other, saying,
“It’s for you.” In other circumstances, actors adjust their lines to
the circumstances. They do not woodenly repeat the next line in
the script when the failure to say an earlier line makes their
planned line incomprehensible. Instead, actors think about what
they might say to enable the cast to perform the play as close to
as originally intended under the new, unanticipated circumstances.
Athletes respond the same way as businesspersons and
actors to failures in the assumptions underlying their texts.
Gifted sportspersons improvise when a play breaks down, as
when a baseball batter misses a hit-and-run signal or a football
receiver runs the wrong route. Faced with circumstances in
which following the letter of the plan will defeat the purpose of
the plan, athletes attempt to figure out alternatives for achieving
the purpose of the plan, knowing that while some members of
their team have failed, others are performing their expected
tasks. The runner scrambles back to first base. The quarterback
throws the ball to whatever receiver appears open.
The routine practices of businesspersons, actors, and
athletes illustrate how texts are routinely interpreted differently
when crucial background conditions fail. To be sure, the reasons
for going off-script must usually be plain.77 Strong presumptions

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265–69 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
For some of these and related mishaps discussed in this paragraph, see ANDREW
FOLDI, OPERA: AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN (40 YEARS OF MUSICAL MISHAPS) (1999);
Dick Cavett, Oh, No! Live Drama and Unwritten Humor, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/opinion/oh-no-live-drama-and-unwritten-humor.html.
77 We might trust an experienced actor or athlete to make judgments to go off-script
that we would deny to their less experienced peers.
75
76
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exist in most interpretive practices that background conditions
are functioning smoothly. Nevertheless, improvisation plays an
important role in text-bound activities. When systematic
malfunctions occur, businesspersons, actors, and athletes engage
in a Dworkinian effort to make the text “the best it can be.”78 If a
contract to purchase weapons for a third party should be
interpreted on the assumption that the third party has not joined
a terrorist cell or indicated a strong desire to murder an
estranged spouse, a script should be interpreted on the
assumption that the phone will ring on cue, and a play should be
interpreted on the assumption that crucial participants have not
suffered serious injuries, then the constitutional clause “the
President shall be Commander-in-Chief”79 should be interpreted
in light of the assumption that the president is a mature adult
whom one would, at the bare minimum, feel comfortable hiring to
watch over one’s own children.
IV. JUDICIAL IMPROVISATION IN TIMES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
FAILURE
The Supreme Court of the United States has consistently
adjusted constitutional doctrine when responding to breakdowns
in the fundamental assumptions underlying the constitutional
order. That tribunal for more than two-hundred years has been
Marshallian, with judicial “adaptation” a regular feature of the
attempt to resolve perceived crises. Some crises are external.
Supreme Court Justices have adjusted existing constitutional
doctrine in light of wars and economic depressions. Other crises
are internal. Much constitutional law, most notably the
constitutional law fashioned by mid-twentieth century judicial
liberals and the civil rights movement, has been a consequence of
adjustments made when constitutional institutions have not
functioned as expected.
Much constitutional doctrine that takes circumstances into
account reflects framing understandings that crisis would shake
the American constitutional regime and constitutional law would
adjust accordingly. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Schenck v.
United States refrained from wooden textualism when asserting

78
79

RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 62 (1986).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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that “[w]hen a nation is at war,” the speech entitled to
constitutional protection shifts.80 In other cases, Justices have
adjusted constitutional doctrine to take into account crises no one
anticipated in 1789 or 1868. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes
in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell held that
constitutional protections for contracts had to be interpreted in
light of an economic collapse unforeseen by the framers.81 His
opinion insisted that constitutional decision makers committed to
“preserv[ing] the essential content and the spirit of the
Constitution”82 could not “confine[]” themselves “to the
interpretation which the framers, with the conditions and outlook
of their time, would have placed upon” various clauses.83 No
universal agreement exists about the validity or desirability of
these and numerous other “adaptations.” Prigg v. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania,84 which one of us (Levinson) believes to be the
most execrable decision in our history, was arguably a “necessary
adaption” designed to maintain a constitutional order designed to
create, in Don Fehrenbacher’s words, a “slaveholding republic.”85
We are nevertheless confident that Americans cannot understand
their constitutional order by ignoring how decision makers,
including judges, treat what they believe to be genuine crises as
matters that must be addressed by the constitutional doctrine
rather than matters beneath the purview of fundamental law that
should be simply ignored.
The Supreme Court has been as creative when adapting
constitutional doctrine to internal constitutional crises. The most
famous footnote in the canon, footnote four of United States v.
Carolene Products Co.,86 exemplifies the judicial response to what
came to be perceived as the constitutional failure of governing

80 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (“When a nation is at war
many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that
their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight[.]”).
81 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 444 (1934).
82 Id. at 443.
83 Id.
84 41 U.S. 539 (1842).
85 DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE SLAVEHOLDING REPUBLIC: AN ACCOUNT OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT’S RELATIONS TO SLAVERY (Ward M. McAfee ed., 2001). For
an account of Prigg as an unfortunate constitutional adaption, see Paul Finkelman, Story
Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial
Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247 (1994). For a more sympathetic treatment, see generally
MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL (2006).
86 See United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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institutions adequately to protect the rights of vulnerable
minorities granted by the post-Civil War Amendments. The
Court, when announcing a program of remarkable deference to
legislatures when litigators challenged state and federal
commercial regulations, emphasized that stricter scrutiny might
be merited when courts had greater reasons to believe ordinary
legislative processes had malfunctioned.87 The Supreme Court’s
“double standard” of rights protection that emerged in the
mid-twentieth century was rooted in theories about the strength
and weaknesses of evolving constitutional institutions, rather
than on claims that some constitutional rights were more
important than others. The consensual greatest series of
decisions in Supreme Court history, Brown v. Board of
Education88 and the subsequent judicial rulings dismantling the
constitutional foundations for the Jim Crow state, required the
justices to modify longstanding judicial rules and practices to
prevent former Confederate states from getting away with what
they now deemed to be the equivalent of constitutional fraud,
instead of accepting the anodyne and remarkably obtuse
“neutrality” and deferential stance of such earlier decisions as
Pace v. Alabama and Plessy v. Ferguson.89
Louis Lusky, the law clerk generally considered responsible
for the Carolene Products footnote,90 maintained that justices
should normally sustain legislative outputs when political
processes were functioning as constitutionally expected. His 1942
essay in the Yale Law Review asserted:
[I]f every person has an equal opportunity to take part in controlling
the government which in turn controls him, there will be a general
confidence that the laws are designed to serve the needs of the entire
community, by making a fair adjustment between the conflicting
interests of groups within the community and advancing as far as
possible the welfare of the community as a whole.91

Race discrimination merited stricter judicial scrutiny because
constitutional institutions repeatedly malfunctioned when

Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Pace v. Alabama, 545 U.S. 1108 (2005); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896).
90 David M. Bixby, The Roosevelt Court, Democratic Ideology, and Minority Rights:
Another Look at United States v. Classic, 90 YALE L.J. 741, 765 (1981).
91 Louis Lusky, Minority Rights and the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1942).
87
88
89
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elected officials considered racial issues. “A government from
which [African-Americans] are largely excluded,” Lusky pointed
out, is not “properly responsible to their needs” with the end
result being that “general confidence in the just enactment of
laws will be greatly weakened.”92 The text of footnote four is a bit
confusing because two distinctive Carolene Products footnotes
exist. Paragraph 1, which was inserted at the request of Chief
Justice Hughes,93 maintains “certain rights deserve particular
judicial solicitude.”94 The far more influential paragraphs 2 and
3, providing the foundation for judicial protection of rights to free
speech and racial equality, are rooted in the “dynamics of
government,”95 a “corrective” for faulty “political processes.”96
The Carolene Products double standard was a judicial
attempt to adjust to two fundamental changes in the American
constitutional regime. The first was the constitutional
commitment to some version of interest-group pluralism as
opposed to the original constitutional commitment to some version
of republicanism. Lusky, Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, and
other constitutional decision makers in the mid-twentieth century
assumed that constitutional institutions should be designed in
ways that accommodated various social interests as opposed to
the Madisonian vision of government institutions designed to
transcend various social interests.97 The second was the
increased recognition that “prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities” 98 prevented most elected officials from
accommodating the interests of persons of color to remotely the
same degree as white persons. Hence, in contrast to the original
understanding of the post-Civil War Amendments,99 courts
Id. at 5–6.
See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminiscence, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1093, 1097–98 (1982).
94 Id. at 1100 (emphasis removed).
95 Id. at 1097–98.
96 Id. at 1103.
97 For the classic expression of interest group pluralism, see DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (Alfred A. Knopf
eds., 1951). Federalist No. 10 is the classic expression of constitutional republicanism. See
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (Alexander Hamilton, James Madison & John Jay) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). For the classic account (and critique) of the transition from
republicanism to interest-group liberalism, see THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF
LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (1st ed. 2009).
98 United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
99 See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEXAS
L. REV. 1361, 1363 (2016).
92
93
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rather than legislatures took primary responsibility for securing
African-Americans and other racial minorities the “equal
protection of the law.”
In “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,”
Professor Wechsler unwittingly detailed how the Supreme Court
in Brown engaged in the constitutional improvisation called for
by Carolene Products to correct what were now deemed the
constitutional failures responsible for Jim Crow segregation.100
Wechsler insisted that the “question posed by state-enforced
segregation is not one of discrimination at all,” but concerned
“the denial by the state of freedom to associate, a denial that
impinges in the same way on any groups or races that may be
involved.”101 He reached the remarkable conclusion that Brown
was a freedom of association case by denying that judicial
authorities could know the crucial facts that might make Brown
a discrimination case. Such an approach was warranted on
matters on which courts should trust state officials. What Chief
Justice Warren understood, and Wechsler failed to acknowledge,
is that no reason existed in 1954 (or, for that matter, in 1896
when Plessy was decided) to trust a state legislative judgment
that separate schools promoted racial equality. The
“reconciliation” between Northern and Southern whites that
placed African-Americans both literally and metaphorically at
the back of the railway left neither Congress nor the courts
willing to implement the post-Civil War Amendments.
Fortunately, in ways “neutral principles” could not detect,
American politics had changed, particularly after World War II,
as well as the role of the Court.
Wechsler’s analysis of Brown presented an accurate picture
of how courts should function in normal constitutional times in a
regime committed to interest group pluralism. He began by
noting that justices have legal obligations to defer to legislative
fact-findings.102 Wechsler then denied that the evidence was
sufficient “to sustain a finding that the separation harms the
Negro children who may be involved[.]”103 Nor, apparently, could
courts ask about what actually motivated state legislatures to
100
101
102
103

See Wechsler, supra note 2, at 22–23.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 32–33.
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impose segregation. To inquire into the actual justification for
segregation would “involve an inquiry into the motive of the
legislature, which is generally foreclosed to the courts[.]”104
These claims that courts should normally defer to legislative
fact-findings and not inquire into legislative motives make sense
when, as Lusky noted, political processes are fair and open to all
so that political victors at any particular time might be fearful of
being displaced in the next election should they prove captive
simply to factional interests. This is the basis of John Hart Ely’s
aforementioned book that defends a vigorous concern by the
Court for “representation reinforcement,” but condemns judicial
intervention when representative government is thought to be
working reasonably well.105 Elected officials can then be trusted
to make good faith interpretations of the Constitution and take
rational steps to pursue the public good. Aggressive judicial
inquiry into facts and motives is counter-constitutional in times
of normal constitutional politics. The system for staffing the
national government and process for making laws are the
main devices for ensuring that elected officials make accurate
fact-findings and do not deliberately violate the Constitution. No
good reason exists for thinking courts will do any better than the
rest of the political system, especially if we are willing to accept
what may well be the legal fiction that Publian institutions are
generating Publian or quasi-Publian rulers and laws. This is why
the Supreme Court in Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma106
subordinated suspicions that the Oklahoma legislature might
have been influenced by campaign donations of optometrists and
ophthalmologists when applying what is known as a “minimum
rationality test” that makes such suspicions irrelevant if a
possibly sane person could believe that the legislature was
genuinely motivated by a desire to safeguard the health, safety,
and welfare of Oklahomans. Perhaps eye-doctors did better with
respect to this law than the general public, but no good reason
existed to think that optometrists and ophthalmologists were
“special favorite[s] of the law”107 in post-World War II Oklahoma.

104
105
106
107

Id. at 33.
See ELY, supra note 18, at 182–83.
348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955).
United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
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The Southern white political actors who imposed
state-mandated segregation were not attempting to do what was
best for all races or acting on a good faith interpretation of the
post-Civil War Amendments. White elected officials in the former
Confederacy did not fear electoral displacement by aroused
African-American voters because they had taken care, by the
beginning of the twentieth century, to eliminate as much as
possible the reality of an African-American vote. Rather, as
speaker after speaker declared in the southern constitutional
conventions that provided the legal foundations for the Jim Crow
state,108 members of former Confederate states were trying to
find every constitutional loophole in order to subvert the
Fourteenth Amendment’s constitutional commitment to racial
equality and, most importantly, the ostensibly unequivocal
commitment of the Fifteenth Amendment to the suffrage on a
non-racial basis. They were openly committing what Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes described as “a fraud upon the
Constitution of the United States.”109 In sharp contrast to
Wechsler, Holmes did not deny the presence of the fraud.
Instead, he said judges were without the practical power to
reinstate the kind of Reconstruction-era monitoring that would
be necessary to obviate the fraud.110
Brown makes sense only in light of a judicial commitment to
eradicate frauds upon the Constitution. Chief Justice Warren in
judicial conference had no difficulty basing his vote on motives
and facts the court had ruled out-of-bounds in ordinary cases. He
bluntly informed other justices that segregation was based solely
on white supremacy. “The doctrine of ‘separate but equal,’” he
stated when leading off the judicial conference on Brown, “rested

See PAUL E. HERRON, FRAMING THE SOLID SOUTH 217–25 (2017).
Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903); see also Richard H. Pildes, Democracy,
Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 205, 297, 301–02 (2000) (describing
a full examination of this truly perfidious episode in our judicial history).
110 See Giles, 189 U.S. at 488. There was no nonsense about “neutral principles”
compelling the outcome in Giles. The Court’s decision in Brown II was quite Holmesian
inasmuch as the decision to settle for “all deliberate speed” was based on pragmatic
institutional considerations that were inattentive to facts on the ground. What made
Wechsler’s views distinctive was his utter indifference to pragmatic actualities and the
ascent into a thoroughly abstract analysis reminiscent of Anatole France’s famous
suggestion that the rich and poor alike would enjoy the opportunity to spend their nights
under the bridges of Paris when it snowed.
108
109
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upon the concept[ion] of the inferiority of the colored race.”111
Other justices agreed. Justice Robert Jackson, who more than
any other justice recognized that Brown could not be resolved by
the appropriate norms for resolving ordinary cases, determined
to vote to constitutionally prohibit segregated schools because “in
the South the Negro suffers from racial suspicions and
antagonisms” and “has suffered great prejudice from the
aftermath of the great American white conflict.”112 Jackson
recognized how the original constitutional mechanisms for
enforcing racial equality had malfunctioned when asserting in
oral argument, “I suppose that realistically the reason this case
is here is that action couldn’t be obtained from Congress.”113
Charles Black best captured the contemporary sense of why
Brown was correctly decided when he maintained:
[I]f a whole race of people finds itself confined within a system which
is set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping it in an
inferior station, and if the question is then solemnly propounded
whether such a race is being treated “equally,” I think we ought to
exercise one of the sovereign prerogatives of philosophers—that
of laughter.114

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the case in which the
Supreme Court abandoned almost 200 years of precedent when
declaring that the First Amendment prohibited libel suits by
public officials unless they could prove the speech was either
intentionally false, or false and made with reckless disregard of
the truth, is another example of constitutional law bending in
response to the breakdown of constitutional norms in the Jim
Crow South.115 This strong and unprecedented116 holding was
motivated by commitments to racial equality as much as

111 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICAN’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 679 (1976).
112 Id. at 688 (quoting Memorandum from Robert H. Jackson on Brown v. Bd. of
Educ. (Feb. 15, 1954) (on file with Library of Congress)).
113 Joel K. Goldstein, Approaches to Brown v. Board of Education: Some Notes on
Teaching a Seminal Case, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 777, 806 (2004) (quoting ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970)).
114 Charles Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 422,
424 (1960).
115 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964).
116 Not quite. A few state courts had reached a similar result in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. See, e.g., Coleman v. McLennan, 98 P. 281, 292 (Kan.
1908); Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press, 9 N.W. 501, 524 (Mich. 1881). For the origins of
actual malice, see MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM 41–44 (1991).
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commitments to the First Amendment. The Sullivan litigation
was part of the southern strategy to prevent media coverage of
the civil rights movement by imposing huge libel damages for
minor misstatements.117 In the trial court, Lester Sullivan
obtained the largest damages award in Alabama history. Had
racial concerns been absent, everyone knew Sullivan probably
would have received nominal damages at most. The Supreme
Court decision overturning that ruling permitted The New York
Times, as well as major television networks, to remain in the
South and continue providing shocked Americans with stories of
police dogs attacking children on peaceful protest marches.
The Supreme Court in Sullivan also improvised when
issuing final judgment. The Court in an ordinary case would
have remanded the case back to the Alabama courts for
reconsideration in light of the new constitutional standard for
determining libel. The Justices knew, however, that Alabama
legal authorities would not determine in good faith whether
Sullivan was a victim of actual malice. Rather, Chief Justice
Warren could be confident that the courts in Alabama would
award damages no matter what the judicial standard. For this
reason, the Justices broke from routine practice, made a fact
finding that actual malice could not be found, and entered a final
judgment for The New York Times.118
Numerous other Warren Court decisions are best understood
as the judges altering rules of normal practice to account for
constitutional breakdowns in the Jim Crow South. Many of these
cases were resolved on grounds other than racial equality.
Michael Seidman details how the Justices conceptualized such
cases as Miranda v. Arizona as responses to racist law
enforcement practices rather than as efforts to construct neutral
rules of constitutional criminal procedure that would apply in all
times and places.119 A similar analysis could be offered of the
motivation behind the Supreme Court’s decision to enter what

117 See KERMIT L. HALL & MELVIN I. UROFSKY, NEW YORK TIMES V. SULLIVAN: CIVIL
RIGHTS, LIBEL LAW AND THE FREE PRESS 69–70 (2011). The national press could have lost
millions of dollars in potential liability if they lost lawsuits filed throughout the South by
purportedly aggrieved white segregationists. Id. at 84–85.
118 See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 285–86.
119 Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673 (1992); see
also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Justice Felix Frankfurter called the “political thicket” of
legislative districting120 in Baker v. Carr and then far more
dramatically in Reynolds v. Sims, which upended the political
systems of almost all the states.121 Earl Warren viewed these
decisions as part of the “civil rights docket” of the Court, as
means to ensure urban African-American votes counted as much
as rural white votes.122 That Baker arose in Tennessee and
Reynolds in Alabama was not coincidental, even if the doctrinal
consequences, as in Sullivan, were national. “[T]he dominant
motif of the Warren Court,” Lucas Powe details, was “an assault
on the South as a unique legal and cultural region.”123
The Supreme Court during the civil rights era was
responding to the constitutional failure to protect the rights of
African Americans rather than engaging in ordinary
constitutional decision-making. Brown might be regarded as
implementing the constitutional commitment to racial equality,124
although when making that decision the Supreme Court did not
take seriously the original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment,125 ignored evidence that Congress was primarily
responsible for implementing the Fourteenth Amendment,126
implicitly engaged in forbidden motive analysis, and did not give
elected officials the deference appropriate when a constitutional
order is functioning within normal parameters.127 Sullivan,
Reynolds, Miranda, Morgan v. Virginia,128 and related cases
however, belie constitutional politics as usual. The Supreme
Court would not have dramatically changed the constitutional
law of free speech, voting rights, constitutional criminal
procedure, and the Dormant Commerce Clause had the Justices
not regarded those cases as race cases and made rules to correct

See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 279–89 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590–625 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
122 See ED CRAY, CHIEF JUSTICE: A BIOGRAPHY OF EARL WARREN 381 (1997).
123 LUCAS A. POWE JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 490 (2000).
124 See JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 230–31 (2011); Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 952 (1995).
125 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A
Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (1995).
126 See Mark A. Graber, The Second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill’s Constitution, 94 TEX. L.
REV. 1361 (2016).
127 See supra notes 105–107 and accompanying text.
128 328 U.S. 373, 374, 386 (1946) (striking down on Dormant Commerce Clause
grounds a Virginia law mandating segregation on interstate and intra-state motor cars).
120
121
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both the breakdown of constitutional norms in the Jim Crow
South and the constitutional failure of the elected branches of
the national government to respond to that breakdown.129
Contemporary constitutional civil rights law was forged in failure.
The Supreme Court has adjusted constitutional law when
responding to acute constitutional failures, as well as the chronic
failure of national, state, and local institutions to protect the
rights of persons of color. During the Civil War, the Justices
invented
procedural
mechanisms
for
avoiding
ruling
on the constitutional measures judicial majorities thought
unconstitutional.130 Most notably, in Roosevelt v. Meyer, the
Justices when holding no jurisdiction existed to determine
whether the Legal Tender Act of 1863 was constitutional, ignored
the provision in the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the Supreme
Court jurisdiction whenever a state court denied a claim of
federal right.131 When peace was restored and normal
constitutional operations returned, the Justices immediately
overruled Roosevelt.132 The justices did not need decades to assess
whether a constitutional breakdown had occurred. The Civil War
Court abandoned precedent shortly after a constitutional crisis
began and restored the status quo shortly after the constitutional
crisis ended.
V. FROM JIM CROW TO THE ANTI-PUBLIAN PRESIDENT
Brown, Sullivan, and other seminal decisions dismantling
the segregated state provide the road map for constitutional
responses to the Anti-Publian presidency of Donald Trump. Both
Jim Crow and Trump’s election occurred because constitutional
institutions failed, whether the failure was inherent in the
institutions themselves or in the people operating the
constitutional institutions. Constitutional decision makers faced
with constitutional failures, American history teaches, jettison
rules of constitutional practice and constitutional interpretation
rooted in assumptions that constitutional institutions are
functioning normally. The Warren Court, when dismantling Jim

See supra notes 115–123 and accompanying text.
This paragraph summarizes Mark A. Graber, Legal, Strategic or Legal Strategy:
Deciding to Decide During the Civil War and Reconstruction, in THE SUPREME COURT AND
AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 33–66 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kersch eds., 2006).
131 See Roosevelt v. Myers, 68 U.S. 512, 517 (1863).
132 See Trebilcock v. Wilson, 79 U.S. 687, 687 (1871).
129
130
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Crow, abandoned presumptions that former Confederate states
were making good faith interpretations of the Equal Protection
Clause. The Justices on that tribunal refused to defer to decisions
made by white supremacists in circumstances that justified
substantial deference to elected officials committed to
constitutional norms. They did not assume good motives or
rational decision making when segregationists claimed that
separate but equal benefited persons of all races. While Donald
Trump remains president, judges and other governing officials,
when interpreting such exercises of executive power as the travel
ban, the ban on transgendered persons in the armed forces, the
withholding of federal funds from sanctuary cities and orders to
prosecute Trump’s political rivals should be similarly wary. They
should assume that Trump is far more devoted to pandering to
his base by keeping unconstitutional campaign promises rather
than defer to post hoc accounts of the underlying facts invented
by administration lawyers for litigation purposes only. No one
should assume Trump is engaged in rational decision making in
the public interest when he makes decisions that seem better
explained by his family’s financial interests or his desire to avoid
criminal prosecution.
When an anti-Publian president runs for office repeatedly
promising flagrant constitutional violations, courts should adopt
the presumption that the efforts to implement that platform
violate the Constitution until the program is redesigned in ways
that eliminate unconstitutional features “root and branch.”133
Donald Trump on the campaign trail declared he would prevent
Muslims from immigrating to the United States.134 His first
travel ban looked suspiciously like a Muslim ban. President
Trump declared the executive order a travel ban.135 Lower courts
were therefore correct in taking the President at his word rather
than taking seriously the novel arguments administrative
lawyers made in court when defending the constitutionality of
the travel ban (“EO-2”). The Fourth Circuit, after pointing to

Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438 (1968).
These campaign statements are summarized in Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 575–76 (4th Cir. 2017).
135 Eugene Scott & Ariane de Vogue, Trump says he’s calling it a ‘travel ban,’ CNN
(June 5, 2017, 2:58 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/05/politics/trump-travel-bancourts/index.html [http://perma.cc/LNL3-TUHH].
133
134
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Donald Trump’s “numerous campaign statements expressing
animus towards the Islamic faith” and “his proposal to ban
Muslims from entering the United States,” concluded:
Plaintiffs have more than plausibly alleged that EO-2’s stated
national security interest was provided in bad faith, as a pretext for
its religious purpose. And having concluded that the “facially
legitimate” reason proffered by the government is not “bona fide,” we
no longer defer to that reason and instead may “look behind” EO-2.136

Constitutional decision makers have no more reason to
assume that Donald Trump’s executive orders are based on
rational policy judgments than the Warren Court had to believe
that segregated schools were grounded in reasonable pedagogy.
The “minimum rationality” (or “rational basis”) test assumes a
president (or other elected official) makes good faith efforts to
pursue the common good or a plausible constitutional vision
underlying the dominant political party.137 A president who has
demonstrated a fondness for white supremacists138—more so
than any other president since Woodrow Wilson left the White
House—does not satisfy the conditions for deference on racial
issues. A president who consistently puts his business interests
ahead of the national interest139 does not meet the standard for
deference when a potential conflict of interest is present. When
Trump issues an executive order on matters that trench on race
or Trump family business interests, other constitutional decision
makers ought to demand a set of probable facts that clearly
support the order, and not be satisfied with rationales developed
for litigation purposes by the White House legal staff that bear
little resemblance to the actual justifications for the announced
policy. Members of the White House legal staff may have a
lawyer’s duty to be “zealous” in presenting all conceivable
arguments in favor of their client, although whether lawyers who
collect their paychecks from the United States instead of from

136 Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 857 F.3d at 591–92. For a similar argument, see
Vicki Jackson & Judith Resnik, Against Deference: Considering the Trump Travel Ban,
Take Care (Dec. 8, 2017), https://takecareblog.com/blog/against-deference-considering-thetrump-travel-ban [http://perma.cc/YED5-63L7].
137 See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
138 See Bret Stephens, President Jabberwock and the Jewish Right, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
19, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2v9MUnk.
139 See Keith Whittington, Possibly Impeachable Offenses: The Need for Congressional
Investigation, NISKANEN CENTER (Aug. 2, 2017), https://niskanencenter.org/blog/possiblyimpeachable-offenses/ [http://perma.cc/DG7L-79NK].

2018]

The Constitutional Powers of Anti-Publian Presidents

167

Donald Trump personally can be singularly devoted to their
individual client instead of the interests of the American people
is debatable. Those on the receiving end of such argument labor
more clearly under no such duty.
Constitutional decision makers have no more reason for
empowering Donald Trump to make complex policy decisions
than they had to empower white supremacists to make decisions
about race. The present delegation doctrine assumes a president
has expertise or, more often, access to expertise on complex
empirical and scientific questions.140 A president who does not
care to be informed on and routinely lies about basic domestic
and foreign policy matters141 does not meet this standard for
open-ended delegations. Courts should therefore require clear
statements from Congress that the Trump administration is
authorized to make a policy before permitting the administration
to make that policy.
Many devices for disempowering the Trump administration
apply standard judicial canons for avoiding constitutional
litigation. Courts are expected to interpret statutes as not raising
difficult constitutional problems, such as the scope of presidential
authority, whenever possible. Justice Louis Brandeis, in
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, famously declared:
“The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of.”142 Given the
probability that Donald Trump’s executive orders are based on
unconstitutional motives, engage in unconstitutional self-dealing,
or do not meet constitutional standards for rational policy
making, the judicial obligation to refrain from making
unnecessary constitutional decisions should compel courts to
require Congress to delegate clearly when Congress wishes to
empower Donald Trump.

See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405 (1928).
See David Leonhardt & Stuart A. Thompson, Trump’s Lies, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/23/opinion/trumps-lies.
html?mcubz=0; see also David Brooks, Getting Trump Out of My Brain, N.Y. T IMES
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/opinion/getting-trump-out-of-mybrain.html?mcubz=0 (“There’s nothing more to be learned about Trump’s mixture of
ignorance, insecurity and narcissism. Every second spent on his bluster is more
degrading than informative.”).
142 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936).
140
141
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The constitutional universe will hardly fall apart should
courts and other constitutional decision makers, explicitly or
implicitly, engage in motive analysis, up the standard of scrutiny,
and interpret statutes as not delegating power when adjudicating
Trump Administration efforts to exercise Article II powers. The
constitutional universe did not fall apart when the Supreme
Court abandoned inherited practices in order to repair the
constitutional breakdown caused when southern (and many
northern) governing officials committed to white supremacy
refused to make good faith interpretations of the Equal
Protection Clause. The innocuous Brown opinion generated a
healthy debate over what policies are entailed by a constitutional
commitment to racial equality.143 On some doctrinal matters,
most notably free speech, courts have largely retained precedents
that supported civil rights protestors and media coverage of the
civil rights movement.144 On other doctrinal matters, most
notably state action, courts largely abandoned precedents that
struck down Jim Crow practices when litigants sought to extend
those decisions to non-racial matters.145 On still other doctrinal
matters, most notably constitutional criminal procedure, liberals
and conservatives dispute whether rules put in force to prevent
official racial abuses should remain in place today.146
The Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County, Alabama
v. Holder147 illustrates how Supreme Court Justices debate the
status of precedents that respond to constitutional failures. All
parties to that case agreed that “[t]he Voting Rights Act of 1965
employed extraordinary measures to address an extraordinary
problem.”148 Chief Justice John Roberts began his opinion by
recognizing that “racial discrimination in voting” was “an
insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in
certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious
defiance of the Constitution,” and that “exceptional conditions

143 See Mark A. Graber, The Price of Fame: Brown as Celebrity, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 939,
1004–08 (2008).
144 See, e.g., Air Wis. Airlines Corp. v. Hoeper, 134 S. Ct. 852 (2014).
145 See Terri Peretti, Constructing the State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 L. & SOC.
INQUIRY 273, 276–77 (2010).
146 See, e.g., Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
147 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
148 Id. at 2618.
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can justify legislative measures not otherwise appropriate.”149
Roberts then announced that the test originally adopted by
Congress when passing the seminal Voting Rights Act of 1965
that triggered what might well be called “strict scrutiny” by the
Justice Department over any changes in voting laws by states
was no longer needed in 2013, and therefore had become
unconstitutional as an unnecessary incursion on state
autonomy.150 Justice Ginsburg insisted that the prophylactic
rules adopted by Congress in 1965 still made sense and that the
judicial policy of deferring to Congressional judgment as to the
remedies for voting discrimination should be maintained.151 Both
Roberts and Ginsburg endorsed judicial decisions that adjusted
constitutional doctrine in response to failures within the
constitutional order. They disputed only whether those failures
had been corrected and whether doctrine forged in constitutional
failure ought to be maintained for the foreseeable future.152
The dispute between Roberts and Ginsburg in Shelby County
highlights how the present question is not whether limits on the
singular presidency of Donald Trump should apply forever to all
future presidents. Future constitutional decision makers may
conclude that both Trump and the rules used to constrain Trump
were temporary aberrations or they may conclude that Trump
represented a more enduring change in the American
constitutional order that requires more enduring doctrinal
adjustments. “Adaptation” by definition must be responsive to
circumstances, but what those circumstances are and whether
they warrant adaption is always controversial. The question is
when what appears to be “settled doctrines” warrant some degree
of “unsettlement” in light of what may be temporary aberrations
or enduring changes in a constitutional order. If judicial decisions
limiting the power of the Trump Administration unsettle
constitutional law a bit, that may be a good thing,153 reminding
us of the continuing wisdom of Justice Holmes’s placement of

Id. (quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 334 (1966)).
Id. at 2631.
151 Id. at 2652 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
152 Compare id. at 2625 (“Nearly 50 years later, things have changed dramatically.”),
with id. at 2634 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting ongoing “‘second generation barriers’ to
minority voting”).
153 See LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION: A NEW DEFENSE
OF CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–8 (2001).
149
150
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“experience” over “logic” as the most important motivating force
for an effective legal order.154
CONCLUSION
Clinton Rossiter some seventy years ago published a truly
important and disturbing book on the phenomenon of what he
called “constitutional dictatorship.”155 Drawing in his American
chapter primarily on Lincoln, Wilson, and Roosevelt, he argued
that in times of crisis, the United States, like Great Britain,
France, and Germany (and ancient Rome), placed near-plenary
power in their leaders to confront perceived crises.156 Rossiter
dismissed any argument that we could in fact eliminate the
need for “constitutional dictatorship.” 157 That would require
eliminating the presence of emergencies or crises that elicited
displays of what could, under ordinary times, be described as
presidential overreaching. Contemporary presidential power is
here to stay, even if modified to some degree. More than ever, we
have good reason to ask about the trustworthiness of presidents
in whose hands we necessarily place immense powers that quite
literally touch on national and world survival.
Problems with presidential impeachments, as well as the
enormous power of the president, further support our claims that
non-Publian presidents ought not be trusted with Publian
powers. An August poll revealed that forty-three percent of those
surveyed support Trump’s impeachment, with twelve percent
supporting censure by Congress.158 By October 31st, according to
Public Policy Polling, the number had climbed to forty-nine
percent, with only forty-one percent opposed.159 Still, this
solution is close to a fantasy. Whether one believes that the
framers
in
Philadelphia
explicitly
rejected
making

See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed. 1881).
See generally CLINTON L. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS
GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN DEMOCRACIES (1979); Sanford Levinson & Jack M. Balkin,
Constitutional Dictatorship: Its Dangers and Its Design, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1789 (2010).
156 ROSSITER, supra note 155, at 207–314.
157 Id.
158 Tom O’Connor, Trump Impeachment Is Most Popular Solution Among Americans,
Poll Says, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/trumpimpeachment-most-popular-solution-americans-655556 [http://perma.cc/ZY36-SSVX].
159 See Support for Impeachment at Record High, PUBLIC POLICY POLLING
(Oct. 31, 2017), https://www.publicpolicypolling.com/polls/support-impeachment-recordhigh/ [http://perma.cc/YU4N-2TYA].
154
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administrative “malfeasance” a ground for impeachment,160 or
instead simply thinks Republicans in Congress—out of party
loyalty or fear of their base—will not impeach for political
malfeasance, 161 advocating impeachment or invoking the
Twenty-fifth Amendment at present is a form of expressive
politics unresponsive to the constitutional problems presented by
a lawless chief law enforcement officer of the land and a
Commander-in-Chief who lacks the emotional maturity to toss off
even trivial slights.
One possible argument against our claim that the
constitutional powers of the president are not indifferent to the
officeholder is the possibility that the Framers of the
Constitution, fearing human infallibility, drew firm lines in the
sand. This constitution is one of fixed rules because human
beings are tempted to abuse power otherwise.162 The Constitution
of the United States “view[s] the abuse of power as the
paramount evil,” Frederick Schauer maintains, and “thus
choose[s] to minimize the occasions on which the abuse of power
is not blocked, even at the cost of . . . imped[ing] the pursuit of
the Good.”163 Those who take this view believe that even if acting
on the consensual view that President Trump is unfit to hold
office will have good short-term consequences, constitutional
rules should be woodenly followed because in the long run,
constitutional decision makers are more likely to misuse, rather
than properly use, authority to constrain a president they believe
a menace to constitutional government and perhaps to regime
and human survival.164

See SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 114–15 (2006).
For an argument that Congress may impeach for political malfeasance, see
Whittington, supra note 139.
162 See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED 21 (2012).
163 Frederick Schauer, The Constitution as Text and Rule, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 41,
50 (1987).
164 See
Jonathan Turley, What’s worse than leaving Trump in office?
Impeaching him., WASH. POST (Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
posteverything/wp/2017/08/24/whats-worse-than-leaving-trump-in-office-impeaching-him/?
utm_term=.10c28cfcdf40 [http://perma.cc/8T96-H3RC] for a fine example of such
woodenness. Turley fears that impeaching Trump, at least on the basis of what is known
about him as of late August 2017, “would fundamentally alter the presidency, potentially
setting up future presidents to face impeachment inquiries or even removal whenever the
political winds shifted against them.” Id. Turley does not provide any reason for thinking
Trump is fit to hold office. He does not deny, for example, that the Constitution of the
United States presently entrusts a president who cannot ignore the most trivial insult
with the power to begin a nuclear war. Turley’s argument, an example of neutral
160
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The problem with interpreting constitutional powers as
officeholder-indifferent is that The Federalist Papers make clear
that the Constitution of fixed rules is not the Constitution of the
United States. The fixed rules that comprise what Levinson
terms the “Constitution of Settlement” concern the rules for
staffing offices and making laws.165 The powers of each branch of
the national government are as much a part of what Levinson
terms the “Constitution of Conversation” as the “majestic
generalities” of the Fourteenth Amendment.166 Some constitutional
rules explain why presidents are elected like clockwork every four
years.167 Other constitutional provisions explain why presidential
power varies considerably over time and with each president;
Franklin Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan were given far more
deference by other officeholders than Herbert Hoover or Andrew
Johnson.168 Treating Donald Trump as a normal president
exercising normal Article II powers would be a far greater break
from this historical practice than recognizing that a bigoted,
ignorant liar should not be accorded the same deference as a
president who might plausibly claim to be “pre-eminent for
ability and virtue.”169
The obvious question in 2018 is whether realists committed
to an experience-based politics should expect highly partisan
members of Congress—and judges who are increasingly
themselves identify with a single political party—to play their
Publian role. That the answer may be no speaks to what Jack
Balkin has termed “constitutional rot,”170 not to the underlying
presuppositions of the Publian constitutional order that,
paradoxically or not, most Americans profess to respect. The
strongest response to our argument is that (almost) no one today

principles run riot, is equivalent to the claim that Congress should not ban human
sacrifices for fear of creating a precedent that might empower the national legislature in
the future to ban religion.
165 Levinson, supra note 162, at 19.
166 Id. at 278.
167 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
168 For studies demonstrating variance in presidential power over time and between
presidents, see generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLITICS PRESIDENTS MAKE:
LEADERSHIP FROM JOHN ADAMS TO GEORGE BUSH (1993); JAMES DAVID BARBER, THE
PRESIDENTIAL CHARACTER: PREDICTING PERFORMANCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1972).
169 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68, at 460–61 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
170 Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018).
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takes truly seriously the notion of civic virtue and organizing our
polity around it. That idea, associated with “civic republicanism,”
was replaced by a much more “liberal” notion of politics that
accepts the basic reality that all of us are motivated primarily by
self-interest and unable (or, at least, unlikely) genuinely to tame
those impulses in behalf of some evanescent idea of the “public
interest” when the common good conflicts with our interests.171
One can find strong hints of this view in Federalist No. 10,
perhaps the most canonical of all of the eighty-five Federalist
essays. Down that road lies the Holmesian “bad man,” who looks
at law simply as a price system that announces the costs of legal
non-compliance, which assumes, of course, that the law will in
fact be enforced.172 From one perspective, Trump is simply the
latest exemplar of the “bad man” who in effect now constitutes
our political order.
Recent events nevertheless suggest that, outside of
Congress, other government officials are implicitly recognizing
that Trump is not entitled to the same Article II prerogatives as
presidents constitutionally fit for office. Military officials have
not blindly followed presidential orders or have suggested they
may refuse when they doubt presidential authority. Secretary of
Defense James Mathis and other military leaders dragged their
feet or flatly refused to implement Trump’s Twitter order
banning transgendered patriots from serving in the armed
forces.173 General John Hyten, the head of the U.S. Strategic
Command, declared that he will not automatically obey a
presidential order to use nuclear weapons.174 Lower federal
courts have been unusually stingy with presidential authority.
Within weeks of Trump’s taking office, Benjamin Wittes and
171 The seminal work on classical republicanism is JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK,
THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC
REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975). For discussions of the differences between constitutional
republicanism and constitutional liberalism, see Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97
YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE
L.J. 1539 (1988).
172 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,
459 (1897).
173 See Travis J. Tritten, Coast Guard commandant signals he will resist Trump’s
military transgender ban, WASH. EXAMINER (Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.washington
examiner.com/coast-guard-commandant-signals-he-will-resist-trumps-military-transgenderban/article/2630294 [http://perma.cc/N4PV-UW8G].
174 Daniella Diaz, Top general says he’d push back against “illegal” nuclear strike
order, CNN (Nov. 20, 2017, 5:07 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/18/politics/air-forcegeneral-john-hyten-nuclear-strike-donald-trump/index.html [http://perma.cc/Q774-RNU6].

174

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

Quinta Jurecic observed “a large number of judges around the
country behav[ing] in a fashion untouched by deference or any
kind of presumption of regularity in the President’s behavior[.]”175
Federal courts have repeatedly found constitutional fault with
Trump’s travel bans.176 Federal District Court Judge William
Orrick recently granted a permanent injunction prohibiting the
Trump Administration’s efforts from denying federal funding to
sanctuary cities.177 Wittes and Jurecic suggest the “unprecedented
barrage of leaks that has plagued the Trump administration”
reflects common understandings that Trump is unfit for office.178
“[W]hen the bureaucracy doubts the president’s oath,” they write,
“that fact gravely frays the executive’s ordinary comparative unity.
The people who work for the president no longer connect loyalty to
the executive branch with the lofty goals to which the oath seeks
to bind the president, so they become much more likely to act on
their own.”179 No military officer, judge, or leaker has justified his
or her actions by claiming that Trump lacks the executive powers
of previous presidents.180 Nevertheless, the lack of deference to
presidential authority that persons outside of Congress have
demonstrated in Trump’s first year seems unprecedented.
Perhaps we are wrong about Donald Trump. Perhaps we are
wrong about whether constitutional powers are indifferent to the
officeholder. We are not wrong in thinking that the political order
in the United States is in a severe state of constitutional rot.181
We hope with this paper to provoke specific constitutional
conversations about the powers of an anti-Publian president,
more general conversations about constitutional practice and
interpretation during times of severe constitutional failures, and
even more general conversations about whether the path to a
more functional constitutional order lies in fixing our

175 Benjamin Wittes & Quinta Jurecic, What Happens When We Don’t Believe the
President’s Oath, LAWFARE (Mar. 3, 2017, 12:30 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/whathappens-when-we-dont-believe-presidents-oath [http://perma.cc/YZ8T-F9FH].
176 See supra notes 134–136 and accompanying text.
177 See Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d. 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017).
178 Wittes & Jurecic, supra note 175.
179 Id. Wittes and Jurecic further observe that when a “large number of people in the
press cannot start with the presumption that the president is making a good faith effort
to do his job . . . the press no longer presumes that any presidential statement is true.” Id.
180 Or, alas, cited a draft of this essay!
181 See Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, U. MD. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 5–9, 11–13).
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constitutional order through better interpretations of
constitutional provisions, changes in the constitutional culture
responsible for the anti-Publian president, or changes in the
constitutional text that generated the anti-Publian president.
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War Powers Litigation After
Zivotofsky v. Clinton
Michael D. Ramsey*
INTRODUCTION
In modern times, judicial opinions have been largely absent
from the debate over constitutional war powers. Among other
things, it is widely assumed—especially in light of the courts’
avoidance of the issue during the Vietnam War—that the
political question doctrine would preclude judicial determination
of war-initiation powers. In Zivotofsky v. Clinton,1 however, the
Supreme Court appeared to re-characterize and limit the political
question doctrine in a way that might allow wider litigation of
war powers issues. According to Zivotofsky, the doctrine does not
preclude courts from determining the meaning of statutes and
the Constitution in separation of powers disputes, even when
substantial foreign affairs issues are at stake.2
The actual subject of the Zivotofsky litigation was, however,
relatively modest as foreign affairs controversies go. The courts’
willingness to retreat from the political question doctrine will be
more severely tested in matters of greater foreign affairs
significance, such as war powers. This essay considers the
implications of Zivotofsky for war powers litigation, including by
revisiting the Vietnam-era decisions. It first asks whether
Zivotofsky, if taken at face value, does indeed suggest a renewed
viability of war powers litigation. Second, it asks whether, as a
practical matter, courts can comfortably undertake the task of
war powers adjudication. Third, it considers the value of more
aggressive war powers adjudication, including whether a
Zivotofsky-inspired approach to war powers disputes is consistent
with the courts’ constitutional role.

* Hugh and Hazel Darling Foundation Professor of Law and Faculty Director of
International and Comparative Law Programs, University of San Diego Law School.
Thanks to Curtis Bradley, Tom Campbell, Michael Glennon, Martin Lederman,
Saikrishna Prakash, Lisa Ramsey, Michael Rappaport, Stephen Vladeck, Ingrid
Wuerth, and participants in the Yale-Duke Foreign Relations Law Roundtable for
helpful comments.
1 566 U.S. 189 (2012).
2 Id. at 194–96.
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I. ZIVOTOFSKY AS DOCTRINAL CHANGE
Zivotofsky v. Clinton appears to signal a major shift in
thinking about justiciability in separation of powers disputes.3
Briefly, the case concerned a statute allowing U.S. citizens born
in Jerusalem to request passports reflecting birth in “Jerusalem,
Israel.”4 The U.S. executive branch refused to apply the statute,
invoking the president’s supposedly exclusive control of foreign
affairs and the diplomatically sensitive nature of Jerusalem’s
political status. In a suit to enforce the statute, brought by the
parents of Zivotofsky, a U.S. citizen born in Jerusalem, the D.C.
Circuit found the case to be a non-justiciable political question.5
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion for six Justices reversed,
emphasizing the central role of the judiciary in determining the
meaning of the Constitution.6 Roberts’ opinion acknowledged
that a political question might exist (a) if the Constitution’s text
committed the decision to another branch or (b) if there were no
judicially manageable standards by which to decide. But it found
neither circumstance to exist in the passport dispute; to the
contrary, the opinion emphasized that the case involved
determining the constitutionality of a statute, which is “what
courts do.”7
Prior to Zivotofsky, political question analysis had been
dominated by Justice Brennan’s six-factor test in Baker v. Carr.8
Baker had been cited repeatedly by lower courts in political
question cases9 (including the lower courts in Zivotofsky), and by
then-Justice Rehnquist’s influential concurring opinion in
Goldwater v. Carter, an opinion that seemed strongly to disfavor
justiciability in separation of powers cases.10 But Zivotofsky

3 See Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization of Foreign Relations
Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1925–26 (2015) (describing Zivotofsky as having “farreaching significance” for justiciability of foreign relations law cases).
4 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107–228,
§ 213(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366, § 214(d) (2002).
5 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 571 F.3d 1227, 1232–33 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(principally concluding that decisions regarding recognition are textually committed to
the executive branch); see also id. at 1240, 1244–45 (Judge Edwards, concurring) (finding
on the merits that Section 214(d) unconstitutionally interfered with the president’s
executive power).
6 Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Ginsburg, and
Kagan joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part and in
the result, and Justice Alito concurred in the result. Justice Breyer was the sole dissenter.
7 Id. at 201.
8 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
9 See, e.g., Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 544, 549–58 (9th Cir. 2005)
(sequentially applying each of Baker’s six factors).
10 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., & Stevens, J., concurring).
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barely mentioned Baker, citing it only in passing.11 More
importantly, Zivotofsky—although rejecting a political question
challenge—mentioned only two of Baker’s six factors (the ones
noted above); it did not at any point describe the political
question doctrine as resting on a six-factor test or acknowledge
that Baker had suggested a six-factor test.12 And even more
notably, the Baker factors Zivotofsky failed to mention were the
most open-ended, the most easily invoked to defeat justiciability,
and the most apparently relevant to Zivotofsky itself
in particular: “the impossibility of a court’s undertaking
independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government”; “an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made”; or “the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question.”13
Also of note, the Zivotofsky majority opinion did not discuss
Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Goldwater—and Rehnquist’s
analysis in Goldwater seems inconsistent with it. Goldwater
involved the question whether the president had to obtain the
Senate’s approval before terminating a treaty in accordance with
the treaty’s terms.14 Although it involved the constitutionality of
an executive action rather than the constitutionality of a statute,
in other respects the dispute in Goldwater fit with Roberts’
description of a question of constitutional law directed to the
courts. As in Zivotofsky, Goldwater did not question the merits of
the president’s policy; the question was not what decision
should be made, but which branch, constitutionally, should make
the decision.
In sum, Zivotofsky appears to reaffirm and extend the
view that foreign affairs controversies involving only the
interpretation of statutes or the Constitution are not
qualitatively different from ordinary statutory and constitutional
questions. In disregarding Goldwater and much of Baker, it
appears substantially to narrow the grounds upon which a

11 See Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195, 197, 201 (citing Baker directly only once, and
indirectly only as quoted—incompletely—in Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224,
228 (1993)).
12 Compare Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 195, 197, with id. at 202 (Sotomayor J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“In Baker, this Court identified six circumstances in which
an issue might present a political question . . . .”).
13 See Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
14 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 996. There was no opinion of the Court in Goldwater,
so Zivotofsky was under no obligation to cite it—but the Zivotofsky majority’s decision not
to discuss Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, which attracted four votes and had been seen
as an important statement of the political question doctrine, seems significant.
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political question can be found, and thus to open more separation
of powers controversies to judicial resolution.
The question remains, however, whether Zivotofsky is an
isolated decision or a meaningful shift. Zivotofsky involved a
relatively minor—even obscure—dispute about the wording of
the passports of (one assumes) a very small number of people.
Little evidence existed of major foreign policy disruption.15
Zivotofsky’s viability when the Court confronts more momentous
matters seems open to doubt.
To think about that question, consider the justiciability of
war powers disputes. Under the Baker formulation—especially as
applied in Goldwater—conventional wisdom has been that
questions of the president’s unilateral ability to use military force
are likely non-justiciable. But Zivotofsky calls that assumption
into doubt, first by suggesting that constitutional disputes in
foreign affairs are matters granted to the judiciary for resolution,
and second by apparently dispensing with Baker’s concern for
“respect due coordinate branches” and “embarrassment” arising
from “multifarious pronouncements” on foreign affairs.16
Zivotofsky’s viability, however, may itself depend on the ability to
construct a framework of justiciability for war powers disputes
that is manageable and plausible.
II. POLITICAL QUESTIONS AND VIETNAM-ERA WAR POWERS
LITIGATION
To make more concrete the questions posed above, this
section considers the most extensive modern litigation of
constitutional war powers. During the Vietnam War era, from
1967 through 1974, lower courts heard multiple challenges to the
war’s constitutionality. None of these challenges was successful
in limiting the war, and none reached the Supreme Court apart
from a single unexplained affirmance of a three-judge district
court.17 Nonetheless, these cases provide a concrete historical
example of war powers litigation.
To begin, there is something of a myth that the Vietnam-era
cases declared all war powers questions to be political questions.
Some cases did, but others found some war powers issues to be
political questions and others not to be. The diversity of
questions and answers in the Vietnam-era thus offers a way to
Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 191–94.
Baker, 369 U.S. at 216–17, 225. These were the principal Baker factors not
discussed in Zivotofsky.
17 Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973).
15
16

2018]

War Powers Litigation After Zivotofsky v. Clinton

181

start thinking about what a post-Zivotofsky war powers
justiciability analysis might involve.
Courts in the Vietnam era pursued at least three different
approaches. Two major cases found war powers litigation broadly
to be political questions. The D.C. Circuit, in one of the early
cases, reached this conclusion almost without analysis, resting
principally on the proposition that foreign affairs matters were
for the president to determine.18 Somewhat later, a three-judge
district court in Pennsylvania reached a similar conclusion after
much more extended analysis; the Supreme Court affirmed this
decision without opinion.19
The Second Circuit pursued an intermediate course in a
series of cases. It found the basic question whether congressional
authorization was needed for war initiation to be justiciable; on
the merits, it found that congressional authorization was
constitutionally required and had been given.20 However,
ostensibly on political question grounds, it held that the method
of authorization was up to Congress (thus rejecting, for example,
the proposition that an actual formal declaration was required
and accepting congressional authorization via the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution and appropriations in support of the military effort).21
In further litigation, the Second Circuit invoked the political
question doctrine to avoid deciding two specific challenges. First,
plaintiffs contended that the president’s decision to bomb North
Vietnam and mine North Vietnamese harbors after a ceasefire
lacked congressional approval.22 At this point, Congress had
repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and indicated that the
war should be wound down. Plaintiffs argued that the president’s
actions were unapproved escalations, while the president argued
that renewed bombing to enforce the ceasefire was the best way
to achieve Congress’s goals.23 The court, on political question
grounds, refused to second-guess the President’s strategic

18 Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (“The fundamental
division of authority and power established by the Constitution precludes judges from
overseeing the conduct of foreign policy or the use and disposition of military power; these
matters are plainly the exclusive province of Congress and the Executive.”).
19 Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 698–707 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (relying heavily on
Baker v. Carr), aff’d without opinion sub nom., Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973);
see also Commonwealth of Mass. v. Laird, 451 F.2d 26, 32–33 (1st Cir. 1971) (finding the
whole matter of war powers to be a political question, at least in the absence of an
objection by Congress to the president’s actions).
20 Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1042–43 (2d Cir. 1971).
21 Id. at 1043; accord DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971); Berk v.
Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 305 (2d Cir. 1970).
22 Orlando, 443 F.2d at 1041.
23 Id.
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assessment.24 In a subsequent case, plaintiffs argued that
the President’s bombing of Cambodia—ostensibly a neutral
country—was not authorized by Congress. The President
similarly claimed that the bombing was the best way to wind
down U.S. involvement, and the court (this time over a dissent by
Judge Oakes) refused to decide on political question grounds.25
A third group of opinions showed greater willingness to
reach the merits. In a subsequent case in the D.C. Circuit, a
divided panel followed the Second Circuit in finding that
congressional authorization for the war was constitutionally
required, and then, rejecting the Second Circuit’s analysis,
concluded that Congress’s authorization could not be found
merely from appropriations and other statutes passed to support
the war effort.26 (Like most of the Second Circuit opinions, this
case came after Congress’s repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin
Resolution.) As a remedy, however, the court found injunctive
relief inappropriate because at that point, the president (at
Congress’s direction) appeared to be ending the U.S. involvement
in any event.27 In addition, two dissenting opinions from the
cases mentioned above argued for reaching the merits. Judge
Lord dissented at length from the three-judge panel’s political
question conclusion.28 In the Second Circuit, Judge Oakes would
have found the Cambodian bombing unauthorized (at least after
DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1152–53 (2d Cir. 1973).
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). The district court ruled on
the merits that the Cambodia bombing was unconstitutional and directed that it cease. In
a once-famous flurry of motions, the court of appeals stayed the district court order, and
the plaintiffs asked Justice Thurgood Marshall, as circuit justice, to vacate the stay.
When Marshall refused, plaintiffs asked Justice Douglas to lift the stay, and he did. See
Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304 (1973) (Justice Marshall); id. at 1320 (Justice
Douglas). On a motion from the government, Justice Marshall, with the concurrence of
the full Court apart from Justice Douglas, overturned Justice Douglas’s order. See
Schlesinger v. Holtzman, 414 U.S. 1321, 1322 (1973). Ultimately, as noted in the text, the
Second Circuit reversed the district court on political question grounds and the Supreme
Court denied certiorari. See Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1315, cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
26 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615–16 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (concluding that “none of
the legislation drawn to the court's attention [including appropriations and extension of
the military draft] may serve as a valid assent to the Vietnam war”). As noted in the
opinion, Judge Tamm would have found appropriations an adequate authorization. Id. at
615. Four judges, including Judge Tamm, favored rehearing the case en banc on the
grounds that appropriations were a proper mode of authorization. Id. at 616 (statement of
Judge MacKinnon, joined by Judges Tamm, Robb, and Wilkey).
27 Id. at 616 (finding it to be a political question whether the president was
proceeding appropriately to end the war).
28 Atlee v. Laird, 347 F. Supp. 689, 709, 712 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (Judge Lord, dissenting)
(“This case does not involve second guessing the wisdom of the Executive in a matter
committed by the Constitution to that branch of the Government. It is rather a
constitutional question concerning the division of power within our system, involving a
determination of whether the executive branch has exceeded the scope of its
constitutional power.”).
24
25
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repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution) because it had been secret
and because it constituted a fundamental change in the scope of
the war by involving an additional country in hostilities.29
These cases suggest at least three types of questions in war
powers litigation: (1) whether Congress’s authorization of military
action is required; (2) if so, whether Congress has authorized it;
and (3) the scope of Congress’s authorization. They further
suggest, as developed in the next section, that some of these
questions are more susceptible to judicial resolution than others.
III. WAR POWERS LITIGATION AFTER ZIVOTOFSKY
This section considers the extent to which Zivotofsky
vindicates the stronger view of war powers litigation in the
Vietnam era. I conclude that it does, with significant limitations.
A.

Standing
At the outset, it is worth noting that narrower modern views
of standing would change the dynamics of the Vietnam-era
litigation. Several of the major cases depended on theories of
standing that are likely no longer viable: citizen suits, suits
based on remote possibilities, and suits based on the standing of
members of Congress.30 However, the litigation also reflected at
least one theory of standing likely still available: suit by a
member of the military challenging deployment into combat.31 It
is also possible that people overseas affected by the conflict might
have standing if U.S. citizens are in the war zone32 or if the Court
recognizes the ability of non-citizens abroad to sue to enforce
constitutional provisions.33 Further, it remains an open question
whether Congress as a whole or one of its Houses (as opposed to
individual members) can bring suit to protect congressional
powers.34 Thus, modern standing law is likely to limit, but not
foreclose, the possibility of war powers litigation.
29 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315–18 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge
Oakes, dissenting).
30 See, e.g., id. at 1307, 1315 (congressional standing); Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 613–14
(congressional standing); Atlee, 347 F. Supp. at 691 (taxpayer standing).
31 See, e.g., Berk v. Laird, 429 F.2d 302, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1970).
32 See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1515–21 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(finding U.S. citizen had standing to challenge U.S. military actions on his land in
Honduras), vacated and remanded on other grounds, Weinberger v. Ramirez de Arellano,
471 U.S. 1113 (1985).
33 A possibility suggested by Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795–98 (2008).
34 See U.S. House of Representatives v. Burwell, 130 F. Supp. 3d 53, 66–77 (D.D.C.
2015) (generally finding the question of the standing of the House of Representatives to be
unresolved by prior cases, and concluding in the particular case that the House as an
institution had standing to challenge some actions of the president); see also Ariz. State

184

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

B.

Questions Involving Congressional Approval
Whether Congress must authorize a military action has two
components: (1) whether the declare war clause gives Congress
exclusive authority over initiating war; and (2) if so, whether the
conflict at issue is a “war” that requires Congress’s authorization.
In Zivotofsky’s terms, the first question seems clearly one for the
courts. It is a question of the Constitution’s meaning in the
abstract; it does not require attention to any particular factors of
any particular conflict. It is not meaningfully different from the
question, for example, whether the president has authority to
seize steel mills to avert a strike, or whether the president has
authority to terminate treaties without Senate approval. True, it
might lead to a decision that a particular executive-initiated
conflict is unauthorized—quite possibly running afoul of the Baker
factors of embarrassment and multifarious pronouncements—but
Zivotofsky appears to discount those factors, at least where a pure
question of law is presented. True also, the constitutional
question may be a hard one (at least for some types of conflicts),
but Zivotofsky makes clear that even a difficult question of
constitutional meaning is for the courts to decide.35
As a result, a post-Zivotofsky analysis confirms the view of
the Second and D.C. Circuits in the Vietnam era that the need
for congressional authorization is (or at least can be) a judicial
question. The decisions that instead found a political question on
this point rested on the proposition that the scope of the
president’s foreign affairs powers is broadly nonjusticiable36—a
proposition rejected in Zivotofsky. Nor is it clear that judicial
engagement with the question is problematic: courts managed it
in the Vietnam era37 as well as in earlier times.38
The second part of the authorization question is more
problematic. Hostilities exist on a scale from minor skirmishes to
total war. Some line must be drawn unless one thinks
Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2663, 2665 n.12 (2015)
(finding that Arizona legislature had standing to contest allegedly unconstitutional
diminution of its powers, but expressly reserving the question of whether the U.S.
Congress would have standing to challenge actions of the president).
35 See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 201 (2012) (acknowledging difficulty of the
case but finding it to “demand[] careful examination of the textual, structural, and
historical evidence put forward by the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of
the passport and recognition powers”).
36 See, e.g., Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664, 665–66 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
37 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971).
38 See The Brig Amy Warwick (The Prize Cases), 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 665–67
(1863) (deciding on the merits whether President Lincoln’s naval blockade of the South
during the Civil War was constitutional); see also infra Part IV (discussing
additional cases).
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(implausibly) that either all military actions must be authorized
by Congress or none must be. The difficulty of drawing the line in
some circumstances should not preclude adjudication when the
line is clear, however, as the Second Circuit found in the
Vietnam-era cases.39 Further, the issue can be made more
manageable if courts approach it categorically, finding that the
presence of certain circumstances do or do not bring a conflict
within the need for approval. For example, in the 2011 Libya
conflict, the President argued that congressional approval was
not required because U.S. military actions consisted wholly of
airstrikes, were of limited duration, and did not involve major
threats to U.S. personnel.40 With these descriptions being largely
uncontested as a factual matter, a court could decide as a matter
of constitutional interpretation whether a conflict so described
requires congressional authorization.
On the other hand, some situations may resist categorical
assessment because they depend on disputed or uncertain facts
or subjective characterizations. For example, the U.S. military
action in Iraq and Syria against the Islamic State seems
challenging to describe categorically: the nature of the Islamic
State, the extent of the U.S. role, and the U.S. objectives seem
sufficiently unsettled that judicial assessment would be, at
minimum, a qualitatively different task than the one envisioned
in Zivotofsky.41
C.

Questions Involving the Type of Congressional Approval
A second major issue in the Vietnam era was whether
Congress could authorize hostilities either by appropriations or
by the vaguely worded Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Courts divided
on whether that question was justiciable.42 Zivotofsky suggests
that it should be. A court’s analysis here would not seem to
depend on factual assessments or subjective characterizations.
For example, the D.C. Circuit held that appropriations do not
39 E.g., DaCosta, 448 F.2d at 1369 (concluding that the Vietnam conflict was a war
for constitutional purposes).
40 Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 6–14 (2011); see also
Michael D. Ramsey, Constitutional War Initiation and the Obama Presidency, 110 AMER.
J. INT’L L. 701, 701–07, 711–13 (2016) (discussing the constitutional debate over the Libya
action). Compare Harold Hongju Koh, The War Powers and Humanitarian Intervention,
53 HOUS. L. REV. 971, 980–98 (2016) (defending the constitutionality of the U.S. military
action), with Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Military Force and Violence but Neither War
nor Hostilities, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 995, 998–1005 (2016) (finding the Libya action
unconstitutional).
41 See infra Part VI (discussing post-Zivotofsky litigation challenging U.S. military
action against the Islamic State).
42 See supra Part II.
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count as approval for constitutional purposes.43 Whether this is
correct or not is a question of constitutional interpretation
separate from the facts, policies, and descriptions of any
particular conflict; the analysis would be analogous to the way
the Court described Zivotofsky as requiring “careful examination
of the textual, structural, and historical evidence put forward by
the parties regarding the nature of the statute and of the
passport and recognition powers.”44
One might conclude—as the Second Circuit did—that the
Constitution delegates to Congress the decision how to authorize
military conflict. Perhaps that makes it a political question
(textually committed to another branch), as the Second Circuit
described it.45 But Zivotofsky indicates that it is better
understood as a decision on the merits: if the Constitution does
not require any particular method of authorization, plaintiffs’
challenge to Congress’s method of authorization fails on the
merits. Similarly, one might say in Zivotofsky that the
president’s recognition power is exclusive and gives the president
power to decide how to describe the status of Jerusalem. But as
the decision in Zivotofsky (and the subsequent litigation)46
indicates, that is a question on the merits—whether the
Constitution (as interpreted by the judiciary) gives the president
that exclusive authority.
In sum, courts should be able to decide, post-Zivotofsky,
whether the Constitution requires Congress’s authorization to be
given in particular ways.
D. Questions Involving the Scope of Congressional Approval
The most difficult of the Vietnam-era cases appear to be
challenges to the scope of congressional approval. These are
almost necessarily fact-intensive—both what Congress approved
and what is going on in a particular conflict. For example, if one
concluded that after repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,
Congress had approved only actions designed to wind down the
war, it is (as the Second Circuit found) hard to say what
activities are designed to wind down the war.47 The decision of
43 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In doing so, the court
famously relied on “what every schoolboy knows”: that once hostilities begin, Congress
will feel an obligation to fund them. Id.
44 Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 200 (2012).
45 See DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1370 (2d Cir. 1971).
46 See Zivotofsky v. Sec’y of State, 725 F.3d 197, 204–05, 219–20 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (on
remand, finding Section 214(d) unconstitutional as infringing the president’s recognition
power), aff’d, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2096 (2015).
47 See DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1147–48 (2d Cir. 1973).
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how to wind down the war seems within the category of
presidential discretion Chief Justice Marshall identified in
Marbury v. Madison, in the earliest formulation of the political
question doctrine.48 And it calls for a political solution: if
Congress wanted to narrow presidential discretion, it could write
a narrower statute.
The modern example of the conflict against the Islamic State
is also illustrative. Arguably, Congress authorized U.S. military
action against the Islamic State, either through the 2001
Authorization for the Use of Military Force against the
perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks, or the 2003 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force in Iraq. But reaching either conclusion
requires inquiry into difficult facts: to what extent the Islamic
State was connected to al Qaeda, or to what extent the Islamic
State was connected to prior Iraqi insurgent groups against
whom military action was clearly authorized.49 Adjudication of
these questions seems problematic and beyond Zivotofsky’s
direction. The inquiry would involve not merely the ordinary
tools of constitutional interpretation, but also resolution
of factual disputes and characterizations that may be less
judicially manageable.
Of course, often there will be no arguable congressional
authorization of a military conflict—as with the U.S. action in
Libya in 2011.50 And sometimes no plausible argument will
stretch an authorization to cover a remote conflict. Judge Oakes’
opinion in the Cambodian bombing case51 may be an example of
this: as the bombing was secret (and indeed the war had been
fought on the premise that Cambodia was neutral), Congress’s
appropriations for winding down the war it knew about seem
inadequate to approve the Cambodian bombing, without
requiring any inquiry into disputed facts or characterizations.52
Nonetheless, it seems likely that some disputes over the
scope of congressional authorization will depend on how one
characterizes the nature and purpose of the hostilities.
Adjudication thus runs substantial risk of infringing the
48 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–67 (1803); see also infra Part
IV (discussing Marbury).
49 See generally Prakash, supra note 40 (considering these issues); see also infra Part
VI (discussing litigation related to military action against the Islamic State).
50 See Prakash, supra note 40, at 999.
51 Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1315–18 (2d Cir. 1973) (Judge
Oakes, dissenting).
52 See John Hart Ely, The American War in Indochina, Part II: The
Unconstitutionality of the War They Didn't Tell Us About, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1093, 1137–38,
1147–48 (1990).
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president’s war-fighting discretion or of involving the judiciary in
the finding or characterization of facts for which it is manifestly
unsuited. Both of these lines of the political question doctrine
remain viable after Zivotofsky and should foreclose some aspects
of war powers adjudication.
E.

Implications
In sum, real and hypothetical war powers litigation indicate
that the issues sometimes are largely questions of constitutional
or statutory meaning and sometimes turn on disputed facts
or subjective characterizations. A Zivotofsky-inspired approach
suggests that the former are not political questions while the
latter may be. Interpretation of statutes and the Constitution as
a general matter is, Zivotofsky said, entrusted to the courts,53 and
courts do not lack standards to decide such cases even where
finding the right answer may be difficult or pose potential
embarrassment to the president. The second category of cases,
however, raises difficulties on both prongs of the political
question doctrine that Zivotofsky left intact. Where there are
conflicting views as to how to fight a war or how to characterize
an enemy or a U.S. objective, the Constitution commits the
discretion to the president, and the president should not be
second-guessed by the courts (per Marbury).54 Situations where
the facts are disputed, rapidly evolving, and difficult to
characterize, suggest a lack of judicially manageable standards
(or, to put it another way, a practical need to defer to the
president’s assessment of the hostile situation).
IV. ZIVOTOFSKY AND THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE COURTS
This section considers whether an expanded role for courts in
war powers adjudication is consistent with the Constitution’s
original meaning and the Constitution’s implementation in
the early post-ratification era. It finds that Zivotofsky’s
distinction between interpreting legal texts, on one hand, and
second-guessing the exercise of executive discretion, on the other,
has strong roots in post-ratification practice and is supported by
the Constitution’s text.
To begin with the text, the Constitution does not suggest any
difference in the courts’ role in war powers adjudication (and
other foreign affairs-related adjudication) as compared to

See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 200–02 (2012).
See generally Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L. REV.
941 (2004).
53
54
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ordinary constitutional litigation.55 The judiciary’s powers and
duties with respect to adjudication are conveyed in general
terms, without reservation as to war or foreign affairs powers.56
The grants of war and military powers to other branches of
government are intermingled within the Constitution’s text with
other grants of—and limits on—governmental powers without
singling them out for special nonjusticiability. In contrast, some
particular subjects may seem to be textually reserved to other
branches. For example, “[e]ach House shall be the Judge of the
Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members;”57
“[e]ach House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
punish its Members for disorderly Behavior, and, with the
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member”;58 and “[t]he Senate
shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”59 But there is
no similar language relating to war powers controversies.
Further, leading contemporaneous assessments of the text do not
indicate any war-related exception to the courts’ decisional
authority. Most notably, Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78, setting out
the theory of judicial review later substantially adopted by
Marbury v. Madison, does not refer to non-justiciability of war
powers controversies.60
Modern assessments of the political question doctrine
typically associate its origins with Chief Justice Marshall’s
opinion in Marbury.61 An examination of Marbury and its
subsequent applications indicate that Zivotofsky is consistent
with early practice. Marbury’s discussion of the issue was
as follows:
By the constitution of the United States, the President is invested
with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is
to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his
political character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the
performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain
officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used,

55 See M ICHAEL D. R AMSEY , T HE C ONSTITUTION ’ S T EXT IN F OREIGN A FFAIRS
321–41 (2007).
56 See U.S. CONST. art. III.
57 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1.
58 Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
59 Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
60 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 330–31.
61 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme than Court? The Fall of the Political
Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 C OLUM . L. R EV . 237,
239 (2002).

190

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion.
The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual
rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the
executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be
perceived by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the
department of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were
prescribed by that act, is to conform precisely to the will of the
President. He is the mere organ by whom that will is communicated.
The acts of such an officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by
the courts.
But when the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other
duties; when he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when
the rights of individuals are dependent on the performance of those
acts; he is so far the officer of the law; is amenable to the laws for his
conduct; and cannot at his discretion sport away the vested rights
of others.
The conclusion from this reasoning is, that where the heads of
departments are the political or confidential agents of the executive,
merely to execute the will of the President, or rather to act in cases in
which the executive possesses a constitutional or legal discretion,
nothing can be more perfectly clear than that their acts are only
politically examinable. But where a specific duty is assigned by law,
and individual rights depend upon the performance of that duty, it
seems equally clear that the individual who considers himself injured,
has a right to resort to the laws of his country for a remedy.62

Marshall then gave as an example: “The power of nominating to
the senate, and the power of appointing the person nominated,
are political powers, to be exercised by the President according to
his own discretion.”63 In contrast, he said, once the appointment
is made, the president lacks discretion to revoke it (in the case of
an officer not removable at will by the president).64
One might conclude from this discussion that Marshall’s idea
of political questions was tautological: that is, where the
president had discretion unbounded by law, courts—whose power
is to “say what the law is”65—had no role. (This would be the
case, for example, in the nomination/appointment illustration
Marshall invoked.) But Marshall might also have had in mind
situations in which the president exercised discretion bounded by
law; for example, where the president made factual assessments
or military judgments in support of the president’s constitutional
powers. In any event, Marbury’s concept of political questions

62
63
64
65

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803).
Id. at 167.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 177.
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arising from executive discretion would not displace the judicial
role in interpreting legal texts, even where those texts relate to
the extent of executive discretion. As Zivotofsky explained, there
is a difference between asking whom the Constitution empowers
to make a decision and asking whether the correct decision
was made.
This distinction runs implicitly through post-Marbury cases
in the war and foreign affairs areas. Little v. Barreme, decided
the next year, challenged the legality of the president’s order to
seize ships sailing to or from French possessions during the naval
hostilities with France.66 A statute authorized seizure of ships
sailing “to”—but not “from”—French possessions; the Court read
the statute literally and exclusively, finding the challenged
seizure to be unlawful.67 The Court did not consider whether the
case presented a political question. Similarly, in Murray
v. Schooner Charming Betsy, the Court considered whether
the U.S. Navy’s seizure of a ship was authorized by the
Non-Intercourse Act; the Court found it was not authorized
because the ship was not American-owned (in doing so, giving
rise to the “Charming Betsy canon” that statutes should, if
possible, be construed not to violate international law).68 As in
Little, the Court did not consider whether the issue was a
political question. Finally, in Brown v. United States, the Court
again found a seizure unconstitutional—in that case, the
executive branch’s seizure of British-owned timber during the
War of 1812.69 Writing for the Court, Marshall found the seizure
unconstitutional because it was not authorized by Congress’s
declaration of war and therefore it was beyond the president’s
constitutional powers.70 Thus, all three cases found executive
branch action in wartime to be illegal without expressing any
reservations about justiciability. That view is consistent with
Marbury because in each case, the question was not whether the
president or the executive branch had properly exercised
discretion, but whether the president or the executive branch had
Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178 (1804).
Id. at 178–79.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117–18 (1804).
69 Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 150–52 (1814).
70 See id. at 122–25; see also David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William S. Dodge,
International Law in the Supreme Court to 1860, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S.
SUPREME COURT: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 7, 40–41 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey
& William S. Dodge eds., 2011). Specifically, Brown was an application of the Charming
Betsy canon: the Court found that international law generally allowed enemy aliens a
period after a declaration of war to withdraw their property to avoid confiscation, and
that the 1812 declaration of war, because it lacked language to the contrary, should be
read not to violate this practice. Id.
66
67
68
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been granted discretionary power by the Constitution or
applicable statutes.
In contrast, the Court did appear to invoke a form of the
political question doctrine in its early cases to avoid reviewing
executive branch factual determinations or other discretionary
determinations, or to avoid making such determinations for
itself. In United States v. Palmer, for example, the Court refused
to assess the legitimacy of a rebellious government in the
Spanish colonies.71 Marshall wrote for the Court:
Those questions which respect the rights of a part of a foreign empire,
which asserts, and is contending for its independence, and the conduct
which must be observed by the courts of the union towards the
subjects of such section of an empire who may be brought before the
tribunals of this country, are equally delicate and difficult.
As it is understood that the construction which has been given to the
act of congress, will render a particular answer to them unnecessary,
the court will only observe, that such questions are generally rather
political than legal in their character. They belong more properly to
those who can declare what the law shall be; who can place the nation
in such a position with respect to foreign powers as to their own
judgment shall appear wise; to whom are entrusted all its foreign
relations; than to that tribunal whose power as well as duty is
confined to the application of the rule which the legislature may
prescribe for it. In such contests a nation may engage itself with the
one party or the other—may observe absolute neutrality—may
recognize the new state absolutely—or may make a limited
recognition of it. The proceeding in courts must depend so entirely on
the course of the government, that it is difficult to give a precise
answer to questions which do not refer to a particular nation. It may
be said, generally, that if the government remains neutral, and
recognizes the existence of a civil war, its courts cannot consider as
criminal those acts of hostility which war authorizes, and which the
new government may direct against its enemy. To decide otherwise,
would be to determine that the war prosecuted by one of the parties
was unlawful, and would be to arrange the nation to which the court
belongs against that party. This would transcend the limits prescribed
to the judicial department.72

Similarly, in Rose v. Himely, Marshall wrote for the
Court: “It is for governments to decide whether they will consider
St. Domingo as an independent nation, and until such decision
shall be made, or France shall relinquish her claim, courts of
justice must consider the ancient state of things as remaining

71
72

United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634–35 (1818).
Id.
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unaltered . . . .”73 Notably, none of these cases involved a question
of executive or congressional authority under the Constitution or
a statute, and thus they did not involve pure questions of
interpretation of legal texts as emphasized in Zivotofsky.74
The historical litigation most similar to potential modern
war powers litigation is The Prize Cases, decided in 1863. The
issue was whether President Lincoln’s naval blockade of the
South during the Civil War was unconstitutional as beyond
presidential power.75 Despite the wartime setting, the Court
decided the case on the merits. As a co-author and I previously
described it:
The most immediately striking aspect of the Prize Cases is that the
Court considered a constitutional challenge to the President’s military
actions during wartime and very nearly ruled against the President.
And this attention came despite strong arguments by the President’s
counsel for judicial abstention (including, apparently, the suggestion
that deciding the merits would make the Court “an ally of
the enemy”). . . .
But although the Court made a show of deciding the cases on their
merits, the majority opinion contained language of substantial
deference to the executive. The Court was quite willing to accept the
President’s characterization of the situation as war (even though, at
the time the blockade was proclaimed, shots had been fired only at a
single fort, and no one had been killed by hostile fire). Indeed,
[Justice] Grier [in the majority opinion] asserted that the President’s
determination on this ground was conclusive on the Court . . . .

73 Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 272 (1808). For later cases, see Foster v.
Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829) (“In a controversy between two nations
concerning national boundary . . . the Court [must] conform its decisions to the will of the
legislature . . . .”); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 419–20 (1839)
(finding that the executive determination that Falkland Islands were not part of the
territory of Buenos Aires was conclusive on the judiciary); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 38, 51 (1852) (finding that executive determination regarding status of Texas
after the Texas revolution was conclusive on judiciary); Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.)
635, 635 (1854) (holding that whether the King of Spain had authority to annul land
grants made to Spanish citizens was not a judicial question); and Jones v. United States,
137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (“Who is the sovereign, de jure or de facto, of a territory is not a
judicial, but a political question, the determination of which by the legislative and
executive departments . . . conclusively binds the judges . . . .”). See also Tara Leigh
Grove, The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 1908,
1909–15 (2015) (reviewing cases); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 592 (2007) (“[A]n important branch of [the political question]
doctrine [in the nineteenth century] operated to identify factual questions on which courts
would accept the political branches’ determinations as binding.”).
74 See Grove, supra note 73, at 1918 n.41 (concluding that “the traditional [political
question] doctrine did not encompass constitutional questions (that is, the determination
whether a statute or other governmental action complied with the Constitution)”).
75 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 640–41 (1863).
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On the other hand, notwithstanding the language of deference, on the
crucial question whether the insurrection had progressed to the level
of a full-blown civil war the Court also referred to contemporaneous
recognition of a state of war by foreign nations, the comparatively
amorphous and evolving nature of civil war, the disruption of the
courts, and the commonsense obviousness of its conclusion before
making the point about deference. Indeed, one could easily argue that
the executive deference point . . . was a throwaway claim of little
consequence placed late in the opinion.76

Thus, while the decision can be read to support varying
levels of deference to executive factual determinations, it strongly
supports the basic justiciability of war powers claims. To be sure,
the decision came long after the immediate post-ratification
period, and so may not be strongly indicative of the original view
of the courts’ role in such controversies. But it indicates that, at
least in the nineteenth century, constitutional war powers
questions were not regarded as categorically beyond the reach
of courts.
V. POLICY
The foregoing discussion suggests that Zivotofsky can be
applied to war powers litigation to produce a manageable but not
excessive role for courts. This section briefly considers whether it
should be as a matter of contemporary policy.
To begin, I assume courts—if they reach the merits—might
plausibly find significant instances where congressional approval
of hostilities is constitutionally required. The most obvious
concern is that this conclusion would interfere with national
security by preventing necessary U.S. military action. This
concern might arise from at least three circumstances: (1) courts
might require the president to desist from needed action; (2) the
president might not take action after concluding that Congress
would not approve or when Congress in fact refuses to approve;
and (3) the president might not take action because it appears
Congress would not be able to approve in time to make the
action meaningful.
As to the first category, the president’s most evident recourse
in the event of an adverse judicial decision is not to stop
hostilities, but to gain Congress’s approval. If the military action
is truly necessary, Congress can be expected to approve. If

76 Thomas H. Lee & Michael D. Ramsey, The Story of the Prize Cases: Executive
Action and Judicial Review in Wartime, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 86–87
(Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009).
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Congress does not approve, that at least raises the possibility
that the action is not necessary (so the president’s inability to
pursue it would not be a material downside to adjudication).
Whether Congress is, in the general case, likely to mis-assess the
need for military action seems speculative. The second category
involves similar analysis. The president’s inability to act due to
Congress’s actual or anticipated failure to approve is problematic
only if one thinks Congress is systematically likely to disapprove
military actions the president favors and are needed.77 It is not
clear that is the case. As to the third category, Congress has
shown—for example, in approving the post-9/11 Authorization for
the Use of Military Force (“AUMF”)78—that it can act relatively
quickly. In any event, in the face of a time-sensitive emergency,
the president has the option of acting quickly and seeking
retroactive approval—a course followed by presidents in
various circumstances.79
A related concern is that if courts find an ongoing war
unconstitutional, it may be difficult and dangerous for the United
States to disengage. Of course, Congress can solve the problem by
authorizing the war, but suppose Congress does not approve of
the war. Arguments for finding a political question in the
Vietnam-era cases in part reflect this concern: even if Congress
did not approve the war, the war could not be easily discontinued
at judicial direction.
This concern, while substantial, may be overstated. First,
many conflicts may be relatively easy to discontinue.80 Second,
even without a broad political question doctrine, courts will have
various methods of restraint. For example, the D.C. Circuit in the
Vietnam-era litigation found the war’s initiation to have been
unconstitutional due to lack of congressional authorization, but
refused to order any remedy.81 Third, and perhaps most
importantly, if courts begin more active adjudication of war

77 For example, in 2013 President Obama considered military action against Syria in
response to the Syrian government’s use of chemical weapons against rebel forces.
However, the U.S. Congress appeared unlikely to approve, and the President decided not
to proceed without Congress’s approval. See Ramsey, supra note 40, at 714–15 (discussing
this episode). It is not clear whether this is an example of Congress impeding a needed
military action or constraining an unwise one.
78 The 2001 AUMF was approved on September 18, 2001, seven days after the 9/11
attack. See Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. Law No. 107–40, 115 Stat.
224 (2001).
79 For example, by President Lincoln at the start of the Civil War. See Lee &
Ramsey, supra note 76, at 53.
80 One could easily imagine prompt U.S. disengagement from a conflict such as the
2011 Libya intervention.
81 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
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powers disputes, presidents would be less likely to undertake
substantial
commitments
without
Congress’s
approval.
Relatedly, courts can use situations in which they uphold
presidential action to establish a framework for when Congress’s
approval is required. For example, in The Prize Cases, decided
during the Civil War, the Court upheld the challenged
presidential action (imposing a blockade on the South); the
majority emphasized that the blockade was a defensive response
to hostilities begun by the other side, while noting that the
president could not begin offensive hostilities without Congress’s
approval.82 Similarly, the Second Circuit in the Vietnam-era
cases found that Congress’s approval was required, but that
approval had been given.83
A further potential problem with enhanced adjudication is
that courts, nervous about the downsides discussed above, might
give the president more authority than the Constitution allows,
and thus license greater presidential adventurism by giving it
formal judicial approval. This concern cannot be entirely
discounted, but seems speculative in light of the remedy of
subsequent congressional authorization (that is, in most cases,
courts would be able to ascribe any bad consequences to
Congress’s failure to authorize the military action).
On the other hand, some material advantages seem to arise
from more aggressive war powers adjudication. First, as
discussed above,84 a Zivotofsky-inspired approach seems most
consistent with the judiciary’s original constitutional role.
Marbury—echoing Hamilton’s Federalist No. 78—called for the
judiciary to say what the law is, without exception for
cases affecting foreign affairs or cases that might involve
embarrassment or multifarious pronouncements. 85 The
expansive Baker factors were a modern invention. In the early
post-ratification period86 (and throughout the nineteenth
century87) courts adjudicated the legality of military force
without invoking political question concerns. It is true, of course,
that Marbury acknowledged a category of political questions

82 The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 668–69 (1863); Lee & Ramsey, supra note
76, at 72–78, 85.
83 See, e.g., DaCosta v. Laird, 448 F.2d 1368, 1369–70 (2d Cir. 1971).
84 See supra Part IV.
85 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 321, 329–34.
86 See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 176–79 (1804); RAMSEY, supra
note 55, at 332–33 (listing further examples).
87 See The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 668–69; see also Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13
How.) 115, 115 (1851) (allowing a claim against military officer for seizure of property in
Mexico in connection with war effort despite claims of military necessity).
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outside judicial competence.88 But that category does not extend
to matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation.
Second, enhanced judicial involvement would likely provide
a greater check on the president. Currently it is largely left to
Congress to provide a political check. However, Congress’s
practical ability to check the president in war powers matters
seems open to doubt. Congress may lack the incentives and
political will to contest the president in war powers controversies
except in extreme circumstances. Although one may debate
whether more checks upon the president in war powers are
desirable, they seem consistent with the Constitution’s original
design. Multiple framers argued that the president’s excessive
tendency to war required congressional involvement in the
war-initiation decision.89
Third, modern war powers authority suffers from the
perception that it lacks a rule of law. That is, with regard to any
presidential military action, there is debate in commentary (and
sometimes in Congress) whether it is constitutional, often with
multiple voices claiming the president is acting illegally.90
However, without an authoritative decision maker to resolve
these claims, the law remains unsettled and contested. Even if
(as was likely true in the Vietnam conflict) the president acts
with adequate approval, constitutional questions may cloud his
authority. The president (and the country) likely would have
benefitted from a clear, prompt judicial ruling that the Vietnam
conflict was constitutional.
Finally, the likely result of greater judicial involvement
would be greater cooperation between the president and
Congress in war powers matters. In many modern conflicts in
which congressional approval was not sought, approval likely
would have been forthcoming: the president might choose not to
seek approval because there might seem no immediate gain from
doing so, not because there is a major disagreement between the
president and Congress. It seems plausible, for example, that
Congress would have approved military strikes in Libya, and it

88 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803); see also United States
v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 634–35 (1818) (referring to “questions [that] are
generally rather political than legal in their character”); Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111,
112 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (finding that the president had constitutional power to protect
U.S. citizens abroad, and that whether the use of force was necessary in the particular
circumstances was a matter of executive discretion and thus was a “public political
question” unreviewable under Marbury).
89 See RAMSEY, supra note 55, at 235–37.
90 See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 40.
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seems likely Congress would approve continuing military action
against the Islamic State. In the long term, the president would
be in a stronger position directing a unified rather than a
unilateral military action.
VI. POST-ZIVOTOFSKY WAR POWERS LITIGATION IN THE LOWER
COURTS
This section reviews post-Zivotofsky war powers litigation in
the lower courts, focusing on two leading cases: Jaber v. United
States91 and Smith v. Obama.92 Although both decisions found a
political question barrier to the particular dispute, their
application of Zivotofsky follows the discussion above and
confirms the justiciability of some war powers disputes.
In Jaber, the plaintiffs’ relatives were killed by a U.S. drone
strike in Yemen.93 The relatives were not targets of the strike but
unfortunately were in the vicinity of al Qaeda members who were
targeted. The plaintiffs made various claims under two U.S.
statutes, the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”) and the Torture Victim
Protection Act (“TVPA”), that the strike violated international
law.94 The D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of
the claim on political question grounds, with this assessment
of Zivotofsky:
Zivotofsky confirms no per se rule renders a claim nonjusticiable solely
because it implicates foreign relations. Rather, it recognizes that, in
foreign policy cases, courts must first ascertain if “[t]he federal courts
are . . . being asked to supplant a foreign policy decision of the
political branches with the courts’ own unmoored determination” or,
instead, merely tasked with, for instance, the “familiar judicial
exercise” of determining how a statute should be interpreted or
whether it is constitutional. In the latter case, the claim is justiciable.
Therefore, if the court is called upon to serve as “a forum for
reconsidering the wisdom of discretionary decisions made by the
political branches in the realm of foreign policy or national security[,]”
then the political question doctrine is implicated, and the court
cannot proceed.
Zivotofsky sought only to enforce a statute alleged to directly regulate
the Executive, and the reviewing court needed to determine only “if
Zivotofsky’s interpretation of the statute [was] correct, and whether
the statute [was] constitutional.” The Court was not called upon

861 F.3d 241 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
217 F. Supp. 3d 283 (D.D.C. 2016).
Jaber, 861 F.3d at 243.
94 Id. The plaintiffs did not claim that the strike was unconstitutional, presumably
because they thought the 2001 AUMF had authorized hostilities against al Qaeda
personnel in Yemen.
91
92
93
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to impose its own foreign policy judgment on the political branches,
only to say whether the congressional statute encroached on the
Executive’s constitutional authority. This is the wheelhouse of the
Judiciary, and accordingly, it does not constitute a nonjusticiable
political question. Here, however, Plaintiffs assert claims under the
TVPA and the ATS that would require the Court to second-guess the
wisdom of the Executive’s decision to employ lethal force against a
national security target—to determine, among other things, whether
“an urgent military purpose or other emergency justified” a particular
drone strike. Indeed, Plaintiffs’ request is more analogous to an action
challenging the Secretary of State’s independent refusal to recognize
Israel as the rightful sovereign of the city of Jerusalem, a decision
clearly committed to executive discretion.95

This assessment seems correct and consistent with some
justiciability of war powers claims. The key is the court’s
characterization of the claims as “requir[ing] the Court to
second-guess the wisdom of the Executive’s decision to employ
lethal force against a national security target—to determine,
among other things, whether an ‘urgent military purpose or
other emergency justified’ a particular drone strike.”96 This
situation-specific analysis, which does seem to render
justiciability problematic even under a broad view of Zivotofsky,
would not be present in the more typical constitutional dispute
over presidential war initiation. Where the question is simply
whether the president has independent constitutional authority
to act in response to a set of undisputed events, the situation is
analogous to the one described by the court as justiciable: where
the court is “tasked with, for instance, the ‘familiar judicial
exercise’ of determining how a statute should be interpreted or
whether it is constitutional.”97 In the war powers situation,
typically the court would be assessing whether an executive
action (rather than a statute) is unconstitutional, but that should
not be a material distinction in many cases. As in Zivotofsky (and
in contrast to Jaber), the question for the court would be which
branch has decision-making authority under the Constitution,
not what decision should be made.
Smith v. Obama involved a service member’s constitutional
challenge to the president’s use of force against the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria.98 The central claim was that neither the 2001
AUMF nor the 2002 authorization of the action against Saddam
Hussein in Iraq provided congressional authorization for military
95
96
97
98

Id. at 248–49 (citations omitted).
Id. at 249 (citation omitted).
Id. at 248 (quoting Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 196 (2012)).
See Smith v. Obama, 217 F. Supp. 3d 283, 284 (D.D.C. 2016).
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action against the Islamic State.99 The district court dismissed
the claim on political question grounds after a careful assessment
of Zivotofsky.100 Acknowledging that not all questions relating to
war are nonjusticiable, the court stated:
[T]he Court begins by clarifying the precise questions posed by
Plaintiff’s claims. Plaintiff’s claims are premised on the notion that
Congress has not previously authorized the use of force against [the
Islamic State]. Defendant disputes this. Resolving this dispute would
require the Court to determine whether the legal authorizations for
the use of military force relied on by President Obama—the 2001 and
2002 AUMFs—in fact authorize the use of force against [the Islamic
State]. With regard to the 2001 AUMF, the Court would have to
determine whether the President is correct that [the Islamic State] is
among “those nations, organizations, or persons” that “planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons,” and
that Operation Inherent Resolve represents “necessary and
appropriate force” against that group. With regard to the 2002 AUMF,
the Court would have to determine whether the President is correct
that operations against [the Islamic State] are “necessary and
appropriate in order to . . . defend the national security of the United
States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq.” For the reasons
set out below, the Court finds that these are political questions under
the first two Baker factors: the issues raised are primarily ones
committed to the political branches of government, and the Court
lacks judicially manageable standards, and is otherwise ill-equipped,
to resolve them.101

The court then elaborated:
Plaintiff’s attempts to analogize his case to Zivotofsky are strained.
Although, as in Zivotofsky, statutes are involved in this case—in
particular, the War Powers Resolution, the 2001 AUMF and the 2002
AUMF—this case does not present nearly the same fundamental legal
issues as were at issue in Zivotofsky. The questions posed in this case
go significantly beyond interpreting statutes and determining whether

99 See Charlie Savage, An Army Captain Takes Obama to Court Over ISIS Fight,
N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/us/islamic-state-warpowers-lawsuit-obama.html?mcubz=0; Bruce Ackerman, Is America’s War on ISIS
Illegal?, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/05/opinion/isamericas-war-on-isis-illegal.html?mcubz=0. The statutes, rather than independent
presidential power, were the president’s principal bases for authority to take military
action against the Islamic State. See Ramsey, supra note 40, at 710–11.
100 See Smith, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 297. The court also found that Smith lacked
standing as an independent ground for dismissal. Id. at 285. The case is currently on
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, where the standing issue has taken a
central role after the plaintiff’s departure from active service in the military. See Brief for
Appellee at 17–25, Smith v. Obama (No. 16-5377), https://www.scribd.com/document/
351181196/DOJ-Response-to-Nathan-Michael-Smith-Appeal [http://perma.cc/3G5S-LSDK].
101 Smith, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 298 (citations omitted).
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they are constitutional. Plaintiff asks the Court to second-guess the
Executive’s application of these statutes to specific facts on the ground
in an ongoing combat mission halfway around the world. For example,
the Court is not asked simply to “interpret” the 2001 AUMF, or to
determine its constitutionality. It is asked to determine whether the
President is correct that [the Islamic State], as it exists today, is an
appropriate target under that resolution based on the nature and
extent of [the Islamic State]’s relationship and connections with the
terrorist organization that the President has determined was
responsible for the September 11, 2001 attacks. The Court would also
have to go further than simply “interpreting” the 2002 AUMF. It
would have to determine whether the President is correct that the
ongoing military action against [the Islamic State] is in fact
“necessary and appropriate in order to . . . defend the national
security of the United States against the continuing threat posed
by Iraq.”
The reality, then, is more nuanced than Plaintiff suggests. Plaintiff’s
claims raise mixed questions of both discretionary military
judgment and statutory interpretation. The Court does not read
Zivotofsky as foreclosing the application of the political question
doctrine under this scenario.102

Again, the court’s emphasis is on the claim involving “mixed
questions of both discretionary military judgment and statutory
interpretation.”103 As discussed above, one can imagine many
situations in which war-initiation disputes are such mixed
questions; but one can also imagine many situations in which
such disputes are not mixed questions and involve only questions
of constitutional interpretation. Consistent with Zivotofsky, the
Smith court’s analysis suggests that the latter disputes might
be justiciable.
The court then focused on the key Zivotofsky factors: textual
commitment and judicially manageable standards:
First, certain aspects of the questions posed by this case are
indisputably and completely committed to the political branches of
government. Both the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs authorize only that force
that the President determines is “necessary and appropriate.” The
necessity and appropriateness of military action is precisely the type
of discretionary military determination that is committed to the
political branches and which the Court has no judicially manageable
standards to adjudicate.
Second, . . . [b]ased on the pleadings thus far alone, the Court can
easily discern that this case raises factual questions that are not of a
type the Court is equipped to handle with traditional judicially

102
103

Id. at 299–300 (citations omitted).
Id. at 300.
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manageable standards. The President and Department of Defense
officials apparently believe that [the Islamic State] is connected with
al Qaeda and that, despite public rifts, some allegiances between the
groups persist and [the Islamic State] continues to pursue the same
mission today as it did before allegedly splintering from al Qaeda.
Plaintiff disputes these factual assertions, relying on an affidavit from
scholars of Islamic Law that argue that as of today, the groups are in
fact sufficiently distinct, and potentially even antagonistic, that they
can no longer be viewed as the same terrorist organization. Resolving
this dispute would require inquiries into sensitive military
determinations, presumably made based on intelligence collected on
the ground in a live theatre of combat, and potentially changing and
developing on an ongoing basis. See Al–Aulaqi v. Obama, 727
F.Supp.2d 1, 45 (D.D.C. 2010) (“The difficulty that U.S. courts would
encounter if they were tasked with ‘ascertaining the ‘facts’ of military
decisions exercised thousands of miles from the forum, lies at the
heart of the determination whether the question [posed] is a
‘political’ one.’”) (quoting DaCosta v. Laird, 471 F.2d 1146, 1148
(2d Cir. 1973)).104

Thus, if a war powers claim did not involve such factual
determinations (and some plausibly might not), this reasoning
suggests that the claim would be justiciable.105 As a result, the

Id. at 300–01 (some citations omitted).
The court added a further consideration that might pose a broader barrier to
war powers litigation, but that also seems unsupported by either Zivotofsky or
the Constitution:
Finally, an additional factor makes judicial intervention particularly
inappropriate on the specific facts of this case. Unlike the situation presented
in Zivotofsky, the Court in this case is not presented with a dispute between
the two political branches regarding the challenged action. In fact, Congress
has repeatedly provided funding for the effort against [the Islamic State]. For
example, on November 10, 2014, President Obama sent a letter to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives requesting that Congress consider proposed
amendments to the 2015 Budget to provide funding for Operation Inherent
Resolve. The letter explained that “[t]hese amendments would provide $5.6
billion for OCO activities to degrade and ultimately defeat the Islamic State of
Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)—including military operations as part of Operation
Inherent Resolve.” President Obama also attached a letter from the Director of
the Office of Management and Budget, which explained in some detail the
military operations that the additional budget would be used to fund. In
December 2014, Congress passed the Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Acts of 2015, in which it appropriated the funds the President
had sought. . . .
The Congressional budget activity cited above by Defendant, and relied on by
the Court, demonstrates that the Court can discern no impasse or conflict
between the political branches on the question of whether [the Islamic State] is
an appropriate target under the AUMFs cited by the President as authority for
Operation Inherent Resolve.
This lack of conflict is relevant to the justiciability of Plaintiff's claims under
the political question doctrine because judicial intervention into military
affairs is particularly inappropriate when the two political branches to whom
104
105
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leading post-Zivotofsky war powers cases indicate that not all
war powers questions are political questions even though some of
them are.
CONCLUSION
In sum, a post-Zivotofsky analysis in separation of powers
cases implies a distinction between, on the one hand, cases that
involve legal interpretation, resting on traditional textual and
historical materials, and on the other hand, cases that involve
disputed facts, policies or characterizations. Applied to war
powers litigation, this distinction seems both manageable and
useful; it suggests that some war powers disputes are justiciable
while others are not. More generally, the viability of Zivotofskyinspired analysis in the especially difficult area of war powers
suggests its broad potential for lasting influence in separation of
powers and foreign affairs disputes.

war-making powers are committed are not in dispute as to the military action
at issue.
Id. at 301–02 (footnotes and citations omitted). For this conclusion, the court cited only
pre-Zivotofsky cases and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Zivotofsky. Id. at 302–03.
Although it is true that Zivotofsky involved a conflict between Congress and the president,
the majority opinion did not suggest that such a conflict was essential to its finding of
justiciability (and no other Justice joined Justice Sotomayor’s suggestion that it should
be). Further, as the Court has emphasized elsewhere, the structural provisions of the
Constitution exist not merely to protect the powers of particular branches of government,
but principally to protect individual liberty by assuring checked and divided powers
among all the branches. See Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 223 (2011).
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Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power
John Yoo
Along with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln,
Franklin D. Roosevelt is considered by most scholars to be one of
our nation’s greatest presidents. FDR confronted challenges
simultaneously that his predecessors had faced individually.
Washington guided the nation’s founding when doubts arose as
to whether Americans could establish an effective government.
FDR radically re-engineered the government into the modern
administrative state when Americans doubted whether their
government could provide them with economic security. Lincoln
saved the country from the greatest threat to its national
security, leading it through a war that cost more American lives
than any other. FDR led a reluctant nation against perhaps its
most dangerous foreign foe—an alliance of fascist powers that
threatened to place Europe and Asia under totalitarian
dictatorships. To bring the nation through both crises, FDR drew
deeply upon the reservoir of executive power unlike any
president before or since—reflected in his unique status as the
only chief executive to break the two-term tradition.1

 Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute. Thanks to Jeffrey Senning for outstanding research assistance.
1 There are a great number of works on Roosevelt, with more appearing all the
time. I have relied on general works for the background to this chapter. See generally
JOHN YOO & JULIAN KU, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2012); CONRAD BACK, FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM (2003); 1 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT:
THE LION AND THE FOX 1882–1940 (1956); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT:
SOLDIER OF FREEDOM (1970); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE BECKONING OF DESTINY 1882–
1928 (2004); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY
(1991); GEORGE MCJIMSEY, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT (2000); 1
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 1919–1933 (1957); ARTHUR
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 1933–1935
(1958); 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF
UPHEAVAL (1960); GEOFFREY C. WARD, A FIRST-CLASS TEMPERAMENT: THE EMERGENCE
OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT (1989). Similarly, there are a multitude of works on the New
Deal. Some that have been particularly helpful are ALAN BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST:
HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN, & THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1983); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE
END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1996); BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
(1998); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR, 1929–1945 (1999); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AND THE NEW DEAL 1932–1940 (1963); SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE
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FDR came to office in the midst of the gravest challenges to
the nation since the Civil War. The most obvious and immediate
crisis was the Great Depression. FDR placed the president in the
role of a legislative leader and produced a dramatic restructuring
of the national government, even though the Depression, as a
breakdown of the domestic (and global) economy, fell within the
constitutional authority of Congress. Large Democratic majorities
in Congress expanded federal regulation of the economy beyond
anything before seen in peacetime. Regulation of prices and
supply, product quality, wages and working conditions, the
securities markets, and pensions became commonplace where they
had once been rare. Social Security was not just one of the
New Deal’s most important planks, but an expression of the
whole platform.
The federal government would declare responsibility to
coordinate and regulate economic activity to provide stability. It
had always exercised broad economic powers during wartime, but
FDR made management of the economy by a bureaucracy of
experts a permanent feature of American life. While the
Republican presidents who had dominated elections since the
Civil War had left economic decisions to the market, FDR pushed
the federal government to provide for economic as well as
national security.
FDR’s revolution radically shifted the balance of power
among the three branches of government, as well as between the
nation and the states. Under the New Deal, Congress delegated
to the executive branch the discretion to make the many
decisions necessary to regulate the economy. Congress did not
have the time, organization, or expertise to make the minute
decisions required. The New Deal did not just produce a federal
government of broad power—it gave birth to a president whose
influence over domestic affairs would expand to match his role in
foreign affairs. When the Supreme Court stood in the way of the
new administrative state, FDR launched a campaign to increase
the membership of the Court to change the meaning of the
Constitution. When political parties challenged the New Deal,
FDR concentrated power in the executive branch, which
undermined their ability to channel benefits to their members.
The New Deal produced a presidency that was more
institutionally independent of Congress and more politically free
of the parties than ever before.2
PARTIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL
(1993); and G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000).
2 See, e.g., MILKIS, supra note 1, at 98–124; THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL
PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985).
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The Great Depression spawned foreign threats, too.
Economic instability in Europe set the conditions for the rise of
fascism first in Italy, then in Germany and Japan. Roosevelt
realized early that American interests would be best served by
supporting the democracies against the Axis powers, but he was
confronted by a nation wary of another foreign war and a
Congress determined to impose strict neutrality. FDR used every
last inch of presidential power to bring the nation into the war on
the side of the Allies, including secretly coordinating military
activities with Britain, attempting to force an incident with
Germany in the North Atlantic, and pressuring Japan until it
lashed out in the Pacific. FDR’s steady leadership in the face of
stiff congressional resistance stands as one of the greatest
examples of presidential leadership in the last century, one that
redounded to the benefit of the United States and the free world.
This Article will review FDR’s approach to executive power
by examining three dimensions of his presidency: domestic
policy, foreign policy, and civil liberties in wartime. First, it will
examine FDR’s expansion of presidential power by leading
Congress, in the throes of the Great Depression, to create a vast
administrative state. He followed with a claim of presidential
independence in interpreting the Constitution, which he enforced
with a Court-packing plan that eventually forced the Justices to
agree. As the administrative state grew in leaps and bounds,
FDR expanded the power of the White House in a failing effort to
maintain centralized, rational control of the bureaucracy. Second,
it will examine FDR’s aggressive use of executive authority to
face the rise of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. FDR
stretched existing laws barring U.S. involvement in World War II
to the breaking point, and then went even further with claims of
sole executive power to assist the Allies. Third, this Article will
examine FDR’s attitude toward civil liberties in wartime by
focusing on three decisions: the use of military commissions to try
Nazi saboteurs, the internment of Japanese-American citizens,
and the widespread interception of electronic communications.
FDR had a vision of the office in keeping with his great
predecessors, Washington and Jefferson. He took full advantage
of the independence of the presidency and vigorously exercised
its constitutional authorities. In order to respond to crises, both
in peace and war, he contested the Constitution’s meaning with
the other branches of government. He challenged the Supreme
Court’s effort to stop the New Deal with his Court-packing plan.
To meet the rise of Germany and Japan, he relied on a robust
reading of the Commander-in-Chief power—even if it meant
ignoring the Neutrality Acts—to bring the United States into the
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war. FDR understood Berlin and Tokyo’s existential threat. He
would set the example for the Cold War presidents to follow in
both managing the vast regulatory state at home and meeting
the challenges of dire threats abroad.
I. THE NEW DEAL AND THE COURTS
FDR entered office in the midst of the worst economic
contraction in American history. Between the summer of 1929
and the spring of 1933, nominal gross national product dropped
by fifty percent.3 Prices for all goods fell by about a third; income
from agriculture collapsed from $6 billion to $2 billion; industrial
production declined by thirty-seven percent;4 and business
investment plummeted from $24 billion to $3 billion. About onequarter of the workforce, thirteen million Americans, remained
consistently unemployed, and the unemployment rate would
remain above fifteen percent for the rest of the decade.5 More
than 5000 banks failed, with a loss of $7 billion in deposits.6
From the time of the crash in October 1929 to its low in
July 1932, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than
seventy-five percent.7 It was not a problem caused by famine or
drought, dwindling natural resources, or crippled production;
crops spoiled and livestock were destroyed because market prices
were too low.
Americans were losing faith in their political institutions to
solve the crisis. Though the causes of the Depression were
complex, some (FDR included) blamed “economic royalists,”
financiers and speculators, and the rich. Economists and
historians have argued ever since over the causes of the
Depression. Little evidence seems to support the claim that the
stock market crash triggered the Depression—stock markets
have sharply declined since then, most recently in 1987, with no
underlying change in economic growth.
3 See MILTON
THE UNITED STATES

FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
1867–1960, at 299–301 (1963).

Id. at 301.
Id.
Id. at 317, 330.
7 To understand the economics of the Great Depression and the New Deal, see 1
ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913–1951 (2003); Peter
Temin, The Great Depression, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 301 (Stanley Engerman & Robert Gallman, eds., 2000); THOMAS E. HALL & J.
DAVID FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER OF PERVERSE
ECONOMIC POLICIES (1998); RICHARD K. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK:
UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (N.Y. Univ. Press
rev. ed. 1997); BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE
GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919–1939 (1995); and FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 299–
301. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (2d ed. 1988), remains a classic
treatment, but one that has been surpassed by more recent work.
4
5
6
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In their classic Monetary History of the United States, Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued that a normal recession
deepened into the Great Depression because the Federal Reserve
mistakenly responded to the banking panic by restricting the
money supply.8 A deflation in prices followed, which led to a
steep drop in economic activity. Ben Bernanke, the current
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, elaborated on this theme by
arguing that the Fed’s deflationary banking policies tightened
the credit available to businesses and households, further
suppressing economic activity.9 Others argue that the Great
Depression must be understood within the context of the
international economy, which witnessed bank failures and
recession in Germany and France, defaults on World War I loan
and reparation payments, abandonment of the gold standard,
and the dumping of agricultural products on world markets.
While our understanding of the Great Depression has
improved thanks to the scholarship of the last forty years, a clear
consensus of its causes has yet to emerge. Unsurprisingly then,
to the Americans who lived through it, the collapse of the
economy was bewildering, confusing, and without precedent. The
Hoover administration’s policies did not help and might have
made matters even worse. As historians have realized, Hoover
did not adopt the aloof, hands-off attitude that his political
opponents charged. During his administration, Congress doubled
public works spending, and the federal budget deficit rose to $2.7
billion, at that time the largest in American peacetime history.
He pressed business executives to maintain employment and
wages, and experimented with policies, such as the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation’s emergency loans to businesses, which
would set important examples for the New Dealers.10
But Hoover’s initiatives were mere stopgaps that were
swamped by other policy mistakes. Though he had initially asked
for tariff reductions, Hoover signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley
Act, which raised rates and killed international trade flows.
Following the conventional economic wisdom of the day, Hoover
sought to balance the budget with tax increases at a time when
the economy needed fiscal stimulus. As Milton Friedman and
Allan Meltzer have separately argued, the Federal Reserve
pursued a deflationary strategy, cutting off the economy’s
oxygen, when increases in the money supply were called for.11
8
9
10
11

at 271.

FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 240–42.
BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 51 (2000).
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 164–65.
See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 299–301; MELTZER, supra note 7,
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Some of Hoover’s failure stems from his vision of the
presidency. As president, he refused to assume the role of
legislative leader, resisted the expansion of the federal agencies,
and opposed national welfare legislation—all on constitutional
grounds.12 FDR’s vision of the office could not have created a
sharper contrast. FDR led the nation through a frenzy of
experimentation in policies and government structure without
parallel in American history. There appeared to be no
comprehensive philosophy behind the New Deal, which comes as
little surprise, given the confusion that prevailed at the time over
the causes of the Depression.
Without any true understanding of the reasons for the
collapse, the New Dealers tried anything and everything.
Thinking that overproduction was the culprit, some
recommended the cartelization of industries to reduce supply and
increase prices. Others who blamed under-consumption
advocated public jobs programs and welfare relief. Some believed
that the budget deficit was the problem, and urged an increase in
taxes and cuts in spending. Some thought international trade
was a cause, and advocated both more flexibility in trade
negotiations and the dumping of excess agricultural production
overseas. Pragmatic and political (he had been a professional
politician for most of his life), and unsure about the true causes
of the Depression, Roosevelt flittered from idea to idea. Some had
the effect of canceling each other out—public works projects
sponsored by the National Recovery Administration had to buy
raw materials at prices inflated by controls imposed by the
Department of Agriculture.
Throughout all the experimentation and expansion of
government, the one thing that did not change was the focus on
the presidency. FDR became the father of the modern presidency
by moving the chief executive to the center of the American
political universe. FDR drafted the executive’s wartime powers
into peacetime service, but without calling for any formal change
in the Constitution. In his First Inaugural Address, he declared
that “our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is
possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in
emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form.”13
What FDR wanted was access to the constitutional powers
granted to the president during time of emergency. He promised
12 Ellis W. Hawley, The Constitution of the Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt
Presidency During the Depression Era, 1930–1939, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 83, 90–91 (Martin Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991).
13 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1938).
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to seek from Congress “broad executive power to wage a war
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given
me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”14 FDR’s expansion
of the powers of the presidency, both political and constitutional,
would grow from this basic theme—the economy and society
would henceforth be regulated in ways that were once considered
suitable only for war.
The nation got a taste of what FDR meant when, on his
second day in office, he issued the second emergency
proclamation in American history. During the period between
FDR’s election and his inauguration, a massive run on banks had
forced many to close their doors or stop lending. Invoking the
Trading with the Enemy Act,15 FDR imposed a national banking
holiday and prohibited all gold transactions.16 Roosevelt’s use of
the Act was questionable, to say the least. Congress had passed
the Act in 1917 to give the president broad economic powers
during wartime or national emergency, but not to regulate the
domestic economy in the absence of a foreign threat. Without the
statute, FDR was left to act under an unspecified presidential
emergency power. At the end of the banking moratorium,
Congress convened in special session and passed the Emergency
Banking Act, which gave the federal government powers to
control gold and currency transactions, to own stock in banks,
and to regulate the re-opening of the banks.17 Because the
Roosevelt administration had only finished drafting the
legislation the night before, a rolled-up newspaper substituted as
a prop for an actual copy of the bill’s text, and the House spent
only thirty minutes discussing the legislation.
Roosevelt set a precedent for his successors by rushing a
torrent of legislation through Congress in his first 100 days. The
National Industrial Recovery Act (“NRA”), the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (“AAA”), the Emergency Banking Act, the
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act (“ERTA”), and the Home
Owners Loan Act (“HOLA”) all granted FDR extraordinary
economic powers to fight the Depression. Their enactment
signaled the breakdown of the previously sharp distinction
between the executive and legislative branches. The executive
branch took the primary responsibility for drafting bills,
Congress passed them quickly with minimum deliberation

Id.
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §5 (2000).
Robert Jabaily, Bank Holiday of 1933, F EDERAL R ESERVE H ISTORY
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bank_holiday_of_1933
[http://perma.cc/PQN4-UDFU].
17 Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933, Pub. L. 1, 48 Stat. 1.
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(sometimes sight unseen), and the laws themselves delegated
broad authority to the president or the administrative agencies.18
Through the agencies, the executive branch would impose an
unprecedented level of centralized planning over the peacetime
economy. The AAA, for example, gave the executive the power to
dictate which crops were to be planted.19 Under the NRA,
agencies enacted industry-wide codes of conduct, usually drafted
by the industries themselves, to govern production and
employment.20 New Dealers sought to address falling prices for
commodities by setting higher prices, reducing competition, and
limiting production.21
Little attention was given to constitutional problems with
the legislation, which threatened to exceed the Supreme Court’s
limitations on federal power. Laws like the NRA or the AAA
pressed the Constitution’s grant of authority to Congress to make
laws “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”22
Other laws, such as the new public employment and
unemployment relief programs, raised constitutional issues
about the national government’s taxing and spending authority,
but again these were only problems of federalism, not of
presidential power. They mirrored the steps that the national
government had taken to mobilize the economy for military
production while reducing domestic consumption—many of the
early programs of the New Deal were modeled on World War I
efforts. As William Leuchtenburg has observed, war became a
metaphor for the calamity brought on by the Depression, and
FDR and his advisers turned to their wartime experience for
solutions.23 “Almost every New Deal act or agency derived, to
some extent, from the experience of World War I.”24
FDR’s legislative whirlwind set in motion a series of events
that culminated in confrontation with the Supreme Court. Even
though
the
President
would
suffer
politically
and
constitutionally, he would eventually prevail. The roots of the
conflict stretched back to the Progressive Era, when the Justices
held that the Interstate Commerce Clause did not allow
regulation of manufacturing or agriculture within a state. Under
the theory of dual federalism, the Court blocked antitrust

HAWLEY, supra note 12, at 92.
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. ch. 26, § 601 et seq.
HALL & FERGUSON, supra note 7, at 124.
21 Id. at 124–26.
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
23 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND HIS LEGACY
41–53 (1995).
24 Id. at 53.
18
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enforcement against a sugar-refining monopoly in 1895 because
the refining itself did not cross interstate lines.25 In 1918, it held
unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited the interstate
transportation of goods made with child labor.26 Even though the
federal ban applied only when the product moved across state
lines, the Court held that “the production of articles, intended for
interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation.”27 When
Congress attacked child labor again with a ten percent excise tax,
the Court blocked that too, on the ground that Congress could not
use a tax to achieve a prohibited end.28
The Court matched its limits on federal authority to regulate
the economy with similar restrictions on the states. Where
Congress could only exercise the powers carefully enumerated in
Article I, states enjoyed a general “police power” over all conduct
within their borders. The courts, however, read the Fourteenth
Amendment—which forbids states from depriving individuals of
life, liberty, or property without due process29—to block a great
deal of state business regulation. In Lochner v. New York, the
Court struck down a state law that prohibited bakers from
working more than sixty hours a week or ten hours per day.30
According to the majority, the Constitution protected the bakers’
individual right to contract to work as much as they liked.31 The
state could not adopt economic legislation to redistribute income
within the industry (the law favored established bakeries at the
expense of immigrant bakers), or infringe the rights of free
labor.32 In dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously
accused the majority of following its preferences rather than the
law.33 “[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire,”
Holmes memorably wrote.34 “The Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”35 From the time
of Lochner to the New Deal, the Court invalidated 184 state laws
governing working hours and wages, organized labor, commodity
prices, and entry into business.36

See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1895).
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
27 Id. at 272, 276.
28 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 35–36, 43–44 (1922).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
31 Id. at 64.
32 Id. at 62.
33 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 271, 311 (1932) (striking
down a state legislative bar requiring a demonstration of necessity for licensing and
25
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Legislation enacted during FDR’s first 100 days in office
virtually dared the Justices to block the New Deal. The NRA did
not just attempt to ban a single product or manufacturing
process—it placed all industrial production in the nation under
federal regulation. The AAA did the same with agriculture, and
another law with coal mining. Laws passed later in FDR’s term,
such as the National Labor Relations Act and the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, set nationwide rules on unions and
utilities, while the Social Security Act created a universal system
of unemployment compensation and old age pension.37
FDR was following in the footsteps of presidents who dared
to interpret the Constitution at odds with the other branches.
FDR himself appeared to have held few constitutional doubts.
New Deal theorists believed, for example, that the Interstate
Commerce Clause pertained to almost all economic activity in the
nation because all goods manufactured or grown within a state
traveled through the channels of interstate commerce to reach
the market.38 While the federal government might usually defer
to the states on many matters, the Depression was so grave that
the states were powerless to control a nationwide problem.
Roosevelt recognized early on that his program risked
antagonizing the federal courts, which were filled with
Republican judges.39 He could count on the opposition of Justices
James McReynolds, Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland,
and Pierce Butler, known as “The Four Horsemen,”40 for their
skepticism toward government regulation of the economy and
their defense of individual economic rights. But FDR believed he
could expect the general support of progressives Justices Louis
Brandeis, Harlan Fiske Stone, and Benjamin Cardozo. Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts held
the swing votes. FDR hoped that the Court would grant the
political branches more constitutional leeway to respond to the

business entry); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (finding
legislature may not authorize state agencies to set gasoline prices sold in the state);
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1923) (finding state mandated minimum
wages, for women and children, interfered with an individual’s constitutional liberty to
contract); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (holding a federal labor law
prohibiting employee termination or discrimination based on labor organization
membership unconstitutional); JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – CASES,
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 292 (9th ed. 2001).
37 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935); Public Utility Holding
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 (1935).
38 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946, 59
HARV. L. REV. 645, 683 (1946).
39 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 83–84 (1995).
40 Id. at 3.
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national crisis of the Great Depression. In previous national
security emergencies, the courts had allowed the federal
government to mobilize the economy with little objection. FDR
had reason for these hopes in early 1934, after 5–4 majorities of
the Court upheld state laws setting milk prices and delaying
mortgage payments.41
Those hopes were dashed with the opening of the Court’s
business in January 1935. In its first case examining a New Deal
law, an 8–1 majority of the Court invalidated the NRA’s “hot oil”
provision, which allowed the executive branch to prohibit the
interstate transportation of petroleum produced in violation of
quotas.42 Chief Justice Hughes wrote that the provision
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the president.43
That decision was only a preview to May 27, 1935—known as
“Black Monday” to New Dealers44—when the Court struck down
three New Deal laws. The centerpiece was the Court’s
unanimous rejection of the NRA in the “Sick Chicken” case,
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, in which the owners of
a chicken slaughterhouse were prosecuted for violating industrial
codes of conduct.45
In finding the NRA unconstitutional, the Justices threatened
the two core features of the New Deal. Schechter Poultry held
that the Constitution prohibited Congress from delegating
legislative power to the president, especially when rulemaking
authority was then sub-delegated to private industry groups.46
The NRA also violated the Constitution’s limits on the reach of
federal economic power.47 The owners of the slaughterhouse sold
their chickens into a local market, which did not directly impact
interstate commerce, even though a high percentage of chickens
came from out of state. If the Court were to keep to its precedent
that intra-state manufacturing and agriculture lay outside
federal authority, more pillars of the New Deal—perhaps even
the whole program itself—might collapse. In pointed language,
the Court specifically rejected the Roosevelt administration’s
overarching approach to the Great Depression: “Extraordinary
conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.”48

41 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425–28 (1934); see also
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
42 Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405, 433 (1935).
43 Id. at 431–33.
44 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 39, at 89.
45 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 508 (1935).
46 Id. at 550.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 528.
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FDR responded with a political attack on the Court. In a
ninety-minute press conference, the President declared Schechter
Poultry to be the most significant judicial decision since Dred
Scott.49 While critical of the Court’s ruling on executive power, he
believed that those problems could be fixed by re-writing the
statutes to give more direction and less delegation.50 It was
Schechter’s narrow view of the Commerce Clause that posed the
real threat to the New Deal. If Congress could not regulate the
activities of the butchers because they were local in nature, it
would be unable to police most other manufacturing or
agricultural enterprises. “The whole tendency over these years
has been to view the interstate commerce clause in the light of
present-day civilization,” Roosevelt told the press. “We are
interdependent—we are tied together.”51 To Roosevelt, the Justices’
way of thinking failed to take account of the national character of
the economy. “We have been relegated to a horse-and-buggy
definition of interstate commerce.”52
FDR considered a variety of proposals if the Court were to
continue ruling against the New Deal: increasing the number of
Justices (giving the president enough new appointments to
change the balance on the Court), reducing the Court’s
jurisdiction, or requiring a supermajority of Justices to declare a
federal law unconstitutional. He rejected them all as premature,
but he had been prepared to respond to a potential rejection of
the prohibition on gold transactions with a declaration of a
national emergency, a fixed price for gold, and an attack on the
Court for “imperil[ing] the economic and political security of this
nation.”53 But the Court upheld the gold regulations, causing
Roosevelt to shelve his plans.54
The administration continued to work with Congress to
expand federal intervention in the economy. Known as the
Second New Deal, these laws went beyond the simple, sweeping
delegations of authority to the president in the NRA or the AAA.
New laws such as the National Labor Relations Act and the
Social Security Act created specialized bureaucracies to handle
discrete areas of economic regulation. While the First New Deal
vested the president with emergency powers to handle the
Depression, the Second New Deal of 1935–1936 promised
49
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permanent government intervention in the economy. One of
FDR’s political achievements was to transform the social contract
so that government benefits became understood as rights—rights
just as real to many Americans as those in the Constitution
itself. But they did nothing to avoid the constitutional problems
of the First New Deal: Their very success depended on their
ability to regulate all economic activity, rather than just trade
that crossed interstate borders.
The Court, however, stuck to its guns. Rather than cower
before this second outburst of lawmaking, in the spring of 1936,
it declared unconstitutional more elements of the New Deal. In
United States v. Butler, the Court held unconstitutional the
AAA’s use of taxes and grants to regulate agricultural
production, which lay within the reserved powers of the states.55
Butler threatened the Social Security Act, which used a
combination of taxes and spending to provide relief and pensions
to the unemployed and elderly.
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., a 5–4 majority struck down a
1935 law that set prices, wages, hours, and collective bargaining
rules for the coal industry.56 The Court found that the production
of coal did not amount to interstate commerce, but instead fell
within the reserved powers of the states.57 “[T]he effect of the
labor provisions . . . primarily falls upon production and not upon
commerce,” Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority.58
“Production is a purely local activity.”59 Carter made clear that
the sick chicken case was not a fluke; any federal regulation of
intra-state industrial production or agriculture was now in
constitutional doubt. In Jones v. SEC, the Justices attacked the
proceedings of the Securities and Exchange Commission as
“odious” and “pernicious” and compared it to the “intolerable
abuses of the Star Chamber.”60 Morehead v. Tipaldo held that
New York’s minimum wage law violated the Due Process Clause,
just as it had earlier found that such laws interfered with the
right to contract.61 As the Court had already found a federal
minimum wage in the District of Columbia unconstitutional
in the 1920s, it had made the regulation of wages, in FDR’s
words, a “no-man’s land” forbidden to both the federal and
state governments.
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In the space of just two years, the Court had ripped apart the
central features of the First New Deal and was promising the
same for the Second. Roosevelt stopped discussing the Court’s
decisions publicly and did not make any proposals about the
Court during his re-election campaign. He attacked business and
the rich as “economic royalists” and the “privileged princes of
these new economic dynasties.”62 Roosevelt proposed a new
economic order that would provide stability and security through
new forms of government-provided rights. FDR reconceived
rights from the negative—preventing the state from intruding on
an individual liberty—to the positive—a minimum wage, the
right to organize, national working standards, and old-age
pensions. Running against the lackluster Republican Alf Landon,
FDR secured one of the great electoral victories in American
history: 523 electoral votes to Landon’s eight (the largest
advantage ever recorded in a contested two-party election in
American history), every state but Maine and Vermont, more
than sixty percent of the popular vote, and a Democratic
Congress with two-thirds majorities in both Houses, including
seventy-five of the ninety-six seats in the Senate.63 Observers
could legitimately question whether the Republican Party would
shortly disappear as a political force.
Fresh off his victory, FDR proposed a restructuring of the
Court that would eliminate it as an opponent of the New Deal.
On February 5, 1937, he sent Congress a judiciary “reform” bill
that would add a new Justice to the Court for every one over the
age of seventy. Because of the advanced age of several Justices,
Roosevelt’s proposal would have allowed him to appoint six new
Court members. Rather than criticize the Court for its opposition
to the New Deal, Roosevelt disingenuously claimed that the
elderly Justices were delaying the efficient administration of
justice.64 In his message to Congress, FDR pointed out that the
Court had denied review in 695 out of 803 cases.65 How can it be
“that full justice is achieved when a court is forced by the sheer
necessity of keeping up with its business to decline, without even
an explanation, to hear 87 percent of the cases presented to it by
private litigants?”66

62 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the
Presidency, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 27, 1936), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15314 [http://perma.cc/L5AP-L8NL].
63 Election of 1936, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1936 [http://perma.cc/XQ93-MFHY].
64 81 Cong. Rec. 878 (1937) (reprinting FDR’s message to Congress).
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Only indirectly did FDR imply a link between the advanced
age of the Justices and their opposition to the New Deal. “Modern
complexities call also for a constant infusion of new blood in the
courts,” FDR wrote.67 “A lowered mental or physical vigor leads
men to avoid an examination of complicated and changed
conditions. Little by little, new facts become blurred through old
glasses fitted, as it were, for the needs of another generation.”68
FDR declared that the remedy would bring a “constant and
systematic addition of younger blood” that would “vitalize the
courts and better equip them to recognize and apply the essential
concepts of justice in the light of the needs and the facts of an
ever-changing world.”69 The President’s purpose could not have
been clearer. He submitted the plan on the Friday before the
Court would hear Monday arguments challenging the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, one of the
pillars of the Second New Deal.
Despite his electoral success, FDR’s court-packing plan—the
first domestic initiative of his second term—suffered a humiliating
defeat. Mail and telegrams to Congress went nine-to-one against
the plan, and polling showed a majority of the country opposed.70
Elements of the New Deal coalition, such as farmers and some
unions, attacked the plan early. Senate Republicans unified in
opposition shortly after the President announced his proposal,
and conservative Senate Democrats came out against the plan
within days. Several liberal supporters of the New Deal followed.
Hatton Sumners, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
organized a majority of his committee against the bill, saying
“[b]oys . . . here’s where I cash in my chips.”71 Various college and
university presidents, academics, and the American Bar
Association opposed the plan. The coup de grace was delivered by
none other than Chief Justice Hughes, in a letter made public
during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, who rebutted point
by point FDR’s claims that the Court was overworked and that
the older Justices could not perform their duties. Both Brandeis
and Van Devanter approved the letter, which most historians
believe ended the court-packing plan for good. Upon its release,
Vice President Garner called FDR in Georgia to tell him,
“We’re licked.”72
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Historians and political scientists have argued ever since
over how, or even whether, FDR still won the war. On March 29,
1937, a week after the release of the Hughes letter, the
Court handed down a 5–4 decision upholding a Washington
state minimum wage law for women.73 In West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, the lineup of votes for and against New York’s
minimum wage, which had been struck down in Tipaldo the year
before, remained the same—except for Justice Roberts, who
switched sides to uphold the law.74 Overruling the earlier bans on
minimum wage laws, Parrish made clear that the Due Process
Clause would no longer stand in the way of government
regulation of wages or hours.
Two weeks later, the Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Act, which had been challenged on the same grounds
raised in the Sick Chicken and Carter cases.75 In NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., Chief Justice Hughes led a 5–4 majority
in rejecting the doctrine that manufacturing did not constitute
interstate commerce. Jones & Laughlin Steel was the fourthlargest steel company in the nation, with operations in multiple
states. As the Court observed, “the stoppage of those operations
by industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon
interstate commerce.”76 “It is obvious,” the Court found, that the
effect “would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”77
Henceforth, the Court would allow federal regulation of the
economy, even of wholly intrastate activity, because of the
interconnectedness of the national market. To do otherwise
would be to “shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national
life” and to judge questions of interstate commerce “in an
intellectual vacuum.”78 Justice Roberts again switched positions
to make the 5–4 majority possible.
The Court’s about-face sapped the strength from FDR’s
court-packing campaign. By May 1937, it appeared that an
outright majority of the Senate opposed the proposal, and opinion
polls showed that only one third of the public supported it.79 At
the end of the month, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported

See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
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the bill out with an unfavorable recommendation.80 Two more
events finished things. Justice Van Devanter announced his
retirement, timed for the same day as the Judiciary Committee
vote, giving Roosevelt his first Supreme Court appointment. His
departure would give the New Deal a secure majority on the
Court. The Court also upheld the Social Security Act from attack
as an unconstitutional spending measure or an invasion of state
sovereignty.81 The court-packing bill lost all momentum, never
emerged from the House Judiciary Committee, and never
reached a floor vote.
While FDR lost in Congress, he had won his larger objective.
The Court would not strike down another regulation of interstate
commerce for almost sixty years. Journalists and political
scientists immediately attributed the “switch in time that saved
nine” to FDR’s threat to pack the Court.82 Even today, a few
creative scholars like Bruce Ackerman defend the sweeping
constitutional changes of the New Deal—which, unlike
Reconstruction, were never written into a constitutional
amendment—with the 1936 electoral landslide and the attack on
the Court.83 More recent work claims that the Court’s
jurisprudence was evolving in a more generous direction toward
federal power anyway.84 The Court, this work points out, had
confidentially voted to uphold the minimum wage in West Coast
Hotel on December 19, 1936, six weeks before FDR sprung his
proposal on the nation.85 The court-packing legislation could not
have pressured the Court because it obviously had little chance of
passage. The argument that the 1936 elections prodded the
Justices to switch positions on the New Deal also suffers from the
absence of the Court as an issue during the campaign.86 If
anything, FDR suffered politically from his confrontation with
the Court. A growing bipartisan coalition against the New Deal
and another sharp recession in 1938 stalled FDR’s domestic
agenda for the rest of his presidency.
Nonetheless, if FDR is considered a great president because
of the New Deal, critical to his success was his willingness to

Cushman, supra note 70, at 222–23.
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86 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1159 (2005–2006); Leuchtenburg, supra note 53, at 379.
80
81

222

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

advance his own understanding of the Constitution. FDR never
accepted the Court’s right to define the powers of the federal
government to regulate the economy. While FDR did not join
Lincoln’s blatant defiance in declining to obey a judicial order, his
administration regularly proposed laws that ran counter to
Supreme Court precedent, and FDR openly questioned the
competence of the judiciary to review the New Deal.87 He sought
to change the Court’s composition and size as a means to
pressure it to change its rulings. With the retirement of the Four
Horsemen, Roosevelt would appoint Hugo Black, Stanley Reed,
Felix Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas to the Court, and by
1941, eight of the nine Justices were his appointees. While they
would fight about the application of the Bill of Rights against
the states, among other issues, they would unanimously agree
that Congress’s powers to regulate the economy were almost
without limit.88
In its call for a peacetime state of emergency, the New Deal
went beyond changes to the balance of powers between the
federal and state governments. Times of war inevitably shift
Constitutional power and responsibility to the president as
commander and chief. FDR and the New Deal Congress created
an administrative state that had the same effect in times of
peace, but which would be permanent, rather than temporary.
Laws enacted in the first 100 days and in the years after vested
sweeping legislative powers in the executive branch. The
executive branch, in turn, became the fount of legislative
proposals. FDR’s bills to cut federal spending and veterans’
benefits to balance the budget passed with alacrity.
The effort to engage in rational administration made the
executive branch the locus of regulation—issued through agency
rulemaking, rather than acts of Congress—as the federal
government took on the job of regulating the securities markets,
banks, labor unions, industrial working conditions, and
production standards. Victory, in the context of the Depression,
was all the more difficult because, whereas war requires the
rationing of scarce resources in favor of military production,
ending the Depression required stimulating demand and
production of all manner of goods, essentially altering millions of
market decisions made every day.

87 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 46 – Fireside Chat, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Mar. 9, 1937), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15381 [http://perma.cc/
9SVA-LHFJ].
88 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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The New Deal’s resemblance to mobilization relied upon a
government bureaucracy more typical of wartime. America’s
administrative state had grown in ebbs and flows, with the early
Hamiltonian vision of a state centered around the Treasury
Department and the Bank, Jefferson’s embargo machinery, and
the massive departments of the Civil War representing the
high-water marks. With the creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1887, the American administrative state started
to grow in earnest. Progressive-era efforts to create national
administration to manage discrete economic and social issues
culminated in the World War I mobilization effort, which
included everything from production quotas to press censorship.89
Between 1887 and 1932, Congress created a few new agencies to
oversee aspects of the economy, such as railroad rates, business
competition, and the money supply.90 These early examples set
the precedent of delegating lawmaking authority to the executive
branch to set the actual rules governing private conduct.
FDR supplemented the New Deal’s delegation of legislative
authority to the executive branch by further enshrining the
presidency as the focal point of political life. Even before his
election, FDR had made clear that the candidate, not the party,
would be the center of the campaign by renting a small plane to
fly to Chicago to accept his nomination in person—the first
nominee of either major party to do so.91 Once in office, he used
new technology to reach over the heads of Congress and the
media. Radio allowed the President to forge a direct relationship
with the American electorate that went unfiltered by the
newspapers. His famous “fireside chats,” the first delivered on
the day before the government reopened the banks on March 13,
1933, allowed FDR to campaign for his policies directly with
the people. Roosevelt did not neglect the press either; he held
twice-a-week, off-the-record press conferences in the Oval Office,
where reporters could ask him any question they liked.92 He

89 See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1980); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920 (1982); ROBERT H.
WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1966).
90 Following the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, Congress
authorized the creation of the Department of Labor and Commerce, the Food and Drug
Administration, The Bureau of Investigation (later the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Trade Commission.
91 Thomas Hardy, FDR’s Nomination, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-fdrnomination-story-story.html
[http://perma.cc/5ZAE-JFC2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
92 Jean Edward Smith, Obama, F.D.R. and Taming the Press, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2009, 6:15 PM), https://100days.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/obama-fdr-andtaming-the-press/.
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employed his ample charm to win over the reporters, who burst
out in applause after the first press conference on March 8, 1933.93
FDR used these tools to marshal support for his legislative
program and to change the political culture. Under Roosevelt, the
president became the driving force for positive government,
rather than the leader of a political system where power was
dispersed among the branches of government, the states, and the
political parties.94 If the presidency were to play this leading role,
it had to strengthen its control over the executive branch itself.
In order to fulfill the promise of economic stability, the President
wanted full command over the varied programs and policies of
the government. This challenge was compounded by the New
Deal’s blizzard of new commissions and agencies, such as the
National Recovery Administration, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission, as
well as the lack of a rational government structure that matched
form to function. When Congress enacted New Deal legislation, it
rarely reduced the size or shape of federal agencies, often simply
creating an additional agency or layer of bureaucracy on top of
the existing ones.
Roosevelt sought to master the executive branch in various
ways, with limited success. He expanded the use of aides
attached to the White House to develop and implement policy
instead of governing through the cabinet. FDR brought in a
“Brain Trust,” many of them academics who had advised him
during the 1932 campaign to develop legislation, draft speeches,
and manage policy. Some were located in the White House, and
others were spread in appointed positions in the agencies, but
they all worked for the President.
Cabinet meetings became primarily ceremonial occasions.
Rather, policy development evolved into the form familiar today,
with meetings between the president and chosen advisors—be
they White House staff, cabinet officers, agency staff, or special
committees including some combination of the former—assuming
a central role.95 The cabinet as a whole no longer represented
leaders of important factions within the president’s party, nor did
there seem to be a guiding principle behind individual
appointments. As James MacGregor Burns has observed, “[t]he
real significance of the cabinet lay in Roosevelt’s leadership role.
He could count on loyalty from his associates; almost everyone
was ‘FRBC’—for Roosevelt before Chicago” (where the Democratic

93
94
95

Id.
MARC LANDY & SIDNEY MILKIS, PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS 153–54 (2000).
BURNS, supra note 1, at 174.
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Party nominated FDR in 1932).96 The declining importance of the
cabinet, both in its corporeal form and in its individual members,
naturally enhanced the control of the White House over
the government.
FDR used his removal power to direct policy, following the
examples set by Lincoln, Jackson, and Washington. He fired the
head of the Federal Power Commission, whom Hoover had
appointed, and replaced him with his own man, even though
legislation appeared to give the Commission itself the authority
to choose the chairman.97 As the United States came closer to
entry into World War II, he summarily dismissed his Secretaries
of War and Navy and replaced them with internationalist
Republicans without serious opposition from Congress or his
own party.
FDR also used his removal power to seek control over the
independent agencies. Unlike the core departments, such as
State, War, Treasury, and Justice, independent agencies were
designed by Congress to be less amenable to presidential
direction.98 Their organizing statutes usually create a
multi-member commission at the top with a required balance
between the political parties. In some cases, Congress shields the
commission members from presidential removal except for cause
(for malfeasance in office or for violating the law). Congress uses
these devices to delegate the power to make legislative rules,
while keeping the ability to influence its exercise and preventing
its direct transfer to presidential control. Until FDR, presidents
were generally understood to have the constitutional ability to
freely remove commissioners even in the presence of these “for
cause” protections against removal, though it is unclear to what
extent previous presidents, in fact, used this authority.99
Upon taking office, FDR decided to replace the head of the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), William Humphrey, a
Hoover administration appointee. The FTC had a potential role
in overseeing important New Deal programs due to its
responsibility to investigate “unfair methods of competition in

Id. at 150.
Christopher Yoo, Steven Calabresi & Laurence Nee, The Unitary Executive During
the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 83–84 (2004).
98 The classic work on the origins of the independent agencies remains ROBERT E.
CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941). For more recent
analysis, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41 (1986);
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); and Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of
Independent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779 (1986).
99 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 284–88 (2008).
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commerce,”100 a broad jurisdictional grant of authority that
allowed it to sue companies for monopolistic activity. The statute
establishing the FTC allowed removal of a commissioner only in
cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”101
FDR decided to remove Humphrey only because he wanted to
have his own man in the job. FDR wrote Humphrey: “You will, I
know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go
along together on either the policies or the administering of the
Federal Trade Commission[.]”102 When Humphrey refused to
leave, FDR fired him. Congress did not complain, and instead
promptly confirmed FDR’s nomination of a new FTC chairman.
Humphrey, however, remained undaunted and sued to recover
his pay for the rest of his term.
Four years later, Humphrey’s estate eventually took his case
to the Supreme Court, which dealt Roosevelt and the presidency
a serious blow.103 The Justice Department argued that the FTC
statute was an unconstitutional infringement on the president’s
removal power and his constitutional duty to faithfully execute
the laws.104 Roosevelt’s lawyers relied on Myers v. United States,
a nine-year-old case that had struck down a law requiring Senate
consent before a president could fire a postmaster.105 In Myers,
Chief Justice (and former president) William Howard Taft wrote:
“The vesting of the executive power in the President was
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the
President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must
execute them by the assistance of subordinates.”106 Taft concluded
that the president’s duty to implement the laws required that “he
should select those who were to act for him under his direction”
and that he must also have the “power of removing those for
whom he cannot continue to be responsible.”107 Based on this
precedent, FDR seemed on safe ground.
On the same day that it decided Schechter Poultry, May 27,
1935, the Court substantially revised its removal jurisprudence.
With Justice Sutherland writing, the majority held that the FTC
“cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or
an eye of the executive.”108 Creating a wholly new category of

100 Robert E. Freer, The Work of the Federal Trade Commission, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (Mar. 23, 1936), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/675261/19360323_freer_the_work_of_the_ftc.pdf.
101 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935).
102 Id. at 619.
103 See generally id.
104 Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 85.
105 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
106 Id. at 117.
107 Id.
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government, Sutherland described the FTC’s functions as “quasi
legislative or quasi judicial” because it investigated and reported
to Congress and conducted initial adjudications on claims of anticompetitive violations before a case went to federal court.109 The
FTC acted “as an agency of the legislative or judicial
departments,” and was “wholly disconnected from the executive
department[.]”110 Myers, and the president’s discretionary
removal authority, only applied to “purely executive” officers
such as the Secretary of State or a postmaster.111
The decision has long been puzzling, especially its
recognition of a fourth branch of government that falls outside
the three mentioned in the Constitution. Further, the reasoning
in Humphrey’s Executor has shriveled on the vine. Recent cases
continue to recognize Congress’s authority to shield certain
government agents (such as the independent counsel) from
removal even when they fall within the executive branch, not
because they perform quasi legislative or judicial functions, but
because their independence is critical to their functions.112
Another oddity is that FDR’s loss in Humphrey’s Executor came
at the hands of Justice Sutherland and the conservatives on the
Court, who were (as we shall see), otherwise strong supporters of
executive power, albeit in foreign affairs.
As they demonstrated in other decisions, the Justices were
concerned with the New Deal’s great expansion of federal power.
They may have believed that one way to blunt the progressive
centralization of power in the national government was to force
the executive to disperse that power once at the federal level.113
Not surprisingly, Congress found the Court’s approach quite
congenial. It could delegate authority to the executive branch
while preventing the president from exercising direct control
over the agency. With the executive branch thus defanged,
independent agencies naturally became more responsive to
congressional wishes, which controlled their funding and held
oversight hearings into their activities. And since the agencies
were still formally within the executive branch, Congress could
have its cake and eat it too, disclaiming any official responsibility
for unpopular regulatory decisions. After Humphrey’s Executor,
Congress added “for cause” limitations on removal for members
Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
Id. at 628–29.
Id. at 628.
111 Id. at 632.
112 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989).
113 See HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 37 (1994).
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of the National Labor Relations Board, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and the Federal Reserve Board.114
Creation of the permanent administrative state strained the
presidency. With the Supreme Court and Congress limiting the
main constitutional tool of executive control, independent
agencies might be able to pursue policies at odds with the
president’s understanding of federal law. Or they might press
policy mandates in a way that caused conflict with other
agencies, created redundancies, or ran counter to other federal
policies. A number of methods for taming the behemoth were
possible. Presidents could impose order by forcing the menagerie
of departments, commissions, and agencies to act according to a
common plan, and thereby coordinate the activities of the
government rationally; the administrative state could be freed of
direct control by either the president or Congress, and instead be
subject to a variety of checks and balances by all three branches;
or the agencies could work closely with private business and
interest groups, which would raise objections to agency action
with the courts, Congress, and the White House.
FDR rejected the idea that the administrative state should
float outside the Constitution’s traditional structure, and he
continued to fire the heads of agencies even when Congress had
arguably limited his power of removal. FDR, for example,
removed the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority in
1938, even though Congress had established that he could only
be fired for applying political tests or any other standards but
“merit and efficiency” in running the agency.115 The chairman
had attacked his Tennessee Valley Authority colleagues and had
declared that he took orders from Congress, not the president.
FDR removed him on the ground that the Executive Power and
Take Care Clauses of the Constitution required that he control
his subordinates.116 FDR established various super-cabinet
entities with names like the Executive Council, the National
Emergency Council, and the Industrial Emergency Committee,
composed of cabinet officers, commission heads, and White House

Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 88–89.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Transmits to the Congress the Record of the
Removal of the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Mar. 23, 1938), in 7 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 151–53, 162–63 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1942).
116 The federal courts upheld FDR’s decision, ultimately holding that Congress had
failed to clearly prevent the President from firing on other grounds in addition to criteria
it listed. See Morgan v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 28 F. Supp. 732, 737 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), aff’d,
115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940); see also Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 89–90.
114
115

2018]

Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power

229

staff.117 None of these improvisations provided a structural
solution to the challenge posed by the administrative state, as
these various bodies proved a poor forum for rational planning
and control over the varied arms of the federal government.
FDR’s last thrust to control the administrative state
required the cooperation of Congress. In 1936, the President
asked a commission, headed by administration expert Louis
Brownlow, to recommend institutional changes for the improved
governance of the administrative state.118 A year later, it
reported: “the President needs help.”119 Its bottom line was clear.
“[M]anagerial direction and control of all departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch,” Brownlow wrote, “should be
centered in the President[.]”120
According to Brownlow, the President’s political responsibilities
dwarfed his formal authorities. “[W]hile he now has popular
responsibility for this direction,” the committee reported, “he is
not equipped with adequate legal authority or administrative
machinery to enable him to exercise it[.]”121 Brownlow and FDR,
who approved the report, held the usual concern that the
administrative state was wasteful, redundant, and contradictory,
but more importantly, they worried that it would become
so independent as to lose touch with the people.122 The
administrative state suffered from a democracy deficit.
The Brownlow Committee concluded that Congress must
give the president more management resources, while keeping
the chief executive at the center of decision-making. It advised
that to make “our Government an up-to-date, efficient, and
effective instrument for carrying out the will of the Nation,”
presidential control must be enhanced.123 It recommended the
creation of a new entity, the Executive Office of the President
(which would house the Bureau of the Budget), six new White
House assistants to the president, centralization of the
government’s budgets and planning, and the merger of
independent agencies into the cabinet departments.124 Brownlow’s
report did not call for a professional secretariat that would

117 See Exec. Order No. 6202-A, Appointing the Executive Council (July 11, 1933);
Exec. Order No. 6433-A, Creation of the National Emergency Council (Nov. 17, 1933);
Exec. Order No. 6770, Creating the Industrial Emergency Committee (June 30, 1934).
118 P ERI A RNOLD , M AKING THE M ANAGERIAL P RESIDENCY : C OMPREHENSIVE
REORGANIZATION PLANNING, 1905–1996, at 94 (1986).
119 Id. at 81.
120 Id. at 103.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 104–07.
123 Id. at 104.
124 Id.
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supervise the activities of the government, as existed in Great
Britain. Rather, the new assistants to the president and the
Bureau of the Budget would provide information to the president
and carry out his orders, with Roosevelt still making all critical
policy decisions.125 By centralizing the administrative state under
the presidency, it would become directly accountable to Congress
and the American people. “Strong executive leadership is
essential to democratic government today,” the report
concluded.126 “Our choice is not between power and no power, but
between responsible but capable popular government and
irresponsible autocracy.”127
FDR had the report’s recommendations distilled into a bill he
presented to the congressional leadership in January 1937. In a
four-hour presentation, FDR personally laid out the plan and
declared: “The President’s task has become impossible for me or
any other man. A man in this position will not be able to survive
White House service unless it is simplified. I need executive
assistants with a ‘passion for anonymity’ to be my legs.”128 Even
though the 75th Congress began with a two-thirds Democratic
majority, it was wary of FDR’s plans and less than thrilled at the
prospect of greater presidential influence over the New Deal
state. Roosevelt’s plan undermined the benefits to Congress of
delegation because it would weaken Congress’s influence over
agency decisions while expanding the president’s authority over
what was essentially lawmaking.
Brownlow’s report landed before Congress at the same time
as FDR’s court-packing plan. While the two plans addressed
different problems, they fed the same fear of presidential
aggrandizement at the expense of the other branches. Key
congressional leaders had not been consulted or briefed on the
reorganization plan, which they proceeded to attack as another
step toward despotism, or a power grab by the university
intellectuals who no doubt would run the new agencies. At a time
when totalitarianism was raising its ugly head in Europe, fears
of consolidated executive power were particularly salient. In
1938, the bill failed in the House and was replaced by a more
modest bill that gave FDR a limited ability to reorganize
government.129 Under that authority, FDR still managed to

125 See MATTHEW DICKINSON, BITTER HARVEST: FDR, PRESIDENTIAL POWER, AND THE
GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH 104–10 (1996).
126 THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 106 (Robert F.
Durant ed., 2010).
127 Id.
128 DICKINSON, supra note 125, at 111.
129 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 277–80.
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locate the Bureau of the Budget within a new Executive Office of
the President. As the Office of Management and Budget, it today
exercises central review over the economic costs and benefits of
all federal regulation, one of the president’s most powerful tools
for rationalizing the activities of the administrative state.130
FDR also expanded the resources within the White House,
an institution now separate from the Executive Office of the
President, which enabled him to gain more information and
control over the cabinet agencies. Still, the independent agencies
remained outside the cabinet departments. FDR never
successfully established any single entity to coordinate the
activities of the entire administrative state, and his failed bill
demonstrates the enduring constitutional checks on the
presidency. Despite FDR’s growing power, only Congress could
pass the laws needed to reorganize the cabinet departments,
re-shape the jurisdiction and structure of the independent
agencies, and provide the funds and positions in a new,
revitalized White House.131
While FDR suffered defeats at the hands of Congress, he
continued to claim and exercise inherent executive authority that
went beyond mere control of personnel. He signed statements to
object to riders inserted into needed spending bills, which he
believed to be unconstitutional. Congress, for example, attempted
to force the President to fire three bureaucrats it believed were
“subversives” by specifically barring any federal funds to pay
their salaries.132 Roosevelt signed the bill but objected to its
unconstitutional end run around the president’s power over the
removal of executive branch officials. Ultimately, the officials left
within months, but they sued for their back pay all the way
to the Supreme Court, which agreed that Congress had violated
the Constitution.133
President Roosevelt also followed Lincoln’s example in using
his executive power to fight racial discrimination. Although
Lincoln had relied on his power as Commander-in-Chief to free

130 See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Decisionmaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Alan B. Morrison, OMB
Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1059 (1986); TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE
STRONG PRESIDENCY 163 (1992); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245 (2001).
131 On the way that presidents today manage policy development through the White
House and the Executive Office of the President, see ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, MANAGING
THE PRESIDENT’S PROGRAM: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE POLICY
FORMATION 18–62 (2002).
132 See Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, ch. 218, §304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
133 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
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the slaves, the southern states imposed racial segregation in the
years after the Civil War, ultimately with the approval of the
Supreme Court.134 While FDR did not take segregation head on,
he issued an executive order in 1941 to prohibit racial
discrimination in employment on federal defense contracts.135
Roosevelt had no statutory authority to order the federal
government to provide fair treatment in employment to all,
regardless of race. He could rely only upon his constitutional
authority as president to oversee the management of federal
programs. Once war began, President Roosevelt could clarify that
his orders were taken under his power as both Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief in wartime.136 FDR’s orders would
not be the first time, nor the last time, that the cause of
racial equality would depend on a broad understanding of
presidential power.
The New Deal depended upon broad theories of the
presidency and the role of the federal government in national
life. What remains less clear is whether FDR’s fundamental
re-orientation of the government into a positive, active
instrument of national policy was worthwhile. Contemporary
critics of the modern presidency question whether chief
executives, acting alone, have led the nation into disastrous
wars.137 We need also ask, but rarely do, whether the expansion
of executive power domestically has benefited the nation. To the
extent we debate the desirability of the administrative state,
most American scholars today bemoan the fact that the New
Deal did not go far enough. They argue that the New Deal failed
because it did not achieve a full-fledged European welfare state,
or that FDR’s coalition fragmented and failed to follow through
on the promise of liberal reform.138 These critics, often the most
vocal detractors of the muscular executive action in foreign
affairs, cry out for more executive power domestically.
Vesting the president with more authority to control the
government’s regulation of the economy may make sense during
an emergency, but it did not work in solving the Great
Depression. Economists recognize today that the New Deal

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543, 548 (1896).
Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 27, 1941).
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neither put an end to high rates of unemployment nor restored
consistent economic growth.139 FDR’s monetary and fiscal policy
were often counterproductive. Full employment would return
only with American rearmament in the first years of World War
II. Other New Deal policies were similarly confused, such as
allowing industry to set production quotas, reduce production to
raise prices, and restrict employment by raising minimum wages.
Economists similarly doubt whether the creation of national
regulation of the securities markets and other industries
contributed to the eventual economic recovery, even though it
was certainly valuable for postwar prosperity. If, as Milton
Friedman argues, the Great Depression would have proven to be
only a normal recession with some deft monetary policy from the
Federal Reserve,140 it bears asking whether the expansive,
permanent bureaucracy was needed at all.
Decades later, American presidents would campaign against
the burdensome regulations made possible by the New Deal. The
administrative state we have today failed to end the Great
Depression. There is little doubt that the explosion in the size
and power of the administrative state has transformed the
nature of American politics. Considering this, was the
administrative state worth the price?
The federal government has dramatically expanded the
scope of regulation to include not only national economic activity,
such as workplace conditions and minimum wages and hours,
but also the environment and endangered species, educational
standards, state and local corruption, consumer product safety,
communications technology and ownership, illegal narcotics and
gun crimes, and corporate governance. It has produced less
deliberation in Congress, which now delegates sweeping powers
to the agencies, and has placed the initial authority to issue
federal law affecting private individuals in administrative
agencies. Those agencies are not directly accountable to the
people through elections, except for the thin layer of presidential
appointees at the very top. Special-interest groups have come to
play a significant role in influencing both congressional
committees and agencies, gaining economic “rents” for their
members at the expense of the broader public.

139 See, e.g., David M. Kennedy, What the New Deal Did, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 251, 252
(2009); Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the
Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 813 (2004);
BERNANKE, supra note 9; ARTHUR I. BLOOMFIELD, CAPITAL IMPORTS AND THE AMERICAN
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1934–39 (1950).
140 See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 249–69.
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This is not a plea to return to the laissez-faire capitalism of
the nineteenth century variety. The modern administrative state
no doubt has produced social benefits, and there are important
areas where the greater information and expertise held by the
executive agencies improves government policy, but it remains
an open question whether the centralization of economic and
social regulation in the national government has been, on
balance, a success. It is undeniable that the requirement of
minimum national standards, most especially in the area of civil
rights, was a necessary and long-overdue change. Equality under
law should not have been a matter of legislative or executive
discretion, but a requirement of the Reconstruction Amendments
to the Constitution. National control of other economic and social
issues, however, may not have been worth the cost in increased
government spending, larger budget deficits, a permanent
government apparatus of unprecedented size (at least in the
American experience), the rise of interest-group politics, and
interference with efficient market mechanisms.
Federal agencies may impose uniform rules, but they may
not impose the best rules. In the absence of broad national
regulation, states could enact a diversity of policies on issues
such as the economy, environment, education, crime, and social
policy. People could vote with their feet by moving to states that
adopt their preferred package of policies, while experimentation
could identify the most effective solutions to economic and social
problems. The New Deal’s concentration of regulatory authority
in Washington, D.C. sapped the vitality of the states, whose
powers are only a pale imitation of those they held in the
nineteenth century.141 FDR certainly deserves credit for restoring
Americans’ optimism and faith in government, and for alleviating
the suffering inflicted by the Depression, but it remains doubtful
whether the great wrenching in the fabric of our federal system
of government and the expansion in the president’s constitutional
powers in the domestic realm can be justified by any limited
advance in triggering a recovery. Despite its revolution in
domestic presidential power and government structure, the New
Deal appears to have had little impact on ending the worst
economic collapse in American history.

141 For a more extensive discussion of the transformation of American politics
wrought by the New Deal, see MILKIS, supra note 1, at 21–51, 149–83; and THEODORE J.
LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 273–74
(2d ed. 1979).
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II. THE GATHERING STORM
FDR’s claim to greatness lies not in the New Deal, but in his
defeat of one of the greatest external threats our nation has
faced: fascist Germany and imperial Japan. FDR exercised
farsighted vision in preparing the nation for a necessary war
unwanted by a large minority, and at times a majority, of
Congress and the American people. In the process, the President
skirted, stretched, and broke a series of neutrality laws designed
to prevent American entry into World War II. Sometimes he went
to Congress and the American people to seek support for his
actions. Other times he did not. But, regardless of the where, or
if, FDR sought support for his actions in the lead up to war, FDR
firmly established that the power to make national security
policy resided in the Oval Office.142
Debate has raged for decades over whether the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise, or whether FDR or the
American government had advance knowledge of the attack.
Some have suspected that FDR believed the only way to rouse a
reluctant American public to war was for the United States to be
attacked first. In this respect, FDR had the same instincts as
Lincoln. The conventional wisdom today attributes more of the
blame for Pearl Harbor to incompetence by the field commanders
and complacency in Washington, and has put to rest the idea
that FDR actually knew that the Japanese would attack
Pearl Harbor.143
Recent scholarly work suggests that FDR managed events to
maneuver the Japanese into a corner, with a strong possibility
that the Japanese would attack American interests somewhere in
the Pacific, most likely the Philippines. Roosevelt’s imposition of
142 See ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1932–1945, at 530–31 (1979). Important historical works on FDR and American entry
into World War II include: ROBERT DIVINE, THE ILLUSION OF NEUTRALITY (1962); WALDO
HEINRICHS, THRESHOLD OF WAR: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN ENTRY INTO
WORLD WAR II (1988); PATRICK HEARDEN, ROOSEVELT CONFRONTS HITLER: AMERICA’S
ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II (1987); WARREN F. KIMBALL, THE JUGGLER: FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT AS WARTIME STATESMAN (1991); FREDERICK W. MARKS III, WIND OVER SAND:
THE DIPLOMACY OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT (1988); DAVID REYNOLDS, THE CREATION OF
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE 1937–1941: A STUDY IN COMPETITIVE CO-OPERATION
(1982); and AKIRA IRIYE, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC (1987). The day-to-day events of American entry into World War II are traced in
WILLIAM L. LANGER & S. EVERETT GLEASON, THE UNDECLARED WAR: 1940–1941 (1953),
and the events leading up to World War II are described in DONALD C. WATT, HOW WAR
CAME: THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1938–1939 (1990); and
JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2005). U.S. diplomacy in the war itself is
discussed by AKIRA IRIYE, 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS:
THE GLOBALIZING OF AMERICA, 1913–1945 (1993).
143 For a summary of these debates, see GORDON PRANGE, ET. AL., AT DAWN WE
SLEPT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PEARL HARBOR 474–76 (2001).
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an arms, steel, and oil embargo against the Japanese Empire was
designed to force Tokyo to either withdraw from China or attack
American, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia for natural
resources.144 FDR pressed Japan in order to bring the United
States to bear against the greater threat of Germany.145 FDR
could not have walked the United States to the brink of war
without an expansive interpretation of the president’s
constitutional powers and the willingness to exercise them.
Roosevelt had laid claim to sweeping executive authority in
foreign affairs even before war with Germany and Japan looked
certain. He was assisted, at times, from an unlikely source:
Justice Sutherland. While Sutherland believed the New Deal
state unconstitutionally trampled on the natural rights of
individuals, as Hadley Arkes has argued, he still strongly
supported presidential power in foreign affairs.146 This became
clear in the case United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.147
In 1934, Congress had delegated to the president the
authority to cut off all U.S. arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay,
which were fighting a nasty border war, if he found the ban
would advance peace in the region.148 FDR proclaimed an arms
embargo in effect on the same day Congress passed the law,149
and the next day the Justice Department prosecuted four
executives of the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation for trying
to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia.150 Curtiss-Wright, which
traced its roots to the Wright brothers, would supply the engines
for the DC-3 air transport and the B-17 Flying Fortress and
build the P-40 fighter.151 Taking its case all the way to the
Supreme Court, the company argued that the law had delegated
unconstitutional authority over international commerce to the
president.152 If Congress wanted to impose an arms embargo, it
would have to do it itself, not just hand the authority to FDR.
In a remarkable and controversial opinion, Justice
Sutherland declared that the constitutional standards that ruled
the government’s actions domestically did not apply in the same

144 See MARC TRACHTENBERG, THE CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL HISTORY: A GUIDE TO
METHOD 79–139 (2006).
145 See MARKS III, supra note 142, at 163.
146 See ARKES, supra note 113, at 198–99.
147 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).
148 Id. at 312.
149 Id. at 313.
150 Id. at 311.
151 History, CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION, http://www.curtisswright.com/company/
history/ [http://perma.cc/SB9A-XC8W] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
152 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 314–15.
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way to foreign affairs.153 The Constitution’s careful limitation of
the national government’s powers, so as to preserve the general
authority of the states, did not extend beyond the water’s edge.
In the arena of foreign affairs, Sutherland maintained, the
American Revolution had directly transferred the full powers of
national sovereignty from Great Britain to the Union. “The
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other
sovereignties,” Sutherland wrote, “if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”154 In
words that could have been cribbed from Abraham Lincoln, the
Court declared that the “Union existed before the Constitution,”
and therefore the Union could exercise the same powers over war
and peace as any other nation.155
An argument in favor of exclusive federal power over
national security and international relations, however, does not
dictate which branch should exercise it. Sutherland located that
authority in the president for inherently practical considerations.
The dangers posed by foreign nations required the structural
ability to act swiftly and secretly, unique to the executive branch.
“In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”156
Echoing Hamilton and Jefferson, and quoting then Congressman
John Marshall, Sutherland declared, “The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations.”157
Justice Sutherland notably eschewed the opportunity for a
narrow holding in conferring wide latitude to the executive
branch. It did not matter that, on the facts of Curtiss-Wright,
FDR was acting pursuant to congressional delegation. “We are
here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President
by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President,” which does not “require as a basis for its exercise an

See id. at 315–22.
Id. at 318. Scholars have not been kind to Justice Sutherland’s analysis. For a
critical discussion of Curtiss-Wright, see David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power:
An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A.
Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973); and LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 19–20 (2d ed. 1996).
155 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 316.
156 Id. at 319.
157 Id.
153
154

238

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

act of Congress.”158 Sutherland found great advantages to the
United States in vesting these powers in the executive, rather
than the legislature. The president, not Congress, “has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has
confidential sources of information.”159
Another case gave Justice Sutherland the opportunity to
deliver a second blessing to FDR’s vigorous use of his presidential
powers. In 1933, Roosevelt ended American efforts to isolate the
Soviet Union and unilaterally recognized its communist
government. As part of an executive agreement with the Soviets,
the United States took on all rights and claims of the USSR
against American citizens, such as those involving the
expropriation of property.160 The federal government sued to
recover money and property held by Russians in the United
States, which were allegedly owed to the Soviet government.161
What made the recognition of the Soviet Union so remarkable
was that FDR not only had set the policy of the United States
and entered into an international agreement on his own, but the
government used that unilateral agreement to set aside state
property and contract rules previously considered sacrosanct—all
without any action of Congress or the Senate.
Property owners resisted. Augustus Belmont, a New York
City banker, refused to turn over deposits held on behalf of the
Petrograd Metal Works after the nationalization of all Russian
corporations in 1918.162 FDR’s executive agreement with the
Soviets required that legal ownership of the profits transferred to
the United States government. Belmont’s estate refused to turn
the money over because, it claimed, the property law of New York
state protected it.163
In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court again sided
with the executive. It found that the recognition of the USSR, the
international agreement, and the pre-emption of state law all fell
within the president’s constitutional powers to the exclusion of
the states.164 “In respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state
Id. at 319–20.
Id. at 320.
See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326 (1937).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 326.
163 Id. at 326–27; see also Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive
Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 C AL. L. R EV. 671, 693 (1998); Michael
D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. R EV. 133,
146 (1998).
164 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
158
159
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lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does
not exist.”165 Presidents since have used this power to make
literally thousands of international agreements with other
countries without the Senate’s advice and consent—from 1939
to 1989, the United States entered into 11,698 executive
agreements and only 702 treaties.166 The courts have
upheld sole executive agreements several times since, including
an agreement ending the Iranian hostage crisis and another
pre-empting the state law claims of Holocaust survivors against
German companies.167
The Supreme Court did not grant the president these powers
in foreign affairs; only the Constitution could do that. Presidents
from Washington onward had interpreted the Constitution’s
vesting of the executive and Commander-in-Chief authorities to
give them the initiative to protect the national security, set
foreign policy, and negotiate with other nations. Sutherland’s
opinions gave judicial recognition to decades of presidential
practice; what had been the product of presidential enterprise
and congressional acquiescence became formal constitutional
law. Roosevelt would draw on these authorities as he
maneuvered to send aid to the Allies and bring the United States
into the war against the fascist powers.
Facing existential threats in the combination of a looming
global conflict and domestic isolationism, FDR drew deeply from
his well of presidential powers. As early as 1935, Roosevelt had
concluded that Hitler’s Germany posed a threat to the United
States.168 As the Axis powers increased the size, strength, and
quality of their militaries while launching offensives against
their neighbors, the President became convinced that military
force would be necessary to protect American interests.
Neutrality offered a false promise of safety. FDR’s approach
represented something of a revolution in American strategic
thought. No longer would American national security depend on
the safety provided by two oceans and control of the Western
Hemisphere, where it had felt no reluctance to launch wars of its
own.169 A German defeat of Great Britain would remove a
valuable buffer that had prevented European nations from naval
Id. at 331.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. PRT. 106–71, at 39 (2001).
167 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 672–74 (1981); American Ins.
Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414–15 (2003).
168 DALLEK, supra note 142, at 102–03.
169 See, e.g., ROBERT KAGAN, DANGEROUS NATION: AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM
ITS EARLIEST DAYS TO THE DAWN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 3 (2007); JOHN LEWIS
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and air access to the Americas. And if Hitler succeeded in gaining
complete control of the resources of the European continent,
Germany would become a superpower with the means to
threaten the United States.170 A central objective of American
strategy was to maintain a balance of power in Europe and Asia
to contain expansionist Germany and Japan, but if war came,
FDR and his advisors identified Hitler as the primary threat.171
By December 1940, FDR could be relatively open with the
public about his broader goals. In his famous “Arsenal of
Democracy” speech, he accused the fascist powers of conquering
Europe as a prelude to larger aims that threatened the United
States. Never since “Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our
American civilization been in such danger as now,” FDR
warned.172 “The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear
that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their
own country,” FDR told the nation by radio, “but also to enslave
the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to
dominate the rest of the world.”173 He rejected the idea that the
“broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific” would protect
the United States.174 It was only the British navy that protected
the oceans from the Nazis. The United States had to begin
massive rearmament and provide arms and assistance to the free
nations that were bearing the brunt of the fighting. FDR did not
tell the public that he was already taking action to bring the
nation closer to war, first against Europe to stop Hitler, while
holding off Japanese expansion in Asia.
FDR’s strategic vision required several elements to succeed.
The United States had to send military and financial aid to
Britain and France, help those supplies cross the Atlantic Ocean,
and build up the United States military (especially the Navy and
Army Air Corps). If the Allies’ fortunes fell far enough, the nation
would have to be prepared to intervene militarily. Resistance to
these steps was widespread. Many Americans believed that
President Wilson had erred in entering World War I; they
wanted to avoid American involvement in another internecine
squabble in Europe. Between 1939 and 1941, a majority of
Americans grew to support aid to the Allies, but that was as far
as they would go. As late as May 1941, almost eighty percent of
TRACHTENBERG, supra note 144, at 118.
Id. at 118–19.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat 16: On the “Arsenal of Democracy,” MILLER
CENTER UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA (Dec. 29, 1940), https://millercenter.org/thepresidency/presidential-speeches/december-29-1940-fireside-chat-16-arsenal-democracy
[http://perma.cc/U3JM-3JGJ].
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the public wanted the United States to stay out of the conflict.175
Seventy percent felt that FDR had gone too far or had helped
Britain enough.176 Isolationists blamed American entry into
World War I on President Wilson’s use of his executive powers to
tilt American neutrality toward Britain and France.177 Worried
about a re-run, they pressed for strict limitations on presidential
power to keep the United States out of the European war.178
Opposition to American intervention took more concrete
form than public opinion polls. Congress enacted Neutrality Acts
in 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939 to prevent the United States from
aiding either side. Congress passed the 1935 Act after Germany
repudiated the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of
Versailles and Italy threatened to invade Ethiopia in defiance of
the League of Nations. It required the president to proclaim,
after the outbreak of war between two or more nations, an
embargo of all arms, ammunition or “implements of war” against
the belligerents.179 It gave FDR the authority to decide when to
terminate the embargo, but it left him little choice as to when to
begin one.
The Act prohibited the United States from helping a victim
nation and punishing the aggressor, instead requiring a complete
cut-off for both. FDR had privately opposed the law’s mandatory
terms, fought to keep his discretionary control over foreign
affairs, and in signing the bill predicted that its “inflexible
provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out.”180
Later acts prohibited the extension of loans or financial
assistance to belligerents,181 extended the embargo to civil
wars,182 and allowed the ban to cover only arms and munitions,
but not raw materials. In 1939, Congress enacted an even
tougher prohibition that sought to prevent belligerents from
“cash-and-carry” transactions for raw materials by prohibiting
American vessels from transporting anything to nations at war.
Domestic resistance required FDR to adopt an approach that
gave the appearance that the United States was being dragged
into the war. By 1941, with Hitler in control of Europe and Japan
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occupying large parts of China, FDR wanted to find a way for the
United States to enter the war on the side of Britain. In August
1941, for example, FDR told Prime Minister Winston Churchill
that he could not rely on Congress to declare war against
Germany.183 Instead, FDR “would wage war, but not declare
it.”184 According to Churchill’s account of their conversation at
the Atlantic Conference, FDR said “he would become more and
more provocative” and promised that “everything would be
done to force an incident” that would “justify him in
opening hostilities.”185
Roosevelt’s plans to move the United States toward war
depended in part on Congress. The Constitution gives Congress
control over international and domestic interstate commerce, as
well as the money and property of the United States. FDR could
lay little claim to constitutional authority to dictate arms-export
policies or to provide financial and material aid to the Allies.
FDR initially hoped that the United States could provide enough
assistance to Britain and France—the United States would prove
the “great Arsenal of Democracy,”186 in his famous words—to
postpone the need for American military intervention in Europe.
After the fall of France, FDR realized that Great Britain could
not hold off the Nazis on its own, but he hoped to send enough
aid to keep Britain alive while he prepared the American public
for war.
FDR pressed Congress for several changes to the Neutrality
Acts that would send more help to the Allies. In the 1936 and
1937 Acts, for example, the administration won more
presidential discretion to determine when a foreign war had
broken out.187 By 1939, it succeeded in changing the law to allow
the president to put off a proclamation of neutrality if necessary
to protect American peace and security.188 This effectively
allowed Britain and France, which controlled the sea routes to
the Americas, to continue to receive aid.
FDR used this flexibility to continue supplying arms and
money to China by declining to find a war to exist there, even
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after Japan had attacked Beijing and Nanjing.189 Similarly,
Roosevelt refused to invoke the Neutrality Acts when Germany
invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939, or Russia in 1941, because a
blanket embargo would have prevented American aid from
flowing to the Allies.190 Manipulating the embargo rules to
affirmatively support one side of various conflicts, FDR showed
little respect for the spirit of the Neutrality Acts. But Congress
would not allow him to go farther. FDR’s proposals throughout
1939 and 1940 to reform the Neutrality Acts to allow for direct
military aid to the Allies repeatedly failed.
As his efforts to modify the Neutrality Acts flagged, FDR
became more aggressive in invoking his inherent constitutional
authority. He asked Attorney General Robert Jackson, “How far
do you think I can go in ignoring the existing act—even though I
did sign it?”191 Vice President John Nance Garner and Secretary
of the Interior Harold Ickes argued that the President’s
constitutional authority in foreign affairs allowed him to act
beyond the Acts.192 Instead of overriding them, however,
Roosevelt simply became more creative in interpreting them. On
May 22, 1940, as German armies swept through France, FDR
ordered the sale of World War I-era equipment to the Allies; on
June 3rd, he ordered the transfer of $38 million in weapons to
U.S. Steel, which promptly sold them at no profit to the British
and French.193 The administration argued that these sales did
not violate the Neutrality Acts because the arms were
“surplus.”194 Three days later (just after the British had
evacuated 300,000 soldiers from the German noose around
Dunkirk), the Navy sold fifty Hell Diver bombers, which had
been introduced to service only in 1938, to Britain because they
were “temporarily in excess of requirements.”195 The sales
occurred at a time when the United States army could field only
80,000 combat troops in five divisions, while the German army in
western Europe deployed two million men in 140 divisions.196 The
U.S. Army Air Corps had only 160 fighter planes and fifty-two
heavy bombers.197 Announcing the decision on June 8th, FDR
told a news conference that “a plane can get out of date darned
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fast.”198 Two days later, in a speech at the University of Virginia,
FDR declared isolationism an “obvious delusion” and called for
an allied victory over “the gods of force and hate” to prevent a
world run by totalitarian governments.199
American aid came too little, too late; France requested an
armistice on June 17, 1940.200 In the midst of a presidential
campaign for an unprecedented third term, FDR sought
bipartisan support for his policies and replaced isolationists in
his cabinet with two internationalist Republicans: Henry
Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the
Navy.201 Both favored repealing the neutrality laws, boosting the
U.S. military through a draft, and sending large amounts of aid
to Great Britain.202 Britain’s destroyer fleet, which had suffered
almost fifty percent losses, needed reinforcements to block a
German invasion force and safeguard its trade lifelines.203
Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that acquiring American destroyers
was “a matter of life and death.”204 FDR reacted by planning to
send two-dozen PT-boats immediately, and said that Navy
lawyers who thought the sale illegal should follow orders or go on
vacation.205 After word of FDR’s plans leaked, Congress enacted a
law forbidding the sale of any military equipment “essential to
the defense of the United States” as certified by the Chief
of Naval Operations or the Army Chief of Staff, and reasserted
a World War I ban on sending any “vessel of war” to
a belligerent.206
Congress’s tightening of neutrality delayed FDR for two
months. While the Battle of Britain raged in the skies, Churchill
begged FDR for additional destroyers. “The whole fate of the
war,” the Prime Minister wrote in July, “may be decided by this
minor and easily remediable factor,” and he urged that “this is
the thing to do now.”207 FDR and his advisors planned a transfer
to Britain of fifty World War I destroyers declared to be
“surplus,” even though similar warships from the same era were
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being activated for Navy service.208 In exchange, Britain would
provide basing rights in its Western Hemisphere territories to
the United States. In August, the President concluded an
executive agreement with Britain, kept secret at first and
without congressional approval, to make the trade.209
FDR’s advisors divided over the deal’s legality. One legal
advisor believed it violated the June 28th statute and the
Espionage Act of 1917, which forbade sending an armed vessel to
any belligerent while the United States remained neutral; State
Department and Justice Department lawyers agreed.210 But
Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of the Treasury, argued that
the June 28th law implicitly recognized the president’s
constitutional power to transfer any military asset in order to
improve national security, while others recommended that the
government first sell the destroyers to private companies that
could then resell them to the British.211 Acheson even went
further. He argued that the 1917 law applied only to ships that
were built specifically on order for a belligerent and not to
existing ships originally built or used for the Navy.212
Attorney General Jackson drew on these ideas in his legal
opinion blessing the deal, but also relied on the president’s
Commander-in-Chief power. “Happily there has been little
occasion in our history for the interpretation of the powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief,” Jackson wrote to FDR.213 “I
do not find it necessary to rest upon that power alone.”214
Nevertheless, “it will hardly be open to controversy that the
vesting of such a function in the President also places upon him a
responsibility to use all constitutional authority which he may
possess to provide adequate bases and stations” for the most
effective use of the armed forces.215 The perilous circumstances
facing the United States reinforced the Commander-in-Chief’s
power. “It seems equally beyond doubt that present world
conditions forbid him to risk any delay that is constitutionally
avoidable.”216 Any statutory effort by Congress to prevent the
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president from transferring military equipment to help American
national security would be of “questionable constitutionality.”217
Jackson defended the exclusion of Congress. He thought that
the deal could take the form of an executive agreement because it
required neither the appropriation of funds nor an obligation to
act in the future.218 Justice Sutherland’s opinion in CurtissWright, which the Attorney General extensively quoted,
supported the argument.219 Jackson had a more difficult time
with the Neutrality Acts. He read the June 28th law to recognize
the president’s authority to transfer naval vessels to Britain,
subject only to the requirement that they be surplus or obsolete.
It did not prohibit the transfer of property “merely because it is
still used or usable or of possible value for future use,” but only if
the transfer weakened the national defense.220 The “over-age”
destroyers, as he called them, could be found to fall outside the
statute and hence within the president’s authority, which must
have derived from the Commander-in-Chief power, to exchange
them for valuable military bases.221 Jackson, however, advised
that transferring brand-new mosquito boats would violate
Congress’s ban on sending ships to a belligerent.
Jackson issued an even broader reading of the Commanderin-Chief power in May 1941, when FDR allowed British pilots to
train in American military schools. Under the Commander-inChief power, the president “has supreme command over the land
and naval forces of the country and may order them to perform
such military duties as, in his opinion, are necessary or
appropriate for the defense of the United States.”222 The
president could “command and direct the armed forces in their
immediate movements and operations” and “dispose of troops
and equipment” to promote the national security.223 Jackson read
the passage of Lend-Lease as support for FDR’s judgment that
helping Britain was important to the national defense.224 If the
president had full constitutional authority to use the armed
forces, even to use military force, to protect the nation by helping
Britain, then he must also have the lesser power to train British
airmen. “I have no doubt of the President’s lawful authority to
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utilize forces under his command to instruct others in matters of
defense which are vital to the security of the United States.”225 It
“would be anomalous indeed,” Jackson observed, if the military
could provide Britain with arms but could not train the British
how to use them.226
Reaction to the destroyers-for-bases deal, announced in early
August, attacked FDR’s methods more than his goals. Roosevelt
worried that his energetic use of executive power would feed
fears that he was becoming an autocrat, worries punctuated by
his nomination that summer for an unprecedented third term as
president. Leaks of secret Anglo-American staff talks and
announcement of a joint U.S.–Canadian defense board already
had isolationists attacking FDR for pushing the United States
towards war.227 FDR predicted that revelation of the executive
agreement would “raise hell with Congress” and lead to
accusations he was a “warmonger” and “dictator,” and might
torpedo his re-election hopes.228
FDR’s first two predictions quickly came true. His
Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, supported the policy but
declared that FDR’s unilateral action was “the most dictatorial
and arbitrary act of any president in the history of the United
States.”229 Edwin Borchard, a Yale professor of international law,
argued that Roosevelt had assumed dictatorial powers, placed
himself above the law, and threatened to “break down
constitutional safeguards.”230 The Constitution, Borchard wrote,
“does not give the President carte blanche to do anything he
pleases in foreign affairs.”231 The nation’s leading scholar of
constitutional law, Edward Corwin of Princeton, attacked
Jackson’s opinion as “an endorsement of unrestrained autocracy
in the field of our foreign relations, neither more nor less.”232 In
The New York Times, Corwin asked “why may not any and all of
Congress’s specifically delegated powers be set aside by the
President’s ‘executive power’ and the country be put on a
totalitarian basis without further ado?”233
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Despite these ringing attacks on presidential power, the
destroyers-for-bases deal proved remarkably popular—Gallup
polls showed sixty-two percent in favor—encouraging even bolder
steps.234 By October 1940, FDR asked for and received
appropriations of $17.7 billion for national defense—his
administration’s original estimate for the year had been $1.84
billion—and defense spending doubled the following year.235 In
June 1940, he called for the first peacetime draft in American
history, which Congress enacted in September only after Willkie
publicly agreed. A Wall Street lawyer and former Democrat,
Willkie was a dark-horse candidate who had won the nomination
without ever having occupied public office. His attacks on the
New Deal had gained little traction during the campaign, so
Willkie pivoted, painting FDR as a “warmonger” and dictator
who had made “secret agreements” to enter a war that would kill
thousands of young Americans. “If [Roosevelt’s] promise to keep
our boys out of foreign wars is no better than his promise to
balance the budget,” Willkie said on the stump, “they’re already
almost on the transports.”236 By the end of October, Willkie came
within four points of the President, and Roosevelt went on a
speaking tour to reassure mothers in a speech at Boston Garden
on October 30, 1940, that “[y]our boys are not going to be
sent into any foreign wars.”237 Though the polls showed the
election close, FDR prevailed by twenty-seven million to Willkie’s
twenty-two million and an Electoral College majority of 449–82.
After the election, FDR redoubled his efforts to send aid to
Britain. He authorized secret staff talks between American and
British military planners, who recommended a grand strategy of
defeating Germany first while holding Japan to a stalemate.238 In
November, FDR ordered the army to make B-17 bombers
immediately available to the British, to be replaced by British
planes on order in American factories, and he discussed making
half of all American arms production available to the British.
British finances collapsed in late November; the country could no
longer pay for the material it needed to continue the war.
Britain’s ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian,
appealed to the American public on November 23rd by saying to
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a group of journalists, “[w]ell, boys, Britain’s broke; it’s your
money we want.”239
Lothian’s report of Britain’s functional bankruptcy shocked
the White House into action. FDR approved the sale of $2.1
billion in weapons that the British could not pay for, as well as
the diversion of $700 million in Reconstruction Finance
Corporation funds to underwrite the factory expansions needed
for the increased arms sales.240 The President hit upon one of his
most artful evasions of neutrality, Lend-Lease, which would “get
away from the dollar sign,” as he told reporters at a December
17, 1940, press conference.241 The United States would “lend”
Britain weapons and munitions and, rather than demand
immediate payment, would expect their return after the war’s
end. Of course, the idea was a complete fiction; war would
consume the arms. Ever canny in his presentations to the public,
FDR deployed a homey analogy: If a house were on fire, a
neighbor would lend a garden hose with the expectation that it
would be returned later, rather than demanding $15 for the cost
of the hose.242
Lend-Lease required congressional action. In his famous
“Arsenal of Democracy” speech on December 29th, Roosevelt
defended Lend-Lease and broader aid to the allies with his most
stirring language.243 FDR declared that the Nazis posed the most
direct threat to the security of the United States since its
founding.244 To avoid war, the United States would have to
become the great “arsenal of democracy” for the free nations
carrying on the fight.245 The United States would be less likely to
get into war “if we do all we can now to support the nations
defending themselves against attack by the Axis,” rather than “if
we acquiesce in their defeat.”246
Disclaiming any intention to send a new “American
Expeditionary Force” outside the United States, FDR declared
that “the people of Europe who are defending themselves do not
ask us to do their fighting.”247 All they sought were “the
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implements of war.”248 Increasing national defense production
and sending it to Britain would “keep war away from our country
and our people.”249 It was one of the most popular speeches of
FDR’s presidency: roughly eighty percent of the public agreed.250
Congress waited until March 1941 to give its approval to
Lend-Lease,251 but FDR decided to move forward during that
critical time anyway. He authorized British purchase of 23,000
airplanes in November 1940, and rifles and ammunition in
February 1941. He ordered the U.S. military to purchase
munitions factories but diverted the production to Britain.252
In spring 1941, FDR turned to the protection of the supplies
that would begin to flow across the Atlantic, and took unilateral
action that provoked the Nazis and drew the United States ever
closer to war. In March, FDR moved to place Greenland under
American military protection, and in April he gave orders to the
Navy to extend its security zone as far as Greenland and the
Azores, and to begin locating German submarines and reporting
their positions to the Royal Navy. In May, he transferred
one-quarter of the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic to deter any
German effort to seize Atlantic islands for bases. He declared an
“unlimited national emergency” at the end of the month and told
the nation that helping Britain win the battle of the Atlantic was
critical to keeping the Nazis out of the Western Hemisphere.253
“[I]t would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard,”
Roosevelt argued.254 He followed his speech with a June
deployment of a Marine brigade to occupy Iceland (which is about
1200 miles from London and 2800 miles from Washington, D.C.),
which freed up a British division and extended the American
security zone even further. In July, he announced that the
Navy would begin escorting ships between the United States
and Iceland.
FDR did not seek or receive congressional approval for any of
these deployments, which made clear, if earlier aid had not, that
the United States was no longer a true neutral. Still, Congress
retained ample checks on presidential power. FDR could send
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only 4000 Marines to Iceland because of the small size of the
regular armed forces, and he could not send any of the new
draftees because Congress had attached a provision to the
conscription act forbidding their deployment outside the Western
Hemisphere.255 Congress had also limited the terms of service of
the 900,000 draftees to one year, requiring FDR to go to Congress
to win an extension.256 Even with America occupying Iceland and
Greenland and escorting ships in the North Atlantic, only fifty-one
percent of Americans supported the draft extension, and Congress
narrowly approved it.257
Meanwhile, FDR pursued measures to check Japan’s
expansion and perhaps provoke it into a conflict. Japan had been
waging war in China since the 1931 Manchuria crisis and had
launched an invasion to conquer the whole nation in 1937.
Japanese military and civilian leaders sought to create a
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” that would supply the
raw materials for the Japanese economy and the war in China.258
In 1940, Japan had intensified its attacks in China and had
moved into Indochina. In September 1940, it entered into the
Axis agreement with Germany and Italy.259
Roosevelt launched a campaign of economic warfare, without
reliance on legal authority. In July 1940, for example, FDR
blocked aviation gasoline exports to Japan.260 Chiang Kai-shek
had sent an urgent message to Roosevelt that without more aid,
the Nationalist Chinese resistance to Japan would fail.261 FDR
responded by banning the export of iron and steel to Japan. In
November, he sent $100 million and 100 warplanes to the
Chinese Nationalist government, and in the Spring he authorized
volunteers—Colonel Chennault’s Flying Tigers—to fly fighters
for China.262 FDR had never found China and Japan to be at war
under the 1939 Neutrality Act, so he had no statutory authority
to impose the materials embargo on Japan or to send money and
arms to China.263 Roosevelt simply undertook the actions as
president in order to protect the national security.
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Japan’s expansion south toward Indochina and Thailand
increased the potential for conflict. On July 26, 1941, FDR
ordered a freeze of Japanese assets in the United States, reduced
U.S. oil exports to pre-war levels, and prohibited the sale
of high-octane aircraft gasoline to Japan.264 By mistake,
administrators executed a complete oil embargo against Japan,
which FDR did nothing to correct. FDR opened negotiations to
reach a settlement with the Japanese government, though he
knew because of American code-breaking success that Tokyo was,
at the least, considering an attack on American, British, and
Dutch possessions in Asia.
Some historians believe that FDR’s goal was to hold off
Japan while resources could be devoted against the dire
challenge in Europe—a view held by many of his military and
civilian advisors. Marc Trachtenberg, however, has convincingly
argued that FDR deliberately painted the Japanese into a
corner.265 In the course of negotiations, Roosevelt demanded that
Tokyo end its war in China in exchange for a resumption of U.S.
oil and steel exports, yet FDR and his advisors knew that Japan
would not willingly give up its territorial gains in China. “[T]he
United States had been waging preventive economic warfare
against Imperial Japan for at least 18 months prior to Pearl
Harbor,” Colin Gray writes.266 “U.S. measures of economic
blockade left Japan with no alternative to war consistent with its
sense of national honor. The oil embargo eventually would
literally immobilize the Japanese Navy. So Washington
confronted Tokyo with the unenviable choice between de facto
complete political surrender of its ambitions in China, or war.”267
As FDR squeezed Japan, he expanded political and military
assistance to the British. On August 9th, he met Churchill in
Placentia Bay, off Newfoundland, where the two leaders issued
the Atlantic Charter.268 It declared Anglo-American principles in
the war to be: no Anglo-American aggrandizement, opposition to
undemocratic changes in territory, self-government for all
peoples, equal access to trade and natural resources,
international economic cooperation, a guarantee of security and
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freedom to all nations, freedom of the seas, disarmament of
aggressors and reduction in armaments, and plans for a
collective system of international security.269 During the
discussions, FDR made clear to Churchill his desire to bring the
United States into the war by forcing an incident with
Germany,270 and set out to make his wish come true by ordering
full naval escorts for British convoys between the United States
and Iceland, which put the Germans in the position of either
firing on U.S. warships or conceding the Battle of the Atlantic.
Without input from Congress, FDR had joined together the fates
of the United States and Britain.
An undeclared shooting war soon broke out. On September
4th, a German submarine fired on the destroyer USS Greer,
which FDR used to publicly justify “shoot-on-sight” orders for
naval escorts in the Atlantic.271 Only later did Congress learn
that the Greer had been hunting the submarine with British
airplanes and had dropped depth charges on the Germans. FDR
declared the Nazis to be the equivalent of modern-day pirates
and compared German subs and commerce raiders to
“rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.”272 As he put it, “when you see a
rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck
before you crush him.”273
FDR won broad support for the Navy’s new rules of
engagement in the Atlantic, but at the price of deliberately
deceiving the public about the facts.274 He followed with an
October speech claiming that captured Nazi plans envisioned the
division of North and South America into five dependent states
and the abolition of the freedom of religion.275 The shooting war
led to German submarine attacks on two American destroyers,
the USS Kearny and the USS Reuben James, with the deaths of
eleven and 115 sailors, respectively.276 FDR responded by seeking
amendment of the neutrality laws to allow merchantmen to arm
and carry goods directly to British ports.
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The changes passed Congress by small majorities because
about seventy percent of the public told pollsters they opposed
American entry into the war.277 FDR concluded that the public,
influenced by the memory of the way Wilson had led the country
into World War I, would not rally behind a war waged in
response to these isolated incidents. Rising tensions with Japan,
however, provided other opportunities. After the Atlantic
Conference, FDR informed the Japanese ambassador that any
further expansion in Southeast Asia would force him to take any
and all measures necessary “toward insuring the safety and
security of the United States.”278 FDR’s attempts at a negotiated
solution were, perhaps, less than genuine. He offered to
undertake formal negotiations with Prince Konoye, the Japanese
Prime Minister, only if Japan suspended its “expansionist
activities” and openly declared its intentions in the Pacific.279
FDR asked that Japan terminate the Axis alliance, withdraw
from China, and open up its trading system. He consciously
demanded terms he knew that the Japanese were unlikely
to accept.
Japanese cabinet meetings on September 3rd through 6th
concluded that unless the government reached a settlement with
the United States by October, its military would attack
American, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia.280 Tokyo
decided its terms must include the freedom to conclude matters
in China, an end to Anglo-American military action in the
Pacific, and secure access to raw materials for the economy. FDR
refused to negotiate on these conditions and instead ordered the
reinforcement of the Philippines. By October 15th, FDR and his
advisors believed that they needed more “diplomatic fencing” to
create the image “that Japan was put into the wrong and made
the first bad move—overt move.”281
Thanks to electronic intercepts of Japanese communications,
FDR knew that the Japanese would attack if no settlement were
reached, and he tried to string out negotiations to give the armed
forces time to strengthen its position in the Philippines. On
November 24, 1941, FDR discussed with his advisors the chances
of a Japanese sneak attack and asked “how we should maneuver
them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too
much danger to ourselves.”282 He also told the British that he
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would respond to any attack on their possessions in Asia. Still,
FDR realized that without an enemy attack on the United States,
his other measures would not convince the American people to
support entry into World War II.
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese solved FDR’s
conundrum.283 No evidence supports the theories that FDR knew
that Pearl Harbor was the target, nor that he willfully ignored
the possibility of devastating losses to the Pacific Fleet. FDR did
not consciously know about any specific attack on the United
States—rather, he placed the Japanese in the position of
choosing between war and giving up their imperial ambitions in
China and the rest of the Pacific. The most that can be said is
that if war were to come, FDR had tried for more than a year to
maneuver the Axis powers into firing a first shot, while
preparing the armed forces and American public for that
eventuality. Pearl Harbor guaranteed the unity of the American
people, just as Fort Sumter had eight decades before. As FDR
told the American people the next day, December 7th was a “day
which would live in infamy,” and he asked Congress for a
declaration of war, which it promptly granted.284
Hitler further obliged by declaring war on the United States
three days later. FDR exercised foresighted leadership in
recognizing the Axis threat to the United States and the free
nations of the West. But faced with a recalcitrant Congress and a
reluctant public, FDR had to use his constitutional powers to
move the nation into a war that he knew, as perhaps no one else
did, was in the country’s best interests. If he had faithfully
obeyed the Neutrality Acts, American entry into the war might
have been delayed by months, if not years. A president who
viewed his constitutional authorities as narrowed to executing
the will of Congress might well have lost World War II.
III. WARTIME CIVIL LIBERTIES
It is commonplace today to read the argument that war
reduces civil liberties too much. We can gain a useful perspective
on the question by examining Roosevelt’s wartime measures.
FDR responded to the devastating Pearl Harbor attack with
domestic policies, such as the use of military commissions, the
internment of Japanese-Americans, and the widespread use of
electronic surveillance. As in the Civil War, the federal courts
deferred to the political branches until the war ended, and
Congress went along with the president for the most part.
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A.

Military Commissions
Military commissions are a form of tribunal used to try
captured members of the enemy for violations of the laws of war.
American generals have used them from the Revolutionary War
through World War II, and, as we have seen, the Lincoln
administration deployed them during the Civil War to try
Confederate spies, irregular guerrillas, and sympathizers.
Military commissions are neither created nor regulated by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is enacted by Congress
and governs courts-martial; instead, they were established by
presidents as Commander-in-Chief and by military commanders
in the field.285
World War II witnessed the use of military commissions on a
par with the Civil War, but primarily for the administration of
postwar justice. While the Nuremburg trials were the most well
known, military commissions heard charges of war crimes
against many former German and Japanese leaders at the end of
the war. But the first commission was set up well before those,
more famous examples, to hear the case of “The Nazi Saboteurs.”
In June 1942, eight German agents covertly landed in Long
Island and Florida with plans to attack factories, transportation
facilities, and utility plants.286 All had lived in the United States
before the war, and two were American citizens. One of them
turned informer; after initially dismissing his story, the FBI
arrested the plotters and revealed their capture by the end of
June.287 Members of Congress and the media demanded the
death penalty, even though no statutory provision established
capital punishment for non-U.S. citizens.288
Roosevelt wanted a trial outside the civilian judicial system.
On June 30th, he wrote to his Attorney General, Francis Biddle
(Jackson having been elevated to the Supreme Court), supporting
the idea of using military courts because “[t]he death penalty is
called for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war aim
and the very existence of our American Government.”289
Roosevelt already thought they were guilty, and the punishment
was not in doubt: “Surely they are just as guilty as it is possible
to be . . . and it seems to me that the death penalty is almost
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obligatory.”290 Two days earlier, Biddle and Secretary of War
Henry Stimson had worried that the plot was not far enough
along to win a conviction with a significant sentence—perhaps
two years at most. Stimson was surprised that Biddle was “quite
ready to turn them over to a military court” and learned
that Justice Felix Frankfurter also believed a military
court preferable.291
On June 30th, Biddle wrote to Roosevelt summarizing the
advantages of a military commission.292 It would be speedier and
easier to prove violations of the laws of war, and the death
penalty would be available. Biddle also believed that using a
military commission would prevent the defendants from seeking
a writ of habeas corpus. “All the prisoners . . . can thus be denied
access to our courts.”293 He did not commit to writing another
important consideration: secrecy. According to Stimson, Biddle
favored a military commission because the evidence would not
become public, particularly that the Nazis had infiltrated U.S.
lines with ease and had been captured only with the help of an
informant.294 Biddle recommended that FDR issue executive
orders establishing the commission, defining the crimes,
appointing its members, and excluding judicial review.295
On July 2, 1942, Roosevelt issued two executive orders.296
The first created the commission and gave it the authority to try
any “subjects, citizens, or residents of any nation at war with the
United States,” who attempt to “enter the United States or any
territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary
defenses,” with an effort to “commit sabotage, espionage, hostile
or warlike acts, or violations of the law or war.”297 The
commission would try the defendants for violations of the laws of
war, which mostly took the form of unwritten custom. FDR
prohibited any appeals to the civilian courts, unless the Secretary
of War and the Attorney General consented.298 His second order,
in one paragraph, established the rules of procedure. The
military judges were to hold a “full and fair trial” and could
admit any evidence that would “have probative value to a
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reasonable man.”299 The concurrence of two-thirds of the judges
was required for sentencing, and any appeals had to run directly
to the President himself.300
As structured by FDR, the commissions subjected the Nazi
saboteurs to a form of justice very different from that normally
applied in civilian courts. The most striking departure was the
absence of a jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution. Neither civilian criminal procedure nor the normal
rules of evidence applied, and FDR made no allowances for a
right to legal counsel, a right to remain silent, or a right of
appeal. Another important difference was that the laws of war,
which at that time remained mostly unwritten, would define the
crimes. Unlike the civilian system, which requires that the
government prosecute defendants for crimes that are clearly
defined and written, the saboteurs would be charged with war
crimes upon which even legal experts would struggle to agree.
FDR’s order was of uncertain constitutionality under the law
of the day. At that time, the governing case was still Ex parte
Milligan. Milligan held that the government had to use civilian
courts when the defendant was not a member of the enemy
armed forces and the courts were “open to hear criminal
accusations and redress grievances.”301 FDR created military
commissions to avoid Milligan, to charge the defendants with
violations of the laws of war, and to preclude any form of judicial
review. Military counsel for the Nazi saboteurs challenged the
constitutionality of the trial on the ground that courts were open,
the defendants were not in a war zone, violations of the laws of
war were not subject to prosecution under federal law. Military
commissions, they argued, violated the Articles of War enacted
by Congress.302
FDR was undeterred when the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the defendants’ case. As the Justices gathered in conference
before oral argument, Justice Roberts reported that Biddle was
worried that FDR would order the execution of the saboteurs
regardless of the Court’s decision. Chief Justice Stone, whose son
was working on the defense team, said “[t]hat would be
a dreadful thing.”303 While Stone did not recuse himself,
Justice Murphy—who was in uniform as a member of the army

299 Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy: Appointment of a Military
Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942).
300 See id.; see also FISHER, supra note 285, at 99–100.
301 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121–22 (1866).
302 Danelski, supra note 288, at 68–69.
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reserve—did.304 Justice Byrnes, who had been serving as an
informal advisor to the administration, did not. Biddle himself
argued the case and urged the Court to overrule Milligan, but
after two days of oral argument, the Justices decided to uphold
the military commission.305 The great pressure on the Court is
reflected in its decision to deliver a brief per curiam opinion the
day after oral argument, with an opinion to follow months later.
Commission proceedings began the day after the Supreme
Court issued its order. The commission convicted and sentenced
the defendants to death in three days.306 Five days later, FDR
approved the verdict but commuted the sentences of two
defendants.307 Roosevelt’s two executive orders remained the only
guidance for the commission on the rules of procedures and the
definition of the substantive crimes. There was no written
explanation, for example, of the elements of the violations of the
laws of war, nor were procedures given, aside from the votes
required for conviction and the admission of evidence.
When the Supreme Court finally issued its opinion, it
carefully distinguished Milligan.308 Chief Justice Stone’s
unanimous opinion for the Court found that Milligan applied to a
civilian who had never associated himself with the enemy.309 The
Nazi saboteurs, by contrast, had clearly joined the German
armed forces. Neither the Bill of Rights nor the separation of
powers barred FDR from using military courts during wartime
to try enemy combatants. Congressional creation of the courts
martial system and the absence of any criminal provisions
to punish violations of the laws of war presented no
serious obstacle. Chief Justice Stone read the Article of War
recognizing the concurrent jurisdiction of military commissions
as congressional blessing for their existence.310 The Justices
decided not to address the issue that had divided them
behind the scenes—whether Congress could require the president
to provide the saboteurs with any trial at all, civilian or
military—because they did not read any congressional enactment
as prohibiting military commissions.311 If the United States was at
war, and it captured members of the enemy armed forces, it could
try the prisoners for war crimes outside the civilian or court
martial systems.
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B.

Detention
In the wake of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt ordered
sweeping military detentions that, in absolute numbers, far
eclipsed Lincoln’s policies in the Civil War. After the Japanese
attack and the German and Italian declarations of war, FDR
authorized the Departments of War and Justice to intern
German, Japanese, and Italian citizens in the United States. In
February 1942, for example, the government detained
approximately 3000 Japanese aliens.312 Detention of the citizens
of an enemy nation had long been a normal aspect of the rules of
war, and was authorized by the Alien Enemies Act (on the books
since 1798).313 That same month, FDR went even further and
authorized the detention of American citizens suspected of
disloyalty. On February 19, 1942, FDR signed Executive Order
9066, allowing the Secretary of War to designate parts of the
country as military zones “from which any or all persons may be
excluded.”314 By the end of 1942, the government moved 110,000
Japanese-Americans to ten internment camps because of the
possibility that they might provide aid to the enemy.315 Recent
historical work suggests that Roosevelt took a far more
active role in the detention decision than has been
commonly understood.316
There was substantial disagreement within the military and
the administration on the internments.317 General John DeWitt,
commander of the Fourth Army on the West Coast, initially
opposed the mass evacuations of Japanese-Americans, as did
officials in the Justice Department and several prominent White
House aides, but by late January 1942, thinking had changed.318
A popular movement on the West Coast demanded removal of the
Japanese-Americans to the nation’s interior. This sentiment
gathered momentum as the United States suffered a string of
military defeats in the Pacific. The precipitating factor in the
eventual internment decision appears to be the release of the
Roberts Commission report on the Pearl Harbor attacks.319 While
the commission only briefly mentioned that some Japanese in the
312 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES 19 (1983).
313 See Alien Enemies Act, c. 66, §1, 1 Stat. 577 (July 6, 1978).
314 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
315 IRONS, supra note 312, at vii.
316 See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS 79, 92–95, 98–99, 104, 106–07, 127 (2003).
317 See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 312, at 29–30, 33–35; ROBINSON, supra note 316, at
76–78, 85–86; ERIK YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS & REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 100 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 2001).
318 See ROBINSON, supra note 316, at 3.
319 Id. at 95.
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Hawaiian Islands, along with Japanese consular officials, had
provided intelligence on military installations before the attacks,
the public response was tremendous. The Roberts Commission
report “attracted national attention and transformed public
opinion on Japanese Americans.”320 Newspapers, California
political leaders, and military officials demanded that the
Roosevelt administration intern Japanese-Americans out of fear
of further sabotage and espionage.321 Some in the War
Department discounted the effect of espionage on the West Coast,
and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover dismissed claims of disloyalty.
Cabinet members raised the issue twice with the President
before the final executive order. Biddle met FDR for lunch in
early February 1942 to express doubts about the need for
internment. While FDR did not make a decision at that time, he
concluded the lunch by saying he was “fully aware of the dreadful
risk of Fifth Column retaliation in case of a raid.”322 A few days
later, Stimson called Roosevelt after learning that General
DeWitt would recommend removal of Japanese-Americans on the
West Coast.323 News that Singapore had fallen arrived the
day before Stimson’s call, making it unlikely that FDR would
second-guess claims of military necessity. Nonetheless,
Stimson—who had his own doubts about the necessity and
legality of the evacuations—proposed three options: massive
evacuation, evacuation from major cities, or evacuation from
areas surrounding military facilities.324 Roosevelt responded that
Stimson should do what he thought best, and that he would sign
an executive order giving the War Department the authority to
carry out the removals.325 DeWitt soon found the evacuations
necessary on security grounds, and Stimson and Biddle agreed on
a draft of the executive order based on Roosevelt’s constitutional
authorities as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.326 It
appears that FDR’s decision rested solely on the military’s claim
of wartime necessity.
Several scholars have observed that Roosevelt was not
vigilant in protecting civil liberties, and in this case, according to
one biographer, the decision was easy for him.327 FDR believed
that the military “had primary direct responsibility for the
achievement of war victory, the achievement of war victory had
320
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top priority, and ‘victory’ had for him a single simple meaning” of
defeating Germany and Japan; victory, for Roosevelt, “was
prerequisite to all else.”328 There was no great outcry from liberal
leaders, there was no cabinet meeting or forum for debate within
the administration, and the Attorney General came to agree with
the War Department that the measure was legal. Recent
historical work argues that the internment decision did not arise
solely because of misinformation about Japanese-Americans or
the pressure of events early in the war.329 The internments
happened, in part, because FDR was ready to believe the worst
about the potential disloyalty of Japanese-Americans.330
Presidential consultation with Congress did not improve
national security decision-making. Both Congress and the Court
approved FDR’s actions. In March 1942, Congress passed a bill
establishing criminal penalties for those who refused to obey the
evacuation orders.331 Support for the law was so broad that it was
approved in both the House and Senate by voice vote with only a
single speech, by Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio,
in opposition.
The Supreme Court did not directly address the
constitutionality of the detentions until Korematsu v. United
States, decided on December 18, 1944.332 According to the Court,
the mass evacuation triggered “strict” scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause because it discriminated on the basis of race.333
Nonetheless, the Court agreed that these wartime security
measures advanced a compelling government interest, and the
Court deferred to the military’s judgment of necessity. According
to Justice Black’s 6–3 majority opinion, “[the court was] unable to
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the
Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast war area at the time they did.”334 While not disputing the
deprivation of individual liberty involved, the majority
recognized that “the military authorities, charged with the
primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded that
curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion.”335
As with an earlier case upholding a nighttime curfew on
Japanese-Americans in the western military region, the Court
concluded, “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
328
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military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal
members of that population, whose number and strength could
not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”336
The Court’s majority stressed that the Constitution afforded
leeway to the executive branch during time of emergency.337
Justice Black agreed that while the government generally could
not detain citizens based solely on their race, such motivation
was not present in the instant case. The exclusion order was
necessary, Black wrote, because “the properly constituted
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast,” and
their judgment was that “the military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
from the West Coast temporarily[.]”338 Although it observed that
Congress supported the military’s power “as inevitably it must”
during wartime, the Court attached no special importance to
the authorization.339
The press of circumstances required deference to military
judgment. “There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some,
the military authorities considered that the need for action was
great, and time was short.”340 Perhaps most important, Justice
Black concluded that decisions taken during the emergency itself
had to be understood in light of the information known at the
time. “We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective
of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions
were unjustified.”341
Korematsu remains one of the most criticized decisions in
American history, considered second only to Dred Scott on the list
of the Court’s biggest mistakes. The three dissenters believed
that the Constitution clearly protected Japanese-American
citizens from what we today would call racial profiling. The
government, Justice Roberts wrote, was “convicting a citizen as a
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a
concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of
his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty
and good disposition towards the United States.”342 The
dissenters did not challenge the proposition that “sudden danger”
might require the suspension of a citizen’s right to free
movement, or that the Court owed the military broad deference
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during wartime, but that the chosen hypothetical did not
represent the true facts of the case. Any “immediate, imminent,
and impending” threat to public safety was absent.343 Justice
Murphy wrote in dissent that “this forced exclusion was the
result in good measure of [an] erroneous assumption of racial
guilt rather than bona fide military necessity.”344 The dissenters
pointed out that the government presented no reliable evidence
that Japanese-Americans were generally disloyal or had done
anything that made them a threat to the national defense.
The exclusion order relied simply on unproven racial and
sociological stereotypes.
Justice Jackson used his dissent to harmonize the role of the
executive and the courts during wartime. “It would be
impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that
each specific military command in an area of probable operations
will conform to conventional tests of constitutionality.”345 For a
Commander-in-Chief and the military, “the paramount
consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than
legal.”346 In words that echoed Lincoln and Jefferson, Jackson
declared that the “armed services must protect a society, not
merely its Constitution,” and observed that “defense measures
will not, and often should not, be held within the limits that bind
civil authority in peace.”347 That said, Jackson did not want to
provide constitutional legitimacy to the exclusion order. There
might be no limit to what military necessity would allow when
courts are institutionally incapable of second-guessing the
decisions of military authorities. “But if we cannot confine
military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort
the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem
expedient.”348 Upholding the Japanese-American internment
would create a dangerous precedent for the future. “The principle
then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need.”349 A one-time-only action is only an “incident,” but once
upheld by the Court, it becomes “the doctrine of the
Constitution.”350 In a solution many have found unsatisfying,
Jackson wanted the Court neither to bless nor block the
military’s enforcement of the exclusion.
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Historical research has revealed that some government
officials doubted whether any real security threat justified the
exclusion order. Nonetheless, the Justice Department chose in
Korematsu to assert that military authorities believed the
evacuations necessary because of an alleged threat against the
West Coast. A companion case, Ex parte Endo, however, found
that the government could not detain a Japanese-American
citizen whom the government had conceded was “loyal and
law-abiding.”351 To this day, the debate over the necessity of the
measures continues, but regardless of which side one falls on in
that debate, it seems clear that the internment of the JapaneseAmericans in Korematsu represents a far more serious
infringement of civil liberties than that which occurred in the
Civil War. The first and most obvious difference is one of
magnitude. FDR interned—without trial—about 110,000
Japanese-Americans on suspicion of disloyalty to the United
States.352 Lincoln ordered the detention of about 12,600.353
The second difference is one of justification. FDR ordered the
detention of the Japanese-Americans not because any had been
found to be enemy combatants. They were interned because of
their potential threat due to loyalty to an enemy nation imputed
from their ethnic ancestry. FDR could have pursued a narrower
policy that detained individuals based on their individual ties to
a nation with which the United States was at war. The citizens of
Japan, Germany, and Italy could be interned as a matter of
course, and anyone fighting or working for the enemy, regardless
of citizenship, could be detained. With regard to aliens, FDR
could have relied upon the Alien Enemies Act to detain natives or
citizens of a hostile nation during wartime.354 FDR’s internment
policy did neither—instead, it presumed disloyalty, sweeping
in 110,000 American’s of Japanese ancestry based solely on
their ethnicity.
C.

Electronic Surveillance
Roosevelt has been described by one historian as
the president most interested in covert activity other than
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Washington, who personally managed spies and directed the
interception of British communications. During World War I,
Roosevelt had served as assistant secretary of the Navy, with
responsibility for intelligence. During World War II, his
interest in covert operations led to the establishment of the
Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central
Intelligence Agency.355
Less well known are Roosevelt’s actions with regard to the
interception of electronic communications. The Administration
initially had not engaged in any wiretapping for national
security purposes, as Attorney General Jackson believed that
electronic surveillance without a warrant violated the Federal
Communications Act of 1934.356 In March 1940, he issued
an order prohibiting the FBI from intercepting electronic
communications without a warrant. As Europe plunged into war,
however, J. Edgar Hoover grew increasingly concerned about the
possibility of Axis spies within the United States. Aware of
Jackson’s order, Hoover went to Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau and asked him to speak to Roosevelt to authorize
the interception of the communications of potential foreign
agents who might sympathize with Germany.357
Roosevelt had long been concerned with the potential threat
of a “fifth column” inside the United States. The spectacular 1916
sabotage of an American munitions plant remained vivid in his
memory. As early as 1936, Roosevelt authorized the FBI to
investigate “subversive activities in this country, including
communism and fascism.”358 When World War II broke out,
Roosevelt ordered the Bureau to “take charge of investigative
work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of
neutrality regulations,” and commanded state and local law
enforcement officers to “promptly turn over” to the FBI any
information “relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,
subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.”359
What “subversive activities” meant was left undefined.
France’s collapse in May 1940 had a profound effect. At the
time, Germany’s smashing victory seemed inexplicable as a feat
of arms alone, lending credence to the theory that collaborators
355 CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLIGENCE
AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 6–9, 76 (1996).
356 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
357 See Richard Caplan & Neal Katyal, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the
Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023,
1049–50 (2008).
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and spies were also responsible. Roosevelt increasingly spoke of
his concern that the United States, too, might suffer from Axis
sympathizers or covert agents’ intent on undermining its war
preparations. Even before Hoover came to make his request, FDR
had encouraged amateur surveillance efforts. His friend,
publisher, and real estate developer, Vincent Astor, had set up a
private group he had called “the Room,” which included leading
figures in New York City.360 As a director of the Western Union
Telegraph Company, Astor ordered the covert interception of
telegrams.361 He and his friends also arranged for the monitoring
of radio transmissions in New York. Using its connections, the
group gathered the private banking records of companies
connected to foreign nations to determine whether they were
supporting espionage within the United States.362 While there is
no direct record of a presidential order authorizing this
surveillance, historical evidence suggests that the group was
acting in response to a request by Roosevelt.363
Given his suspicions, Roosevelt quickly agreed with
Morgenthau and Hoover that the wiretapping of suspected Axis
agents or collaborators was necessary to protect national
security. The next day, he issued a memorandum to Jackson to
allow the FBI to wiretap individuals who posed a potential threat
to the national security.364 After Pearl Harbor, FDR released the
handbrake and authorized the interception of all international
communications. Even though some Justices had criticized
wiretapping, the Court held in 1928 in Olmstead v. United
States, that the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to
intercept electronic communications.365 It would not be until
1967, in Katz v. United States, that the Supreme Court would
hold that electronic communications were entitled to Fourth
Amendment privacy protections.366
Congress, however, appeared to have prohibited the
interception of electronic communications in the Federal
Communications Act of 1934. It declared that “no person” who
receives or transmits “any interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio” can “divulge or publish” its contents except
through “authorized channels of transmission” or to the
recipient.367 In United States v. Nardone, decided in 1937, the
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Supreme Court interpreted this language to prohibit wiretapping
by the government as well as by private individuals.368 In
a second Nardone case, the Court made clear that the
government could not introduce in court any evidence gathered
from wiretapping.369
FDR recognized that his wiretapping order of May 1940
violated the text of the statute, or at least the Supreme Court’s
reading of it, but the President claimed that the Supreme Court
could not have intended “any dictum in the particular case which
it decided to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the
nation.”370 Administration supporters in Congress introduced
legislation to legalize wiretapping, but the House rejected the bill
154–147.371 FDR continued the interception program throughout
the war despite the Federal Communications Act and Nardone.
FDR’s pre-war interception order applied to anyone “suspected of
subversive activities” against the U.S. government, which
included individuals who might be sympathetic to, or even
working for, Germany and Japan.372 At that time, however, the
United States was not yet at war. While FDR wanted the FBI to
limit the interceptions to the calls of aliens, his order did not
exclude citizens. Most importantly, it was not limited only to
international calls or telegrams, but included communications
that took place wholly within the United States.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
War and emergency demand that presidents exercise their
constitutional powers far more broadly than in peacetime. That
was never more true than under President Franklin Roosevelt.
FDR tackled the Great Depression by treating it as a domestic
emergency that called for the centralization of power in the
federal government and the presidency. But he could not act
alone, because the Constitution gives Congress the authority to
regulate the economy and create the federal agencies. Under
Roosevelt’s direction, Congress enacted sweeping legislation
vesting almost complete power over industry and agriculture in
the executive branch, which repeatedly sought to centralize
power over the plethora of New Deal agencies in the presidency.
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Roosevelt responded to the looming threat of fascism by
bringing the United States into World War II, and he made all
the significant decisions of foreign and domestic policy once the
war began. Historians rarely, if ever, mention any role for
Congress in the prosecution of the war against Germany and
Japan, aside from the provision of money and arms. It was the
President, for example, who decided that the United States
would allocate its resources to seek victory in Europe first, and
Roosevelt alone who declared that the Allies would demand
unconditional surrender as the only way to end the war.
FDR, not Congress, made the critical decisions about the
shape of the postwar world. He wanted a world policed by four
major countries: the United States, Great Britain, China, and the
Soviet Union. He agreed with Great Britain and the Soviet Union
to divide Germany—the “German question” was the fundamental
strategic problem at the root of both World Wars. At Yalta, FDR
agreed that the Soviet Union would control a sphere of influence
extending over Eastern Europe, and in return, those nations
would be allowed to hold democratic elections.
While some believe that Stalin had hoodwinked him, FDR
may have recognized the reality of the balance of power in
Europe after the war. He may have hoped that his
reasonableness in agreeing to Stalin’s demands would win, in
exchange, Soviet support of the United Nations. Roosevelt also
demanded that Britain and France give up their colonies. FDR
wanted to forestall a return to both the isolationism and the
international disorder of the interwar period. Historians argue
today whether Roosevelt truly believed in collective security, or
whether he was a realist who accepted the balance of power at
the end of World War II. Either way, it was the President who
took the initiative to set the policy, although it was one where he
could not act alone. Without the Senate’s approval, the United
Nations would have gone the way of the League of Nations.
Too often, we focus on mistakes of commission—a
decision to go to war gone bad, or a law that has unintended
consequences—known as Type I errors. FDR showed that the
presidency may be far more effective than the other branches in
preventing a failure to take action—errors of omission, or Type II
errors. Left to its own devices, Congress would have blocked aid
to the Allies and delayed American entry into World War II by
several months, if not years. This may be a result of the internal
structure of Congress, which suffers from, at times crippling,
collective action problems. The passage of legislation through
both Houses with many members is fraught with such difficulty
that the Constitution can be understood to favor inaction and,
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therefore, maintenance of the status quo. The status quo may be
best for a nation when it enjoys peace and prosperity, where
threats come more often from ill-advised efforts at reform or
revolutionary change. But maintaining the status quo may harm
the nation when long-term threats are approaching, or
unanticipated opportunities present themselves and must be
seized rapidly before vanishing.
In the area of domestic affairs, whether the New Deal or
internal security programs, Roosevelt worked hand-in-hand with
Congress. He had to: the Great Depression’s economic nature
brought it squarely within the enumerated powers of Congress.
Nevertheless, the emergency of the Depression illuminated the
natural advantages of presidential leadership in the legislative
process. A complex economy beset by a mysterious, but
dangerous, ailment required administrative expertise for a cure,
and Congress willingly cooperated by transferring massive
legislative authority to the agencies.
FDR deserves praised for trying every reasonable idea,
including this transformation of executive-legislative relations, to
reverse the sickening drop in economic activity. Crucially,
neither he, nor anyone else, affirmatively knew how to end the
Depression. Only now do we know that the New Deal, combined
with the Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policy and the
government’s restrictive fiscal policies, prolonged the Great
Depression itself. Rather, it was World War II, not the New Deal,
which ended the persistent unemployment levels of the 1930s.
When the smoke cleared in 1945, the New Deal’s true legacy
endured in the form of bloated, independent bureaucracies that
future presidents would struggle to control. Plainly, presidential
cooperation with Congress provides no guarantee of success, and,
in fact, can prove quite malignant.
Throughout FDR’s astounding presidency, a theme unites
both his success in foreign policy and the appearance of such in
domestic policy. FDR believed deeply in the independence of the
presidency and a vigorous use of its constitutional authorities. He
did not shrink from constitutional confrontations with the other
branches. To pursue the policies he believed to be in the national
interest such confrontation was often required. He openly
disagreed with the Supreme Court’s limitations on the New Deal
and publicly sought to manipulate its membership. He pushed
his powers as Commander-in-Chief beyond their perceived limits,
refusing to abide by the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of the
Neutrality Acts in order to involve the United States in a war
that neither Congress nor a clear majority of Americans favored.
FDR correctly judged the threat to the nation’s existence posed
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by the rise of fascism. The nation and the world are better off
today because he pushed a reluctant nation into war. His broad
understanding of his executive powers created the foundation for
policies that secured freedom in the twentieth century.
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